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Abstract 
The history of women in Britain's armed forces is dominated by wartime 
participation and, latterly, explanations of wider employment of servicewomen in 
the 1990s. Women's service is mainly attributed to lessening the need for men. 
Reasons suggested for 1990s' developments have included social factors, 
technology, servicewomen's career aspirations and policy-makers' attitudes. 
However, army issues overshadow accounts that emerge from the other Services. 
 
When regular service was introduced, women were excluded from seagoing, flying 
and weapons' training. Terms of service on marriage and pregnancy ensured careers 
were long-term opportunities only for childless women. This thesis accounts for how 
the reputedly egalitarian Royal Air Force (RAF) integrated its servicewomen, 
expanding their employment into armed guard duties and flying 'non-combat' 
aircraft, while asserting that women's exclusion from combat was upheld. This 
contrasted with the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS). As a separate, shore-
based organisation, it illustrated the conservative approach taken by the naval 
authorities. Yet it was the Royal Navy (RN) that opened main combat roles to 
women first.  
 
This thesis argues that the Admiralty reluctantly established a peacetime WRNS in 
response to Air Ministry and War Office policy. It restricted women's employment 
until failure to adjust to social change led to a personnel crisis in the late 1980s. 
Unable to follow the RAF's piecemeal widening of women's roles, seagoing in 
warships was approved in 1990, overturning women's exclusion from main combat 
roles. RAF combat jet flying followed as a consequence. However, for the vast 
majority of airwomen, the 1982 decision to introduce weapons' training made them 
as combatant as male counterparts. Exclusion from land warfare continued; the RN 
and the RAF followed the army's lead. The armed forces' right to be different from 
civilian maternity policy succumbed to legal challenge rather than commitment to 
modernising terms of employment.   
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In 2007, Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold recalled that, as captain of HMS Brilliant in 
1990, he had 'developed a view that the warriors in a ship sat at workstations using 
computers, controlling weapons.  ... in the surface Navy there would be no reason 
whatsoever for women not to have any of the jobs.'1 The frigate, the first to have 
female sailors on its complement, deployed to the Gulf War in January 1991. Flight 
Lieutenant Jo Salter, the first woman to qualify as a ground attack pilot, described 
joining 617 Squadron to fly Tornado jets, becoming 'combat ready' in 1994 and 
patrolling the 'no-fly zone' over the north of Iraq.2 These developments were well 
beyond the original intentions of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry for the 
employment of servicewomen. Having women on 617 Squadron, famous for the 
Ruhr dams bombing in 1943, or in HMS Brilliant, with its battle honours of the 
English Channel (1940-45), the Atlantic (1941-3) and North Africa (1942), would 
have been unthinkable in the 1940s when retention of women in the armed forces 
was agreed. 
 
On the introduction of regular service in 1949, women were not employed in combat 
roles. Subsequently, for women in the Royal Air Force (RAF), there was a gradual 
erosion of exclusions: a small cohort gained aircrew status when their trade of air 
quartermaster was upgraded in 1962; weapons training was introduced in the early 
1980s; employment as rear crew in airborne early warning aircraft3 was approved in 
principle in 1984; pilot and navigator roles in unarmed aircraft were opened in 1989 
and in armed aircraft from December 1991. However, it was the Royal Navy (RN), 
in opening seagoing in warships from 1990 and flying in the Fleet Air Arm from 
July 1991, that allowed women to serve in main combat roles first. With exclusion 
from combat overturned, new boundaries for servicewomen's roles emerged in the 
early 1990s. Women could not serve in submarines or in land warfare. The Army's 
                                                 
1 Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, interviewed by the author, 18 Jun 2007, transcript p.3. Rank titles 
are listed at Appendix 1. Details of interviewees are at Appendix 2.  
2 Flight Lieutenant Jo Salter, interviewed by the author, 20 Sep 2007, transcript p.1 and p.14. Under 
this  'no-fly zone' policy, Iraq was denied use of its airspace over the north and south of its territory 
following the First Gulf War. 
3 The role of airborne early warning aircraft was to detect, track, identify and report aircraft. 
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infantry, armoured corps and artillery, and the equivalents of Royal Marines (RM) 
and RAF Regiment, remained closed to women.4  
 
In addition to restrictions on roles because of exclusion from combat, women's 
military careers were shaped by terms and conditions of service. These derived from 
both civilian and armed forces' norms. In particular, developments in employment of 
servicewomen must be understood in the context of policies on and attitudes towards 
marriage and pregnancy. In common with much public sector employment after the 
war, there was no formal marriage bar.5 However, policies on postings and 
accommodation created barriers to married life. In addition, women who married 
while in the Services had the right to leave at shorter notice than other personnel. 
Pregnant women were obliged to leave. While restrictions on married service were 
eased, dismissal on pregnancy was maintained until October 1990. 
 
The women's Services differed in their organisation as they had done in the Second 
World War. The Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) continued, as in wartime, 
as an entity separate from, and in shore-based support of, the Royal Navy. Although 
Wrens6 enjoyed the trappings of rank and uniforms, they did not come under 
military law until 1977, and so initially served as uniformed civilians. The Air 
Ministry intended the RAF to be integrated. Rather than persisting with its wartime 
separate service, from 1 February 1949 women were attested or commissioned into 
the RAF. The term 'Women's Royal Air Force' (WRAF) was intended for 
administrative purposes. The Women's Royal Army Corps (WRAC) was a half-way 
house between the WRAF and the WRNS. Like the former, women came under 
military law, but like the latter they were in a separate corps. As a consequence of 
wider employment, women transferred from the WRNS into the Royal Navy in 
November 1993. Reference to the 'WRAF' ceased in April 1994. Following 
decisions to open more support roles to women in the army, the WRAC was 
disbanded in April 1992. From that date, women joined other corps of the army. 
 
                                                 
4 The Royal Artillery was opened subsequently to women in 1998. 
5 For example, the marriage bar was abolished in the civil service in 1946. Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska (ed.), Women in Twentieth-Century Britain (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001), p.342.  
6 Women in the WRNS were commonly referred to as 'Wrens' and that term is used in this thesis. 
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This thesis explores why and how women were integrated into the RN and the RAF, 
from the establishment of regular service following the Second World War to the 
mid-1990s, by which time women were serving in main combat roles and reference 
to women's Services had ceased. In doing so, it identifies why regular service was 
introduced after the war and retained as the requirement for personnel subsequently 
declined. It investigates women's changing relationship to combat by establishing 
how acceptable employment of women was expanded, why the Royal Navy opened 
main combat roles before the Royal Air Force, why the new boundary line of 
servicewomen's employment was drawn at land warfare and submarine service, and 
the consequences of these changes for the WRNS and the WRAF. It examines 
relationships between armed forces' personnel policies and societal norms by 
determining developments in women's terms and conditions of service, regulations 
and attitudes towards marriage and pregnancy and how they affected women's 
careers. It explains to what extent the armed forces reacted to employment laws 
from which they were exempt.7 In addition, it establishes the significance of the 
differences in organisation and status of the WRNS and the WRAF, particularly in 
respect of the authority and influence exercised by their Directors.  
 
Scholarly accounts of the establishment of women's regular service are limited. 
However, Lucy Noakes has provided a history of why the War Office supported the 
retention of regular servicewomen after the Second World War. She quoted Lesley 
Whateley, Director of the ATS at the end of the war, as believing that continued 
service was a 'foregone conclusion'.8 However, Noakes contended that prospects for 
military careers 'must have appeared fairly fragile, as the government was reluctant 
to commit itself' to such a policy.9 Drawing on the speech made by George Isaacs 
(Minister for Labour and National Service) announcing in the House of Commons 
that regular service for women was to be introduced, she concluded that the decision 
to create a women's corps for the peacetime army was 'contingent on the military's 
need for men, in this case as a means of reducing the demands of an unpopular 
                                                 
7 For example, the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) which required equal treatment at work and in 
provision of goods and services, the Employment Protection Act (1975) which gave working women 
maternity leave rights, and the Social Security Act (1986) which introduced statutory maternity pay.  
8 Leslie Whateley, As Thoughts Survive (London: Hutchinson, 1949), quoted in Lucy Noakes, Women 
in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex, 1907-1948 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
p.146. 
9 Noakes, Women in the British Army, p.146. 
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policy of national service.'10 She noted that, as in the war, women were employed in 
a separate corps as 'the question of integrating the ATS into the regular army simply 
never arose.'11 She concluded that, as had been the case in the war, the purpose of 
employing women in the army was to 'support and replace men, freeing them for the 
higher status occupation of combat'.12  
 
Understandings of what constituted a 'combat role' and who was designated as 
'combatant' are essential to the history of women's Services. As a matter of principle, 
women were said to be non-combatant, as they had been during the Second World 
War. However, it is important to recognise that the nature and extent of servicemen's 
combatant duties differed between the Services. Characteristics of combat roles 
included responsibility for killing the enemy in direct or close contact (e.g. infantry 
action) or at a distance (e.g. air or naval action); risk of death, injury or capture; 
offensive action (seeking out the enemy); and defensive action (including defending 
a base area and self-defence).  
 
The Royal Navy used a concept described as 'all of one company'. All members of a 
ship's company were recognised as sharing risk and all sailors were regarded as 
being in combat roles, whatever their job aboard ship. Wrens, being excluded from 
ships' complements until 1990, were therefore not in combat roles. 
 
For the RAF, Cynthia Enloe's concept of a 'hierarchy of militarized masculinities' is 
particularly apposite.13 Pilots of fighter and ground attack jets (fast jets) were at the 
pinnacle, with higher status than crews of multi-engine aircraft and helicopters. 
Within fast jet squadrons, flying 'single-seat' aircraft (crewed only by a pilot rather 
than also having a navigator, as in other fast jets) afforded the greatest status. 
However, only a minority of RAF personnel were employed as aircrew. Most 
worked in 'ground trades'. They served predominantly at fixed bases that could be 
hundreds of miles away from the enemy's forces. Nevertheless, such bases were 
vulnerable to attack and they were defended by the RAF Regiment, akin to an army 
                                                 
10 Ibid, p.147.  
11 Ibid, p.149. 
12 Ibid, p.156. 
13 Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War, (London: 
University of California Press, 1993), p.56. 
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regiment. In the event of an attack, the Regiment could be supplemented by other 
RAF personnel from ground trades, trained to use small arms.14 Airmen's potential 
liability to undertake armed action in defence of their base, and women's exclusion 
from that task until the 1980s, was the basis for describing ground-based airmen as 
having combat roles and airwomen as not being employed in combat. Although 
women shared the risk of coming under attack, this was insufficient for them to be 
regarded as combatant. 
 
With the use of weapons in defence of a base being low in the combat hierarchy, 
there is a need to differentiate it from other types of combat. This thesis uses the 
term 'main combat roles' to describe seagoing and flying roles in order to distinguish 
them from the use of small arms in defence of a base. 
 
The issue of what constitutes combat has dominated the historiography on women in 
the armed forces. Historians have tended to concentrate on wartime service, with 
emphasis on army women's relationship to combat as evidenced by their roles in 
anti-aircraft artillery batteries in the Second World War. This has been a popular 
case study as scholars benefit from a rich collection of sources including the 
memoirs of General Sir Frederick Pile, who ran Anti-Aircraft Command throughout 
the war,15 testimonies from female participants and War Office files in the National 
Archive. Women were not permitted officially to undertake all the duties. Barred 
from loading and firing the guns, they were said to be non-combatants. General Pile 
described the distinction between those who aimed guns (women) and those who 
fired them (men) as 'muddled thinking'.16 He regarded women as combatants, 
believing that the ban on women actually firing at the enemy was a political issue 
which he was not prepared to challenge at the time.17  
 
Scholars have analysed the effectiveness of the mixed batteries, the impact on men 
and women who were employed in the work, the conflict for women between 
                                                 
14 Small arms included sub-machine guns, rifles and pistols. 
15 General Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence against Air Attack during the Second World 
War, (London: George G Harrap & Co Ltd, 1949).  
16 Ibid, p.193. 
17 Ibid, p.186 and p.193.  
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membership of the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS)18 and self-identification as 
'gunners', the description of the women's work as non-combatant, and public and 
political perceptions at the time.19 Lucy Noakes, in her history of women in the 
British Army in the first half of the twentieth century, observed that artillery women 
'remained lower status members of a separate organisation, on lower pay [than men] 
and, defined as non-combatant, unable to be awarded combat medals.'20  
 
Little has been written about policies on women's regular service until the expansion 
of employment opportunities in the 1990s. Again, there has been an emphasis on the 
army and female soldiers' relationship to combat. For example, Rachel Woodward 
and Trish Winter examined the opening of roles for women in the Royal Artillery, 
the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the Royal Engineers, and the 
continuing exclusion from the infantry and armoured corps in 1998. They suggested 
that increased opportunities for women were publicly attributed to the armed forces' 
intention more closely to represent society as a whole, removing artificial barriers 
and providing equality of opportunity in order to attract the best recruits. However, 
they ascribed change also to necessity, as the armed forces were 'fishing for recruits 
in a shrinking pool of available fit, willing, suitable young male labour'.21  
 
Like Woodward and Winter, Joanna Bourke was primarily interested in women in 
the army. She also gave emphasis to the dwindling supply of young men in driving 
the armed forces to increase women's participation from the 1970s onwards. She 
added the importance of women's liberation, greater prevalence of mixed 
workplaces in civilian employment, less need for physical aggression as weapons 
                                                 
18 The Auxiliary Territorial Service was the women's army corps in the Second World War.  
19 For example: Margaret R Higonnet & Patrice L-R Higonnet, 'The Double Helix', in Margaret R 
Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel & Margaret Collins Weitz (eds.), Behind the Lines: Gender 
and the Two World Wars, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 31-47; Roy 
Terry, Women in Khaki: the Story of the British Woman Soldier, (London: Columbus Books, 1988), 
pp.152-8; D'Ann Campbell, 'Women in Combat: the World War II Experience in the United States, 
Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union', The Journal of Military History, Vol.57, No.2, Apr 
1993, pp. 301-23; Gerard J. DeGroot, 'Whose Finger on the Trigger? Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries 
and the Female Combat Taboo', War in History, Vol.4, No.4, 1997, pp. 434-53; Jutta Schwarzkopf, 
'Combatant or Non-combatant? The Ambiguous Status of Women in British Anti-Aircraft Batteries 
during the Second World War', War & Society, Vol.28, No.2, Oct 2009, pp.105-131; Georgina 
Natzio, 'Homeland Defence: British Gunners, Women and Ethics during the Second World War', in 
Celia Lee and Paul Edward Strong (eds.), Women in War: from Home Front to Front Line (Barnsley: 
Pen and Sword Military, 2012), pp.87-100.    
20 Noakes, Women in the British Army, p.120. 
21 Rachel Woodward and Trish Winter, Sexing the Soldier: The Politics of Gender and the 
Contemporary British Army (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.42-3. 
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became more technologically based, and interest from women wanting to undertake 
more roles.22  
 
While Woodward, Winter and Bourke concentrated on the army, the military 
sociologists Christopher Dandeker and Mady Wechslar Segal, in work based on 
official documents, statistics and interviews with policy-makers conducted between 
1991-4, examined expansion of women's roles in all three British armed forces in the 
late twentieth century. They identified four factors, similar to Bourke's, that 
contributed to decisions to widen women's employment. First, they noted pressures 
from society, such as demography, public attitudes towards gender roles and 
legislation. Second, there was an increasing demand for better career opportunities 
by servicewomen. Third, technological change led to a 'relative decline in the 
emphasis placed on physical prowess and aggressiveness', a factor that they thought 
probably varied in importance across the Services and was most relevant in the 
army.23 Finally, they added the need to consider the attitudes of policy-makers 
responding to the other three factors, with those 'socialized into the values of the 
1960s and early 1970s' being 'less commit[ted] to traditional views of military 
women's employment'.24 Dandeker and Segal concluded that, while demographic 
factors in the late 1980s and early 1990s influenced thinking in the MOD, social, 
political and legal pressures were more important in bringing about new roles for 
servicewomen.25 Writing as post-Cold War cuts to the armed forces were being 
implemented, they suggested that continued wider military employment of women 
would signify the importance of equality of opportunity as the key factor in these 
policy changes.26 Their assessment has an unstated premise that women's 
employment still needed to be justified in the 1990s, rather than women having 
access to military careers equally with men.  
 
                                                 
22 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare 
(Great Britain: Basic Books, 1999), p.342-3. 
23 Christopher Dandeker and Mady Wechsler Segal, 'Gender Integration in Armed Forces: Recent 
Policy Developments in the United Kingdom', Armed Forces & Society, Vol.23, No.1, Fall 1996 
pp.37-40. 
24 Ibid, p.41. 
25 Ibid, pp.43-4. 
26 Ibid, pp.30-1 and Christopher Dandeker, 'New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks 
on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies,' British Journal 
of Sociology, Vol.45, No.4, 1994, p.649. 
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Dandeker and Segal appeared to attribute RAF combat roles only to aircrew when 
they noted that 'the total number of RAF personnel actually in combat - even in 
wartime - is very small.'27 Although they remarked that airwomen were trained 'in 
the use of firearms for defensive purposes' from the early 1980s,28 they did not 
assign any notable significance to this development. 
 
In the early 1990s, women's increased employment stopped short of main land 
warfare roles or submarine service. Exclusion from the infantry and the armoured 
corps has been explained by Woodward and Winter as being based on women being 
presumed to be disruptive to cohesion in fighting units.29 Resultant undermining of 
male bonding was expected to have a detrimental impact on operational 
effectiveness.30 However, Dandeker and Segal noted that that argument was 
perceived by army authorities as too vague to withstand legal challenge. They 
observed a move towards an explanation that there was a lack of privacy and 
decency in living conditions in the field, this being an acceptable justification under 
the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) for differential treatment. They also thought that 
this reasoning could be used to justify women's exclusion from some naval vessels.31  
 
In addition to the discourse on combat, scholars have also commented on the 
importance of the military's relationship with norms of civilian employment and 
society and men and women's attitudes towards, and expectations of, their military 
careers. In his examination of race, gender and sexuality in the army in the late 
twentieth century, Hew Strachan observed that the army asserted a 'right' or 'need' to 
be different from civil society on the grounds of protecting combat effectiveness.32 
Dandeker and Segal reported use by an officer of the expression 'the right [of the 
armed forces] to be different' in connection with gender integration in the early 
1990s.33 Dandeker further noted this principle being used during General Sir 
Michael Rose's tenure as Adjutant General in the mid-1990s as the justification for 
                                                 
27 Dandeker and Segal, 'Gender Integration in Armed Forces', p.34. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Woodward and Winter, Sexing the Soldier, p.19. 
30 'Operational' or 'combat' effectiveness means the ability to prevail over an enemy. 
31 Dandeker and Segal, 'Gender Integration in Armed Forces', pp.33-4.   
32 Hew Strachan (ed.), The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century 
(London and Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), p.xvii. 
33 Dandeker and Segal, 'Gender Integration in Armed Forces', p.40. 
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the exclusion of homosexuals from the armed forces.34 However, Dandeker argued 
that it was important for the armed forces to be 'responsive to the changing society 
which they defend, that pays for them, and without whose support they can do 
little.'35  
 
While Christopher Dandeker emphasised differences between the Services and 
society in the 1990s, Cathy Downes suggested that there was a trend 'to reduce but 
not eliminate the gap'.36 She cited as evidence the increasing percentage of 
servicemen who were married, the rise in home ownership, spouses' greater 
employment aspirations, and military pay (from 1970) being based on comparability 
with civilian jobs.37 David French observed that, from the 1950s, as the percentage 
of married soldiers in the regular army increased, the needs of married men were a 
key problem that authorities attempted to address through cutting down 
unaccompanied postings, provision of more married accommodation and reducing 
the frequency of moves.38 Downes and French wrote about trends and personnel 
policies affecting servicemen. However, similar issues need to be addressed in 
respect of servicewomen, with the addition of the vexed issue of pregnancy.  
 
Jeanne Boydston invited historians not to assume the primacy of gender but to 
consider it as ‘nested in, mingled with and inseparable from the cluster of other 
factors.’39 While gender is ever-present in this history, women's integration into the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force involved a number of dichotomies: the Navy's 
segregation of seagoing from shore-based work compared with the RAF's divide 
between flying and ground-based roles; organisational factors of the integrated RAF 
contrasted with the separate WRNS and the consequent authority or influence of 
senior women officers; airwomen's military status versus Wrens' civilian standing 
until 1977; terms and conditions of service for married compared with single 
                                                 
34 Christopher Dandeker, 'On "The Need to be Different": Recent Trends in Military Culture', in Hew 
Strachan (ed.), The British Army, note 2, p185. General Rose was Adjutant General (Head of Army 
Personnel) between 1995-97. 
35 Ibid, p173.  
36 Cathy Downes, 'Great Britain', in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (eds.), The Military: 
More than Just a Job? (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p.163. 
37 Ibid, p.175. 
38 David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British 
People, C.1870-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.317-20. 
39 Jeanne Boydston, ‘Gender as a Question of Historical Analysis’, Gender & History, Vol.20, No.3, 
November 2008, p.576. 
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personnel; differing aspirations between servicewomen and their female senior 
officers; and men's career and family priorities as well as women's. In addition, it is 
important to recognise constraints imposed by the defence budget. Policy-makers in 
the period covered by this history were, for the most part, working with declining 
financial resources. The value for money in employing women rather than men was 
a persistent issue. 
 
The historiography's emphasis on the army presents an incomplete account of 
women's regular service in the second half of the twentieth century. This thesis seeks 
to broaden the understanding of the fragile nature of the decision to employ women's 
Services in the aftermath of the war and to retain them as the size of the armed 
forces subsequently reduced. It suggests that the 'lessening the need for men' 
argument, used in accounts about the army, is an insufficient explanation for the 
existence of the WRNS and the WRAF. In addition, releasing men for more 
important work was not an issue for the Royal Air Force. Employing fewer men in 
ground-based work did not generate candidates of the quality needed for aircrew 
duties. However, as will be seen, debate about the purpose of the WRNS fluctuated 
between women releasing men for the fleet or blocking shore-based jobs required to 
give men respite from seagoing. What emerges in policy discussions in the Service 
Ministries is a set of arguments that vary over the period from a belief that regular 
servicewomen implied losing an equivalent number of more employable 
servicemen, to the post-war assessment that women were an essential part of 
preparations for a future major war, to seeing servicewomen as a means of 
minimising risks of poor recruitment on reversion to all-volunteer forces, a cost-
effective means of managing decline in requirement for personnel in the early 
1960s, and to valuing women's skills in place of lower quality male volunteers. 
However, the existence of the separate, shore-based WRNS is revealed as more 
precarious than that of women in the RAF who served interchangeably with men on 
operational stations.  
 
Nevertheless, the apparently 'conservative' Royal Navy opened main combat roles 
before the reputedly 'egalitarian' Royal Air Force and this has to be explained. This 
thesis adds evidence of the weight to be placed on Dandeker and Segal's social 
factors and attitudes of policy-makers and servicewomen. It suggests that 
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technological factors are important in terms of demands placed on educational 
attainment and capacity to absorb training, rather than in terms of declining reliance 
on strength. It adds to Dandeker and Segal's analysis the need to account for 
interactions between the Services' policies. The Navy's inability to follow the 
examples of the RAF and the army in piecemeal additions to women's employment 
resulted in its revolutionary step of admitting women to main combat roles. Once the 
Navy had breached the principle that women could not be employed in overtly 
combat roles, the RAF was obliged to follow by opening fast jet flying sooner than it 
otherwise would. However, this thesis argues that, for the vast majority of women in 
the RAF, the earlier decision to train them in the use of small arms made them 
combatants to the same extent as their ground-based male colleagues were. 
However, this development was not described as being a combat role at the time. 
Avoiding describing women's roles as combat because of public or political 
sensitivities, as the anti-aircraft artillery experience of the Second World War 
showed, is seen to persist until seagoing in warships was opened to the WRNS. In 
drawing the new boundary line of servicewomen's employment at exclusion from 
land warfare, this thesis suggests that the Air Force and Admiralty Boards were 
content to concede primacy in policy-making to the Army.   
 
This thesis is about the gradual erosion of two principles: that women were non-
combatant and that the armed forces had a right to be different from society. Non-
combatant status governed the number of women who could be recruited, exclusions 
from key roles, postings to which women were assigned, promotion chances, pay 
and status. Regulations on married service and pregnancy resulted in women 
curtailing their period of service. What emerges is the failure of policy-makers and 
Directors of the women's Services to grapple with societal trends in and attitudes 
towards marriage and child-bearing, and regulations which made married service 
problematic. Changing attitudes towards family priorities are revealed also as 
influencing men's career choices. Rather than a dwindling supply of young men in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s being the key factor influencing naval personnel 
policy, this thesis argues that a crisis of retention of experienced men and lack of 





The WRNS and the WRAF were selected as the subjects for this thesis because they 
opened their main combat roles to women in the early 1990s. They also provided an 
opportunity to examine the importance of differences in organisation. With 
airwomen integrated into the RAF, the role of the Director WRAF is seen to be at its 
most influential in the years of transition from the wartime footing to regular service 
in the late 1940s. In contrast, although her executive role reduced over the period, 
the Directors of the WRNS remained an authoritative figure.   
   
This thesis has not attempted to address all aspects of women's military service post-
war. Developments of women's army employment, where they remained excluded 
from main combat roles, is beyond the scope of work that could be conducted and 
included in this research. However, reference is made to army policies where they 
help to provide a fuller understanding of the issues. Similarly, only limited mention 
is made of the armed forces' nurses, who are employed in separate organisations, 
and of women in the reserve forces. While this research addresses moves towards a 
policy of equality of opportunity, it is confined to gender issues. Inequalities in 
respect of policies and attitudes towards ethnic minorities, and draconian treatment 
of homosexuals well after such relationships were legalised in society, are beyond 
the scope of this research.  
 
The thesis is organised in three parts. Part I examines the introduction of regular 
service for women following the Second World War. Chapter 1 looks beyond the 
public justification of lessening the need for men by following debate about 
peacetime planning within the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. It describes the status 
to be accorded to regular servicewomen, the key exclusions from service at sea, 
flying and the use of small arms, and the roles they were to be allowed. Chapter 2 
explores roles of female leaders and how they influenced personnel policies for 
regular service, organisation of the WRNS compared with the WRAF, pay and terms 
and conditions of service, recruiting, training and career structure.  
 
Part II identifies and accounts for key developments from the 1950s - 1980s. 
Chapter 3 examines the early years of regular service and failures in meeting policy 
targets. It seeks to understand how women's Services survived when the need for 
men was significantly lessened, as signalled by the end of national service. Chapter 
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4 explores the impact of social legislation of the 1970s through an examination of 
developments in the RAF. Chapter 5 addresses issues in the Navy over the same 
period, concentrating on studies conducted into the status and employment of the 
WRNS. It sets out arguments made against women serving in ships, while also 
examining exceptions to this principle. 
   
Part III explores interactions between decisions taken to open all flying roles and 
seagoing in warships, and the consequences for the WRAF and WRNS. Chapter 6 
examines studies into the wider employment of servicewomen in the late 1980s and 
the policy decisions that followed. It shows that, unable to match the RAF's or the 
army's piecemeal approach to extending women's roles, it was the personnel 
situation in the Navy that challenged the principle that women should not serve in 
main combat roles. The implementation and implications of these policy decisions is 
covered in Chapter 7. It assesses policy targets and how implementation was 
adversely affected by defence budget cuts following the end of the Cold War. It also 
traces the impact on organisation, career structures and pay and conditions of 
service, assessing the extent to which a new principle of equality of opportunity was 
intended.  
 
Parts I and II of this thesis rely predominantly on archival sources, particularly the 
National Archive (TNA) and the National Museum of the Royal Navy (NMRN), the 
British Library's newspaper collection, and to a lesser extent the RAF Museum, the 
Imperial War Museum (IWM) and the Parliamentary Archive. TNA holds policy 
files relevant to this thesis up to the late 1970s and some for the early 1980s. These 
have been used to trace developments and arguments from the creation of regular 
service following the war, retention of women's Services through periods of 
declining strength of the armed forces, the developing problems of retention and 
recruitment of personnel in the 1970s, and responses to equality legislation. The 
NMRN holds a valuable collection of files deposited by the Directorate of the 
Women's Royal Naval Service in the late 1980s. These include planning for regular 
service, regulations governing the WRNS, records of conferences of women 
officers, material collected by Commandant Margaret Fletcher for her history of her 
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Service,40 and copies of The Wren, the magazine of the Wrens' Association. In 
addition, it has recordings made as part of an oral history project on the introduction 
of seagoing for women. In comparison, records of the WRAF are limited. This is 
perhaps indicative of its weaker identity as a women's Service. However, the RAF 
Museum holds the papers of the first wartime Director, Air Chief Commandant Jane 
Trefusis Forbes41, and material collected by Squadron Leader Beryl Escott in the 
1980s for her history of women in the RAF.42 The wartime papers provide valuable 
evidence on the extent of women's integration into the RAF and development of 
regulations and terms of service. These wartime conditions were the starting point 
for the construction of women's regular service following the war.        
 
Part III's exploration of policy on seagoing, flying, changes to terms and conditions 
of service for women and the abandonment of separate designation of the women in 
the Services, covers developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Files tracing 
the evolution of these policies have not yet been transferred to archives. In addition 
to open sources for the period, this research has relied on requests to government 
departments under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act (2000) which came into 
force in 2005, and interviews with participants in key events.  
 
Government departments’ ability to deal with FOI requests varied. The Treasury and 
Department of Work and Pensions responded promptly to requests for lists of 
preserved files and equally so with the contents of files of interest. The Office of 
Manpower Economics, the secretariat to government pay review bodies, destroyed 
its files for the Armed Forces Pay Review Body for the period in question.43 The 
main department for this research has been the MOD. A key lesson was not to route 
all requests through the MOD’s FOI cell in Whitehall, but to enquire directly to 
other departments or to authorities within the armed forces. Thus the Air Historical 
Branch of the MOD and the Royal Navy’s Fleet Information Cell proved to be the 
                                                 
40 M. H. Fletcher, The WRNS: A History of the Women's Royal Naval Service (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1989). 
41 Jane Trefusis Forbes' papers are held under her later name Dame Katherine Watson-Watts. On the 
award of the title ‘Dame’, she adopted her first name which was Katherine; Watson-Watts was her 
married name. 
42 Beryl E. Escott, Women in Air Force Blue: The Story of Women in the Royal Air Force from 1918 
to the Present Day (Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Patrick Stephens, 1989). 
43 My subsequent complaint concerning delay in responding to a request for information on record 
keeping policy was upheld by the Information Commissioner in 2010. 
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most efficient routes to information. A list of copies of documents and files received 
in support of this thesis is provided in the bibliography.  
 
The individuals interviewed for this research were predominantly selected on the 
basis of their insight into policy development and implementation. They covered 
many angles in the debate. Analysis in this thesis has been based on weighing 
evidence from these different voices alongside copies of released documents. 
Interestingly, those involved in the decision to open seagoing to women had clearer 
recollections than participants in decisions concerning flying policies. As this thesis 
demonstrates, this reflects the magnitude of the change brought about by seagoing 
policy compared with flying.   
 
Archival sources have been supplemented by access to papers held privately. 
Notably, Andrew Peake permitted the use of the documents and letters of his 
mother, Dame Felicity Peake. As Felicity Hanbury, she served in the Women's 
Auxiliary Air Force throughout the Second World War. She was appointed as 
Director in 1946 and participated in negotiation of her Service's transition from 
auxiliary to regular status before retiring in 1950. Other valuable papers have been 
provided by Captain Caroline Coates (RN), who was a member of the study team 
that examined the future of the WRNS in 1988-9, and Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson 
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Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service for Women: from Wartime 
Expediency to Peacetime Foothold 
 
On 30 May 1946, announcing continuing conscription for men, George Isaacs 
(Minister for Labour and National Service) told the House of Commons that 'In 
order to lessen the needs of the Services for men …[it had] also been decided to 
continue the WRNS, the ATS and the WAAF [Women's Auxiliary Air Force] on a 
voluntary basis as permanent features of the Forces of the Crown.’1 Commandant 
Vera Laughton Mathews (Director WRNS, 1939-46) expected ‘splash headlines’ for 
what she considered to be a ‘revolutionary change’, but recollected that ‘not a paper 
gave it a headline’.2 Mathews had a point. In introducing peacetime service for 
women, Britain responded differently from its post-World War I stance when it 
disbanded women’s Services. It also diverged from policies of allied countries. 
Australia and Canada demobilized their women’s Services. The USA, which had 
fewer servicewomen than Britain, reduced numbers from 266,000 to 14,000 
(approximately 1% of its armed forces) by 1948 when its wartime authorisation for 
women's Services was due to expire.3 While the USA re-enacted the necessary 
legislation that year and Australia and Canada re-established women’s forces in the 
early 1950s, Britain made its policy decision in 1946, introduced interim 
arrangements through an extended service scheme and brought in regular force 
conditions on 1 February 1949.     
 
'Lessening the need for men' was a publicly recognisable justification for women's 
military service, having been a feature of wartime recruiting.4 Politically, it pre-
empted potential criticism about women no longer being subject to national service.5 
Lucy Noakes, coupling the phrase with the concept of women releasing men for 
                                                 
1 House of Commons Debates [henceforward HC Deb], 5th Ser., Vol. 423, Col.1338, 30 May 1946. 
The Women's Auxiliary Air Force existed from 1939 to January 1949. 'WRAF', the First World War 
title, was re-introduced on 1 February 1949 (see below). 
2 Vera Laughton Mathews, Blue Tapestry. (London: Hollis & Carter, 1948), p. 276. Actually, the  
story made the front page of the Daily Mail under a heading 'Plan for Girls', 31 May 1946. 
3 The USA’s 1948 legislation limited women to 2% of the strength. Martin Binkin and Shirley J 
Bach, Women and the Military, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp.10-11. For 
Canada, see  www.forces.gc.ca Newsroom Backgrounder ‘Women in the Canadian Forces’ (accessed 
19 Mar 2009); for Australia, see www.defence.gov.au (accessed 22 Nov 2008).  
4 For example, 'Free a Man for the Fleet' poster, Imperial War Museum [henceforward IWM]: PST 
8286. 
5 Conscription of women was approved under National Service Act No.2 (1941). Single women were 
called up from January 1942 (RAF Museum [henceforward RAFM]: AP 3234 The Women's 
Auxiliary Air Force, 1953). 
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higher status work, argued that this factor was key to the War Office's support for 
regular service.6 This chapter reveals the struggle to reach a decision on the future of 
the women's Services in the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. It suggests that, rather 
than reducing the need for men, some senior men in the Air Ministry and the 
Admiralty saw servicewomen as implying the loss of an equivalent number of more 
useful servicemen. Air Marshal Slessor, by making a case for readiness for a future 
war, emerges as a key figure in swaying opinion at the Air Council against those 
who argued that women would not represent value for money. Had the RAF been 
against maintaining a women's component then, arguably, the Royal Navy would 
not have retained the WRNS.  
 
Examination of the status of the women's Services, exclusion of women from key 
roles and work that women were to undertake shows also that the Service Ministries 
took different views on how to shape these new peacetime careers. Policy decisions 
stemmed from fundamental differences between the environments of air forces and 
navies, as well as by gender and budget considerations.7 They resulted in an 
integrated, militarized WRAF and a civilian WRNS that remained separate from the 
Royal Navy. What the Services held in common was exclusion of women from 
combat roles, a factor that inhibited career prospects. 
 
Wartime Participation 
Women's Services were initially formed during the First World War. The WRNS, 
created in November 1917, supported the Royal Navy in shore-based jobs. By the 
time it disbanded in 1919, 7,000 women had served in its ranks.8 On 1 April 1918, 
the RAF was created by merging components of the Royal Flying Corps from the 
army and the Royal Naval Air Service. The WRAF came into being on the same 
day. Initially, it drew 10,000 women from those already serving in the WRNS or the 
Women's Army Auxiliary Corps. In total, over 32,000 women served in the WRAF 
between 1918-20.9 Like the other women's Services, it was demobilized. In losing 
                                                 
6 Lucy Noakes, Women in the British Army, p.156.  
7 This point about  the employment opportunities in support roles in the air force has been made by 
Dandeker and Segal, ‘Gender Integration in the Armed Forces', p.34. 
8 Fletcher, The WRNS, p.11.  
9 The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps formed in March 1917 (Noakes, Women in the British Army, 
p.68). It was renamed Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps in April 1918. WRAF statistics from 
Escott, Women in Air Force Blue, p.295. 
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their jobs after the war, servicewomen shared a fate common to women substituting 
for men in various jobs. 
 
Women's Services were reconstituted in 1938 and 1939 in anticipation of the 
outbreak of war.10 In the WRNS, officers could join 47 branches and ratings 81 
'categories' of work over the period 1939-45, compared with 10 and 21 respectively 
between 1917-19.11 In addition to domestic and clerical work, roles included 
technical duties at unskilled or semi-skilled levels, operator work for new 
technologies such as radar, and keyboard work of all descriptions.12 The Command 
at Plymouth initiated employment of women as crew for harbour craft. Duties 
included transferring personnel and mail between the shore and ships at anchor, as 
well as the maintenance of the boats. This role was favoured in publicity campaigns, 
although only a small proportion of Wrens were employed as boat crew.13 Female 
officers with degrees in scientific or mathematical disciplines could work on 
weapons’ trials and train submarine crews in torpedo attack.14 About 26% of officers 
were employed on cipher duties, maintaining confidential books, and coding and 
decoding signals. A few served in troop ships crossing the Atlantic, along with 
female ratings15 who worked as shorthand typists.16 In 1944, the WRNS reached its 
peak of 73,500 women (8.5% of total naval forces' strength).17  
 
In the WAAF, women could join 23 branches for officers and 93 trades for non-
commissioned ranks between 1939-45, compared with 5 and 53 respectively 
between 1918-20.18 Airwomen served on operational stations alongside men. Like 
the WRNS, they were employed in domestic, clerical and operator trades. In 
engineering, some roles were initially reduced in scope so that women could 
                                                 
10 For an account of the campaign to re-establish women's Services, see Jeremy Crang, 'The Revival 
of the British Women's Auxiliary Services in the Late Nineteen-thirties', Historical Research, Vol.83, 
No.220, May 2010, pp.343-357. 
11 Fletcher, The WRNS, pp.150-1. As in the RAF, work for officers was organised in 'branches'. 
'Categories' was used to designate work of non-commissioned ranks, whereas the RAF used the word 
'trades'.  
12 TNA: ADM 116/5771, History: General Review of Manning, 30 Jan 1948. 
13 Mathews, Blue Tapestry, p.202 and p.206. 
14 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956,  
pp.76-7. 
15 'Rating' or 'rate' are generic terms used in the Navy for non-commissioned personnel. 
16 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p.84. 
17 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1938-50 (London: HMSO, 1951), Vol.88, Table 125. 
18 Escott, Women in Air Force Blue, pp.298-9. 
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undertake part of the work. However, where they proved their competence, some 
sub-divisions of trades were dropped and women undertook the full roles. Examples 
included engine flight mechanics, electricians and instrument repairers.19 
Percentages of allowable substitutes for men were restricted if there were perceived 
shortcomings in women’s ability to sustain long hours or heavy work.20 The WAAF 
recorded its greatest strength in 1943 as 181,800 (15.7% of total air force strength).21  
 
Women served mostly in the United Kingdom. In the WRNS, women under the age 
of 19 were permitted to serve locally to where they lived. About one-third were 
serving on these 'immobile' terms in late 1942.22 Airwomen were required to serve 
where sent.23 The requirement for female workers at overseas bases was initially met 
by employing women locally. As the war progressed, servicewomen were posted 
overseas from the UK. The naval authorities were quicker than the Air Ministry to 
take this step, sending a first draft of Wrens to Singapore in January 1941.24 Initially 
voluntary, compulsory liability for overseas drafting was introduced for Wrens aged 
over 20 in November 1943.25 Although airwomen could be posted to bases overseas, 
the Director did not press the issue. Such postings were agreed 'when the shortage of 
manpower in certain trades or branches made it virtually essential.'26 Air Ministry 
authorities foresaw difficulties such as 'the possible effect of climatic conditions, the 
concern of parents, ... security, both physical and psychological, the provision of 
special kit, ... accommodation in troopships, medical arrangements and living 
conditions.'27 Initially, small numbers of officers were sent to the USA or countries 
in the Dominions and, from July 1942, to the Middle East. Airwomen enrolled in the 
UK served overseas only from 1944. Compulsory service abroad was avoided as the 
                                                 
19 RAFM: AP3234, The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945, 1953, p.86. 
20 Ibid, p.87. 
21 Annual Abstract of Statistics 1938-50 (London: HMSO, 1951), Vol.88, Table 125. In support of the 
army, the ATS also peaked in 1943, reaching 210,300 (7.2% of total army strength). 
22 Ursula Stuart Mason, Britannia's Daughters: the Story of the WRNS (Barnsley: Pen and Sword 
Books, 2011), p.47. 
23 J. Hammerton (ed.), The Book of the WAAF: a Practical Guide to the Women’s Branch of the RAF 
(London: Amalgamated Press, 1942), p.8. 
24 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p.66.  
25 NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR1077 Regulations and Instructions for the WRNS, 1943. 
26 RAFM: AP3234, The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945, 1953, p.105. 
27 Ibid. 
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requirement was met through volunteers. Fewer than 9,000 members of the WAAF 
served abroad during the war.28 
 
Over the course of the Second World War, the armed forces expanded women's 
employment in terms of numbers, roles and locations in which women could serve. 
However, reliance on women's contribution varied. As Table 1.1 shows, 
numerically, the army depended most on women's employment. In percentage terms, 
the RAF made greatest use of women. The Navy was least dependent on its women's 
Service.  
 
Table 1.1 Strength of the Armed Forces 1938-49 
 
At 30 June, except 1938 figure which was 31 March.     Thousands 
           
  
1938 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 
           
           
RN 112.7 405.5 506.7 671.0 790.0 788.8 350.0 189.6 138.6 139.9 
WRNS 0 15.1 28.6 53.3 73.5 72.0 20.5 7.4 7.0 6.4 
Total 112.7 420.6 535.3 724.3 863.5 860.8 370.5 197.0 145.6 146.3 
Women  
% of 
Total 0 3.6 5.3 7.4 8.5 8.4 5.5 3.8 4.8 4.4 
           
RAF 69.5 664.6 839.8 972.5 1011.4 962.6 438.5 284.5 222.2 205.1 
WAAF/ 
WRAF          0 37.4 125.7 181.8 174.4 153.0 46.7 22.5 15.5 14.5 
Total 69.5 702.0 965.5 1154.3 1185.8 1115.6 485.2 307.0 237.7 219.6 
Women  
% of 
Total 0 5.3 13.0 15.7 14.7 13.7 9.6 7.3 6.5 6.6 
           
Army 198.8 2221.4 2468.1 2691.8 2742.4 2930.9 1128.9 773.5 447.6 393.8 
ATS/ 
WRAC 0 42.8 140.2 210.3 199.0 190.8 60.1 29.5 14.3 9.0 
Total 198.8 2264.2 2608.3 2902.1 2941.4 3121.7 1189.0 803.0 461.9 402.8 
Women  
% of 
Total 0 1.9 5.4 7.2 6.8 6.1 5.1 3.7 3.1 2.2 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, Vol. 88 (1938 – 1950), (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 125. 
 
Policy Development 
Assheton Study on the Future of Women's Services  
The idea of retaining servicewomen after the war can be traced back to 1942 and 
Violet Markham’s report on amenities and welfare in the women’s Services. Going 
beyond her terms of reference, she suggested women should be employed with the 
                                                 
28 Ibid, p.106. 
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forces of occupation in Continental Europe. She argued that skills developed during 
the war could be used in the task of reconstructing liberated or occupied countries. 
Although she acknowledged that many women would want to return to civilian life, 
she thought there would be great interest in this outlet for further service.29  
 
Violet Markham's report prompted a further study. It was led by Ralph Assheton, the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury. In her evidence to his committee, Markham 
clarified that she had been proposing the 'continued existence of the women's 
Services up to general demobilization'.30 However, Assheton was given the broader 
remit of making recommendations on the future of the women's Services, not just 
the scope for their employment in post-war reconstruction.31   
 
The Services' evidence to Assheton was derived from opinions on the importance of 
women to their future structures and budget implications. The Admiralty wanted to 
re-establish the pre-war pattern of men's postings which rotated between shore-based 
jobs in the UK, UK waters or foreign service. Not being allowed to serve at sea, 
women would mostly fill UK shore jobs. The Admiralty argued that every woman 
would mean one less man available for ships in an emergency. At most, it might 
want a small permanently employed nucleus of women to organise and train a larger 
reserve.32 The War Office declined to say what it wanted in the absence of 
information on its budget and the number of men it was to be allowed. It thought 
'even a nucleus [of women] for further expansion might need to be dropped in 
favour of other prior claims'.33 However, if money was available, it wanted a 
permanent nucleus of women and a reserve.34 The RAF was considered different 
because women worked alongside men on operational stations. The Air Ministry 
thought it 'very desirable' to have a regular women's Service, assuming its budget 
allowed. If money was tight, though, it too would have a nucleus of employed 
women plus reservists.35 
                                                 
29 Report of the Committee on Amenities and Welfare Conditions in the Three Women’s Services, 
Cmd. 6384, (London: HMSO, 1942), pp.53-5.  
30 The National Archive [henceforward TNA]: CAB 66/38, Report of the Committee on the Women’s 
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Ralph Assheton concluded that all three Services would need to employ women in a 
future major war. Nobody wanted to contemplate '... the delays and difficulties 
experienced at the start of the present war, which would be bound to recur if the 
women's Services had to be started from scratch'.36 However, decisions could only 
be made in the context of restructuring the armed forces for peace, taking into 
account budgets.37 Accordingly, in July 1943, Winston Churchill announced in the 
House of Commons that women's Auxiliary Services would be needed 'for some 
time after hostilities [had] ceased ... to accompany Forces of Occupation'.38 Work 
passed to post-war planning committees. 
 
Planning for Post-War 
There were competing arguments in the Air Ministry over the future of the WAAF. 
Those in favour of regular service argued the need to organise in peace on the 
pattern required in a major war. Women had proved themselves capable of a wide 
range of duties and were considered better than men in some. Thus, the argument 
went, there would be an efficiency gain in employing women. Proponents also urged 
that airwomen would expect the opportunity of regular service. They suggested there 
was a risk of being unable to recruit sufficient men of the required quality to sustain 
an Air Force which was to be three times the size of the pre-war force after 
demobilization (Table 1.1).39  
 
The case against regular servicewomen was also based on wartime evidence. A 
number of difficulties were emphasised: problems of administration, training and 
accommodation; high wastage rate through women leaving on marriage; limitations 
on overseas posting; airwomen not undertaking the full range of work done by men; 
and the potential for resentment by men of working for women, accepted under war 
conditions, but a potential source of friction in peace. The difficulty of finding 
sufficient women for non-commissioned officer (NCO) and officer ranks was a 
major objection.40  
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 HC Deb, 5th Ser., Vol.391, Col. 1072-1073, 22 Jul 1943. 
39 TNA: AIR 2/7824, Committee on Manning the Post-War RAF – Sixth Interim Report,  Dec 1944.  
40 Ibid. 
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Drawing on reports from various RAF Commands, the Air Ministry's evidence to 
the Royal Commission on Equal Pay (1943-6) cautioned that wartime experience 
should not be generalised. Women in sedentary jobs were said to benefit from 
comparisons with men of ‘very inferior quality to the male personnel who would be 
employed in peacetime.’41 Women were perceived to perform better than men in 
code and cipher duties, as telephonists, fabric workers, clerks, waitresses and 
nursing orderlies. However, this work was described as mundane. Men were said to 
need more stimulating work to show their talents. Compared with men, women were 
reportedly more prone to sickness and absenteeism, less likely to exercise authority 
or initiative or to take responsibility.42 While men’s poor performance was attributed 
to the intrinsic nature of the job, for women it was their personal failings that were 
to the fore.  
 
In early 1945, there was strong opposition to retention of airwomen. Air Marshal 
Sutton, in his final weeks as Air Member for Personnel (AMP), urged colleagues to 
bear in mind the financial implications of the high turnover of women compared 
with men. Rather than women lessening the need for men, he feared that employing 
women would entail the 'loss of the equivalent number of highly trained airmen'.43 
The post-war planning committee, chaired by Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill 
(Vice Chief of the Air Staff), shared Sutton’s views. Emphasising costs, difficulties 
in obtaining officers and NCOs, the loss of men who would be 'most urgently 
required as basis for expansion in a future emergency' and potential legal and 
disciplinary difficulties, it adopted as a planning assumption that there would be no 
regular WAAF.44 Such a force would only conceivably be necessary if it proved 
impossible to recruit enough men. However, ‘this possibility could be disregarded 
for the time being’.45 The committee concluded that a women’s reserve force would 
be needed.46   
 
                                                 
41 TNA: AIR 14/1009, Sandford to Secretary Royal Commission on Equal Pay, 5 Jun 1945. 
42 Ibid. 
43 TNA: AIR 2/7824, Future of the WAAF, Note to Air Council, 31 Jan 1945. 
44 Ibid, Air Council Post War Planning Committee Conclusions, 7 Feb 1945. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service 
36 
Air Marshal Sutton was replaced in March 1945 by Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, a 
future Chief of Air Staff. Slessor had previously expressed support for regular 
servicewomen.47 He raised doubts about the planning committee's intentions and, in 
June 1945, he put a paper to the Air Council urging it to re-open the issue. Noting 
that ‘few [would] deny that the WAAF was very largely ineffective during the first 
year of the war because it had no foundation of experience, organisation or training’, 
he urged that a reserve for women would not be adequate.48 A regular component 
was needed to provide a core of women in appropriate trades around which future 
mobilization could be built. In addition, regular servicewomen would be needed for 
administration, organisation and training of reservists. He dismissed financial 
objections by arguing that, while 'women might not do as much as men and they 
might cost more than men', that '[was] not the point'.49 He elaborated that ‘… in any 
future war a substantial proportion of the Service [would] consist of women (which 
no-one contests)’.50 He believed the RAF should be organised in peace ‘to prevent 
war not merely to win it in the 3rd or 4th year’.51 
 
There was still opposition at the Air Council. Sir Arthur Street (Permanent Under 
Secretary) questioned value for money on the grounds that women would cost more 
than twice as much as regular servicemen due to higher turnover. With implications 
also for the other Services, which he thought were against regular servicewomen, the 
matter would need to go to the Cabinet. Meanwhile, an extended service scheme 
should be introduced for women, pending a decision about peacetime service. 
Slessor was directed to consult Army and Navy opinion on commissioning a study 
into the long-term need for servicewomen.52  
 
Rather than being opposed to regular servicewomen, the Army Board's thinking was 
ahead of the Air Ministry's. Like Air Marshal Slessor, the army's post-war planning 
committee emphasised the need to prepare for future mobilization. By August 1945, 
                                                 
47 TNA: AIR 75/47, Note to Air Member for Personnel, 24 Oct 1944. 
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it wanted 3,000 regular servicewomen and a reserve of 16,000.53 The War Office 
declined the proposal for a new study because its plans were advanced and it 
intended seeking approval to employ regular servicewomen.54 
 
The Admiralty was reluctant to commit to keeping the WRNS and welcomed the 
idea of a further study.55 At a time of great uncertainty concerning its budget, the 
number of men it was to be allowed, the value for money of employing Wrens and 
the potential for the Royal Commission on Equal Pay to increase women's pay,  the 
Board was not ready to make a decision.  
 
In evidence given to the Royal Commission, the Admiralty’s assessment of Wrens 
was expressed in damning terms as being up to 25% less effective than men in most 
trades and never more than 10% superior where they were deemed to perform better. 
While the derivation of these percentages was not explained, inferiority was 
attributed to: 
 
‘lack of physical strength and inability to stand up to prolonged strain, … 
inferior mechanical aptitude, lower capacity for the application of 
knowledge, inclination to get flustered in emergency and more easily 
discouraged when up against difficulties; lack of capacity for improvisation; 
unwillingness to accept responsibility and inability to exercise authority.’ 56 
 
Given this judgement, it was not surprising that the Admiralty resisted the continued 
employment of women although the evidence to the Commission may have been 
chiefly intended to highlight differences in roles, responsibilities and output to 
undermine any case for equal pay.57  
 
In December 1945, with projected budgets being less than anticipated, the Admiralty 
Board asked planning staff to look into demobilising the WRNS by 31 March 
                                                 
53 TNA: WO 32/13160, Future of the Women's Services, 11 May 1945 and Provision of a Permanent 
Regular Women's Service, 11 Aug 1945. 
54 TNA: AIR 6/75, Air Council Conclusions, 2 Oct 1945. 
55 Ibid. 
56 TNA: ADM 1/18884, Statement for Royal Commission on Equal Pay, 3 Oct 1945. 
57 Women were paid less than single men. See Chapter 2. 
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1947.58 However, by March 1946 the personnel department's perception of women’s 
utility was veering away from the stance that they blocked shore appointments 
towards the idea that they released men for higher value work. Rear Admiral Denny, 
the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel, wrote to Admiral of the Fleet Viscount 
Cunningham (First Sea Lord) arguing that there could be advantage in using women 
in shore-based jobs to avoid men having too much time ashore compared with time 
at sea.59  
 
Deciding on Peacetime Service 
Echoing the War Office's plans, Air Marshal Slessor recommended regular service 
for women in a paper for the Air Council in January 1946.60 He made two key 
points. First, he cautioned against a peacetime organisation which lacked a 
necessary wartime component, in case the government of the day failed or was 
unable to give the go ahead to correct the deficiency before a war started. Second, 
by now Slessor doubted that the RAF could obtain enough men in peacetime for an 
Air Force expected to be about 300,000 strong. He proposed long service as a means 
of developing female officers and NCOs. Rather than questioning women's ability to 
fill more senior ranks, he turned this objection into a reason for employing regular 
servicewomen. He also saw women continuing to work alongside men as a means of 
overcoming the potential for prejudice; working with women was to become a 
‘natural incident of service life’.61   
 
At the Air Council meeting, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder (Chief of 
Air Staff from the beginning of 1946) supported Slessor's case. He argued that ‘In 
the event of another war, we might not have a year’s grace which we had at the 
beginning of the last war.’62 Also in favour, Lord Henderson argued that 'the public 
was now attuned to the idea of women in the Services.'63 Sir William Brown (Arthur 
Street's successor as Permanent under Secretary) raised concern about the financial 
                                                 
58 TNA: ADM 167/124, Admiralty Board Minutes, 21 Dec 1945. 
59 National Museum of the Royal Navy [henceforward NMRN]: 1988.350.57, Permanent Service, 28 
Mar 1946.   
60 TNA: AIR 6/82, Future of the WAAF AC3(46), 11 Jan 1946. 
61 Ibid. 
62 TNA: AIR 6/76, Air Council Conclusions, 15 Jan 1946. 
63 Ibid. Lord Henderson was a government whip in the House of Lords.  
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implications. He doubted that peacetime service would appeal to women.64 His was 
now a minority view. Slessor's recommendation was agreed. 
While the Air Council made its case for a 10,000 strong women's Service to be 
employed in as wide a range of duties as possible and the War Office wanted to 
employ 3,000 servicewomen, the Admiralty Board still leaned towards doing 
without the WRNS. 65 Albert Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, thought 
that it was ‘doubtful wisdom to attempt to maintain active Women’s Services in 
peacetime’.66 He acknowledged that, if the others retained servicewomen, there 
would be strong pressure on the Admiralty to adopt the same policy. However, he 
believed the Cabinet would reject the idea.67 He complained about the pressure to 
make a decision before the outcome of the Royal Commission on Equal Pay was 
known. However, a rough estimate provided for the Board suggested that, even if 
equal pay was introduced, women would still be marginally cheaper to employ than 
men due primarily to women's lesser entitlement to allowances.68  
 
In March 1946, General Lord Ismay (Ministry of Defence) advised Clement Attlee 
that a decision on the women's Services was urgently needed. With the War Office 
and the Air Ministry ready to proceed, Ismay informed Attlee that they had been 
'unable to get the Admiralty to make up their minds'.69 He asked the Prime Minister 
to put pressure on the Admiralty through the Defence Committee.70  
 
Action through the Defence Committee brought matters to a head. However, Albert 
Alexander remained reluctant to keep the WRNS. He made the point to Sir Henry 
Markham (Permanent under Secretary) that the Royal Navy was the smallest of the 
Services and money was limited. He added that Wrens were not as productive as 
men and attracted additional costs for women's accommodation. He argued that the 
Admiralty 'should not be too ready to follow the other Services in this matter'.71  
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 TNA: WO 32/13160, Appendix A to PICB/P(46)3, 1 Apr 1946. The figure included in the final 
paper for the Cabinet was 8,000, Cabinet Paper DO(46)63, 8 May 1946. 
66 TNA: ADM 167/127, Minute by Mr Alexander, 4 Mar 1946. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid, Minute by Mr Dunn, 7 Mar 1946. 
69 TNA: PREM 8/835, Ismay to Prime Minister, 26 Mar 1946. 
70 Ibid and CAB 131/1, Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions, 27 Mar 1946. 
71 TNA: ADM 116/5725, Signal, First Lord to Markham, 17 Apr 1946.  
Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service 
40 
In Albert Alexander's absence in India, the Board discussed the issues. It agreed that 
a reserve, without a regular component, would not provide the basis for expansion in 
a future war. It recommended to Alexander that the Navy should keep the WRNS, 
with a permanent nucleus of up to 5,000 women and a reserve. The Board suggested 
that Wrens be employed in work requiring only short periods of training and for 
which they were better suited than men. Noting the lack of information on costs, the 
proposal was subject to further work to confirm that women would not be more 
expensive to employ than men.72 Although not fully convinced, Alexander 
conceded.73 The Admiralty put its name, alongside the War Office and the Air 
Ministry, to the proposal to create regular service for women.74  
 
Albert Alexander's opinion that the idea would be rejected at Cabinet was ill-
founded. As Lucy Noakes observed, the Defence Committee was more concerned 
with the issue of the peacetime conscription of young men. The minutes recorded a 
desire for servicewomen to be trained in roles such as typing, book-keeping and 
domestic trades which the Committee deemed would be useful when the women 
returned to civilian life. It concluded that ‘Subject to consultation with the Treasury, 
[the Services' Ministries could] recruit as many women as could usefully be 
employed in substitution for men.’75  
 
Status, Titles and Ranks 
Status of Women's Services 
Early in the war, discipline in the women's Services had no legal basis. The 
acceptance of punishment was described as dependent on the 'good will' of the 
offender.76 Not under military law, women could not be held in the Services or 
charged with desertion. A meeting in May 1940 recorded that 10% of ATS women 
left in the first five months of the year. The WAAF reported a loss of 27% of its 
recruits from the previous nine months. It was difficult to distinguish how many 
                                                 
72 Ibid, Signal, Markham to First Lord, 17 Apr 1946 and ADM 167/126, Board Minutes, 17 Apr 
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73 TNA: ADM 116/5725, Signal, First Lord to Markham, 29 Apr 1946. 
74 TNA: CAB 131/2, Organisation of the Women's Services in Peace, 8 May 1946. 
75 TNA: CAB 131/1, Cabinet Defence Committee Conclusions, 17 May 1946. 
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women deserted as many cases were just recorded as 'compassionate discharge'.77 
Statistics were not given for the WRNS. However, the Official History produced in 
1956 quoted the discharge of 6.3% of WRNS personnel for the period December 
1940 to March 1941. Thirty-seven women were recorded as deserting, 164 left on 
compassionate grounds, 112 at their own request and 285 were discharged during a 
two-week probationary period for WRNS recruits.78  
 
In September 1940, the Cabinet Home Policy Committee directed that the 
application of military law to servicewomen be further considered.79 Air 
Commandant Trefusis Forbes (Director WAAF) was keen to put women on a more 
equal footing with servicemen by bringing them under the Air Force Act.80 Helen 
Gwynne-Vaughan (Director ATS) wrote in her wartime memoir that her 'own hopes 
came to be centred increasingly on this question because I realized to how many 
others it was fundamental. So often the fact that we were civilian blocked some 
avenue of usefulness ...'.81 Like her counterparts, Commandant Mathews wanted the 
Naval Discipline Act (NDA) to apply to women. She argued that women replaced 
men and worked alongside men who came under military law. Second, men and 
women committing an offence jointly were subject to different procedures. Third, 
some women were engaged in secret work and work verging on combatant. Fourth, 
numbers were vastly greater than originally envisaged and so greater disciplinary 
powers were needed. She went on to say that conscripting women would result in 
recruitment 'from all classes' and so 'the same standard of good behaviour [could] 
not be relied upon'.82 For these reasons, and as a boost to efficiency and morale, she 
argued that women should be brought under the NDA.83   
 
In 1941, the War Office led on the issue of military status for women. It argued that 
military law would be good for prestige, recruiting and discipline. More importantly, 
it intended employing women in anti-aircraft artillery roles which it described as 
                                                 
77 TNA: ADM 116/5102, Meeting with Judge Advocate General, 23 May 1940.  
78 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p.41. 
79 RAFM: AP3234, The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945, Air Historical Branch 1953, p.18. 
80 RAFM: AC 72/17 Box 4, WAAF Report, 10 April 1940 – 30 June 1940, Section 12. 
81 Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, Service with the Army, (London: Hutchinson, 1942), p.135. 
82 TNA: ADM 116/5102, Disciplinary Status of the WRNS, 8 Apr 1941. 
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'practically combatant duties '.84 It took the matter to the War Cabinet where it was 
supported by the Air Ministry.85 However, the Admiralty was reluctant to keep pace. 
Sir Henry Markham (Permanent under Secretary at the Admiralty) wrote that  'the 
idea of extending their Lordships' commission to WRNS officers [was] distasteful.'86 
The Admiralty 'doubted the need for the changes for the WRNS'.87 The War Cabinet 
agreed that the War Office and the Air Ministry could proceed without the 
Admiralty.88 Defence (Women's Forces) Regulations for the ATS and the WAAF 
came into effect on 25 April 1941, making these Services 'part of the Armed Forces 
of the Crown'.89 Women now came under the Army Act or the Air Force Act 'to 
such extent and subject to such adaptations and modifications' as deemed necessary 
by the Army Council or Air Council.90 Officers were granted the King's 
commission.91 These new regulations did not apply to the WRNS. Wrens were not 
brought under the Naval Discipline Act and, in law, remained civilians. 
 
Commandant Mathews continued to battle within the Admiralty, now spurred on by 
the difference in standing between her Service and the others.92 However, all but one 
of the Commanders-in Chief consulted on the issue in 1941 opposed the introduction 
of the NDA.93 The Admiralty considered the WRNS to be the best of the women’s 
Services and that it therefore had no need of military law to maintain its discipline. It 
argued that standards of behaviour would not be jeopardized by conscription.94 This 
claim could simply have been reluctance to accord military status to the WRNS, 
described in a positive manner. The Head of Naval Law asserted that male officers 
did not want to be put in a position of hearing charges against Wrens.95 Women’s 
                                                 
84 Ibid, McKean (War Office), Women's Services - Memorandum on the Question of Military Status, 
19 Feb 1941.  
85 Ibid, War Cabinet Conclusions 33(41), 31 Mar 1941. 
86 Ibid, Note by HVM, 15 Mar 1941. 
87 Ibid, War Cabinet Conclusions 33(41), 31 Mar 1941. 
88 Ibid. 
89 RAFM: AP3234, The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945, 1953, p.19. 
90 Ibid, p.19 and Appendix 1. 
91 Ibid, Appendix 1. 
92 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p.41. 
93 Ibid, p. 40. 
94 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p. 38.The 
WRNS did not require conscripts, recruiting sufficient volunteers (TNA: ADM 116/5771, War 
Manning General Review, Section XXIX, Jan 1948). Of a total of 217,249 women who served in the 
WAAF between 1939 and 1945, 33,932 were conscripted (RAFM: AP3234, The Women’s Auxiliary 
Air Force 1939-1945, 1953, p.63). 
95 TNA: ADM 234/219, Women’s Royal Naval Service 1939-45 (Official History), 1956, p.43. 
Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service 
43 
discipline was to be left to the senior women to administer; the NDA would have 
brought it into the purview of male officers.  
 
Mathews tried again in 1942 without support. In 1944 she added new considerations, 
the most important of which were the spectre of mass desertion as husbands returned 
from overseas and the difficulty of controlling demobilization without the threat of 
charges under military law.96 She blamed naval husbands for inciting desertion.97 
She now had support from some major UK Commands which were likewise 
concerned about desertion.98 However, the Admiralty still regarded the NDA 
unnecessary, that it probably would not solve the problems Mathews raised and it 
would create a lot of paperwork.99 
 
Having made its official case against the NDA on the basis of good discipline, the 
Admiralty was subsequently constrained to maintain that position. A change of 
policy could have led to questions as to whether morale and discipline had 
deteriorated. The formation of the peacetime service, though, provided an 
opportunity de-coupled from such questions. In 1946, Mr Samuel (Head of Naval 
Law) favoured its introduction, not because the WRNS could not continue to be run 
as before, but on the grounds that it would be ‘the correct status for a body which 
[was] an integral part of the Navy’.100 Nevertheless, the Admiralty Board declined 
this legal advice. Again it cited the standing of the WRNS in public opinion as the 
best of the women’s Services. It argued that, with the smaller number of women 
required in peacetime, it would be able to select the best volunteers. As a 
consequence, good discipline did not require the safeguard of law.101  
 
While this reasoning became the official explanation, there were other 
considerations. First, the NDA was thought to be harsh compared to the Air Force 
Act and the Army Act because it was written with the maintenance of discipline at 
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sea as its essence. As women were not to serve at sea, much of it would not be 
applicable. Second, it was suggested that Wrens might leave the Service rather than 
accept this more stringent disciplinary code. Third, it was assumed that, if a Wren 
was subject to a court martial, then a WRNS officer would have to be appointed as a 
member of the court.102 This was the advice of Mr Samuel who thought it would be 
'unacceptable' for the court to be 'composed entirely of men' and that there would be 
'repercussions from the public' if that were the case.103 At the time, only executive 
branch officers (seamen officers) could serve on courts martial. The Admiralty 
Board was concerned that opening this function to female officers would set a 
precedent for non-executive branch male officers, a view shared by Mr Samuel.104 It 
would seem that the Board was intent on preserving the elite standing of seamen 
officers.  
 
The Admiralty disliked the powers of command that the RAF intended giving its 
regular service female officers and NCOs. For the RAF, women were to be regarded 
as equal members of the Service except in respect of combat roles. Women were to 
join the RAF, not a separate women’s Service or Corps. Officers would hold the 
King’s commission which required them to ‘exercise and well discipline in their 
Duties such Officers, Airmen and Airwomen as may be placed under [their] orders’ 
and instructed subordinates ‘to Obey [the officer] as their superior’.105 The outward 
symbol of this authority was that commissioned officers were saluted by lower 
ranks. However, for the Admiralty Board, compulsory saluting of female officers by 
lower-ranked men was anathema. It preferred that the practice ‘should be governed 
by courtesy and not prescribed by regulation.’106 Deploring the widening gap 
between the Navy and the other two services, the Board lamented that it could not 
stop them from taking this step.107 WRNS officers were to be given a 'Board 
commission', which required them to obey orders from their superiors, but did not 
grant powers of command.108  
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WRNS officers felt keenly the distinctly lower status conferred on them compared 
with their counterparts. Commandant Woollcombe (successor to Mathews in 1946) 
urged her officers to accept the decision loyally, saying that ‘… the Service must do 
its best to fill the place allotted to it.’109 Nevertheless, the issue of status would not 
die away, not least because of the goading of Wrens by other servicewomen that 
they were ‘mere civilians’.110 According to Admiral Sir Robert Burnett, 
Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, this description was commonly used in the press 
and by the public. He thought the Wrens' apparently lower status compared to army 
and RAF women contributed to the increase in desertion being experienced. 'Parents 
and prospective employers, husbands and sweethearts' had an impression that 
service in the WRNS was like 'any other civilian job which may be terminated at the 
best by a week's notice, at the worst by downing tools, and walking out.'111 He did 
not urge reversing the NDA decision, which he described as being 'intended as a 
compliment, and loyally understood and accepted as such by the Service'.112 Rather, 
he suggested the need to describe the WRNS as part of the Royal Navy.113 Mr 
Samuel ascribed taunting of Wrens by other servicewomen to 'feelings akin to an 
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the WRNS'.114 Taking up Admiral Burnett's suggestion, 
he proposed that the WRNS be described as ‘part of the permanent organisation of 
the Royal Navy’ in place of its weaker description as ‘an integral part of the naval 
organisation’.115 The Admiralty Board accepted his advice.116 Nevertheless, not 
coming under military law, Wrens remained a uniformed corps of civilians.  
 
Regular Services' Titles 
The women's Services were created as reserve formations before the outbreak of war 
and two of them used 'auxiliary' in their titles. The term, along with 'territorial' used 
in the army, was commonly applied to reserve formations, trained as units and 
available for service in the event of war. Thus, its application to companies in the 
ATS and the WAAF was in keeping with standard practice. In 1941, the word 
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'auxiliary' was adopted in the army as the feminine of 'soldier', to refer to non-
commissioned members of the ATS.117  
 
'Auxiliary' proved to be a problematic term for those setting up regular service for 
women in the RAF and the army. The Admiralty had no issue to address as there 
was nothing in the title ‘Women’s Royal Naval Service’ that caused difficulty. 
Retaining it was seen to have the advantage of continuity with its successful wartime 
predecessor.118 However, 'Auxiliary Territorial Service' and 'Women's Auxiliary Air 
Force' would not be accurate titles in the military sense of the word 'auxiliary'. 
Nevertheless, Clement Attlee favoured retention of these existing titles which had 
‘gathered … a great amount of goodwill and honour.’119 While he acknowledged 
that use of 'auxiliary' would be militarily incorrect, he did not regard that as a 
conclusive reason for change.120  
 
Use of the term 'auxiliary' was problematic in a general sense as well as in military 
language. When applied to servicewomen, it came to be seen as indicating their 
lower status compared with that of servicemen. For example, Ben Parkin (Labour 
MP for Stroud who served as an RAF officer during the war) urged that 'auxiliary' 
be dropped from the title to be adopted in the post-war service for airwomen. He 
described it as having an 'honourable connotation' but 'a relic of the time when 
[women] were brought in as odd drivers, orderlies or generally decorative adjuncts 
to an office.'121 
 
This interpretation of 'auxiliary' as signifying women's lower military status has 
become common usage in scholarly works where it has been linked to women being 
non-combatants. For example, Gerard DeGroot described servicewomen as 
'marginalized as auxiliaries, in order to emphasize the difference between 
combatants and non-combatants.'122 Jutta Schwarzkopf suggested that 'the 
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designation "auxiliary" unequivocally signall[ed] women's subordinate status in the 
military' and that women were 'confined to "auxiliary" functions, defined by their 
exclusion from combat.'123 However, military use of the word did not necessarily 
imply 'non-combatant'. For example, at the outbreak of World War II, the men's 
Auxiliary Air Force contributed twenty flying squadrons and forty-four barrage 
balloon squadrons.124 
 
Despite Clement Attlee's sentimental attachment to the wartime titles, the Air 
Ministry and the War Office were determined to adopt new ones. The argument 
rumbled on until 1948. The Air Council believed that the title should reflect 
women’s integration into the Service. Consideration was given to designating 
women as ‘RAF’ with a signifier of gender such as RAF(W) or RAF(Women’s 
Division), similar to the means of identifying the men’s ground combat component, 
namely the RAF Regiment.125 Albert Alexander (Minister for Defence, formerly at 
the Admiralty) made the case for new titles to Clement Attlee in January 1948. He 
suggested 'RAF (Women's Section)' and either 'Royal Army Women's Corps' or 
'Royal Army Women's Service'.126 He argued that airwomen would be 'fully 
integrated with the RAF proper' and, therefore, would 'not be in any sense 
auxiliary'.127 On the use of 'ATS' for army women, he noted that women would be 
neither 'auxiliary' nor 'territorial'.128 Attlee finally gave way to the need for changes 
of titles 'with some reluctance'.129    
 
The problem of what new titles were acceptable was the subject of more discussion. 
'Women's Royal Army Corps' was chosen, apparently being the preference of the 
Royal family.130 The Air Ministry's proposal of RAF(W) was perceived as 
unappealing. Clement Attlee favoured 'Women's Royal Air Service'.131 However, 
Lord Tedder (Chief of the Air Staff) and Sir James Barnes (Permanent under 
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Secretary at the Air Ministry) 'attach[ed] the greatest importance to embodying the 
words "Royal Air Force" in any proposed title' as those for the other women's 
Services embodied 'Royal Navy' and 'army'.132 The Air Council preferred '... 
"Women of the Royal Air Force" as the accurate and logical title' but was prepared 
to compromise by reverting to the First World War designation of ‘Women’s Royal 
Air Force’.133 Royal assent was given in December 1948. The new titles came into 
use on 1 February 1949.134 
 
Ranks and Uniform Markings 
Status within military hierarchies was immediately evident through rank titles and 
the braids and badges worn on uniforms. Non-commissioned women's ranks in 
wartime Services had mainly conformed to titles used in equivalent men's Services. 
However, officers' ranks were different and this caused confusion because the 
standing of women's titles was not well understood. Mary Tyrwhitt, Director of the 
ATS from May 1946, was particularly keen to address the issue because 'The Army 
used to pretend they didn't know what our ranks meant and they called us "Miss" 
and refused to use our titles.'135 In 1949 she succeeded in arguing for the same titles 
as male officers.136  
 
In 1948, the Air Council decided to change the least understood titles of 'assistant 
section officer' and 'section officer' which were used for the most junior female 
officers. It replaced them with 'pilot officer' and 'flying officer', the same as ranks in 
use for men. However, it chose to retain other officer rank titles as they were 
deemed sufficiently close to those of men's to be understood (for example, wing 
officer rather than wing commander). In addition, women at those ranks were more 
likely to be employed in women's administration rather than in posts also open to 
men. Thus, the Air Council thought there was no need to make further changes.137  
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With the War Office ready to make its formal submission on identical rank titles for 
female officers to the King in early 1950, the Service Ministers' Committee asked 
the Air Council to reconsider.138 Senior RAF members remained against the idea on 
the grounds that 'the Service in general [might regard] it as being a little ridiculous 
for male rank titles to be applied to women officers.'139 Air Chief Marshal Sir John 
Slessor, now Chief of the Air Staff, thought men might resent the move. Discussion 
also revealed a wider anxiety. Air Chief Marshal Sir George Pirie and Air Marshal 
Sir Victor Goddard thought RAF rank titles inappropriate for all ground-based 
officers, male or female. Titles created in 1918 reflected the fact that then nearly all 
officers flew aeroplanes or commanded formations of aeroplanes. The continuation 
of wartime specialist ground-based roles such as RAF Regiment, secretarial and 
accounting, equipment, catering and technical, left the anomaly of non-aircrew men 
also holding ranks suggestive of flying duties. Addressing the question of rank titles 
of ground-based officers was deemed too contentious. The Air Council shelved the 
issue.140 Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State, was unwilling to override RAF 
members of the Council but lamented that the Service, which he regarded as 
pioneering the integration of women, was now to lag behind the army.141  
 
Rather disparagingly, Air Marshal Sir Leslie Hollinghurst (Air Member for 
Personnel) described the Navy as having 'contracted out as usual.'142 It did not come 
under pressure to change rank titles because the Service Ministers' Committee 
agreed it was in a 'special position, since they were a civilian service.'143 
Commandant Woollcombe did not press the case. Despite her colourful description 
of WRNS’ officer ranks as 'rather an unhappy blend of the Merchant Navy, the 
Railway and the Asylum’, she thought it 'undesirable and sometimes inconvenient 
that men and women Officers should bear the same rank titles.'144 She was against 
any change and there the matter rested. 
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The Navy also maintained distinctive markings on men and women's uniforms. The 
pattern was established during the First World War when the Treasury 'forbade the 
WRNS to wear gold lace, because of the wasting of gold.'145  Blue lace was chosen 
instead. In addition, the so-called 'executive curl' on male officers' sleeves was 
replaced with a diamond (Figures 1.1a and 1.1b). This gave Wrens a strong sense of 
identity as a distinctive Service. The WAAF, and from 1949 the WRAF, used the 





Figure 1.1a Rank Marking and Cap - RN Lieutenant 
 
 
Figure 1.1b Rank Marking and Cap - WRNS Second Officer 
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Figure 1.2b Rank Marking and Cap - RAF Flight Lieutenant 
 
 
Figure 1.2c Rank Marking and Cap - WRAF Flight Officer 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 from Colour Supplement to J. Hammerton (ed.), The Book of the WAAF. 
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Exclusion from Essential Functions 
The extent of women's participation in the armed forces was governed by their 
relationship to combat. Were women combatants? Could they be employed in 
combat roles? What constituted a combat role? 'Combatant' and 'combat role' were 
not defined but were open to interpretation.  
 
Status as Non-Combatants 
From the outset of the Second World War, servicewomen were regarded as non-
combatants. This was explicit in the 1938 Royal Warrant which founded the ATS 
and its RAF companies.146 The WRNS was also formed for non-combatant work. 
Although the ATS and the WAAF were declared as part of the armed forces in April 
1941, this change did not necessarily imply that women were combatants.  
 
The meaning of non-combatant blurred as the war progressed. The Amendment to 
the National Service Act (1941) allowed women to use lethal weapons if they agreed 
in writing.147 In March 1942, the Air Council clarified that women would 'not be 
trained in the use of firearms or other lethal weapons, or be employed in any trade 
which involv[ed] combatant duties.'148 Acknowledging that there was 'no absolute 
distinction between combatant duties and non-combatant', the Council decreed that 
airwomen would not be employed as 'PAC [parachute and cable] operators, 
armoured car crew, motor-boat crew and ground gunner'.149 It did allow women to 
volunteer for what it called 'borderline trades' which included balloon operators, 
torpedo-men (sic) and armourers.150 Meanwhile Wrens were trained to use Lewis 
guns on harbour craft and attached booby traps to balloon cables.151 Servicewomen 
also went into occupied Europe for the Special Operations Executive.152 
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The extent of liability to participate in combat was also problematic for airmen 
employed in ground-based trades. From 1937 to June 1940, most airmen trained 
only to drill with weapons, not to fire them. With the threat of invasion, airmen were 
then expected to use small arms to supplement army detachments which guarded 
airfields. Following the fall of Crete, where there was a failure to defend a key 
airfield, defence of RAF bases transferred from the Army to the RAF. The RAF 
Regiment, akin to an army regiment, was created for this purpose and other airmen 
continued in support of the task. Post-war, training all airmen in ground combat 
proved contentious because of the cost of ammunition and diversion of men from 
their normal duty. This was particularly of concern in highly skilled trades, such as 
engineering, where the priority was to employ men in their primary role. A policy of 
2 hours training per week, introduced in 1946, was not sustained. It was replaced by 
a policy of up to 48 hours training per annum in 1951.153 
 
In 1941, Air Commandant Trefusis Forbes wanted airwomen to be trained to use 
firearms as part of the wartime initiative to provide more defence forces for 
airfields.154 She claimed that the other female Directors were against the idea of 
women using lethal weapons because they perceived a psychological difference 
between ‘women having immediate responsibility for the killing of men and being 
indirectly responsible’.155 She believed that they thought ‘it would be detrimental to 
the “womanliness of women” to be actually responsible’.156 However, she asserted 
that airwomen were bright enough to realise that the distinction between direct and 
indirect killing was ‘not worth considering’.157 Whether or not this was an accurate 
reflection of Commandant Mathews' view in 1941, by 1943 she was in favour. 
Arguing her case that women should come under the Naval Discipline Act, she 
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pointed out that the Admiralty Board had approved the training of some Wrens in 
the use of guns.158  
 
Discussion of weapons training for servicewomen arose post-war in the War Office 
where there was some strong support. However, the idea does not appear to have 
been formally considered by the Army Board and it did not become policy.159 
Opponents of the proposal cited cost of training, expenditure of ammunition, 
assumed adverse public opinion, parental objections which might have an impact on 
recruiting, and the views of servicewomen who had joined without this obligation.160 
Examples of communist countries' employment of women as fighters were also used 
as a reason against Britain adopting such a policy.161 Lucy Noakes' detailed analysis 
concluded that 'Even when women wore an army uniform their gendered identity 
took precedence ...' and that the creation of regular service reinforced the combat 
taboo.162  
 
Major General McCandlish, who led on this policy, speculated that the Navy would 
regard the WRNS as 'non-combatant shore-based employees' while the RAF might 
train women for defensive duties as part of its philosophy of integrating women into 
the Service.163 However, at a meeting to discuss War Office proposals the reverse 
positions were taken by Navy and RAF representatives. Mr Bird, whose status and 
department were not noted, and Commandant Woollcombe attended on behalf of the 
Admiralty. Mr Bird reported that no action had been taken in the Admiralty, but that 
it was probable that compulsory training for defensive purposes would be 
introduced.164 This seems a doubtful representation of the Admiralty's position, as 
the Board had already decided (as Major General McCandlish indicated) that Wrens 
would retain civilian status. The Air Ministry, represented by Group Captain 
Jackman from the Directorate of Personnel Services, said the question had not yet 
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been considered. He could not say what future policy might be but that the 'Air 
Ministry had no intention of introducing compulsory weapon training for the WRAF 
at present.'165 This reflected the position of the previous Secretary of State, Philip 
Noel-Baker. In a letter in 1947 to his War Office counterpart, he recorded his view 
that he hoped women would never have combatant status.166 In the event, the 
initiative stalled in the War Office. All servicewomen were deemed non-combatants 
although this was known at the time not to be their position in law.167 The exclusion 
of airwomen from training in the use of firearms was subsequently embodied in the 
Queen's Regulations for the RAF.168 
 
Seagoing and Flying 
In 1943, in reply to a question in the House of Commons during the naval estimates 
debate, Captain Pilkington (Civil Lord of the Admiralty) said that ‘… the principle 
of WRNS serving afloat [was] not objected to by the Admiralty … But the real 
difficulty about this proposal [was] accommodation on board.’ He went on: ‘… if, 
when and where it [was] found practicable to employ Wrens afloat that [would] 
certainly be done.’169 Such professed optimism about the role that women could play 
was absent from the 1946 policy proposal for regular Service. Without equivocation 
it declared that ‘it [was] not, of course, intended to employ WRNS on board ship.’170  
 
As the RAF did not permit women to fly during the war, female pilots joined the Air 
Transport Auxiliary (ATA) which was part of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. In 
1943, when the Admiralty suggested introducing WRNS’ pilots for limited flying 
roles, the Air Ministry objected. It suggested that Wrens also join the ATA as it 
would embarrass the RAF if its women did not fly while Wrens could. 171 The 
Ministry of Aircraft Production urged the Air Ministry to create a WAAF flying 
section whose pilots could then be seconded to the ATA in the same way as RAF 
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pilots.172 Air Chief Marshal Leigh Mallory, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied 
Expeditionary Air Force, also wrote to Chief of the Air Staff in support of female 
pilots. He argued that women, as an integral part of the RAF, should also be ‘part of 
its essential function – flying’, particularly as Wrens could ‘man (sic) craft at sea’.173  
 
Women were also excluded from most rear crew duties including those remote from 
contact with the enemy such as target drogue operations and even pigeon keepers.174 
Drogue operations were rejected on the grounds that women were ‘physically 
unsuitable to the work’.175 The five airwomen trained as pigeon keepers were not 
posted to the role because duties included training flight crews in how to release 
birds into the slipstream of an aircraft.176 Some airwomen did eventually make it 
into the air in the traditional women’s role of nursing. The need for medical 
orderlies to attend wounded personnel being evacuated by air gave rise to the 'Flying 
Nightingales'.177 Less heralded were the short trips undertaken by female mechanics 
who participated in air testing of repaired equipment.178  
 
The question of women pilots was discussed for some years after the war. In 1947 
Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Air, announced in the House of Commons 
that women aircrew would be trained ‘when circumstances permitted’.179 This 
position, agreed at the Air Council in February 1947 and again in September 1949, 
seemed to be more than the empty promise about seafaring made by Captain 
Pilkington.180 However, despite attempts by successive Secretaries of State for Air 
(Arthur Henderson having taken over from Noel-Baker in October 1947) to bring 
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about a WRAF flying role, circumstances never were quite right. Objections were 
raised about cost, the lack of capacity in the training system, the waste of places 
needed for men and a lack of suitable roles.181 Peter Elliott, of the RAF Museum, 
noted that a promised review in 1951 has not been traced, but that the Air Council 
finally decided to drop the idea in December 1954.182 However, female pilots from 
the ATA could join the RAF Volunteer Reserve, as could other female pilots if they 
had sufficient hours of flying experience. In 1952, out of a total of 5,126 reserve 
force pilots, 59 were female. The scheme closed to new entrants in July 1953 when 
the budget for Reserve flying schools was cut.183  
 
Although financial arguments were made against having WRAF pilots, there were 
two categories of men who received flying training without giving full value for 
money through subsequent operational flying. Some male officers in the Technical 
Branch were trained to 'wings' standard although they would undertake no 
productive flying. It was thought to be good for the RAF if male ground branch 
officers had a connection with flying as it would give them a 'common outlook'.184 
In contrast to the argument about women aircrew, an objection about wasted 
resources was dismissed because cutting the programme would not achieve great 
economies.185 Selected national servicemen also trained as aircrew up to basic flying 
training standard, with a commitment to keep current at this level for their period in 
the Reserve.186 By July 1950, the RAF was training three hundred national 
servicemen per annum as pilots.187 Peter Elliott observed that some members of the 
Air Council suggested it would be better to train regular members of the WRAF than 
national servicemen. However, their view did not prevail.188  
 
                                                 
181 TNA: AIR 8/793, Flying Employment for Members of the Permanent Women’s Service, Jun 
1947, and Air Council Standing Committee Minutes, Jun 1947; Peter Elliott, ‘The RAF’s First 
Women Pilots’, pp.170-74. 
182 Peter Elliott, ‘The RAF’s First Women Pilots’, p.172. 
183 TNA: AIR 20/8985, McGlennon to Private Secretary to Air Member for Personnel, 24 Sep 1952 
and Brief for Auxiliary and Reserve Forces Committee Meeting, 30 Nov 1953. 
184 TNA: AIR 6/90, Air Council Standing Committee Conclusions, 11 Oct 1946. 
185 Ibid. 
186 TNA: AIR 6/136, Air Council Standing Committee Memoranda, Pilot and Navigator Training, 
Aug 1946 and AIR 6/90, Air Council Standing Committee Conclusions, 4 Sep 1946. There were 
three further stages (applied training, crew training and operational conversion unit) before pilots 
reached operational squadrons.  
187 TNA: AIR 8/1591, Sandford to Sir Maurice Dean (MOD), 3 Jul 1950. 
188 Peter Elliott, ‘The RAF’s First Women Pilots’, p.172. 
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The Services agreed that women were non-combatant. It seemed axiomatic in the 
Admiralty that women would not serve at sea. In the Air Ministry, flying roles were 
not implemented on the familiar grounds of prejudice, priority accorded to men's 
careers and costs.  
 
Roles for Women 
 
The post-war employment of women was part of broader restructuring as the armed 
forces restored regular service career patterns and planned peacetime national 
service for men. Reviews were initiated to rationalize working methods, plan the 
work force and cut costs. Planning to be about 30% larger than its 1938 strength, the 
Navy wanted to revert to regular service volunteers, backed up by a substantial 
trained reserve. The Admiralty Board believed that 'conscription would not on 
balance be to the advantage of the Navy'. Although it recognised that it would need 
to 'take its share of conscripts', In fact, the Navy took comparatively few national 
servicemen (Table 1.2).189 The RAF planned for the increased importance of air 
power. At nearly three times its 1938 size, it would be significantly dependent on 
national servicemen.  
 
Table 1.2 National Servicemen – Allocations 1947-50 
 









    
1947 12,700 48,600 122,100 
1948 3,700 46,700 100,500 
1949 8,100 43,100 115,400 
1950 1,300 52,300 120,600 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Reports, Cmd. 7559 (Nov 1948), Cmd. 8017 (Aug 1950), 
Cmd. 8338 (Aug 1951), (London: HMSO). 
 
Navy 
Post-war, only 27 categories of work were expected to remain open to women. The 
proposed allocation of ratings had a traditional look, with over 42% of the jobs 
being in catering and domestic duties and a further 24% in clerical work.190 Wrens 
work within the Fleet Air Arm was in doubt, being contingent upon the decision on 
                                                 
189 TNA: ADM 167/126, Admiralty Board Minutes, 14 Oct 1946.  
190 NMRN: 1988.350.57, Permanent Service (305B), AFO 6356a/46, WRNS Ratings Allocation for 
December 1946, 18 Oct 46. See Appendix 3 for categories open to women. 
Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service 
59 
how men's work was to be organised. One study advocated more integration with 
seagoing categories, which would have reduced opportunities for Wrens. A second 
study favoured the wartime system of specialist categories for aircraft work. This 
specialist solution prevailed. As a consequence, men in these roles would spend the 
bulk of their careers in shore-based work.191 This decision re-opened the work to 
Wrens.192 Abolition of other roles was also partially reversed in the late 1940s. 
Operator jobs in telegraphy and telephony were restored to the list and cinema 
operators were likewise reprieved.193 
 
The working party established to set up women's regular service wanted to minimize 
overheads to ensure the plan was economic. As a separate organisation, the WRNS 
had its own administrative systems and staff for matters of policy, recruiting, 
selection, training and drafting. At unit level, women administered discipline and 
undertook welfare and accommodation duties. Given the desire to keep this 
unproductive component small, it followed that women should not be employed in 
small groups which would create excessive demand for female support and 
supervisory staff.194 The other key guiding principle was that non-administrative 
staff were to be employed as replacements for naval men predominantly on a one-
for-one basis. However, a more generous complement of five female cooks for four 
men could be allowed if work was judged to be heavy.195 The target strength for the 
WRNS kept changing. When it was set at 9,500 ratings in 1947, about 14% were 
expected to be employed in domestic and administrative work for the WRNS. This 
was described as slightly higher than the equivalent in the RN.196  
 
Branches of the Navy were invited to consider where they could employ WRNS 
officers in place of men. Bids were received for 201 female officers of whom 67 
were to replace warrant rather than commissioned officers. This was regarded as a 
                                                 
191 According to naval historian Eric Grove, the Fleet Air Arm employed 24,000 men in shore 
establishments in 1947. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II 
(London: Bodley Head, 1987), p.27. 
192 TNA: ADM 1/19887, Naval Air Personnel Committee Report, Feb 1946.  
193 NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR 1077(47) Regulations and Instructions WRNS, Appendices 3 and 4, 31 
Dec 1947. 
194 TNA: WO 32/13160, Structure and Conditions of Service for the Permanent WRNS: Ratings’ 
Paper (Jul 1947) and Officers’ Paper (Oct 1946). 
195 Ibid, Inter-Service Working Party on the Permanent Women's Services - Final Report, 7 Jan 1948.  
196 Ibid, Structure and Conditions of Service for the Permanent WRNS: Ratings’ Paper, Jul 1947.  
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‘most unhealthy sign’ as it would limit the opportunities for promotion for male 
ratings seeking the highest non-commissioned rank.197 The list was cut to reduce the 
number of warrant officer replacements. In addition, the requirement for cipher 
officers was dropped. Machines operated by ratings were being introduced instead. 
Specialist roles open to women included meteorology, safety equipment, air radio, 
communications, secretariat, pay and cash, air stores, catering, clothing and 
victualling.198  
 
In terms of organisation, a choice had to be made as to whether female officers were 
to be entered into separate, specialist branches or to form one branch. Commandant 
Mathews favoured the former idea for junior officers, with senior officers coming 
together as one branch as they would not be employed in place of men, but only on 
WRNS work.199 However, a meeting chaired by Rear Admiral Denny decided in 
favour of one branch for all rather than sub-dividing a small cohort.200 All junior 
officers were to be capable of being employed on a mixture of specialist and female 
administration duties.201  
 
Air Force 
While the majority of trades remained open to women post-war, changes were 
made.202 Some roles were no longer needed, for example barrage balloon work. 
Others, such as air movements' assistant roles and five clerical trades, were initially 
reserved for national servicemen whose time spent in training was to be kept at 
under four months on average.203 However, women were preferred to national 
servicemen as radar and wireless assistants because they would give longer 
service.204 Women were excluded from the wartime role of armament assistants 
because it involved weapon handling. This was now seen as incompatible with their 
                                                 
197 NMRN: 1988.350.58-9, Permanent WRNS Officer Force, 20 Aug 1946. For bids for officer posts, 
see Appendix 3. 
198 TNA: WO 32/13160, Structure and Conditions of Service for the Permanent WRNS Officer 
Corps, Oct 1946. See Appendix 3 for planned officer numbers. 
199 NMRN: 1988.350.58-9, Director WRNS to Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel, 30 May 1946. 
200 Ibid, Minutes of Meeting, 23 Aug 1946. 
201 TNA: WO 32/13160, Structure and Conditions of Service for the Permanent WRNS: Officers’ 
Paper, Oct 1946. 
202 For a list of trades for airwomen in 1949, see Appendix 3.  
203 TNA: AIR 19/808, Air Member for Personnel to Secretary of State, 5 Jan 1949; AIR 2/10626, 
Report of the Trade Structure Committee, Part I, Mar 1949. 
204 TNA: AIR 2/10237, Meeting on the Field of Trades Open to WAAF,  21 Oct 1948. 
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non-combatant status.205 A paper on the future of the technical branch noted that 
airwomen would not be trained to the highest standard as apprentice training was too 
long and females would not be allowed to join at the young age specified for the 
scheme.206  
 
Unlike the WRNS which adopted a single branch, WRAF officers could join the 
majority of branches for non-flying personnel. The technical branch planned to take 
only a third of its strength as graduate entrants; the majority of places were to be 
filled by those commissioning from the ranks. However, with few women taking 
appropriate degrees and airwomen not eligible for apprenticeships and so not 
reaching the top echelon of engineering trades, there would be limited opportunities. 
In addition, women were deemed incapable of managing a section comprised 
predominantly of men. The wartime practice of employing female officers to 
supervise airwomen working in signals and radar operations was discontinued. Thus, 
available technical branch jobs were reduced to a handful in statistics and analytical 
work.207 This unwelcoming approach led to the near demise of the female technical 
officer, with just two appearing in the Air Force List of 1948.208 Nevertheless, the 
Technical Branch remained on the list of opportunities open to WRAF officers.209 
 
There was an important structural difference between the WRAF and the WRNS. 
The WRAF would not administer itself but it would be integrated into RAF systems. 
Consequently, it was estimated that only 1.4% of women would not be in roles also 




                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 TNA: AIR 20/6538, S11 to DWAAF, 5 Mar 1947. Apprentices were aged 15½ - 17 on entry. 
Women could not join until they were 17½ - 18 (see Chapter 2). 
207 Ibid, Employment of WAAF Officers in the Technical Branch, Apr 1947. See Appendix 3 for 
officer branches for the WRAF. 
208 Air Force List, (London: HMSO, October 1948). The technical branch included engineering, 
signals and armaments. Of approximately 417 female officers employed in signals during the war, the 
vast majority were part of the administration and special duties branch. Only about 45 were 
commissioned in the technical branch (TNA: AIR 20/6538, Employment of WAAF Officers in the 
Technical Branch, Apr 1947). 
209 TNA: AIR 2/11882, Air Ministry Order A76, 20 Jan 1949. 
210 TNA: WO 32/13160, Comparative Statement of Draft Schemes 16 Aug 1947.  
Chapter 1: Creating Regular Service 
62 
Conclusion 
'Lessening the need for men' was not the key driver behind policy decisions in either 
the Air Ministry or the Admiralty. As plans developed for the post-war period, 
women were seen in both Ministries as implying the loss of an equivalent number of 
more useful men. Women's Services would put a strain on budgets as they came 
with overhead costs for administration, training and accommodation. Women would 
serve for shorter periods of time than regular servicemen, leading to additional 
recruiting to find replacements.   
 
However, it was common ground that women would be needed in a future major 
war. The question to be resolved was how to prepare for that eventuality. Would 
reserve forces be adequate or was there merit in maintaining regular cadres? In the 
Air Ministry, the outcome hinged on Air Marshal Slessor overturning Air Marshals 
Sutton and Evill's preference for a reserve only. Slessor's main argument was based 
on the need for all components of the RAF to be ready at the start of hostilities and 
lessons of the early war years' problems in creating women's corps from scratch. In 
1946, military need overcame residual objections concerning lack of value for 
money. As the challenge of maintaining the size of the RAF became clearer, 
lessening the need for men was an additional argument in favour of employing 
women. While the War Office reached the same conclusion, the Admiralty was 
reluctant because it was less reliant on women. As with national service, it went 
along with the other Services, although it would have preferred to revert to an all-
male, volunteer Navy.  
 
Having determined that there would be regular service for women, the Air Ministry 
decided that they would be integrated into the RAF. This policy flowed from the 
view that women were interchangeable with men in ground-based work, including 
on operational stations. The 'WRAF' did not exist as an organisation, rather it was an 
administrative designation. Women enlisted or commissioned into the RAF and had 
the same powers of command as men. Rank insignia were identical to men's. 
However, full equality was denied when different titles were retained for senior 
officer ranks. The debate on titles revealed not only a view that women would not 
expect to command men at more senior levels, but also ambiguity over the RAF's 
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application of flying related ranks to officers (male and female) who were only 
employed in ground-based branches. This argument illustrated the key divide in the 
RAF which was between those who flew and those who did not. It was not solely a 
phenomenon of gender.  
 
In contrast, the WRNS remained a separate Service with civilian status. The 
Admiralty deemed it unacceptable for shore-based women to have the same standing 
of rank and authority as seagoing men. The ruling that the Naval Discipline Act 
would not apply to the WRNS was rooted in women's inferior position in the Navy. 
However, it was presented in terms of Wrens' superiority over airwomen and female 
soldiers. The decision resulted in women not exercising powers of command in their 
own right. Wrens were marked out as distinctive also through rank titles and 
uniform insignia, aiding a strong female identity which was much less evident for 
airwomen.  
 
Gender was the primary factor in consideration of combatant status and roles. As a 
matter of policy and crucially for career prospects, women were treated as non-
combatants. They were excluded from small arms training, flying and seagoing. 
There was no discussion of seagoing for Wrens. The Admiralty treated as self 
evident that women, by virtue of their gender, would not be sailors. However, the 
issues were more open to debate in the other Services. In the War Office, some 
argued unsuccessfully for women to be armed for self defence. It is unclear to what 
extent the Air Ministry considered this self defence question. Small arms training 
was contentious even for airmen in ground-based trades. Nevertheless, airmen were 
obliged to undertake annual weapons' training and had the liability to be armed if the 
need arose. Airwomen did not. The Air Ministry's deliberations on flying policy 
brought out a distinction between aircraft types. It was agreed in principle (though 
ultimately not in practice) that women could fly passenger aircraft, but not armed 
aircraft. This distinction between types of aeroplanes would allow women to be 
described as non-combatant. Nevertheless, men flying unarmed aircraft still enjoyed 
'combatant' status, although they were lower in status than men flying armed 
aircraft.  
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All three Services cut back roles available to women compared with the wartime 
peak. The majority of RAF support trades were open to women in theory, although 
there was evidence of stereotypical bias against their employment in engineering. 
Women were also initially not eligible for some roles because of the need to find 
productive work for national servicemen whose even shorter period of service 
limited their usefulness. For officers, of lasting significance was the move to 
professional support roles. The benefit of having dedicated officers rather than 
aircrew in roles such as engineering, catering and administration had been proven 
during the war. These specialist ground-based roles for officers would provide 
opportunities for women to pursue careers outside of the WRAF’s hierarchy. Debate 
in the Navy again focussed on the divide between seagoing and shore-based work. 
This was particularly evident in the issue of whether women should continue in 
engineering in the Fleet Air Arm. Once the decision had been made that men would 
remain as aircraft specialists and would not train for other seagoing work, then these 
roles were re-opened to Wrens. As Lucy Noakes argued in connection with women 
in the army, women were seen as releasing men for higher value work at sea.  
 
Women in the RAF and the WRNS were thus established on very different terms. 
The former served with men on operational stations while the latter were excluded 
from the environment in which the majority of men worked. As an integrated 
component of the air force, women had a firm foothold. The WRNS, as a separate 
organisation from the men’s Service, was less well established. The implications of 
these different starting points and the transition from temporary to regular status are 
taken up in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2: Establishing Women's Military Careers: Striking a 
Balance between Gender and Armed Forces' Norms 
 
In the autumn of 1948, an exchange of correspondence between Sir Stafford Cripps 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Albert Alexander (formerly First Sea Lord, now 
Minister for Defence) on terms of service encapsulated their different perspectives 
on servicewomen. Cripps suggested that female officers should be paid on the 
civilian nurses' pay scale. Cripps described nurses as 'an important class of 
professional women engaged on women's work' and he argued that their pay 
provided a more appropriate comparator than that of male officers.1 Alexander 
rejected Cripps' proposal, arguing that it was 'hardly calculated to make women 
officers feel that they [were] an integral part of their respective Services.'2  
 
Were female military personnel to be treated as 'women', with civilian employment 
norms prevailing, or as 'service personnel', fitting into the existing armed forces 
regulations? How was this concept of a new career for women to be realised?  
 
Through examination of the Directors of the women's Services and their roles, the 
devising of terms and conditions of service, and the career structures put in place for 
the WRNS and the WRAF, this chapter suggests that the outcomes were a balance 
between the application of armed forces and civilian norms. Women's non-
combatant status is seen as a key factor in pay negotiations and in establishing career 
paths. In adopting conservative approaches to regulations and practices on marriage 
and pregnancy, the idea of long-term careers for women was fundamentally flawed. 
Policy-makers failed to address the barriers to family life that David French also 
observed as hindering men's army careers following the Second World War.3 In 
addition to gender-based factors, what also emerges is the importance of the RAF's 
and the RN's differing organisational philosophies of integration and separation in 
the shape that women's military careers were to take, the ethos of the women’s 
Services and the scope for female leadership.  
 
                                                 
1 TNA: T213/489, Cripps to Alexander, 8 Sep 1948. 
2 Ibid, Alexander to Cripps, 22 Oct 1948. 
3 David French, Military Identities, p.293. 
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The Directors and Their Roles
4 
Drafting a history of the WAAF after the war, Group Officer Constance Woodhead 
assessed the problem of finding senior women officers in these terms: 
 
'Our ages varied from twenty-five to near fifty ... one of us, at least, bore an 
ancient and noble name, many were from "good county" families [original 
emphasis], some from the professional classes, some from the world of 
commerce ... but hardly one career woman, not a single University don or 
teacher, hardly a woman with serious experience of public or business life 
behind her. ... women already launched on a successful career were naturally, 
in all but a few cases, unable or unwilling to give up that career for a nebulous 
future in anything as new as a women's military service. It was left to a 
handful of inexperienced women ... to guide and control the very big service 
which the WAAF became.'5 
 
Her assessment echoed that made earlier by Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, the first 
Director of the ATS. An academic at Birkbeck College, she was able to take on the 
role in 1938 with the approval of College authorities because its lecture programmes 
were held in the evenings.6 She observed that initially women officers tended to be 
'leisured women' and that 'the officers who would be best worth having in war were 
by no means always those who could give most time in peace. ... The result, in spite 
of brilliant exceptions, was too large a proportion of the type of officer who was not 
accustomed to regular or exacting work.'7 Despite these misgivings, the women who 
would have the responsibility of helping to shape the women's regular Services 
emerged from those who had risen to the top during the Second World War.  
 
Women's Royal Naval Service 
In 1939, the Admiralty appointed Vera Laughton Mathews to be the Director of the 
WRNS. Born in 1888, the daughter of a naval officer and a Spanish born, Italian 
                                                 
4 A list of Directors of the WRNS and WAAF/WRAF is at Appendix 4. 
5 RAFM: X002.5638,Woodhead/Welsh Papers, Constance Woodhead, unpublished manuscript, 
Ch.XIII, pp.7-8. 
6 Gwynne-Vaughan, Service with the Army, p.96. 
7 Ibid, p.94. 
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mother, she served as a WRNS officer in the First World War.8 She had the ideal 
combination of service culture in her family and previous experience. Between the 
wars, she maintained her WRNS’ connections by taking the role of Vice President of 
the Wrens’ Association.9 University educated, she had worked as a journalist and 
had been active in the women’s suffrage movement.10 She put her own name 
forward for consideration for a role in the re-formed WRNS.11 She mentioned in her 
application that she was married with three school-age children and was surprised 
not to be questioned about her family responsibilities.12 She went on to serve 
throughout the war and into the early phase of preparation for the introduction of the 
permanent Service.  
 
Mathews handed over to Jocelyn Woollcombe in November 1946. With Angela 
Goodenough, the other potential contender, having died suddenly while serving in 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in February 1946, Woollcombe was the obvious choice as 
successor.13 She, too, came from a family rich in experience of Service life. Her 
father was a naval officer and her mother the daughter of a colonel. Woollcombe 
had worked as a clerk in Naval Intelligence from 1916-1919 and joined the WRNS 
in 1939. She served as Deputy Director from 1943 with responsibility for recruiting 
and training. She held the Director’s role for four years, relinquishing the post in 
1950.14   
 
Women's Auxiliary Air Force / Women's Royal Air Force 
The Admiralty found female leaders in whom it had confidence by virtue of their 
family backgrounds, pre-war experience and competence in office. The Air 
Council's experience was not as satisfactory as it lost trust in the Director of the 
WAAF in 1943. Jane Trefusis Forbes, a successful business woman who had been a 
company commander in the ATS from 1938, was appointed in 1939. Born in 1899 
                                                 
8 Lesley Thomas, 'Mathews, Dame Elvira Sibyl Maria Laughton (1888-1959)', Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography [henceforward ODNB]. 
9 The Wrens’ Association was established in 1920.  
10 ODNB: Lesley Thomas, 'Mathews, Dame Elvira Sibyl Maria Laughton'. 
11 Mathews, Blue Tapestry, p.53. 
12 It was not until 1941 that it became policy to accept mothers with school age children in the armed 
forces. TNA: T 162/688, Notes of a meeting, 23 Jan 1941.  
13 Goodenough’s obituary in the Wren magazine noted that she was appointed as Deputy Director in 
1939 and subsequently took on the welfare brief. NMRN: 1988.350.99.4, The Wren, No.171, Apr 
1946, p.4. 
14 ODNB: Lesley Thomas, 'Woollcombe, Dame Jocelyn May (1898-1986)'. 
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in Chile, where her father was working as a civil engineer, she had served during the 
First World War in the Women’s Volunteer Reserve.15 Trefusis Forbes’ tenure 
ended in crisis, the catalyst for which was Violet Markham’s report on amenities and 
welfare in the women’s Services. Markham considered the WAAF to be over-
centralized, with too much authority vested in the Directorate. She made a number 
of recommendations for delegation of powers to Headquarters and Air Ministry 
departments. Trefusis Forbes and Air Marshal Sutton (Air Member for Personnel) 
disagreed over the report and her relationship with her superiors never recovered. 
She noted at the time that Sutton had told her that she was ‘down the drain with the 
Air Council’16 The situation was resolved when Canada sought a visit to mark the 
anniversaries of its women’s Services. Trefusis Forbes was promoted and dispatched 
to North America, relinquishing her appointment as Director at the end of 
September 1943 in order to 'carry out "this very important special duty".'17  
 
Air Chief Marshal Portal had to recommend a successor to Trefusis Forbes to Sir 
Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State. He asked Air Marshal Sutton to suggest 
candidates. Sutton listed the nine most senior female officers, dismissing five of 
them as not having strong enough physiques to cope with the demands of the job. 
Another was rejected as 'temperamentally unsuited', leaving three officers to 
consider.18 Portal turned to his usual confidant, Wilfrid Freeman, for advice. 
Freeman, formerly Vice Chief of the Air Staff, was running the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production. However, he took a close interest in the WAAF in which his wife, 
Elizabeth, was an officer. In his parting shot as Vice Chief, he sent a paper to Air 
Council members including a diatribe about the quality of WAAF senior officers.19 
He believed that 'the wrong people are in high places' and this was leading to a 
decline in efficiency.20 Noted for being forthright, he now marked the women’s 
                                                 
15 ODNB: Tessa Stone, 'Forbes, Dame (Katherine) Jane Trefusis (1899-1971)'. 
16 RAFM: AC 72/17 Box 3, handwritten note by Trefusis Forbes, 3 Nov 1942. 
17 Christ Church, Oxford [henceforward ChCh]: Portal Papers, Box C, File 4, Minute from AMP to 
Secretary of State, 3 Sep 1943. Trefusis Forbes left the Service after completing tours to Canada, the 
USA and India. She regretted not being involved in the establishment of regular service and offered 
her services again in 1948 during the crisis over Berlin. Her offer was declined. RAFM: AC 72/17/3 
Box 2, letter from Air Ministry to Trefusis Forbes, 19 Jul 1948. 
18 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box D, File 5, AMP to CAS, 9 Jun 1943. 
19 TNA: AIR 6/62, Air Council Memoranda, WAAF Administration, 16 Oct 1942. 
20 Ibid. 
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card. 21 Two were dismissed as ‘dear old things’ and another pair as 'weak'. One was 
described as ‘mannerless and hopeless’, the next as ‘ill … presumably suffering 
from the change of life’.22 Of the three names left on Sutton's list, he thought one 
was 'weak' and another 'hopelessly weak and tarred with the same brush as the 
present Director.'23 That left Wing Officer Wynne-Eaton, whom Freeman saw as a 
candidate for deputy rather than Director.24 
 
Portal and Freeman favoured a less senior officer who did not feature on Sutton’s 
list. This was Felicity Hanbury, a friend of Elizabeth Freeman. She seemed to fit to 
perfection the model of an officer. Public school educated and presented at Court, 
her father had been a colonel in the army and her mother was the daughter of a 
politician. Having learned to fly, but with insufficient solo hours to satisfy the Air 
Transport Auxiliary, she made a successful career in the WAAF. Widowed early in 
the war, she was decorated with the MBE (military division) for her work at Biggin 
Hill during the Battle of Britain. In 1943 she was a squadron officer at Headquarters 
Bomber Command. In August of that year, she was promoted to acting wing officer 
and appointed to run the women’s officer training school at Windermere.25  
 
Having had his list of contenders rejected, Sutton put forward the next most senior 
female officer. Freeman's advice now was to 'lock up [Sutton] in an asylum' as his 
recommendation was 'the pleasantest but certainly the least fitted [WAAF officer] to 
be head of any Service.'26 Forwarding Sutton's brief to Sir Archibald Sinclair 
(Secretary of State for Air), Portal added his own recommendation of Felicity 
Hanbury. In defence of her age and lack of seniority (she was 30 years old and, 
having just been promoted to wing officer, she was two ranks below the level at 
which the appointment would be made), he cited the War Office's appointment of 
Jean Knox in 1941 in place of Helen Gwynne-Vaughan. He claimed that this had 
been a remarkable success.27 However, the War Office was about to dispense with 
                                                 
21 John Terraine, The Right of the Line: the Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945, 
(Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988), p.44. 
22 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box D, File 5, Freeman to Portal, 11 Jun1943. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Peake Papers: Box 6, Record of Service, Air Historical Branch, 28 Apr 1987.  
26 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box C, File 4, Freeman to Portal, 5 Sep 1943. 
27 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box C, File 3, CAS to Secretary of State, 16 Sep 1943.     
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Jean Knox's services. She retired at the age of 35 under circumstances that Roy 
Terry judged as never fully explained.28 
 
Sir Arthur Sinclair was not persuaded by Portal's case for Hanbury. Lady Welsh, 
who had also been favoured by Freeman, was appointed. Mary Welsh was in 
uncertain health and Portal expressed doubts as to whether she would stand the 
strains of the role.29 However, she had been successful as Inspector for the WAAF. 
Her potential appointment was also seen as politically sensitive because she was 
married to Air Marshal Sir William Welsh who was then serving as Head of an RAF 
delegation in the USA. Portal was conscious of the potential for accusations of 
nepotism, but he was prepared to defend her appointment.30 Mary Welsh took up the 
job in October 1943, holding the post for three years. 
 
Welsh’s performance disappointed as she did not tackle the issue of 'clearing out the 
deadwood' perceived by Portal and Freeman amongst senior women.31 The latter 
concluded in 1945 that he had been ‘utterly wrong about Welsh’ and lamented that 
he had recommended her for the job.32 Felicity Hanbury remained the favoured 
officer and Portal kept an eye on her progress. Crucially, he intervened in 1944 to 
prevent a case being made against her for inefficiency.33 Not only talented but 
enjoying the patronage of the Chief of the Air Staff, Hanbury continued upwards 
and was given postings at home and abroad which put her in the leading position 
when Welsh retired. Although only 33, this time there were no objections to her 
appointment on 1 December 1946. At last, the Air Council had found a female 
                                                 
28 Roy Terry, Women in Khaki, pp.132-33. Knox retired in October 1943. 
29 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box C, File 3, CAS to Secretary of State, 16 Sep 1943. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 ChCh: Portal Papers, Box D, File 3, Freeman to Portal, 22 Mar 1945. 
33 At the Women Officers' School, Hanbury crossed the station commander where the school was 
based and Headquarters’ staff (including the senior WAAF officer) who sided with him. But Hanbury 
had a host of impressive supporters, Violet Markham and Helen Gwynne-Vaughan amongst them. 
Portal, alerted by Freeman, called for the papers and dismissed the case as ill-founded.(ChCh: Portal 
Papers, Box D, Folder 3, correspondence between Freeman and Portal, Mar and Apr 1944; Box C, 
File 6, papers on the case against Hanbury, May 1944 and Portal to AMP 14 May 1944 and 1 Jun 
1944).  
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leader from a Service family, educated at public school and with ‘belly fire’ that 
seemed to be the model for an officer.34  
 
Each of the women's Services had new Directors in 1946 who would see them 
through the transition from wartime auxiliaries to regular service status. These new 
leaders (Jocelyn Woollcombe for the WRNS, Mary Tyrwhitt for the ATS and 
Felicity Hanbury for the WAAF) had the benefit of experience gained throughout 
the war, though this was still significantly less than that of men of equivalent rank. 
 
Roles of the Directors 
For the Air Force and the Navy, the adopted philosophies of integration with or 
separation from the men's Service were crucial to the roles of the Directors. 
 
Based in the Air Ministry, the WRAF Director worked in the Air Member for 
Personnel's department under the Director General Personnel. Her position was 
mainly advisory. Recognizing that women being employed in a predominantly male 
service might need special consideration, Air Ministry departments were obliged to 
consult her on policy issues affecting employment or well-being. The Director was 
not responsible for training, technical efficiency or discipline.35 Her executive 
authority was limited to the disposal of compassionate cases for postings or 
discharge. Her staff also participated in the selection of commissioning candidates 
and had a say in the posting of officers. Regulations gave the Director the right to 
visit any station where airwomen served. She also had direct access to any member 
of the Air Council, which marked the unique nature of the appointment as such 
access was not granted to men of equivalent rank.36  
 
Following negotiation with the Treasury, Felicity Hanbury's Directorate was 
established for two group officers, three wing officers, three squadron officers and 
six flight officers, three junior ranks and two civilian clerks. Three of these officers 
                                                 
34 For views on officer qualities: TNA: AIR 20/8992, Air Marshal Embry to Air Member for 
Personnel, 31 Jan 1950 and  AIR 75/47, Chief of Air Staff to Air Member for Personnel, 15 Aug 
1951. 
35 TNA: AIR 2/11882, Rank and Status of Director WRAF, undated minute circa 1948.  
36 TNA: T 213/288, Monk-Jones (Air Ministry) to Clough (Treasury), 2 Nov 1948. 
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were shared with the Personnel Services Directorates.37 However, the previous 
practice of having dedicated female administration officers at Command and Group 
Headquarters was abolished. Administrative officers now joined the more widely 
employable RAF Secretarial branch and all female officers were to train to deal with 
women's administration in addition to their specialist function.38   
 
In contrast to the advisory role in the WRAF, the importance of which was forecast 
to decline as integration of women into the RAF progressed, the Director WRNS 
had executive authority as head of her Service.39 She was responsible for recruiting 
of ratings, the selection, appointment and promotion of officers and initial recruit 
training and she advised on other issues. She was answerable to the Admiralty for 
the performance of the WRNS and for its morale and well-being.40 As with the 
WRAF, the WRNS Directorate worked in the personnel area. 
 
The wartime system of female administrative officers in the WRNS continued. The 
authority of the Director WRNS as head of Service conferred greater status to this 
network of administrative officers compared with the advisory roles that pertained in 
the WRAF. As well as posts at Command Headquarters, special posts were 
established at each unit where Wrens were employed. Known as Unit Officers, these 
women were responsible for training junior officers and NCOs in their general 
service duties, welfare, accommodation, discipline, programmes of education and 
vocational training, and sport. They were mostly of first officer rank and were 
treated as heads of department, although they were junior in rank to men who ran 
departments.41 Attending regular management meetings with men running 
establishments, unit officers had more power than WRAF officers who undertook 
women's administration only as an additional duty. Unit Officers provided an 
important mechanism for encouraging and maintaining a sense of identity among 
Wrens and for enforcing standards of dress and behaviour.  
 
                                                 
37 Ibid and reply 27 Nov 1948.  
38 TNA: AIR 2/11882, Air Ministry Order A76, 20 Jan 1949. 
39 TNA: AIR 2/11882, Rank and Status of Director WRAF, undated minute circa 1948.  
40 NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR 1077, Regulations and Instructions for the WRNS , Dec 1947 and Nov 
1951 editions.  
41 Ibid. 
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Terms and Conditions of Service 
Period of Service 
The Directors negotiated different joining ages for women compared with men and 
shorter periods of engagement. The latter was set at 4 years, on the assumption that 
young women would not wish to make a longer commitment.42 Age on entry was set 
at a minimum of 17 ½ or 18 in response to perceptions that it was inappropriate for 
younger girls to join the Services.43 The RAF's post-war planning committee feared 
that young girls would be a welfare burden on their officers and, if 'anything went 
wrong, there would be a greater reason for public outcry.'44  
 
Marriage and Pregnancy 
Like other employers, the Service Ministries had to decide whether employment of 
married women would continue post-war.45 The Air Ministry’s post-war manning 
policy committee was divided on the issue. In April 1944, those who favoured 
discharging women on marriage carried the argument.46 However, the question was 
discussed again later that year in the context of how to find sufficient women to 
serve for long enough to reach senior leadership ranks, both commissioned and non-
commissioned. Requiring married women to leave would result in the loss of 
potential candidates. Air Commandant Lady Welsh successfully argued in favour of 
women being given an option of discharge on marriage rather than automatic 
discharge. Accepting the retention of women who married while in the Service, the 
Committee then proposed that married women and widows be eligible to join. The 
recommendation that married women be permitted to serve came with the proviso 
that they could show that they would be available for posting wherever needed, 
including overseas.47  
                                                 
42 TNA: ADM 116/5579, Inter Service Working Party - Final Report, circa Jan 1948. Initial periods 
of regular service for youths varied from 5 years to 12 years (Ministry of Labour and National 
Service, Careers for Men and Women: His Majesty's Forces, (London: HMSO, 1950)). 
43 Minimum age on joining varied periodically but was not reduced below 17. For example, Report of 
the Advisory Committee on Recruiting, Cmnd.545, (London: HMSO, October 1958) suggested that 
recruiting age be reduced to 17 as it would entail no additional administrative difficulties compared 
with the prevailing minimum age of 17½.  
44 Peake Papers: Box 5, Post-War Planning Committee, 18th Interim Report, 14 Sep 1946. 
45 A small survey of local government, banks, railway companies and an airline, the BBC, and five 
large manufacturers showed that they had pre-war marriage bars but employed married women 
during the war. Of those that had decided a post-war policy, most stated an intention to re-introduce a 
marriage bar. Marriage Bar in the Civil Service, Cmd. 6886, (London: HMSO, 1946), pp.19-22. 
46 TNA: AIR 2/7824, Committee on Policy for Manning Post-War RAF, 14 Apr 1944. 
47 Ibid, 48th meeting, 3 Nov 1944 and 6th Interim Report, Dec 1944.  
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Like the planning committee in 1944, the Air Council was divided on the question 
of married women's employment when it considered terms of service in 1947. Air 
Marshal Sir William Dickson, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, took particular issue with 
commissioning of married women as officers. He argued that it was ‘a great 
mistake', claiming that it was ‘anti-social’ and ‘introduced an element of inflexibility 
in posting’.48 It is not clear whether this latter point implied a need to post married 
personnel with some degree of geographic proximity or whether the emphasis was 
on the undesirability of having married personnel serving at the same location. What 
is certain is that the posting of married women was regarded as problematic. Felicity 
Hanbury, in attendance at the Air Council meeting, suggested that ‘from the 
administrative point of view, it would be of the greatest value to have a few married 
women in the Service.’49 Her views were not elaborated in the minutes. She may 
have been making the same point as in 1944 about retaining candidates for senior 
ranks. With Hanbury receiving support from Air Marshal Slessor (Air Member for 
Personnel), the Air Council opted to allow married women to serve, subject to 
‘adequate administrative safeguards’ being introduced.50  
 
One such safeguard appears to have been the right of husbands of married applicants 
to object, though actual consent was not required.51 Recruiting literature made 
explicit the need for married women to prove they could fulfil service obligations.52 
What would constitute such proof was already seen as problematic. In 1947, 
Commandant Jocelyn Woollcombe noted that 'experience [was] daily showing the 
difficulty of establishing the mobility of married women applicants'.53  
 
Having determined that married women could join, the issue of those with children 
below the school leaving age (15 from 1947) also had to be addressed. In society at 
the time, there was an expectation that married women with young children would 
                                                 
48 TNA: AIR 6/76, Air Council Conclusions, 13 Feb 1947. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
51 TNA: AIR 2/7824, Conditions of Service and Emoluments of Women Employed in the RAF, 
Amendments to Note by the Air Ministry, Apr 1947. 
52 Ministry of Labour and National Service, Careers for Men and Women: His Majesty's Forces, 
(London: HMSO, 1950), Part D (WRNS) and Part H (WRAF); TNA: AIR 20/8992, 'Give Your 
Ambition Wings', information pamphlet, circa 1950.  
53 NMRN: 1988.350.57, WRNS Permanent Service Working Party, DWRNS to Head of Naval 
Branch, 2 Jan 1947. 
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not take paid employment outside of the home.54 Employment in the armed forces 
brought difficulties beyond those of most other work places. Frequent postings to 
different locations and hence separation from a woman's family network, 
accommodation difficulties due to the shortage of married quarters and restrictions 
on married couples working at the same establishment would make it extremely 
difficult for a married woman with children to serve on full military terms.  
 
For the servicewomen's Directors the willingness of all women to accept postings 
was crucial. If these smaller, peacetime Services were to be efficient, they could not 
afford cohorts that would only serve locally as in the wartime WRNS. In addition, 
enforcement of compulsory service overseas for women, avoided during the war, 
was now essential in the RAF because the establishment for WAAF personnel in 
Germany exceeded the supply of volunteers.55 The Air Ministry preferred airwomen 
to national servicemen for overseas duty because tours of duty abroad needed to be 
for about two years duration. Conscripted men would not serve for long enough to 
make overseas postings economic.56 Air Commandant Hanbury believed that 
women with children under the school leaving age would be unable to make the 
necessary commitment to serve where needed and that they should be excluded from 
joining. This was adopted as policy.57  
 
Rules on pregnancy were simple; discharge was automatic. In the WRAF, it 
occurred as soon as the pregnancy was reported.58 This was not contentious. It was 
common ground that the obligations of new motherhood were incompatible with 
military service. However, Commandant Jocelyn Woollcombe feared that the 
consequence of such a policy would be that ' "career" [original emphasis] WRNS 
Officers must almost inevitably be single women or at any rate women without 
families.'59 She wanted female officers to be able to rejoin and compete for senior 
                                                 
54 Pat Thane, 'Women Since 1945', in Paul Johnson (ed.), Twentieth Century Britain: Economic, 
Social and Cultural Change (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1994), pp.394-5. 
55 TNA: AIR 2/9278, WAAF Liability for Overseas Service, Air Member for Personnel, 22 Jul 1947. 
56 Ibid, Henderson to Alexander, 22 Nov 1947. The period of national service was expected to be 12 
months. It was increased to 18 months and, due to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, it became 
2 years.   
57 TNA: AIR 6/76, Air Council Conclusions , 24 Jul 1947. Felicity Hanbury was in attendance. 
58 TNA: AIR 19/808, Air Ministry Order A.75, 20 Jan 1949. Reference to discharge of Wrens on 
pregnancy did not quote the point at which women left the Service (NMRN: 1988.350.28, Notes from 
Conference of Senior Women Officers, 25 Oct 1949). 
59 NMRN: 1988.350.58-9, Director WRNS to Secretary to Second Sea Lord, 30 Sep 1946. 
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posts when 'their family responsibilities were less onerous'.60 Rear Admiral Denny 
(Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel) was not enthusiastic. He believed that 'the 
practice of importing a number of ex-officers in the higher ranks as a matter of 
course was most undesirable.'61 He thought that encouraging women to return should 
only be considered if there was a lack of suitable candidates for promotion.62  
 
Pregnancy of unmarried women was a particular concern to the authorities. In her 
memoir, Felicity Hanbury recalled that dealing with the discharge of pregnant single 
women had always 'held a very important place in the work of the WAAF 
administrative officers.'63 In such cases, the WAAF officer guided the woman to 
civilian agencies that could provide assistance, advised on how to register for work, 
and how to claim support from the father, through the civil courts if necessary.64 
When regulations for the regular WRAF were discussed at a meeting of Air Member 
for Personnel and his senior staff, Felicity Hanbury recorded that she 'listened, 
spellbound, to these men discussing, apparently in all sincerity, what punishment 
they should mete out to any airwoman or WRAF officer who became illegitimately 
pregnant.'65 Her opinion not being sought, she apparently interjected, ' "And what do 
you propose to do to the men involved? ... Promote them to Air Marshals, I 
suppose?" '66   
 
However, the Air Council did believe it had leadership obligations on moral 
standards and it took pregnancy of unmarried women seriously, particularly if 
fathers were in the RAF. Echoing a letter issued in May 1945, Air Marshal Sir 
Leslie Hollinghurst (Air Member for Personnel October 1949 -  October 1952) 
wrote to Commanders-in-Chief asking them to issue orders on the subject of moral 
                                                 
60 Ibid, Notes of a Meeting held on 19 Jun 1946 and Director WRNS to Secretary to Second Sea 
Lord, 30 Sep 1946. 
61 Ibid, Notes of a Meeting held on 19 Jun 1946. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Felicity Peake, Pure Chance, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1993) p.172. (Felicity Hanbury 
became Felicity Peake on marriage to Harald Peake in 1952). Indeed, the wartime WAAF Pamphlet 
Number 1, issued by the Director WAAF, was a guidance note on dealing with pregnant airwomen. 
(April 1942 issue in Peake Papers: Box 1). 
64 Peake Papers: Box 1, WAAF Pamphlet Number 1, Apr 1942.  
65 Peake, Pure Chance, p.172. 
66 Ibid.  
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responsibility and social relationships to officers and men under their command.67 
He acknowledged that relationships were inevitable. Where these led to marriage, he 
welcomed them. He described airwomen as making 'the finest possible wives for 
men making a career in the RAF',  having a 'steadying influence ... on their 
husbands.'68 However, relationships that resulted in pregnancy outside marriage 
were condemned as having a disproportionately damaging impact on the woman 
who had to give up her job and then cope with the social stigma and financial 
hardship of single motherhood. Such cases also resulted in bad publicity for the RAF 
and could hinder recruiting to the WRAF.69  
 
Hollinghurst regarded men as 'invariably by all standards the more blameworthy' for 
pregnancy outside marriage than airwomen.70 He directed that, where a man was 
senior in rank and was considered to have taken advantage of a young airwoman, he 
was to be charged under the Air Force Act. Advice was given on talks for men on 
conducting proper relationships with airwomen, sex education for young airwomen, 
steering young women away from the perils of excessive drinking, and the process 
for swift posting away to another station if an inappropriate relationship was 
detected. A system of collecting data on pregnancy of single women by RAF station 
was to be introduced. Station commanders were warned that 'When the incidence 
[was] unduly high it [would] normally be held to reflect upon the power of 
command and leadership ... and appropriate action should follow.'71 The paper did 
not quote an 'acceptable' average. Although the letter suggested great anxiety on the 
issue, it also noted that the incidence of pregnancy outside of marriage was lower 
than in the same age group in society. However, Air Marshal Hollinghurst pointed 
out that the RAF should have higher standards than the civilian community. 72 
 
                                                 
67 TNA: AIR 19/808, AMP to Commanders in Chief, 24 Jun 1950. The earlier letter (Air Marshal Sir 
John Slessor, May 1945) was written when there was concern about an increase in pregnancy in 
single women.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.      
72 Ibid. Hollinghurst's letter did not include statistics. However, research covering a 2.5 year period to 
June 1949 recorded 318 discharges of unmarried, pregnant airwomen (TNA: AIR 32/298, WRAF 
Wastage by Marriage and Pregnancy, Sep 1949).      
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Discharge on pregnancy was on the agenda at the conference of Senior WRNS 
Officers in October 1949. Apparently discussing pregnancy of single women, the 
notes recorded that investigations 'had produced some very horrifying figures'.73 
Wrens' failings were attributed to 'lack of standard and moral conviction, drink and 
ignorance.'74 The merits of the talk on sex given during recruit training were called 
into question. Some thought it did more harm than good. Representatives from the 
Commands at Nore and Plymouth blamed large shared cabins that allowed 'girls to 
listen and take part in undesirable talk.'75 Presumably taking idleness as a sign of 
degeneracy, the Plymouth representative also condemned 'the habit of WRNS 
ratings of lying in bed all Sunday morning.'76 Commandant Woollcombe undertook 
to review the approach to sex education in initial training and, meanwhile, urged her 
colleagues to do 'everything possible to improve the moral tone.'77   
 
Marriage and pregnancy curtailed women's service. Coupled with the need to decide 
whether to sign on for a further period every four years, regulations contributed to a 
pattern of short service by women. 
 
Pay 
Emoluments for regular servicemen were made up of basic pay, benefits in kind and 
marriage allowance. Basic pay was set on an assessment of the needs of single men 
on the assumption that they lived in barracks and food was provided. Marriage 
allowance was paid to men provided they were old enough to qualify. From July 
1946, the qualifying ages were 25 for officers and 21 for non-commissioned men.78 
Its value was about 30% of total remuneration. For example, following the pay rise 
in July 1946, a married RAF corporal received 35 shillings a week marriage 
allowance in addition to basic pay which ranged per week from 52 shillings and 6 
pence (unskilled) to 66 shillings and 6 pence (highest skilled) and benefits in kind 
                                                 





78 RAFM: C. G. Burge (ed.), ‘White Paper on Post-War Pay, Allowances and Service Pensions and 
Gratuities for Members of the Forces below Officer Rank’ and Post-War Code of Pay, Allowances, 
Retired Pay and Service Gratuities for Commissioned Officers’, Royal Air Force Quarterly, Vol.17, 
1945-46, pp.111-16 and 177-79. Pre-war qualifying ages were: junior ranks 25 (RN), 26 (Army and 
RAF); officers age 30. Married women were not eligible for the allowance. 
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valued at 20 shillings.79 The 1946 pay rise was said to give non-commissioned 
single men total emoluments below those of male, semi-skilled industrial workers 
and married men more.80 Peacetime national servicemen earned less than regular 
service single men.81  
 
Women's pay as wartime auxiliaries had been set within this armed forces pay 
structure. In 1938, the War Office considered setting the rate at 50% of single men's 
pay. However, in recognition that this was too low compared with the pay of female 
industrial workers, it settled on a rate of two-thirds of that paid to single men, plus 
similar benefits in kind (uniform, accommodation, medical services). When the 
WAAF was formed out of the ATS, it adopted this principle. The WRNS moved to 
the two-thirds ratio in 1940, having initially paid women according to norms for 
female civilian counterparts.82 Servicewomen were not entitled to marriage 
allowance because it was assumed that it was a husband's responsibility to provide 
for his family.83 However, a widowed servicewoman with dependent children could 
receive the allowance.84  
 
The link to men's pay was broken in 1946 when women received a flat rate increase 
rather than two-thirds of men's new rates.85 A number of reasons were given: lack of 
detail of the terms of regular service for women, including whether they would serve 
on short engagements or full career terms; uncertainty about the outcome of the 
Royal Commission on Equal Pay; and implications for lower paid nurses if the two-
thirds rate persisted.86  
 
Service Ministries took two years to conclude work on career structures and agree a 
common line on pay. In the Air Ministry, two factors militated against equal pay: 
                                                 
79 Ibid, pp.111-16. Value of benefits in kind from TNA: T 213/489, Notes on Revised Scales of Pay 
for the Permanent Women's Services, 25 Aug 1948. 
80 TNA: ADM 116/5579, Minute by Head of Naval Branch II, 11 Sep 1947. 
81 TNA: AIR 72/40, Air Ministry Order, A.685, 9 Nov 1950. 
82 TNA: ADM 116/5579, Report of Working Party - Women's Emoluments, 21 May 1946. 
83 Mathews, Blue Tapestry, p.81. She described marriage allowance as 'answer[ing] the usual 
objections to equal pay'.  
84 This provision was noted as continuing in TNA: ADM 116/5579, Minute by Dunn, Head of Naval 
Branch II, 11 Sep 1947 and AIR 10/5614, Queen's Regulations for the RAF, 1956 edition, Regulation 
2729.  
85 ADM 116/5579, Pay Code Signal No.36, 27 Jun 1946. 
86 Ibid, Post War Pay, Allowances and Pensions - Emoluments of Women's Services, inter-
departmental meeting held on 21 May 1946. 
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women's exclusion from the use of weapons and the burden of overseas postings 
which would fall on regular servicemen to a greater extent than women.87 However, 
the latter reason was subsequently judged to be hazardous as 'if this was admitted, 
then the Army could claim higher rates [for men] than the RAF'.88 Air Ministry 
officials wanted to establish in principle that women's pay should be equal to single 
men's once it was implemented for the civil service. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of 
State, agreed.89 In the Admiralty, Commandant Woollcombe argued that, as women 
in senior ranks would be employed only in administration for the WRNS, pay rates 
should taper back to two-thirds of single men's for ranks above second officer.90 
This line was pursued by the Admiralty. However, the Air Ministry rejected it on the 
grounds that all women would remain employable in place of men and senior 
women's administrative roles were comparable to the work of men of equivalent 
rank.91 The War Office was content to side with the Air Ministry's proposal that 
women receive 80% of single men's pay, with a fall back position of 75%.92 
Although tapering was still suggested by Mr. Edwards (Civil Lord of the 
Admiralty), in September 1948 Service Ministers agreed to pursue the Air Ministry's 
line.93  
 
Stafford Cripps was influenced by the economic crisis, the outcome of the Royal 
Commission on Equal Pay which reported in 1946, and government policy on pay 
restraint. Cripps saw danger in re-establishing even the two-thirds ratio for 
servicewomen's pay. Officers would receive much more than nurses. He regarded 
this possibility as unacceptable for a number of reasons: it would represent a 
'startling' pay rise at a time of wage restraint policy; female officers, who could be 
appointed at a young age, would receive more money than nurses who were 
'professional women engaged on women's work'; and perhaps crucially, this would 
lead to pay claims for armed forces nursing services which would have an impact on 
                                                 
87 TNA: AIR 6/76, Air Council Conclusions, 13 Feb 1947. 
88 TNA: AIR 2/12605, Minute to Secretary of State, 20 Aug 1948. 
89 Ibid, Minute to Secretary of State, 20 Aug 1948 and Minute by Secretary of State, 1 Sep [1948]. 
90 TNA: ADM 116/5579, Minute by DWRNS, 31 Mar 1947. 
91 TNA: T 213/305, Interdepartmental Committee on Post-war Pay, Allowances and Pensions, 
Minutes, 27 Jul 1948.  
92 TNA: ADM 116/5723, Minute by Dunn, Head of Naval Branch II, 13 Sep 1948 and Minutes of 
Service Ministers' Meeting, 24 Sep 1948. 
93 Ibid, Minutes of Service Ministers' Meeting, 24 Sep 1948. 
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pay for civilian nurses.94 Indeed, due to difficulties in recruiting nurses and their low 
pay compared with women officers, the Air Council had already expressed a need 
for nurses' pay to be improved.95  
 
Cripps opposed the 80% sought by the Services because this was the ratio used for 
female non-industrial civil servants. It was taken as being the pay rate which 
indicated women's work was equal to men's.96 The government had accepted the 
Royal Commission on Equal Pay's findings that men and women should receive 
equal pay for work of equal value. However, it had deferred action due to the 
economic crisis. Cripps feared that, when at some unspecified date in the future, a 
government implemented the equal pay proposal, women in the armed forces would 
also expect it.97 He opposed equal pay for servicewomen, regarding it untenable that 
they should be paid the same as fighting men because they 'had no liability to 
engage in personal combat'.98  
 
Pay negotiations between the Treasury and Service Ministries revealed anomalies 
about men's combatant status, with both sides recognising that not all servicemen 
were 'fighting men'.99 For men in support roles, use of weapons was described as a 
'contingent liability', something they might be called upon to do in an emergency.100 
Nor had men's pay been directly linked to their relationship to combat roles. In the 
war, men in technical trades in the army were paid more than men in fighting units, 
even though they might be employed in repair depots a long way from action. The 
post-war pay award enabled a 'skilled fighting soldier [to] receive the same pay as a 
skilled tradesman'.101 However, skilled tradesmen in the RAF continued to be better 
                                                 
94 TNA: T 213/489, Pay of the Women's Services, record of discussion between Chancellor and 
Treasury officials, 6 Aug 1948 and Cripps to Alexander, 8 Sep 48. 
95 TNA: AIR 6/76, Air Council Conclusions, 30 Apr 1947. 
96 TNA: T 213/489, Cripps to Alexander, 8 Sep 48. 
97 Ibid. 
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paid than its ground combat personnel. Gunners of the RAF Regiment were in the 
third of four groups for pay purposes.102 The Treasury argued that men were paid on 
the basis of the 'majority employment', that is as though they had the same shared 
risk and responsibility as those in fighting units.103 However, Albert Alexander 
(Minister for Defence) wrote that 'no component of men's pay could be said to relate 
to combat'.104 Nevertheless, women's pay was set on the basis that they did not share 
men's liability for combat. 
 
Stafford Cripps asked his officials to draw up a special pay scale, with rates for non-
commissioned ranks linked to the pay of women in industry.105 The resulting draft 
proposal devised rates of pay for junior ranks on what was described as 'a purely 
arbitrary basis', while those for officers were intended to be lower than the pay of 
nurses.106 The gap between women's and men's pay was to widen with increasing 
rank.107  
 
The problem that quickly emerged was that by taking industrial pay as a reference 
point, and so not taking account of marital status as servicemen's pay did, women 
would be paid as highly as single servicemen. According to Treasury calculations, 
an unmarried trained private soldier received 42 shillings per week and benefits in 
kind valued now at 35 shillings. This was less than average semi-skilled male 
industrial wages of 89 shillings. Starting from the average of 77 shillings and 6 
pence per week paid to semi-skilled female industrial workers, and deducting the 35 
shillings ascribed to benefits in kind, would give servicewomen pay of 42 shillings 
and 6 pence per week. This was 6 pence more than a single private's pay. Treasury 
officials suggested that linking women's pay to industrial wages was impractical. 
Devising a scheme that would be sufficiently attractive to encourage women to join, 
and then provide incentives to longer service and promotion, was thought to be too 
complex. They preferred to re-establish the two-thirds ratio of single men's pay as 
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being simpler to implement and more likely to be acceptable to the Services than a 
separate pay code for women.108 
 
Air Commandant Felicity Hanbury regarded the link to men’s pay scales as critical. 
She foresaw that a permanent decoupling of pay would result in battles each time 
there was an increase for men.109 Doubting that official Air Ministry channels would 
be effective in winning over the Treasury, she enlisted help from two sources. First 
she asked Air Chief Marshal Wilfrid Freeman to write to Stafford Cripps. Knowing 
Cripps from their time together at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, Freeman 
reminded him that he had once been in favour of equal pay. He described the 
argument that women were non-combatants as 'fallacious' as women in the Air 
Force were '[almost] as combatant as a large portion of the RAF with the sole 
exception of aircrews.'110  
 
Freeman's approach was rebuffed, so Hanbury also sought help from Caroline 
Haslett, the head of the Electrical Association for Women.111 Haslett was a known 
contributor on the issue of women's pay, having given evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Equal Pay on behalf of the British Federation of Business and 
Professional Women.112 A friend of Lady Cripps, she used this connection to lobby 
the Chancellor. She urged him to avoid creating an idea of 'women's work' being 
distinct from 'men's work' and she feared the impact on the recruitment of women 
into technical trades.113 Her letter was also politely acknowledged but set aside.114 
Undeterred, she used her friendship with Isobel Cripps to go to 11 Downing Street 
to see Sir Stafford a week before the Cabinet was due to meet on the subject.115 The 
following day, Cripps wrote on a Treasury file:  
 
                                                 
108 Ibid, Clough to Padmore, 25 Aug 1948.  
109 Peake, Pure Chance, pp.174-5.  
110 TNA: T 213/489, Freeman to Cripps, 29 Sep 1948. 
111 Caroline Haslett is described as 'never an ardent feminist' but as committed to using 'the 
possibilities of engineering to raise the whole social status of women'. She founded the Association in 
1924. She was prominent in public service. ODNB: Citrine, revised by Eleanor Putnam Symons, 
'Haslett, Dame Caroline Harriet (1895-1957)'.   
112 Royal Commission on Equal Pay 1944-46 Report, Cmd. 6937, (London: HMSO, 28 Oct 1946, 
Appendix I. 
113 TNA: T 213/489, Haslett to Cripps 20 Oct 1948 and 28 Oct 1948.    
114  Ibid, Cripps to  'My Dear Caroline', 25 Oct 1948. 
115 Institute of Engineering and Technology [henceforward IET]: NAEST 33/14.3, Haslett to Lady 
Cripps, 6 Dec 1948.  
Chapter 2: Establishing Women's Military Careers 
84 
 'After discussion with a number of women I am of the opinion that my pay 
scales though rational will not be acceptable to the women in the forces and 
that they would not help recruiting either. For some reason or other the women 
think it would be derogatory not [original emphasis] to get a proportion of the 
men's salary! The trouble is that when we get equal pay they will want 5/5 and 
not 4/5 ... However I have come to the conclusion that I should not persist in 
the idea of a separate scale for women.'116 
 
Cripps' Cabinet paper set out a case for his special pay scale for women, but 
suggested that, if this was not accepted, then a ratio of not more than the previously 
prevailing two-thirds of single men's pay should be set.117 Albert Alexander 
proposed four-fifths.118 At the meeting, Cripps was supported by George Isaacs 
(Minister of Labour and National Service), Aneurin Bevan (Minister for Health), 
Herbert Morrison (Lord President of the Council) and Mr. Woodburn (Secretary of 
State for Scotland). Their key concerns were size of the pay rise at a time of wage 
restraint and implications for other women workers if a fixed ratio of women's to 
men's pay was accepted as a principle.119 When pressed by Clement Attlee, Cripps 
admitted that, while a special scale would be theoretically better, ‘they must have [a] 
fixed rate because of the emotion aroused on this.’120 The Cabinet settled on a 
compromise rate of 75% of single men’s pay.121 This outcome was justified on the 
basis of ‘the prevailing relationship between men’s and women’s remuneration in 
industry; the recruiting situation; and the fact that women are non-combatant’.122 On 
non-combatant status, Albert Alexander was advised that it would be 'unwise to 
stress this in the House [of Commons]'.123 This may have been intended to avoid 
discussion on the relationship between men's pay and differing liabilities to engage 
in fighting.  
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Pay negotiations can be seen as a victory for the Service Ministries over the 
Treasury, with the adoption of military rather than civilian terms of service. The 
result meant that regular servicewomen were to earn more than minimum term 
national servicemen in 1949. Status as regulars rather than conscripts, with its 
commitment to longer service, outweighed the customary gender bias for pay.124 
However, with pay being set as a percentage of that of single men and, therefore, 
already abated to take account of marital status, a Treasury official observed that pay 




As wartime temporary personnel, women did not serve on terms which attracted 
pension rights. In new regular service, they would earn pensions. Like pay, this also 
proved controversial.  
 
Men who served for 22 years or more were paid an immediate pension on retiring. 
Its value depended on years served and rank attained. Unlike pay, it was not related 
to marital status. Bachelors received the same pension as married men.126 The 
Treasury regarded pension provision as generous but recognised the need, as many 
men would be required to retire in their mid-forties, an age when their family 
responsibilities would be at a peak.127 Officials thought also that 'fighting men' 
might have difficulty finding new jobs as their skills would not necessarily fit them 
for civilian work.128 
 
The Air Ministry again took a robust line, suggesting that the pension rate for 
women should be 80% of men's.129 The War Office and the Admiralty thought this 
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proposal might jeopardise the chance of persuading the Treasury to accept 80% as 
the pay ratio.130 Nevertheless, Service Ministers agreed to put it forward. This time 
they opted for a fall back of two-thirds of men's rates rather than the 75% they were 
prepared to accept for pay. This was intended to indicate 'flexibility and 
responsibility'.131   
 
Initially, the Treasury considered women’s peacetime Services as a short-term 
experiment. Once the 'glamour' of wartime service had worn off and the 'disabilities' 
in civilian life had eased, officials doubted that women would 'take kindly to 
[military service]'.132 It described women's pensionable service as 'a most unbusiness 
like proposition'.133 It wondered whether, rather than retaining individuals on a long-
term basis, it would be preferable to 'replace them by a fresh entry'.134 However, if a 
pension was to be offered, women should be obliged to serve for longer than men to 
earn it as they did not undertake equal work.135 Female civil servants, who received 
pensions at age 60, were seen as the comparator.136 The likelihood of women being 
able to find new employment after retirement was argued both ways. It was thought 
that women approaching fifty would have difficulty in gaining civilian work. On the 
other hand, it was argued that, as so many would have been employed in domestic 
trades, they would find a ready market for their experience.137  
 
Stafford Cripps was concerned that setting women's pensions as a fixed percentage 
of men's would be too generous because all men's pensions were determined on the 
basis of married men's pay. If a ratio was agreed in principle, then it should be lower 
than that used for pay so that women would not benefit from the way that men's 
pensions were calculated. 138 In Cabinet, he argued that women would be very well 
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off on their pensions and this would 'provoke demand for increases for men'.139 The 
idea that women did not have the same family responsibilities as men was common 
ground at the Cabinet meeting. Accordingly, the Cabinet agreed to set the ratio at 
two-thirds of men's pensions.140 
  
Doctors and dentists were an interesting exception. When these professionally 
qualified women were employed during the war, the British Medical Association 
and the British Dental Association insisted that they receive the same pay as men.141 
This continued to be the case for regular service. The Air Ministry assumed that, as 
pay was equal, then pensions would be equal.142 The Treasury proposed that they 
should be treated like other women in the Services for pension entitlement.143 The 
Air Ministry declined to take the lead in explaining the Treasury position to the 
professional associations.144 Treasury officials persisted in the view that ' women 
doctors are after all women and should be remunerated as such'.145 In a letter to the 
Air Ministry, the line was defended on the grounds that conceding pensions payable 
at the same ratio as pay would undermine the decision to differentiate pay and 
pension ratios for other women in the Services.146 When the matter was raised with 
Sir Stafford Cripps, he suggested to his officials that they should 'gracefully retire on 
this one!'147   
 
Career Structure and Training 
Women's Royal Air Force  
The philosophy of integration of women into the RAF resulted in existing structures 
for men's careers being adapted for women. On joining, airwomen undertook a five 
week recruit training course compared with airmen's eight week course. Run by 
female officers and NCOs, the course had a similar syllabus to the men's with the 
major omission of small arms training. Its purpose was to develop 'reliability, self 
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respect, pride in the Service and team spirit.'148 An airwoman was also to 'be fully 
aware of ... her added responsibilities as a woman in a predominantly male 
Service.'149 On completion, airwomen moved on to trade training where they took 
courses with airmen.   
 
The Air Ministry decided that airwomen would be eligible for promotion on the 
same terms as airmen, sitting the same promotion examinations.150 As they would 
supervise subordinate men, they would also attend courses which covered the 
responsibilities of NCO ranks. Courses lasted four weeks and covered leadership, 
responsibilities of rank and general administration. They could be supplemented by 
training required for specific trade responsibilities in these more senior ranks.151 
With the average time for men to reach corporal being seven years, women were 
given the opportunity of earlier promotion to fit in with their pattern of four-year 
engagements. Thus a woman could complete a tour of duty as a corporal within her 
second stint. This advantage for women was seen as a worthwhile concession as 
men would still have a better chance of reaching senior NCO ranks.152  
 
As with men, candidates for officer training were selected from non-commissioned 
ranks or directly from civilian life. Officer training lasted twelve weeks and was 
carried out at the women officers' school at RAF Hawkinge. The course was one 
week shorter than that for men who were selected for non-flying branches.153 
Female officers also had to undertake a three week course in administration 
duties.154 As with airwomen, training for specialisation was conducted jointly with 
men. From 1949, female officers could also attend the previously men-only Officers 
Advanced Training School for the junior officers course.155 
 
The Air Ministry wanted female junior officers' promotions up to flight officer to be 
based on time in rank in accordance with existing practice for men. Initially, the 
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Treasury was opposed, arguing that this implied careers for women when the overall 
plan for their employment was not clear. Air Ministry views prevailed. Promotion to 
squadron officer and above was to be competitive with men of the same 
specialisation, with the requirement based on establishment vacancies.156 While it 
would take some years before female officers’ length of service and experience 
compared with men’s, this disadvantage gradually diminished in later years. 
 
Career prospects were not as bright as regulations suggested. The key problem was 
contained in the term ‘establishment vacancies’. Establishing authorities could 
earmark roles as requiring a combatant officer to undertake defence duties additional 
to the primary task of the job.157 As women were barred from such duties they were 
deemed ineligible for these posts. Not only did this limit their immediate promotion 
prospects by reducing the field of vacancies, it made them uncompetitive beyond 
that point in their career, as men held the more important jobs in any given rank and 
they took this advantage into successive promotion competitions. Mr Cannon, of the 
establishment department of the Air Ministry, argued that 'combatant' designation 
should only apply to RAF Regiment posts and aircrew. He saw women being 
sidelined into minor roles in administration of other women, rather than being 
offered roles suited to their talents. He regarded this as a circumvention of the Air 
Council’s policy of integration.158 His was an apparently lone voice. Air 
Commandant Nancy Salmon, who succeeded Felicity Hanbury as Director WRAF 
in 1950, viewed the limitation as 'a handicap ... foreseen and accepted'.159 The 
outcome was effectively a ceiling at the senior officer rank of squadron officer. In 
subsequent years, promotions to more senior ranks were overwhelmingly in the 
Secretarial Branch and largely associated with posts in WRAF administration.  
 
Women's Royal Naval Service 
As with airwomen's recruit training, women joining the WRNS attended a female 
recruit training school before going on to specialist training which was done 
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alongside men. The recruit course lasted 4 weeks.160 Trade training ranged from two 
weeks for the trade of writer (shorthand) to thirty-five weeks for telegraphists.161 
Men's initial training was longer as it also included basic seamanship. 
 
Like the Air Force system, promotion for non-commissioned Wrens adopted the 
same rules as for the men’s service, with the same trade examinations to be 
passed.162 A key concern remained the development of NCOs and officers, for it was 
these women who had the responsibility on stations for the further development of 
Wrens. While airwomen were required to go through training for NCO rank, Jocelyn 
Woollcombe failed in attempts to establish such courses for Wrens.163   
 
It was the norm for potential officers to be selected from female ratings. Only when 
there was a shortage were officer candidates to be selected directly from civilian 
applicants. An exception was made for meteorological officers who were required to 
have an honours degree in mathematics, physics or geography. They could join on a 
five year short service commission.164  
 
Officer training was conducted at the Royal Naval College at Greenwich which 
mainly housed staff officer and career development training for RN officers.165 
Jocelyn Woollcombe described officer training as lamentably short at only eight 
weeks.166 The syllabus was filled to capacity with Service history, office procedures, 
written and oral communication skills, drill, sport and visits. Evenings included 
compulsory social events and, perhaps with an eye to the future, time was allowed 
for a talk on an accomplishment expected of an officer’s wife, namely flower 
arranging. Cadets faced a variety of tests: their capacity for self discipline and self 
control; their ability to withstand strain; their ability to learn something new; their 
ability to express themselves coherently through the written and spoken word; and 
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their standard of courtesy and thought for others.167 In an effort to improve the 
success rate, ambitious young Wrens were coached by their local female officers. 
They were guided in written and spoken English and the financial responsibilities of 
an officer.168   
 
Commandant Woollcombe had little time for the Air Force’s intent to integrate 
women which seemed to value the role of a specialist above that of administration of 
the women’s Service. She described herself as ‘thankful that the Admiralty 
proposals [took] the opposite view that the ultimate crown of a WRNS officer's 
“career” [would] only be achieved by success as an Administrative Officer.’169 She 
told a conference of her senior officers that there could be no promotion for female 
specialists beyond the junior officer rank of Second Officer as jobs above that rank 
were reserved for men. Specialists would have to take up WRNS' administrative 
work to advance to more senior ranks.170 Regulations confirmed this situation by 
stating that chief officers and above and most first officers would be employed in 
administration.171 Woollcombe's attitude could be seen as limiting the career 
aspirations of many women officers. However, it reflected the reality that, in the 
absence of the seagoing experience of their male counterparts, specialists would 
struggle to compete with men for appointments and promotions. Although WRNS 
officers’ promotions were to be largely an internal matter, the scheme adopted the 
practice of the Royal Navy relating to time in rank and age. Promotion had to be 
achieved within certain boundaries of age and experience; failure to achieve the next 
rank in that window of opportunity resulted in compulsory retirement.172  
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The key difference between the two Services was that women in the RAF apparently 
had the opportunity to make their careers as specialists. However, non-combatant 
status was used to exclude women from the best jobs. In the WRNS, the most senior 
ranks were to be attained in administration of their own Service rather than in wider 
naval employment.  
 
Conclusion  
That regular servicewomen were to be paid less than men is not a surprise. What is 
interesting is the way in which their terms of service were adapted from those 
prevailing for wartime auxiliary service and men's regular service, rather than being 
linked to a civilian pay scale. An attempt by Sir Stafford Cripps to impose nursing or 
civil service norms was defeated by the united opposition of Service Ministries and 
the intervention of Air Commandant Felicity Hanbury. Treatment as military 
personnel was deemed essential. The positive aspect of this outcome was that pay 
rises for women would automatically occur when they were given to men, without 
the need for separate negotiations which had taken so long in the post-war 
establishment of regular service. However, the negative aspect was that the armed 
forces pay code discriminated between married and single men. As marriage 
allowance was connected with family responsibilities, which it was assumed women 
would not share, servicewomen were treated as single. They received a percentage 
of single men's rates and so earned less than civilian workers whose marital status 
did not dictate pay. Nevertheless, regular servicewomen were not lowest in the 
hierarchy. Their longer commitment to the armed forces secured them a position in 
pay scales above that of national servicemen serving the minimum term. 
 
The primary reason given for not recognising women's work as equal to men's was 
their non-combatant status. Here the Air Ministry differed from the other Services in 
that it saw women's contribution as of equal value in principle to that of men. It 
recognised the limited liability for combat of the majority of its personnel. However, 
as Chapter 1 showed, the War Office at this time was considering defensive arming 
of the WRAC. The reason why that proposal was not taken to the Army Board in 
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1949 has not been traced in the records.173 It leaves open the question of what would 
have happened to pay policy if the War Office had approved arming of women and 
whether this contributed to the decision not to proceed.  
 
While the armed forces did not impose a marriage bar, personnel policies acted as a 
deterrent to married service. Regulations were brought about by a mixture of what 
the Directors thought prudent, the adaptation of men’s regulations, expectations of 
behaviour in the Services and norms of society at that time. Terms and conditions of 
service, which were hardly helpful to married personnel of either sex, were even less 
so for women. They went beyond the norms of British society and reflected the 
Services’ cultures and career patterns. Directors of the Women's Services saw 
regular service as implying the acceptance of mobile rather than local service, 
including overseas postings which had been mostly voluntary during the war. 
Reflecting the values of the times, they surrendered the possibility of women with 
young children serving as they had in the war. With barriers to married service 
having been erected, this would be a career opportunity only for those prepared to 
remain single or, if married, childless, as predicted by Jocelyn Woollcombe. 
 
Career  structures were also influenced by organisational factors. The Directors 
serving in the late 1940s had both joined their respective Services in 1939 and had 
been enculturated accordingly. They could each see the merits of the systems within 
which they worked and they developed the regular women’s Services accordingly. 
WRAF general service training mimicked that of the RAF with its initial recruit 
course, NCO and SNCO rank courses and officer training course. If women were to 
compete with men for promotion and were to supervise men in the workplace, they 
needed equivalent leadership and management training to the men’s. The WRNS 
were not expected to undertake the same responsibilities as men and were unable in 
these early years to establish the same suite of courses as the RN enjoyed. The 
Navy’s gendered division of work influenced the promotion prospects which quickly 
narrowed down to those within the Directorate. The WRAF held out the promise of 
a more meritocratic approach. However, this ideal was compromised by the opaque 
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procedures for establishing appointments as requiring combatant status. 
Nevertheless, assuming a woman chose to stay for enough years, gained experience 
and was successful in training courses, a path to senior ranks was open outside the 
Directorate.  
 
The power bases of the women’s Directorates were markedly different and derived 
from their Services’ organisation. An entity in its own right, the WRNS inculcated a 
strong, gendered identity through training and close control over women’s careers. 
This apparent strength masked vulnerability to being disbanded as a cost saving 
measure. However, for Commandant Woollcombe, it had the advantage that women 
would speak about issues affecting women rather than it falling to male policy-
makers as could happen in the other Service Ministries.174 For the WRAF 
Directorate, these transitional years were predicted to be the height of its influence 
as it was observed that the logical conclusion of the policy of integration would be 
that ‘the responsibilities of DWRAF in the post-war Air Force should become 
progressively less, rather than increased’.175 While integration led to a weak identity 
as a women’s Service, it was counter-balanced by its more solid foundation as a 
necessary part of the RAF. The strong and gendered WRNS identity and the weaker 
WRAF identity were less a function of the women themselves than of their place in 
the larger organisations. In Part II we will see how the two Services developed from 
these starting points.    
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Chapter 3: Servicewomen in the Period of Men's National Service: 
Failing to Resolve the Conflict between Careers and Marriage 
 
Speaking at the Association of Wrens' Annual Meeting in May 1947, former WRNS 
Director Vera Laughton Mathews said: 
 
'We know that the decision to keep the WRNS as a permanent Service was due 
very largely to the man-power situation in the country, but that will not be so 
for ever, and the future of the WRNS depends very much on the account that 
those now serving give of themselves. They must make themselves essential to 
the Navy.'1 
 
Mathews emphasised the publicly stated reason for the creation of regular service 
for women, namely lessening the need for men. However, this overlooked two 
important aims in the paper that went to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet in 
May 1946. First, there was to be a core of women in the armed forces to provide a 
nucleus around which expansion could take place in national emergency. Second, 
there would be reserve forces from which those reinforcements would be drawn.2  
 
David French explained how expectations of the nature of a future major war 
changed in the early 1950s as the Soviet Union demonstrated its nuclear weapons' 
capability. He noted that military planners assumed that, if deterrence failed, a major 
war would start with an exchange of nuclear weapons and that the UK would be a 
main target for such an attack. Accordingly, 'by 1955 British planners assumed that 
[a global war] would be nasty, brutish, very short, and that it would have to be 
fought with forces in being because there would be no time to mobilise and despatch 
reserves'.3 Duncan Sandys' defence White Paper of April 1957 proposed significant 
changes to the armed forces to reflect 'these scientific advances [that] fundamentally 
alter[ed] the whole basis of military planning.'4 Sandys set out proposals for male 
regular forces of 375,000 to be supported by civilian staff and contractors. He 
announced that conscription was to end. The last intake was planned for 1960, with 
                                                 
1 From a speech at the Association of Wrens Annual Meeting, May 1947 (NMRN: 1988.350.18.5,  
The Wren, No.177, Oct 1947). 
2 TNA: CAB 131/2, Cabinet Defence Committee paper DO(46)63, 8 May 1946. 
3 French, Army, Empire, and Cold War, p.156. 
4 Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd.124, (London: HMSO, April 1957). 
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an expectation that the last national serviceman would leave by the end of 1962. 
Reserve forces would be earmarked for home defence duties rather than as 
reinforcements to be deployed to continental Europe. Women's Services were not 
mentioned.5  
 
If there was less need for men, less reliance on reserves and no time to expand the 
armed forces in the event of major war, what purpose was now served by women's 
Services? Had women made themselves essential as urged by Commandant 
Mathews? 
 
This chapter evaluates the extent to which original policy targets for the women's 
Services were met. It argues that creating a core for future expansion was initially 
most important, while 'lessening the need for men' was a useful justification for 
public consumption rather than a numerical reality. However, in considering the 
implications of women's terms and conditions of service, this chapter reveals the 
conflict between the idea of long-term military careers for women and prevailing 
attitudes towards marriage. David French identified the needs of married servicemen 
as a key problem for the army at the time, but one which authorities attempted to 
address.6 What emerges here is the failure of policy-makers and senior female 
officers to grapple not only with societal trends in relation to marriage and child-
bearing, but also regulations that made married service for women problematic. 
Despite difficulties in retaining female personnel, women's Services survived even 
when the need for men was dramatically reduced from 1957. This chapter suggests 
that airwomen had made themselves essential to the RAF. However, the existence of 
the WRNS is seen to be more precarious.  
 
Early Years: 1949 - 1957 
Initial Policy Targets 
Given economic crises causing budget uncertainties, the developing confrontation 
with communist states affecting requirements for personnel and the complex task of 
re-organising the armed forces after the war, it is unsurprising that the Service 
Ministries lacked clarity on how many women would form the regular core. The 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 French, Military Identities, pp.317-9. 
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Cabinet paper of 1946 proposed a WRAF of at least 8,000 women to be 
economically viable. The Admiralty suggested the WRNS should be 2-3,000 strong, 
but potentially as many as 5-6,000. The War Office wanted 3,000 women but would 
take more if its budget allowed.7 By December 1948, the planned figures were much 
higher. A brief for Albert Alexander (Minister of Defence) quoted target strengths of 
26,000 for the WRAF, 7,500 for the WRNS and 18,000 for the WRAC.8 
Achievement fell well short of these ambitious targets. However, judging by 1946 
aspirations, Service Ministries succeeded in creating core women's Services in the 
1950s (Table 3.1).   
 
The vulnerability of the WRNS as a shore-based, civilian-in-uniform organisation 
was evident immediately. A major study on the size and shape of the armed forces 
recommended disbanding it. 9 Too many women were employed in administering 
women (800 out of a strength of about 7,000). The study argued that, as the RN was 
not short of male volunteers, Wrens could be replaced by regular servicemen. These 
would be more flexible in the jobs they could do and would serve on average for 
longer. It went on to say that this was not the case in the other Services which would 
have to replace women with men serving even shorter periods (i.e. national 
servicemen).10 The report was published in February 1949, the same month as 
regular service for women commenced. As a consequence, the Admiralty Board 
dismissed the suggestion of dispensing with the WRNS as politically unthinkable. In 
addition, such a move would lead to an increase in the proportion of men ashore, 
contrary to the Board's current policy.11 
  
Reserve forces customarily comprised male civilian volunteers who undertook 
military training in their spare time in return for a bounty, and former servicemen 
whose terms of engagement could include a period on the reserve. The latter now 
included national servicemen. However, reserve liability was not included in non-
commissioned women's terms of regular service, so female reservist forces had to be 
                                                 
7 TNA: CAB 131/2, Cabinet Defence Committee paper DO(46)63, 8 May 1946. 
8 TNA: DEFE 7/559, Brief for Minister of Defence for Cabinet meeting on 9 Dec 1948. 
9 TNA: DEFE 7/592, Report of Inter-Service Working Party on Size and Shape of the Armed Forces, 
28 Feb 1949 (Harwood Report).  
10 Ibid. 
11 TNA: ADM 167/132, Board Minutes, 12 Apr 1949. 
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almost entirely civilian-based.12 At a meeting in the Admiralty in 1947, it was 
assumed that a WRNS Reserve should be about 80% of the strength of its active 
Service.13 While there was a recruitment campaign, the WRNS reserve matched this 
target (Table 3.2). Numbers fell away in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Air 
Ministry decided to accept reservist women into any trade for which training could 
be provided, without limit on numbers.14 However, a brief flurry of interest in the 
early 1950s was not sustained. The number of female reserves became insignificant 
(Table 3.2).  
 
Throughout the period of men's national service, the claim that regular service for 
women would lessen the need for men was weak. The first major test of personnel 
policy came in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War and perceptions of an 
increased threat to British interests in Europe and the Middle East from the Soviet 
Union. In response, and with a view to encouraging European allies to do more for 
defence, the government increased men's national service from eighteen months to 
two years.15 Consequently, the number of men in the armed forces rose from 
666,000 in 1950 to 848,000 in 1952. There was no corresponding increase in 
employment of servicewomen (Table 3.1). Over the period 1949-57, only 2.7% of 
the intake to the armed forces was female (Table 3.3). The strength of women's 











                                                 
12 TNA: AIR 19/808, Air Ministry Order, A77, Women's Royal Air Force - Conditions of Service for 
Airwomen in the Royal Air Force, 20 Jan 1949 and WO 32/13160, Comparative Statement of Draft 
Schemes, circulated with minute dated 16 Aug 1947. Women were to be given the opportunity to join 
the Reserves but would not be compelled.  
13 TNA: ADM 116/5579, Notes of a Meeting to Discuss Conditions of Service for the WAAF, 
undated but circa Jul 1947. 
14 TNA: AIR 2/1158, Future Policy for Ground Branches and Trades in the RAF Volunteer Reserve, 
May 1952. 
15 L. V. Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Government: The Politics and Policy of National Service 
1945-51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp.257-8. 
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Table 3.1 Strength of the Women's Services 1949-62  
           






























WRNS 6.4 5.4 4.9 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.1 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.0 
WRAF 14.5 10.1 9.4 10.0 9.5 8.6 6.8 5.4 4.7 4.3 4.9 5.3 5.6 6.6 
WRAC 9.8 6.4 6.1 6.3 7.1 6.8 5.8 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.7 5.4 
Women - 
Total 
30.7 21.9 20.4 20.9 21.3 19.9 16.7 13.6 12.5 11.7 12.8 13.0 13.2 15.0 
Men - all 
Services 
737.4 666.0 804.0 848.4 841.3 816.1 783.5 745.2 687.1 600.1 550.1 503.3 458.4 424.8 
Personnel 
- Total 
768.1 687.9 824.4 869.3 862.6 836.0 800.2 758.8 699.6 611.8 562.9 516.3 471.6 439.8 
Women 
as % of 
Personnel  
4.0 3.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.4 
 Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.93, (London: HMSO, 1956), Tables 136 and 137 and No. 
103, (London: HMSO, 1966), Tables 134 and 135. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Women in Reserve Forces 1949-62  
           






























Navy - - - 0.6 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.0 
As % of 
Regulars 
   13 87 84 88 94 88 79 42 45 45 33 
               
Air 
Force 
1.6 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 
As % of 
Regulars 
11 27 36 34 35 33 35 37 34 30 18 15 11 8 
               
Army 7.7 11.8 12.0 11.1 11.0 10.1 7.4 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.6 7.1 5.8 5.3 
As % of 
Regulars 
79 184 197 176 155 149 128 128 123 141 143 154 123 98 




9.3 14.5 15.4 15.1 18.4 16.7 13.4 11.3 10.0 9.7 8.9 9.3 7.7 6.8 
Men in 
Reserves 
206.5 220.9 280.7 429.1 610.8 800.3 865.4 904.8 883.7 882.3 839.1 770.1 642.6 540.5 
Reserves 
- Total 
215.8 235.4 296.1 444.2 629.2 817.0 878.8 916.1 893.7 892.0 848.0 779.4 650.3 547.3 
Women 
as % of 
Total  
4.3 6.2 5.2 3.4 2.9 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 
 Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.93, (London: HMSO, 1956), Tables 136 and 137 and No. 103, 
(London: HMSO, 1966), Tables 134 and 135. 
 
Chapter 3: Servicewomen in the Period of Men's National Service 
101 
Table 3.3 Intake to the Armed Forces 1949-62 
           






























               
WRNS 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 
WRAF 3.7 3.0 3.9 3.4 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.3 1.9 2.5 3.0 
WRAC 2.1 2.4 1.9 3.0 3.7 2.6 1.5 1.9 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.8 
Women 
- Total 
7.8 6.8 7.4 7.8 8.0 5.9 3.7 4.1 3.8 4.6 5.2 4.7 5.7 6.8 
               
Male 
Intake 
215.8 234.7 246.5 266.6 238.0 221.1 217.4 230.9 154.3 144.1 113.9 101.2 51.0 56.3 
               
Total 
Intake 
223.6 241.5 253.9 274.4 246.0 227.0 221.1 235.0 158.1 148.7 119.1 105.9 56.7 63.1 
Women 
as % of 
Total 
Intake 
3.5 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.3 2.6 1.7 1.7 2.4 3.1 4.4 4.4 10.1 10.8 
 Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.93, (London: HMSO, 1966), Tables 136 and 137 and No.103, 
(London: HMSO, 1956), Tables 134 and 135. 
 
 
Recruiting and Retaining Regular Servicewomen: Why Policy Targets Were 
Missed 
 
Planning for annual intakes of women depended not only on how many jobs they 
could fill but on how long they would stay. Shorter service by early leavers (for 
example failures in training, exercising the right to leave on marriage or dismissal on 
pregnancy) was expected to be compensated by a proportion of women signing on 
for longer than the initial four year term. War Office planning figures from 1945 
proposed an annual intake of 750 to support a women's Corps of 3-3,300 regulars 
(intake of 22.7% to 25% of strength). It was assumed that just over a third of women 
would be on long engagements.16 Admiralty figures were 2,000 female recruits to 
sustain a WRNS of 9,000. At 22.2%  (intake: strength) this was close to the army's 
assumption.17 The Air Ministry planned an intake of 5,000 to support a strength of 
26,000 women, giving a more optimistic intake: strength ratio of 19.2%.18 Applying 
the range of intake assumptions (19.2% - 25%) to the 1948 aspiration for 51,500 
servicewomen, the Services would require annual intakes of about 10-13,000 
women.   
 
                                                 
16 TNA: WO 32/13160, Future of the Women's Services, Minute by Director ATS, Mar 1945, Future 
of the Women's Services, 11 May 1945, Provision of a Permanent Regular Women's Service, 11 Aug 
1945. 
17 Ibid, Comparative Statement of Draft Schemes, circulated with minute dated 16 Aug 1947.  
18 Ibid. 
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In 1948, a government survey of recruiting concluded that the public was not 
convinced of the usefulness of the armed forces compared with mining, export 
industries and land work.19 This was not a surprising finding given the government’s 
efforts to re-invigorate the economy in 1947 under the banner of ‘The Battle for 
Output’.20 To appeal to potential recruits, it was proposed that emphasis should be 
placed on self-interest rather than patriotic duty. Men were said to want to learn a 
trade which would fit them for a higher status job when they returned to civilian life. 
Women apparently expected travel and adventure rather than career opportunities. 
The lifestyle, with its frequent moves and separation from family and friends, was 
seen as incompatible with family life.21  
 
The survey included a section on women's opinions. Of women questioned about 
women serving in the armed forces, 18% thought it was a good life, while 40% 
declined to give an opinion due to lack of knowledge. From the data, the researcher 
estimated that between 4% and 6% of young women could be interested in joining 
the Services.22 If the figures were accurate, this would provide a field of about 12-
18,000 potential new candidates per annum.23 As not all candidates would prove 
suitable, this would have made it difficult to sustain the high level of recruitment 
demanded by the 1948 targets. However, the outflow of trained women was nearly 
40% and this figure implied a recruitment target of 20,000 women per annum to 
achieve a strength of 51,500. This was unsustainable and there was a net loss of 
women nearly every year. Given the high rate of leaving, volunteering in the 1950s 
was only sufficient to sustain forces at the lower end of figures proposed in 1946 
(Tables 3.1 and 3.3).    
 
The Central Office of Information was responsible for publicity for the Services’ 
recruiting campaigns. Advised by a policy committee which included servicemen 
and civilians from the Service Ministries, it placed advertisements in national and 
local press, including magazines. Advertisements were keen to portray images of 
                                                 
19 TNA: RG 23/145, Recruitment to the Services, Report No 2, Aug 1948, fieldwork conducted 
spring 1948.  
20 The Battle for Output: Economic Survey for 1947, Cmd. 7046, (London: HMSO, 1947). 
21 TNA: RG 23/145, Recruitment to the Services, Report No 2, Aug 1948. 
22 Ibid. 
23 There were more than 300,000 females in each year group for ages 15-19 and 20-24 (Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, No.93, (London: HMSO, 1956), Table 8). Taking one year group and an 
assumed 4-6% interest, this gave a new recruiting field of 12-18,000 candidates. 
Chapter 3: Servicewomen in the Period of Men's National Service 
103 
modernity and femininity, as well as highlighting new career opportunities. 
However, campaigns could be constrained by other priorities. For example, in 1948 
the Services Recruiting Policy Committee decided to ban the use of posters aimed at 
women in the north-west of England as a protective measure for the textile 
industry.24 
 
Early examples of advertisements for the WRNS used the strap line ‘You’ll like the 
life in the WRNS’.25 The glamour of the Service and its members was emphasised. 
An example from 1952 pictured a young, attractive woman, with styled hair 
showing under her cap and a modicum of make-up, suggesting the retention of 
femininity while serving with the Royal Navy (Figure 3.1). Although the age on 
entry was 18 to 28, not uncommonly, the advertisement was pitched to ‘girls’. No 
educational qualifications were demanded. It was personal attributes of character 
and ambition that were called for from potential recruits.26  
 
WRAF recruiting contained more information on the work and career prospects than 
the Navy campaign. Posters and advertisements included the strap line ‘Join the 
WRAF and give your ambition wings’ (Figure 3.2). Women’s integration within the 
RAF, working with men, and the prospect of holding rank senior to men, were to the 
fore, alongside an appeal to lifestyle choice.27 Depictions of airwomen included 
work scenes as well as leisure. As with the Navy, they were always attractive, smart 
and feminine. By 1950, advertisements adopted the word ‘women’ to replace ‘girls’ 
and they made an appeal to discard the limitations of civilian life as well as 
emphasising attractions of the Service. Women were urged to ‘seize life’s 
opportunities’ and ‘achieve financial independence’ rather than ‘sit still and watch 
life pass you by’ or ‘stay tied to anyone’s apron strings’. 28 A 1951 advertisement 
depicted a WRAF sergeant working alongside male colleagues in an operations 
room and out-ranking one of them (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
                                                 
24 TNA: INF 12/72, meeting 48(6), Jul 1948. 
25 TNA: INF 2/89, Advertisements 1952-3 campaign. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Under the pressure of budgets, the Air Ministry ran a joint advertisement for RAF and WRAF in 
1949. TNA: INF 2/67, Advertisement, 1949.   
28 TNA: INF 2/75, Advertisements 1947-1951.   




Figure 3.1 WRNS Press Advertisement circa 1952. (TNA: INF 2/89) 
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Figure 3.2 WRAF Recruiting Poster 1949. (TNA: INF 2/75) 
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Figure 3.3 - Advertisement (1951):  WRAF Sergeant Working with RAF  
Sergeant and Corporal. (TNA: INF 2/75) 
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To supplement advertisements, more detailed information was available through the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service's pamphlets on ‘Careers for Men and 
Women’.  The armed forces booklet was first published in 1947 when understanding 
of the shape of the permanent women’s Services was emerging. Sections dealing 
with opportunities for men and boys were extensive, detailing educational standards 
required, training and career prospects, as well as terms and conditions of service. 
The WRNS was dealt with in two pages giving minimal information on terms and 
conditions and a list of possible trades. In contrast, what could be called a 
recruitment pitch was made for potential airwomen. It described the WRAF as ‘the 
women’s division of the RAF’ and called it ‘A new peacetime profession … open to 
women’.29 Foremost in the list of advantages was training for a good job, as well as 
the appeal to the customary list of travel, sport, education and comradeship.30  
  
An analysis of WRAF recruiting in 1949 showed that the average age of a new 
recruit was just over 19. There were significant regional variations in the rate of 
volunteering, with proportionately fewest recruits being drawn from Scotland, 
Wales and the English regions of the midlands and the north-west. 31 A 1951 survey 
indicated that only a small proportion had good qualifications. The majority were 
from working class backgrounds and had left school at an average age of 14 years 
and 8 months. All 123 in the survey were single. Typically, they had had three 
civilian jobs before enlisting: factory work (32%), clerical jobs (23%), shop work 
(12%) or domestic trades (11%). Most had at least one hobby classified as active, 
such as sport or dancing.32  
 
Despite apparently positive attitudes towards careers for women, limitations were 
revealed in an Air Ministry pamphlet aimed at parents. Taking a ‘frequently asked 
questions’ approach, this fascinating booklet urged the need to consider a daughter’s 
career with the same care as a son’s. However, ambition appeared to be secondary to 
traditional expectations as revealed in a question on promotion. The scene was set 
with a remark which might be posed by parents. It read: ‘In the event of our 
                                                 
29 Ministry of Labour & National Service, Careers for Men and Women No. 22: His Majesty’s 
Forces, (London: HMSO, 1947), WRNS pp 20-21, WRAF pp.60-63 & 67. 
30 Ibid. 
31 TNA: AIR 77/421, Report on WRAF Recruiting, Jan 1950. 
32 TNA: AIR 32/400, Characteristics of WRAF Recruits, Jul 1951.  
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daughter not marrying, we understand that she can make the WRAF her career.’33 
Career prospects were presented as a fall back should the primary aspiration of 
marriage not be achieved. Nor was there any expectation of combining marriage and 
career. 
  
Serving if married was difficult, at a time when marriage at an earlier age was a 
trend in British society. The critical age category for the armed forces was 20-24 as 
women were mostly under 20 years old on joining and signed on for four-year 
engagements. Census returns from 1951 and 1961 show that in this age group, the 
percentage of women describing themselves as married rose from 46.5% to 56.4%. 
Corresponding statistics for the age group 25-34 rose from 78.8% in 1951 to 85% in 
1961.34 In addition, according to David Coleman, the median interval between 
marriage and birth of a child was in the order of 19 - 20 months.35 So even if a 
woman had stayed in the Services after marriage, there was a strong likelihood that 
she would leave within two years to have a child. 
 
Policies on postings appeared to cater for personnel with serving spouses. In the 
WRNS, married women could serve at the same establishment as their husbands 
provided there was no great disparity in rank between them and their work did not 
bring them into contact with each other. Otherwise, 'every endeavour' would be 
made to post a married woman near her husband.36 However, this was not 
guaranteed as the needs of the Service came first. Women had to apply to their 
commanding officer for permission to live off-base with their husbands.37 In the 
RAF, if both husband and wife were in the Services, it was at the commanding 
officer's discretion as to whether they could serve at the same station. If one was an 
officer and the other non-commissioned, they were barred from serving together.38 
In addition, not all stations had WRAF sections, so collocation was not always 
possible. These regulations were drawn up on an assumption that married personnel 
working together was to be avoided. There were also social complexities. 
                                                 
33 TNA: AIR 19/808, WRAF Policy, Booklet ‘Your daughter and the WRAF’. Undated.  However, 
the RAF crest bears the King’s Crown not the Queen’s thus it pre-dates 1952. 
34 Annual Abstract of Statistics, No.103, (London: HMSO, 1966), Table 13. 
35 David Coleman, ‘Population and Family’, in A.H. Halsey and Josephine Webb (eds.), Twentieth-
Century British Social Trends (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p.43. 
36 NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR1077 Regulations and Instructions for the WRNS, 1951. 
37Ibid. 
38 TNA: AIR 10/5614, Queen's Regulations 334 and 564, 1956. 
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Attendance at a mess or club was determined by rank not marital status. For non-
commissioned ranks, a wife holding junior rank was often unwelcome at events in a 
Senior NCOs' mess. Likewise, attendance of junior ranks in officers' messes was 
problematic.39 
 
Implementation of regulations on collocation was obstructed by practical 
difficulties. In the 1950s, a lack of married quarters was compounded by the 
shortage of civilian accommodation. This led to couples being separated.40 As all 
servicewomen were deemed to be single irrespective of their actual marital status, 
women were not eligible to take up tenancies of married quarters.41 Women married 
to civilians had to trust to civilian housing. A woman married to a serviceman had to 
rely on quarters being available where he worked, assuming that the couple had 
postings with the necessary proximity.  
 
There was also a degree of ambivalence towards posting of married women. In the 
WRNS, the idea of making concessions to married women was not universally 
welcomed. The senior female officer at Plymouth Command headquarters 
complained that married Wrens ignored their commitment to being mobile, 
demanding the right to be posted to suit their marital circumstances. If they were 
dissatisfied they '[made] threats of desertion and sometimes of correspondence with 
their M.P.s.'42 Concessions, if made, were 'largely at the expense of the single 
girls.'43 The author wanted Wrens to be obliged to resign on marriage as was the 
case in the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service. Failing that, she 
proposed 'powers of greater discouragement to those contemplating remaining in the 
Service on marriage.'44  
 
The RAF appeared to be sympathetic in principle, but constrained in practice. A 
1959 report on WRAF commissioning policy suggested that it would be helpful if 
married women were 'afforded a reasonable chance of being posted with or near 
                                                 
39 TNA: DEFE 71/50, Posting of Married Airwomen, 26 Jan 1977. Entry to messes was still 
determined by rank. 
40 Report of the Advisory Committee on Recruiting, Cmnd.545, (London: HMSO, October 1958), 
p.15. 
41 TNA: AIR 10/5614, Queen's Regulation 1719, 1956. 
42 NMRN: 1988.350.28.5, Letter to Director WRNS, 20 Jul 1960. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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their husbands'.45 It noted arrangements were made for some married women to be 
collocated 'but these cases [were] the exception rather than the rule, and involve[d] 
many informal negotiations.'46 There was reluctance to advertise such a mechanism, 
as collocation could not be guaranteed. Nevertheless, the Officers and Aircrew 
Manning Committee decided that discreet reference could be made to the process 
and that requests would be considered.47  
 
Attitudes, regulations and societal trends combined to make retention of women in 
the armed forces difficult. The engagement structure of successive four-year 
contracts also contributed to higher than planned rates of leaving. Women had to 
make a positive decision to re-engage for further periods; the default position was to 
leave. Some snapshot data is available. Figures for the WRNS in 1951 indicated that 
14.5% of the WRNS had completed their period of service and left. A further 25% 
left early due to marriage, pregnancy, on compassionate grounds or deserted.48 A 
1957 paper for the Air Council noted that about one-third of the WRAF left each 
year.49  
 
Transition to All-Regular Forces 
Duncan Sandys' Defence White Paper, April 1957 
The Defence White Paper of April 1957 set out the proposed size and purpose of 
men's forces and stated that civilian staff and contractors would be needed to support 
them. It failed to mention women's Services. An article by the defence 
correspondent of the Daily Express promptly claimed that a defence committee had 
considered 'Proposals for the reduction and eventual abolition of the Wrens, Wrac 
and Wraf (sic).'50 It went on to ask if women performed essential tasks, or whether 
men or civilians could do them instead. It concluded that as 'vast reductions in 
manpower' were planned it was unlikely that women's Services would survive.51 The 
                                                 
45 TNA: AIR 2/15707, WRAF Recruiting Advisory Panel, 1(59), 10 Dec 1959. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid, Minutes of OAMC Working Party, 24 Feb 1960. This committee was not responsible for non-
commissioned ranks. The extent of collocation for airwomen was unlikely to be better than for 
officers as fewer RAF stations accepted non-commissioned women.  
48 NMRN: 1988.350.28.1-4, Conference of Senior WRNS officers March 1952, Manning State. 
49 TNA: AIR 19/808, Proposed Policy and Conditions of Service for an Immobile Section of the 
WRAF, 25 Jul 1957. 
50 Daily Express, 9 Apr 1957, p.7.  
51 Ibid. 
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question of the purpose of women in the armed forces was taken up by Miss Joan 
Vickers, M.P. (Conservative, Plymouth - Devonport). She claimed 'The use of 
women in the Services [was] extravagant' and they could be replaced by civilians.52 
 
Speculation had some justification. In March 1957, a brief provided for Sandys 
suggested that the women's Services were 'only worthwhile so long as it remain[ed] 
difficult or impossible to recruit enough male regulars.'53 It went on to say that 
women were slightly cheaper to employ than men, but if this changed 'There would 
be no advantage in continuing to employ women in the Services as a matter of 
deliberate choice.'54 However, it suggested that as the RAF and army did not expect 
to recruit enough men of sufficient quality, their women's Services would still be 
needed. In addition, women did work which was unpopular with men and women 
were better than men in other (unspecified) jobs. Disbanding the WRNS had 
apparently been discussed within the Admiralty on a 'number of occasions' and there 
was scope for 'doing away with women in the Royal Navy apart from nurses'.55 
 
The Admiralty's position on the future size of the Navy focussed on two options: 
adult male strength of either 75,000 or 80,000. In addition to these figures, it could 
have boys under training, locally employed personnel and women. A paper which 
explored how to reduce to 75,000 adult men suggested that the WRNS was not 
economic. It would be 'more satisfactory' to be allowed more men.56 However, the 
paper, which went to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, argued for 80,000 adult men 
plus a WRNS of 3,000.57 Nevertheless, disbanding the WRNS was one of several 
measures listed as potential cuts which might be needed. Other measures 
investigated, and vigorously rejected, included disbanding the Royal Marines or the 
Fleet Air Arm.58 These measures may have been little more than the Admiralty 
making a point about its difficulty in reducing to the proposed size. So well did it 
make its case about its greater ability to recruit men than the army or RAF, that it 
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was allowed to aim for a target of 88,000 men as long as it took over a share of the 
other Services' commitments.59   
 
Far from disbanding women's Services, the mood in the Service Ministries was to 
avoid taking additional risks in re-shaping the armed forces through having to find 
enough male volunteers to replace women as well as ending conscription.60 George 
Ward, Secretary of State for Air, and Julian Amery at the War Office made 
'reassuring statements about the WRAF and the WRAC during the Estimates 
Debates [but] the Admiralty ... remained silent'.61 This was put down to there being 
less need for the WRNS.62 It is not clear why the Admiralty delayed joining public 
proclamations about the continuing need for women's Services, as a briefing note to 
commanding officers on the White Paper made explicit that the WRNS, boy entrants 
and locally employed personnel were additional to the 80,000 strong Navy.63  
 
The continuing need for women in all-regular forces was formally agreed at the 
Service Ministers' Committee in July 1957. Faced with uncertainties about reverting 
to all-regular forces, commitments were made to increase the number of 
servicewomen. The number of Wrens was to rise by 1,000, the WRAC by 50% over 
five years, and the WRAF from 5,000 to 10,000.64 Duncan Sandys proposed 
reducing costs by creating a single women's Defence Force whose members would 
work with any of the Services.65 This idea was immediately rejected on the grounds 
that it would be disastrous for recruiting.66 It was seen as 'essential to esprit de corps 
[original emphasis] that women should feel themselves an integral part of their own 
Service.'67   
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Attitudes to Servicewomen as Revealed by Pay Policy 
The Air Ministry argued that its ambitious plan to double the size of the WRAF was 
dependent on securing better pay for women. It resurrected arguments it had made in 
1954 when equal pay for non-industrial civil servants and teachers was announced. 
At the time, it proposed that women be paid the same as single men on the grounds 
that they were interchangeable and their work was of equal value to the RAF. Both 
Air Chief Marshal Dickson (Chief of the Air Staff) and Sir James Barnes 
(Permanent under Secretary) supported the case. However, Lord De L'Isle (Secretary 
of State for Air) made the point that equality would have to extend to terms of 
service, in particular the 'special arrangements affecting marriage.'68 This echoed the 
Treasury's view that the right to resign on marriage, added to lack of liability for 
weapons training, meant that women should not qualify for equal pay.69 Neither the 
War Office nor the Admiralty agreed with the Air Ministry. The former repeated the 
previous argument that men in non-fighting jobs could serve in support of active 
units and would be obliged to fight as a last resort. The WRAC did not share this 
liability and were barred from units serving close to potential battle areas. The 
Admiralty view was that Wrens did not do equal work as they did not go to sea. 
However, it did concede that it might be harder to make a distinction between men 
and women's roles in the RAF. Even so, it noted that airmen were trained to use 
weapons whereas airwomen were not.70 
 
Air Chief Marshal Boothman, Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command, raised the 
pay issue again in 1955. He repeated the argument that the civilian case for paying 
women less than men was usually based on men's family responsibilities. However, 
he pointed out that armed forces' pay already made a distinction between single and 
married men through the payment of marriage allowance. He thought that women 
did the same work as men, the same additional duties and shared the same 
promotion rosters. He believed that the RAF should press for women to receive the 
same pay as single men to counter recruiting difficulties, even if the other Services 
did not agree.71 The Air Ministry went as far as to draft a paper for the Service 
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Ministers' Committee. However, it was  left on file, to be held until 'a suitable 
occasion'.72 When expansion of women's Services was agreed in July 1957, the Air 
Ministry was again keenest to improve women's terms of service and again not fully 
supported. However, Service Ministers agreed to seek a pay rise to 85% of single 
men's rates. This was negotiated successfully with the Treasury.73 
 
Recruitment and Retention for All-Regular Forces 
Success of the reversion to all-regular forces was critically dependent on recruiting 
and retaining volunteers, male and female. A paper for Service Ministers by the 
Defence Administration Committee claimed that recruiting trends meant that the 
army and RAF '[would] not be merely somewhat under strength' but '[would] be 
completely unable to carry out their tasks' when national service ended.74 A 
committee was established to investigate recruiting in December 1957 under the 
chairmanship of Sir James Grigg.75 Dame Felicity Peake (formerly Hanbury) also 
joined the committee. Grigg's report, published in October 1958, was surprisingly 
confident that the Services could attract enough men to sustain all-regular forces.  It 
envisaged an annual entry into non-commissioned ranks of 42,000 men over the 
period 1958-62 to cover the loss of conscripts, reducing to 34,000 per annum once 
national service ended.76 However, it suggested that improvements should be made 
to nearly all aspects of personnel policies and career structures.  
 
The Committee criticised recruiting policies and career progression. It noted a 
failure to target sufficient boys at the ages at which they left education, and lack of 
opportunities for boys leaving grammar schools with 'O' levels.77 Career progression 
in non-commissioned ranks was described as hampered by inappropriate promotion 
examinations. For officers, career structures that resulted in them leaving the 
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Services in their late forties or early fifties were also seen as deterring men who 
were concerned about finding civilian employment at that age. 
 
Chief amongst the recommendations for men were better pension provision, 
simplified allowances, reductions in 'fatigue' and guard duties, fewer petty 
restrictions on off-duty time, and more stability for family life, with less separation 
and more accompanied service.78 The condition of married and single 
accommodation was condemned as 'nothing short of scandalous'.79 In a visit to RAF 
Abingdon, Felicity Peake observed successful use of caravans as married quarters. 
Young married couples found them acceptable and cheap, but problems arose from 
lack of space if there were children.80  
 
Grigg's report described women's Services as being 'accepted without question, since 
... no large organisation should carry out its obligations by relying solely upon 
men.'81 It went on to say that any criticism of the Services should '[not] spring from 
the fact that they employ women in peace-time, but from the feeling that they do not 
employ enough ... there [were] still far too many men operating telephone 
switchboards and driving staff cars.'82 It criticized a 'lack of emphasis on the need 
for Women's Services', blaming the White Paper for 'quite erroneously [creating] an 
impression that women were no longer wanted'.83 
 
In its analysis of the state of women's Services, Grigg's committee covered much the 
same ground as for men. However, it dismissed the need for equal pay, concluding 
that 'women in the Forces [were] well off financially as compared with those 
outside' and that equal pay 'would [not] markedly affect the rates of recruitment.'84 It 
suggested reducing the minimum age by six months since the 'responsibility of 
looking after a girl of 17½ [was] no less than that of looking after a girl of 17'.85 
There was no discussion of allowing girls to join at 15 for apprentice training as was 
open to boys. There was a clear expectation that girls should be treated differently 
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and that re-assuring parents, headmistresses and career mistresses about levels of 
supervision of girls living away from home was paramount.86  
 
The crucial difference between men and women's terms of service was women's 
right to leave on marriage, resulting in a 'high proportion of women not complet[ing] 
their engagements'.87 The report supported the right to leave, describing marriage as 
'fully as important a social duty as a career in the Women's Services.'88 However, 
having identified marriage as the key reason for the inability to  retain women, it 
made no recommendations about making married service easier. Rather, it proposed 
to improve allowances and pension rights to ameliorate the financial impact of 
leaving early and making terms and conditions of service sufficiently attractive to 
generate better recruitment.  
 
Grigg's key idea was a radical change from fixed-term engagements for women to 
open-ended terms. After serving a minimum of two or three years, chosen as the 
period over which the initial cost of uniforms and training would be amortized, 
women would serve until retirement age with the right to give six months notice to 
leave.89 The government rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would have an 
'adverse effect on morale and manpower planning.'90 
 
As with men's recruiting, Grigg was confident that the Services could find the 5-
6,000 female recruits it would need annually.91 Indeed, this proved to be so. 
Between 1959 and 1962, female intakes averaged 5,300 per annum (Table 3.3). 
However, rather than increasing the WRNS, numbers declined by about 300. The 
WRAC increased by 800, but at 17% this fell well short of the aspiration of a 50% 
increase. The WRAF saw the greatest increase (an extra 1,700 women), but at 6,600 
it too missed its ambitious target of 10,000 members (Table 3.1). It is not possible to 
say conclusively why women were not joining, though Irene Hilton of the Women's 
Employment Federation suggested that 'Practically all young girls hope[d] to marry 
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early and this affect[ed] their attitude towards long term training or long term 
projects of any kind' [original emphasis]. She observed that 'The long contract to-
day has no advantages to the young ... The feeling of being tied, on the other hand, 
weighs heavily.'92 However, it is evident that marriage and pregnancy remained the 
most common reasons for leaving early and the desired build up of the women's 
Services proved unattainable. 
 
In 1958, the RAF decided to follow the army's example and try a local service 
scheme for airwomen. This abandoned the principle that women must accept 
'mobile' service, that is a commitment to serve wherever sent. It was hoped that, by 
avoiding the necessity of living away from home, it would encourage more women 
to join, married women as well as single. It had the additional benefit of saving costs 
by not having to provide barrack accommodation. Local service women would be 
eligible only for trades with comparatively short training. The initial target was for 
up to 1,000 women to join on two-year engagements. In an evaluation in September 
1960, quality was deemed a success but numbers disappointing. Only 445 posts had 
been filled. Recruitment had dropped from 56 per month to 12 per month and there 
were fears about the likelihood of women extending beyond their initial 
commitment.93 The scheme was retained as overheads were low.94 However, it did 
not fulfil its intentions. Statistics for March 1962 recorded only 456 local 
servicewomen against a potential establishment of 1,134.95 
 
By May 1962, the short period served by airwomen was seen as an advantage. Air 
Marshal Sir Walter Cheshire (Air Member for Personnel) reported to the Air 
Council that the need for personnel in ground trades was set to decline between 
April 1963 and April 1965. Meanwhile, he planned to increase the combined 
maximum size of regular and local service WRAF from 6,500 to 6,800 as a means 
of filling trades that were then short of men or for which women were more suitable. 
As women served on average for only 2 - 3 years, any surplus would quickly 
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disappear as a subsequent cut in recruiting targets would 'soon [be] reflected in 
serving strength'.96 It seems that women had become a useful means of regulating 
the overall strength of the RAF through natural wastage. 
 
Developments in the Women's Services 
WRAF Integration 
Integration of the WRAF officers into RAF career patterns continued in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. The women's separate officer training school at RAF Hawkinge 
was closed and in 1962 training was collocated with male officer training at RAF 
Jurby on the Isle of Man.97 Staff College places for female officers were approved in 
principle by 1950.98 This was an important development because it opened up more 
jobs at Headquarters and Defence Ministries for women. However, candidates had 
to pass preliminary staff training and few women qualified. Of the eight women who 
took the examination in 1952 only two passed. A further two passed in 1953.99 From 
those qualified, Squadron Officers Martin and Borlase were the first selected to 
attend the College in Andover in 1953.100 Squadron Officer Martin went on to 
become the first woman to achieve the rank of air commodore in competition with 
RAF officers.101 To the dismay of Jean Conan Doyle (Director WRAF, 1963-6), 
Squadron Officer Borlase became engaged to a fellow student on the course, 
married and left the Service in 1954.102 Borlase's departure so soon after completing 
this prestigious course may have fuelled belief that investing in women's training 
was poor value for money.  
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Airwomen's career opportunities were also developing. They had a wider range of 
postings than those open to other women's Services, though this was not always 
straightforward. For example, though they were initially employed with the Second 
Tactical Air Force in Germany, in 1952 the Air Council decided to disestablish these 
posts for women. This was on the grounds that its war role was mobile, so living 
conditions were 'primitive and arduous ... [and] women would be an embarrassment 
to which a Commander should not be subject.'103 In 1955, this policy was reversed. 
Restricting the deployment of women was described as 'outmoded by the nuclear 
concept'.104 Although Air Marshal Sir Francis Fogarty's note did not expand on this 
point, it appeared to mean an expectation of rapid escalation of hostilities to nuclear 
war with the Soviet Union. If that were the case, concerns about living conditions in 
the field would be unimportant. The Air Council agreed that airwomen could be 
employed in 'forward units' as radio operators and in signals jobs.105  
 
A proposal from Technical Training Command in 1963 not only to collocate junior 
ranks' recruit training but to integrate it, came to nothing. Air Commandant Jean 
Conan Doyle was thought to oppose the move as 'efficiency and morale would 
suffer if [men and women] were trained in the same place.'106 This seems an odd 
stance as initial officer training had been collocated the previous year and trade 
training courses, which followed on from junior ranks' recruit training, was already 
combined. Conan Doyle may have been safeguarding a rare senior post for female 
officers as commander of the WRAF Recruit Training School.      
 
Meanwhile the role of the WRAF Directorate was shrinking from its 1940s peak of 
influence. Following an audit of its personnel and functions, the number of female 
staff jobs at the Air Ministry and the headquarters of the various RAF Commands 
was reduced.107 In addition, the Air Secretary's Department, which was responsible 
for posting personnel to jobs, decided that the WRAF Directorate would not 
automatically have a place on boards selecting female officers for posts. The 
Director would be 'consulted ... before Board meetings' and could be invited 'when 
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special WRAF considerations [arose]'.108 This change reduced the Director's 
influence over WRAF officers' careers.  
 
WRAF Aircrew - Air Quartermasters 
A major step for non-commissioned women's opportunities came with the opening 
of some air quartermaster (AQM) posts.109 AQM was not a formally established 
trade. The work was carried out by airmen from other trades who volunteered for 
temporary flying duty. Work included responsibility for loading and unloading 
freight from cargo flights or acting as stewards for passenger flights. These men had 
lower status than those in aircrew trades and branches. They received a supplement 
known as 'crew pay' rather than the more generous 'flying pay' awarded to aircrew 
and they did not wear a flying badge which would have proclaimed their status.110  
 
Air Commandant Hanbury first sought to establish airwomen as stewards in 1946. 
Although she seemed to have support from Air Commodore Staton (Air Officer 
Commanding Number 46 Group, Transport Command) nothing came of her 
initiative.111 The idea was revived in 1957 at a meeting to discuss the implications of 
new transport aircraft coming into service, particularly the passenger-carrying 
Comet. The number of AQMs needed would increase at a time when 'there was an 
urgent problem to attract sufficient volunteers of a high quality'.112 Volunteers had to 
be NCOs. It was observed that, by that stage, men tended to be married and were 
reluctant to volunteer because of the amount of time spent away from home.113 
However, the new aircraft were seen as providing an opportunity to create two 
specialisations within AQM work: one for freight and one for passenger flights. 
Women's suitability for work on freight-carrying aircraft was dismissed on grounds 
of lack of strength, but they could be employed on Comets in the passenger role. It 
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was agreed to seek eight female volunteers for passenger aircraft duty on a trial 
basis, provided accommodation could be found for them.114 
 
The 1957 decision did not solve problems with AQM work. The Officer and 
Aircrew Manning Committee proposed that it should become a trade with dedicated 
personnel and aircrew status rather than relying on temporary volunteers.115 Such a 
move would also bring about aircrew status for female AQMs. Wing Commander 
Dutt of the Manning Branch protested that ‘surely it [was] not intended to give 
women aircrew status?’116 He went on to say that if women became aircrew there 
was a problem because the Selection Centre did not have female accommodation nor 
were the selection exercises suitable for women.117 However, the Committee saw no 
objection to this small number of women being designated as aircrew. In February 
1961 the Air Council passed the proposal that 25 women be employed in the role out 
of a planned complement of 310.118 Treasury approval for aircrew status and pay for 
AQMs was sought. However, it insisted on delay until the next review of Service 
pay because a pay freeze was in force.119 The Treasury also queried the award of 
aircrew status and pay for women because they would only serve on passenger 
aircraft.120 However, aircrew status, badges and pay were finally approved in 
1962.121 By February 1963 there were fifteen female AQM aircrew.122 
 
WRNS Consolidation 
Dame Nancy Robertson (Director WRNS, 1954-58) described her objective as being 
'to consolidate the permanent Service and to ensure that there was a worthwhile 
career open to ambitious and well-qualified girls.'123 Her successor, Dame Elizabeth 
Hoyer Millar, described the difficulty of sustaining enough posts for Wrens. As 
bases closed in the 1950s, she said the 'problem was to find them billets [i.e. jobs] in 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 TNA: AIR 2/15707, Status and Conditions of Service of Air Quartermasters, Sep 1960.   
116 TNA: AIR 2/15501, Dutt (Manning 3) to Director of Manning 1, 19 May 1960.  'Manning' here 
means a personnel branch not just 'men'. 
117 Ibid. 
118 TNA: AIR 6/131 Air Council Meeting 4(61) Conclusions, Paper AC(61)12 – New Conditions of 
Service for Air Quartermasters, 23 Feb 1961. 
119 TNA: AIR 2/15501, handwritten note, 4 Oct 1961. 
120 TNA: AIR 2/16376, Head of S10(Air) to AUS(P)(Air), referring back to 1961, 3 May 1965 
121  TNA: AIR 2/16320, Flying Duties as AQMs – Air Ministry Pamphlet 96B, Sep 1962 (1st edition 
May 1962).   
122 TNA: AIR 2/15789, DWRAF to DGPS, WRAF Shortage of NCOs, 18 Feb 1963. 
123 Quoted in Mason, Britannia's Daughters, pp.101-2. 
Chapter 3: Servicewomen in the Period of Men's National Service 
122 
order to keep the strength going to what was the ceiling we were allowed, and below 
which would have been uneconomic.'124 Cuts in the Fleet Air Arm hit the WRNS 
particularly, as at the start of regular service 2,600 Wrens (approximately 40%) were 
employed on Naval air stations.125 Malta was the main opportunity for overseas 
postings at this time. Periodically, Wrens would spend time at NATO 
Headquarters.126 First Officer Joan Cole was given the interesting post of assisting 
the Women's Royal Australian Navy to start up again, having been disbanded after 
the war. She held the role of its Director from November 1954.127  
 
Conclusion 
The decision to end national service for men was perhaps an opportunity to 
terminate the employment of servicewomen. The concept of women's Services being 
cores for expansion had no place in the April 1957 White Paper. However, reverting 
to all-regular forces was expected to put a strain on male recruitment. Although the 
Admiralty may have considered disbanding the WRNS as a savings measure, 
women's Services were seen as a means of mitigating the risk of shortfalls in male 
volunteers. With the demise of national service, women formed the shortest serving 
component of the personnel mix. From the perspective of the MOD's 'manpower' 
planning division, 'there [were] few jobs for which women [were] absolutely 
essential' and numbers required depended on 'progress in recruiting men and in 
civilianisation.'128 As national service came to an end, the allowable number of 
airwomen was seen as a new, cheap way of regulating the strength of the RAF as 
establishments continued to decline.  
 
Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, failure to retain servicewomen 
undermined the public basis for the policy that they would lessen the need for men. 
Women's early return to civilian life was attributable to marriage and pregnancy. 
This coupled social norms of women marrying at a younger average age than in pre-
war times with the regulatory climate in the Services. In 1964, in response to a 
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question about steps being taken to retain servicewomen, Christopher Mayhew 
(Minister for the Navy) described marriage as 'a great bugbear [taking] our people 
away'.129 Yet means of lessening its impact were not sought. From recruiting 
literature suggesting careers as a fallback in the absence of marriage, through to an 
official inquiry into recruitment which described marriage as a social duty for 
women, and on to regulations which made married service difficult, there was a 
sense that long-term military careers were not natural for women.  
 
Attitudes towards and employment of the WRNS and the WRAF diverged. The 
Admiralty continued to be ambivalent about the purpose of the WRNS. What the 
Directors' WRNS of the time described as 'consolidation' was more a case of 
retaining a foothold. The Air Ministry was more committed to making good use of 
servicewomen. As seen in the debate about equal (single personnel) pay, it perceived 
women's contribution to ground-based work as of the same value as men's. Its 
philosophy of integration of the WRAF made progress. Airwomen were accepted for 
work on the RAF's Cold War frontline – the Second Tactical Air Force, stationed in 
West Germany. Air quartermasters became the first regular servicewomen to gain 
aircrew status. Female officers had access to top level training at Staff College, 
opening the way to wider employment. The next chapter deals with further 
developments in the RAF. 
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Chapter 4: The Women's Royal Air Force to the Early 1980s: the 
Growing Influence of Legislation 
 
 
In 1978, after three years' consideration of the impact of recent legislation in the 
MOD, a paper for the Principal Personnel Officers' Committee advised that:   
 
' ... where the circumstances of their service are the same, men and women ... 
should be treated equally. To seek to do less ... might lead to a charge that 
MOD was sheltering behind the exemption clauses contained in recent 
legislation. This ... might lead to pressure for absolute equality (including the 
full range of military duties) which has been in evidence in other areas both at 
home and abroad in recent years.'1 
 
In approving the paper's recommendations, the Committee agreed that publicity for 
new policies would not be sought on the grounds that ‘measures taken to ensure 
equality of treatment in conditions of service may draw attention to the restrictions 
placed upon the employment of women in combat and other related roles’.2 
 
The Committee was concerned about three major pieces of legislation affecting 
women's employment: the Equal Pay Act (1970) which came into force in 1975, the 
Employment Protection Act (1975) and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975). The first 
required employers to pay staff equally for work of equal value. The second, inter 
alia, enshrined working women's entitlement to paid maternity leave. The Sex 
Discrimination Act (SDA) had two main features: clauses concerning employment 
and those covering provision of education, goods, facilities, services and premises. 
The armed forces were exempt from the SDA and the Employment Protection Act. 
A caveat in the Equal Pay Act enabled the MOD to continue to pay servicewomen 
less than men on the grounds that their work, being non-combatant, was not 
equivalent to men's.  
 
                                                 
1 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Sep 1978. This was a joint Services 
committee. Membership included the senior personnel officers: Second Sea Lord for the RN, 
Adjutant General for the army and Air Member for Personnel for the RAF. 
2 Ibid and DEFE 10/1249, PPO Minutes, 15 Nov 1978. 
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Not only was employment policy in the armed forces lagging developments in 
Britain, but the Committee was also informed that it was increasingly divergent 
from that of NATO allies. A summary of the situation noted that, of the NATO 
nations that employed servicewomen, all but the UK, Turkey and West Germany 
trained them to use weapons.3 Only Norway had the same policy as Britain in 
allowing women to leave on marriage. However, Britain was alone in not permitting 
servicewomen to rent married quarters and receive associated allowances.4 
 
American policy had changed significantly in the 1970s as it reverted to all-
volunteer forces and coped with challenges to policies brought by servicewomen 
using equality legislation. Women lost the right to leave on marriage, gained 
maternity leave benefits and started to be employed in flying in all the Services, 
seafaring in the Coast Guard and subsequently in the US Navy.5 However, by 
limiting posts open to women, these new roles continued to be described as non-
combatant.6 
 
The dilemma facing the Principal Personnel Officers' Committee was how to adjust 
to developments in employment legislation, abiding by the spirit of new laws, 
without surrendering the guiding principle that women should not be employed in 
combat. Concentrating on developments in the RAF to the mid-1980s, this chapter 
addresses why and how legislation affected MOD policy, despite exemptions. It 
identifies significant advances in WRAF employment brought about by new equality 
awareness and fears for implications for the RAF's image if it did not modernise its 
approach. It reveals uncertainty about what constituted 'combat roles' in the RAF 
and argues that the introduction of small arms training made airwomen as combatant 
as their male counterparts. As in the USA, combat discourse found ways of 
delineating between men's combatant status and women's. While some employment 
restrictions were removed, the barriers to long-service careers created by policies on 
marriage and pregnancy persisted. This chapter seeks to explain why policy-makers 
                                                 
3 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Sep 1978. Portugal, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Iceland did not employ servicewomen. The paper noted that Belgium had only 
recently started to include women and their status was not covered. West Germany only employed 
women as medics. 
4 Ibid. The Dutch were in the process of removing the right to leave on marriage. 
5 Major General Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: an Unfinished Revolution (Novato, Ca: 
Presidio, 1992 edition), pp.289-304, 317-21 and p.333.  
6 Ibid, pp.337-45. 
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reacted against developments in America that permitted women to combine military 
careers and motherhood. It argues that senior women officers were particularly 
resistant to change, believing that motherhood was incompatible with military 
service. Without support from female leaders, this was not an issue that male policy-
makers were likely to tackle.     
 
Legislation 
Sex Discrimination Act (1975) 
The Ministry of Defence was accustomed to exemption from legislation which 
might affect personnel's rights on the grounds that military work was different from 
civilian.7 It required little effort to gain exemption from the SDA. The Ministry sent 
a paper on roles of servicewomen to the chairman of the House of Lords committee 
overseeing the legislation.8 It set out its case against extending women's employment 
on the basis of the short period of women's service compared with men's, public 
opinion being against women in combat roles, the harsh nature of field conditions, 
women's lack of physical strength, cost inefficiency and assumed problems in 
maintaining morale and discipline in combat units if women were present. The key 
point was that combat was men’s work not women’s.9 The paper made insufficient 
distinction between the Services and, with an emphasis on field deployments, 
presented an army-centric position. It did not appear to do justice to the integrated 
pattern of employment in the RAF as it described all servicewomen, including the 
WRAF, as 'solely employed in separate women's Services'.10 The committee 
accepted the MOD's argument and the armed forces were exempted.11  
 
In July 1975, Mr Stevens, a senior Air Force Department civil servant responsible 
for advising on terms and conditions of service, thought it prudent to ‘look around 
                                                 
7 For example, it was exempt from the Sexual Offences Act (1967) which legalised homosexual acts 
between consenting adults (Parliamentary Archive [henceforward PA]: HL/PO/PU/4/193, Sexual 
Offences Act 1967, clause 1(5)). Also, under Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act (1947), 
service personnel could not sue for accidental injuries. (TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Section 10 of the 
Crown Proceedings Act, PPO 58/78, 17 Jul 1978). 
8 PA: ROY 1/3, House of Lords Select Committee, Anti-Discrimination (No 2) Bill, memorandum by 
the Ministry of Defence, circa 1972. The paper was not signed or dated. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 PA: HL/PO/PU/4/212, Sex Discrimination Act 1975, clause 85. 
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for the loose ends of the Sex Discrimination Bill’.12 He had two concerns. First, the 
Daily Mirror was interested in MOD policies following the introduction of 
maternity rights in the USA's armed forces. Second, the MOD was unprepared for 
the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, passed in 1974 and coming into force on 1 July 
1975.13 It was only realised in March that there was no exemption. Recruiting 
procedures had to be hastily changed to comply.14 Stevens thought exemption from 
pending sex discrimination law might not apply to education, goods, facilities, 
services and premises provisions. He wanted ‘at least the makings of an MOD 
position … in case there was press coverage for sex discrimination in the services.'15 
In a second letter, Stevens urged policy departments to ‘identify those areas where 
there [was] discrimination and satisfy [themselves] that it [was] justified’.16 The 
criterion was whether a minister could reasonably be expected to defend the 
situation.17 Thus the tone of staff work was akin to a stock-take. Stevens' letter did 
not suggest taking action to change discriminatory practices, but perhaps this was 
implied by the proposed ministerial test. 
  
Work revealed differences in the treatment of men and women, sometimes in favour 
of women but more frequently to the advantage of men. Men were employed in 
more roles, were better paid, accrued better pensions and received more generous 
allowances. The number of women who could be recruited was limited. However, 
women had the advantage in being able to leave more easily, including the right to 
leave citing marriage.18 Airwomen were not required to transfer to the Reserve on 
completion of regular service.19  
 
A case that arose in the Navy Department in late 1977 illustrated the unfairness of 
the regulations on married quarters and the different approaches taken in the 
Services. A Second Officer in the WRNS was married to a former lieutenant 
                                                 
12 TNA: DEFE 71/309, S10 to staff, 9 Jul 1975. 
13 Ibid. 
14 TNA: DEFE 71/24, Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, DPM1(RAF), 18 Mar 1975, S10(Air), 23 Apr 
1975 and 19 May 1975. 
15 TNA: DEFE 71/309, S10 to staff, 9 Jul 1975. 
16 Ibid, S10 to Air Force Department, 3 Nov 1975. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Women married before joining were not entitled to leave under these regulations unless they could 
prove material change of circumstances. Single women had no preferential right to leave. 
19 TNA: DEFE 71/309, S10 to Air Force Department, 3 Nov 1975 and S10 to DS14, Mar 1976. 
Chapter 4: The WRAF to the Early 1980s 
128 
commander who, having retired from the Royal Navy, was unemployed. She applied 
to rent a married quarter on posting to the Naval Headquarters at Northwood. 
Although none were available at Northwood, there was unoccupied accommodation 
at Hendon that would suffice. As an exception to the regulations, the naval 
authorities proposed allowing the officer to take a quarter because her husband was 
'to some measure dependant on her'.20 They wanted to charge her the same rent as a 
male officer, on the understanding that if it was needed for an 'entitled' family, she 
would have to vacate.21 The Air Force department was intending to go further. It 
wanted to make it a matter of routine to offer surplus married quarters to women at 
the standard rent.22 However, finance staff in the army department argued that the 
Second Officer should be charged either the rent levied on 'irregular' occupants or 
the market rent set for those MOD civilians who were permitted to take a quarter.23 
Both of these solutions would result in the officer paying about 50% more in rent 
than a married male officer.24  
 
Mr F J Stevens (of the army finance staff, not to be confused with Mr T M P Stevens 
of the Air Force department) wanted policy on married quarters to be decided by the 
Principal Personnel Officers' Committee and not changed by 'erosion' brought about 
by particular cases. He supported the proposal to charge the higher rent.25 The 
Assistant under Secretary Naval Personnel weighed in with a short, dismissive reply 
to Mr Stevens, admitting that there were two views of the matter, but that Stevens' 
view was held 'by a minority of one'.26 Air Vice Marshal Bailey (Director General 
Personnel Services) concurred, suggesting to Stevens that he was 'swimming against 
the tide' and that it was unacceptable to charge a higher rent because the officer was 
female.27  
 
Although out of step with his opposite numbers on this case, as F J Stevens wished, 
policy on allowing women to rent quarters was addressed by the Principal Personnel 
                                                 
20 TNA: DEFE 70/24, Mr Howell (Head of Naval Personnel Division 2), 30 Nov 1977.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, Mr F J Stevens, Head of  F4 (Army Department), 24 Nov 1977 and Air Vice Marshal Bailey 
to Stevens, 13 Dec 1977. 
23 Ibid, F4 (AD), 10 Nov 1977, 17 Nov 1977 and 21 Nov 1977. 
24 Ibid, Mr Howell (Head of Naval Personnel Division 2), 30 Nov 1977. 
25 Ibid, Mr F J Stevens, 24 Nov 1977.  
26 Ibid, AUS NP, 2 Dec 1977. 
27 Ibid, Bailey to F J Stevens, 13 Dec 1977. 
Chapter 4: The WRAF to the Early 1980s 
129 
Officers' Committee as a result of the work started by his namesake. It took three 
years for the Services to agree their position on equality legislation for the 
Committee. 
 
Mr Jaffray (Deputy under Secretary Personnel and Logistics) put the paper to the 
Committee. His aspiration was to avoid the MOD 'com[ing] under pressure to widen 
employment opportunities for women to a far greater extent than the Service boards 
would wish to go at this stage.’28 He cited two principles to justify differential 
treatment. First, social mores were thought to exclude women from combat duties. 
Second, a married woman was described as not warranting the same assistance as a 
married man who had to provide for his family. Jaffray reported advice from the 
Treasury Solicitor that the latter had been eroded by changes in public attitudes and 
that a woman could be regarded in law as head of her household. On combat duties, 
he acknowledged that most of those NATO countries with women in their forces 
trained them in the use of personal weapons. However, he considered that excluding 
British servicewomen from combat roles remained valid, pointing out that it had 
been used to justify exemption from the Sex Discrimination Act. He quoted the 
House of Lords Select Committee opinion that ' "for many positions in the Armed 
Services the male sex is a genuine occupational requirement".'29 This was simply the 
Select Committee echoing back the MOD's own sentiment. It was not an 
independent assessment. 
 
In November 1978 the Committee approved Mr Jaffray's recommendations for a few 
alterations to women’s terms and conditions of service, some raised to the standard 
applied to men and two reduced to those of men. Most improvements related to 
married women. They were granted the right to rent married quarters and their 




                                                 
28 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Sep 1978. 
29 Ibid, Annex C. 
30 Ibid and DEFE 10/1249, PPO Minutes, 15 Nov 1978. 
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'Sex and the Service Girl' - Dealing with Pregnancy and Marriage
31
 
RAF regulations required pregnant women to be discharged immediately they were 
deemed unable to fulfil their duties. The Employment Protection Act (1975) did not 
change the situation. Employers were allowed to dismiss a woman if 'at the date of 
termination of employment she [was] or [would have] become, because of her 
pregnancy, incapable of adequately doing the work which she [was] employed to 
do.'32  
 
Two earlier pieces of legislation (the Abortion Act 1967 and the Family Planning 
Act 1967) did affect policies. While the MOD acted swiftly to comply with the 
Abortion Act, the RAF blundered. The Act permitted abortion in authorised 
hospitals and patients were entitled to secrecy. On the recommendation of the 
Principal Personnel Officers' Committee, Ministerial authority was granted for 
Service doctors to perform abortions in approved military hospitals. This included 
five RAF hospitals.33 However, the RAF's Queen's Regulations were not amended. 
These allowed a woman who miscarried before her 28th week of pregnancy to be 
retained in the Service. However, if she was not married, a report would be made on 
her character. If she was judged promiscuous, she would be discharged.34 In 
consequence, it was surmised that airwomen sought abortions through civilian 
facilities rather than risk being reported by RAF medical officers as though they had 
miscarried.35 
 
Contradictions between the Abortion Act and RAF regulations came to light in late 
1976 when Air Vice Marshal Soutar, the principal medical officer at Strike 
Command Headquarters, sought clarification from the MOD. Soutar noted that 
information about an abortion could come to medical officers from civilian 
hospitals. Service doctors did not know whether they should keep the matter secret 
in accordance with the Act or inform the authorities under Queen's Regulations. 
Mindful that a report could lead to the woman's 'discharge without delay', Soutar 
                                                 
31 Heading used by Mr T M P Stevens of the Air Force Department when asking staff to examine 
policies for inequalities. TNA: DEFE 71/309, Stevens, 9 Jul 1975.  
32 PA: HL/PO/PU/4/213, Employment Protection Act 1975, clause 34. 
33 TNA: DEFE 71/50, Abortion Act 1967, Policy letter 12/69, 16 Dec 1969. 
34 TNA: AIR 10/5614, Queen's Regulations, 4th edition, regulations 629 and 630; DEFE 71/50, 
Termination of Pregnancy, Deputy Director WRAF, 19 Jan 1977 and Abortions for Servicewomen, 
Mr Stevens, 14 Sep 1977. 
35 TNA: DEFE 71/50, Pregnancy in WRAF Personnel, Soutar to MOD, Dec 1976. 
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complained that 'many medical officers [were] genuinely confused about their 
responsibilities'.36 Staff work on his letter revealed the other two Services had 
properly implemented the 1969 policy letter. RAF regulations were amended to 
comply with the Act.37  
 
Response to the Family Planning Act, which enabled health authorities to provide 
contraceptives to women on clinical or social grounds, was more complex. RAF 
medical services promptly issued a policy letter instructing doctors that they could 
issue contraceptives on clinical grounds to all women. Unmarried women could be 
given a prescription on social grounds if they could prove intent to marry within a 
month.38 However, Women's Services' Directors thought provision of contraceptives 
to unmarried servicewomen amounted to official sanction for immoral behaviour 
and promiscuity. They believed parents of potential female recruits would be 
horrified. They feared corruption of easily led young women by those of bad 
influence in communal accommodation. They also suggested that wives of 
servicemen would protest because servicewomen were perceived as a threat to 
marriages.39 Their view was supported by senior chaplains.40 However, the Principal 
Personnel Officers favoured the RAF's policy position. Making a distinction 
between methods of contraception and attitudes towards official sanction of sexual 
behaviour, they observed that 'there was nothing inconsistent in providing 
contraceptives for men as this was to contain the spread of venereal disease and not 
to prevent pregnancy'.41 Unlike views on women's sexuality, no moral judgement 
was passed on men's behaviour. 
 
In 1969 a draft policy letter was sent to Roy Hattersley (Minister for Defence 
Administration) for approval. He rejected the statement that the Services acted in 
loco parentis for young women given that the age of legal majority was due to fall 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, Abortions for Servicewomen, T M P Stevens, 14 Sep 1977 and draft revised regulations, 23 
Sep 1977. 
38 TNA: DEFE 49/19, Family Planning, Policy Letter 17/67, 17 Jul 1967.  
39 Ibid, Chief Officer Mary Talbot, National Health Service (Family Planning) Act 1967, 9 Oct 1968 
and Chief Officer Talbot 28 Mar 1969, Annex to Report for PPO Committee, National Health Service 
(Family Planning) Act 1967, 22 May 1969. The WRNS led for women's Services.  
40 Ibid, Chaplain of the Fleet, 16 Jun 1969, Principal Chaplain Church of Scotland and Free Churches 
(Naval), 16 Jun 1969, Principal Roman Catholic Chaplain, (Naval), 12 Jun 1969.  
41 Ibid, Principal Personnel Officers' Minutes, 2 Jul 1969. 
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from 21 to 18 in 1970. He also thought undue emphasis was placed on 
promiscuity.42 A policy letter was issued to medical officers allowing prescription of 
contraceptives to unmarried servicewomen on social grounds if they could prove 
intent to marry within three months. Otherwise, such prescriptions were to be made 
only with 'very great discretion ...bearing in mind all the circumstances of the 
case.'43  
 
Senior WRAF officers took a hard line on pregnancy. In the early 1970s, the 
Directorate championed differential rights for married and single servicewomen, and 
between those who lived in barracks or in a family home. It suggested amending 
regulations which required immediate discharge to a system in which married 
women would be discharged in the sixteenth week of pregnancy. This was to allow 
time for a replacement to be assigned before the woman left.44 However, instant 
discharge was proposed for women, including married women, living in communal 
service accommodation. It was claimed that lack of privacy in barrack blocks, 
'unpleasantness' for other women having to put up with a pregnant woman’s 
morning sickness and, for the unmarried, shame associated with their condition, 
were all deemed to justify swift discharge. Servicewomen were expected to have 
high standards of appearance, behaviour and self-discipline.45 These were 
considered questionable if a single woman became pregnant, a standpoint rooted in 
fears for the image of the WRAF.  
 
Mr Stevens opposed different rules for married and unmarried women, and for those 
who lived in barracks compared with those who did not. He argued that the proposal 
had ‘undertones of sexual discrimination’.46 After a year of intermittent 
correspondence, Air Commodore Molly Allott (WRAF Director at the time) 
conceded. Regulations were promulgated to allow all women to work up to the 
                                                 
42 Ibid, Hattersley to Second Sea Lord, 3 Nov 1969. 
43 Ibid, Guidance to Service Medical Officers on Family Planning, 14 Nov 1969. The extension to 
three months was made on medical advice. 
44 TNA: DEFE 71/50, Airwomen Discharge on Pregnancy, Wing Commander Alison Mackintosh, 29 
Jan 1974. 
45 Ibid, Deputy Director WRAF to S10(Air), 16 Dec 1974.   
46 Ibid, Stevens to Deputy Director WRAF, 23 Jan 1975. 
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sixteenth week of pregnancy, subject to fitness and at the discretion of the individual 
and her commanding officer.47  
 
As Chapter 3 showed, servicewomen found it difficult to combine career and 
marriage. The circular nature of the situation was summed up thus by a civil servant: 
 
‘... the failure to mitigate the difficulties of combining marriage and a service 
career [for women] has a direct bearing on individual decisions to leave on the 
grounds of marriage, the prime course [cause?] of premature exit, thus 
contributing to short service which is one of the limiting factors on the 
employment of women’.48 
 
In the United States, moves to abolish the right to leave on marriage began in the 
Marine Corps in 1964 and then extended to the other Services. The result was a 
proven increase in the period served by women.49 Air Commodore Joy Tamblin 
(Director WRAF October 1976 - February 1980), chairing the NATO women’s 
committee in 1977, was familiar with these developments and her reports on NATO 
were circulated within the Air Force Department, including to the Chief of Air Staff 
and the Air Member for Personnel.50 Nevertheless, it was believed that removing the 
right to leave on marriage would have a detrimental effect on female recruitment.51 
Neither Tamblin, nor her successors challenged the policy which remained in place 
until the early 1990s.  
 
Although unwilling to remove women's right to leave, the RAF made efforts to 
improve the retention of married women. According to Air Commodore Ruth 
Montague (Director WRAF November 1989 - March 1994), 'there was a conscious 
                                                 
47 Ibid, Stevens to S10b, 25 Feb 1975. American servicewomen challenged discharge on pregnancy, 
winning a court case in 1970. From May 1975, Department of Defense (sic) rules allowed women to 
return to work after giving birth. However, Holm (Director of the Women’s Air Force 1965-73) 
claimed Directors’ of the Women’s Services had been reluctant to allow single pregnant women to 
live in barracks because it would ‘subject the rest of the women to the stigma that would come from 
sharing dormitories with those bearing illegitimate children’. Holm, Women in the Military, pp.298-
303. 
48 TNA: DEFE 71/309, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, S10(Air) to DS 14, 18 Oct 1977. 
49 Holm, Women in the Military, pp289-90. 
50 Air Commodore Tamblin, interviewed by author, 26 May 2009, transcript pp.4-5. 
51 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Sep 1978. 
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effort to collocate married couples' which started in the 1960s.52 This did not 
necessarily mean at the same RAF station but could be at 'units as close as 
possible.'53 However, from the statistics put to the Principal Personnel Offices' 
Committee in 1978, it was not obvious that this 'collocation' practice was effective. 
The committee was informed that 904 members of the WRAF (19%) were married 
as at 30 September 1977 and that, in the preceding 12 months, 597 women had 
exercised their right to leave the Service on or after marriage.54 Air Commodore 
Montague's statistics recorded that, in the early 1980s, airwomen served on average 
for 2¼ years and officers for 4½ years.55  
 
Significant changes to these figures occurred over the next ten years. At the time of 
writing her article in the early 1990s, Air Commodore Montague noted that 35% of 
WRAF personnel were married, with airwomen serving on average for 6½ years and 
officers for nearly 10 years. She attributed this improvement to continued efforts to 
collocate couples. She also acknowledged the policy to allow women to hold the 
licence for a married quarter that came into effect in 1979.56 However, she did not 
consider women's greater ability to control fertility. Not only did married couples 
have a better opportunity to live together, but also servicewomen were able to 
postpone pregnancy and delay the date at which they were obliged to give up their 
careers.57 
 
Service Pay and the Equal Pay Act (1970) 
Until 1970 pay continued to be dependant partly on marital status. However, this 
made service pay rates look poor to potential young male recruits compared to 
civilian employment. A new system was introduced in April 1970 following a major 
review by the National Board for Prices and Incomes.58 Pay was set on the basis of 
comparability with civilian occupations, without reference to marital status. 
                                                 
52 Montague, ‘Women in the RAF’, p.226. 
53 Ibid. 
54 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Sep 1978. 
55 Montague, ‘Women in the RAF’, p.227. 
56 Ibid, pp.226-7. She was writing just over two years after compulsory discharge on pregnancy 
ceased. How quickly that affected statistics is unclear. 
57 There was a trend in society for women to delay having children. The mean age at first birth was at 
a low of 23.9 in 1972. By 1996 it had risen to 26.5. The percentage of women likely to remain 
childless was also increasing. Coleman, ‘Population and Family’, pp.44-5.  
58 Standing Reference on the Pay of the Armed Forces Third Report, Cmnd. 4291 (London: HMSO, 
1970). 
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Personnel occupying service accommodation now paid for food and accommodation 
rather than receiving benefits in kind.59 From April 1970, women were paid 90% of 
men's basic rates.60 
 
The revised pay code also introduced a supplement to basic pay called the X-factor. 
It 'recognise[d] those special conditions of employment which [were] peculiar to 
Service life, and which [could] not therefore be compared with civilian 
employments.'61 It took account of potential exposure to danger and turbulence 
created in private life by frequent moves. It cited commitments to accept military 
discipline, liability for duty at all times without extra pay and inability to resign at 
will, change jobs or negotiate for pay. These disadvantages were weighed against 
the perceived advantages of adventure, travel, the chance to learn a trade, 
substantially longer paid leave than most civilians and greater job security. Women 
were described as having lesser commitment than men because they were excluded 
from combat and could leave on marriage. Accordingly, while men received an X-
factor worth 5% of basic pay, women's rate was set at 'a token 1%'.62 
 
The armed forces were not exempt from the Equal Pay Act (1970). However, the 
Secretary of State was only required to avoid making or recommending 'terms and 
conditions of service ... [having] the effect of making a distinction, as regards pay, 
allowances or leave, between men and women ... not being a distinction fairly 
attributable to differences between the obligations undertaken by men and those 
undertaken by women' 63 More simply, the MOD could differentiate between men's 
and women's emoluments on the grounds that work and commitment were unequal. 
This allowable pay differential was embodied in the X-factor. Basic pay for women 
was equalised with men's in April 1975 to comply with the Act. X-factor rates were 
increased to 10% for men and 5% for women.64  
 
 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 TNA: DEFE 10/1207, Draft Evidence to Armed Forces Pay Review Body, 1 Nov 1977. 
62 Standing Reference on the Pay of the Armed Forces Third Report, Cmnd. 4291 (London: HMSO,  
1970). 
63 PA: HL/PO/PU/4/199, Equal Pay Act (1970), Clause 7. 
64
Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) Fourth Report, Cmnd. 6063, (London: HMSO, 1975). 
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Small Arms Training and Combat Discourse  
Lack of training with small arms was a crucial barrier to WRAF careers. Women 
were excluded from some posts, not because they were unable to undertake the 
primary function, but because they were ineligible for war roles assigned to those 
posts.65 Also, lack of experience in operational work hampered women's promotion 
prospects in competition with men. Station commanders manipulated establishments 
in favour of airmen in order to meet commitments to defend bases.66 Reluctance to 
open posts to WRAF personnel hindered the Air Force Department's intention to 
recruit more women to counter shortfalls of men.67 Finally, the absence of a liability 
to use weapons was a key factor in the argument for paying women less than men.68 
 
Air Commodore Joy Tamblin was frustrated by exclusion from training with 
weapons. She recollected from a visit to Cyprus that the local commander allowed a 
senior female officer to be armed so that she could fill a post geographically remote 
from the main base. She thought he was a 'very forward thinking CO [commanding 
officer] ... a sensible chap.'69 She remembered that some station commanders 
believed security and guard duties 'fell very heavily on the men because the women 
couldn't do armed duties'.70 During visits to RAF stations Coltishall, Waddington 
and Boulmer, Tamblin encouraged commanders to raise the issue through their 
chains of command.71  
  
Change was in the interest of station commanders. Stations were tested against their 
war roles and the career prospects of commanding officers depended on the outcome 
of such evaluations. However, peacetime establishments were lower than those 
planned for war. Operating at a level below war establishment, flexibility was 
further hindered by airwomen not being deployable for armed duties.72 Anomalies 
were exposed by RAF Boulmer, a UK air defence station. Its senior commanders 
                                                 
65 FOI AHB: ID3/110/21, Arming of WRAF Personnel, for Air Force Board, 17 Oct 1978. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 TNA: DEFE 71/226, Arming of WRAF Personnel, Mr West (Head of S10 Air), 21 Apr 1978. 
69 Tamblin, transcript p.2. 
70 Ibid, p.3. 
71 TNA: DEFE 71/31, Group Captain Mackintosh to Air Commodore Tamblin, 1 Nov 1977 on points 
raised at Strike Command or Group Headquarters. 
72 TNA: DEFE 71/226, Annex B to Draft Air Force Board Paper for Air Member for Personnel, 6 Sep 
1978.  
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explained that they were reluctant to take women in ‘engineering and support trades 
as these produce[d] the manpower for the station guard force in war’.73 However, 
women were employed in fighter control work and so were responsible for ‘fighting 
the tactical air defence battle and for ordering fighters to shoot at and destroy enemy 
aircraft.’74 Their view was that ‘There appear[ed] to be little moral difference 
between giving an order to kill and carrying out the killing … the effect of a female 
Sector Controller ordering a wing of fighter [aircraft] or a SAM [Surface to Air 
Missile] section to engage [the enemy was] infinitely greater than the damage that 
[could] be done by the same individual using a sub-machine gun.’75 
 
In April 1978, taking up the issue 'As part of our general review of "sex-equality" 
questions ...', the Air Member for Personnel's department sought the views of policy 
areas.76 In response, Air Commodore Reed-Purvis (Director of Security) offered 
three categories of combat: offensive action in which personnel would seek and 
destroy the enemy; defensive action where weapons would be used from prepared 
positions near the place of work; and self-defence actions in which the individual 
would react to being confronted by an enemy. Of these, he accepted that women 
could undertake the third task but not the first two. He argued that, as it was 
anticipated that not all airmen would be capable of operating effectively in action, '... 
it was unrealistic to imagine that all airwomen could be expected to react as 
combatants when under fire. To plan otherwise in peace would be to court disaster 
in war’.77 He thought that the most that airwomen could be expected to do was to act 
in self-defence, to which he added armed guard duty.78  
 
Air Commodore Reed-Purvis' view was similar to the army's position on how to 
better utilise the WRAC. It was proposing to describe women as 'combatant but non-
belligerent', with female soldiers to be trained to use ‘defensive weapons’ for self-
defence purposes only.79  These intentions to arm servicewomen without according 
them the same combatant status accorded to men was opposed by Air Commodore 
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Parkinson (Director of Training). He refuted a description of armed guards as 'non-
combatants', saying 'we need[ed] to be completely honest in this matter.'80 In a later 
letter he observed that if the intention was to improve operational effectiveness then 
‘armed women [would] be combatants in the same way that all male RAF personnel 
… already [were].’81  
 
In November 1978, Air Marshal Sir John Gingell (Air Member for Personnel) took 
his recommendation in favour of arming women to the Air Force Board. In support, 
he cited shortages of personnel, a difficult recruiting climate and attitudes towards 
sex discrimination. He thought commanders would be willing to accept more 
women if they could be armed. He mentioned that the 1977 revision to the Geneva 
Convention explicitly stated that women were combatants 'with a right to take part 
directly in hostilities'.82 He produced evidence that arming servicewomen was 
commonplace in NATO and Commonwealth forces. The Air Force Board saw the 
proposal 'not [as] a matter of "women's lib" but of practical advantage and public 
attitudes.'83 Although concerned about possible adverse public opinion, it agreed 
women should be armed to ‘[defend] themselves, others and Service property’ on a 
trial basis.84  
 
A change in women's employment of that magnitude needed to be shared with the 
other Services through the Principal Personnel Officers' Committee. The Army 
wanted an equivalent scheme; the Navy was opposed. Joy Tamblin reported the 
Navy’s position as being that ‘shore establishments in which WRNS work[ed] [were 
not considered] vulnerable to attack, thus they [did] not foresee a need for WRNS to 
be armed.’85 Vice Admiral Sir Gordon Tait (Second Sea Lord) more vehemently 
expressed fears that the decision would ‘give rise to vociferous demands from vocal 
minorities for other and wider changes in the employment of servicewomen.’86 His 
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remarks were made in the context of an ongoing study into whether Wrens should 
serve at sea (see Chapter 5).   
   
Concern remained that public opinion would be against arming women. Air Force 
policy confined women's armed duty to positions internal to RAF stations. They 
would not be used as perimeter guards but would be employed out of public sight. 
However, such evidence as there was of public opinion pointed more towards 
indifference, or surprise that women were not already armed. A senior civil servant 
pointed out that there had been ‘a distinct lack of excitement in March [1979] after 
the various Press articles on the subject’.87 The trial of arming women apparently 
generated only ten letters to the Prime Minister and these were of divided opinion.88 
In response to ministerial aspiration to stimulate debate, Ian McDonald in the public 
relations office offered to try to 'plant a question in Any Questions Radio 
Programme and ... introduce the subject into the Jimmy Young Show.'89 He was not 
optimistic of stirring interest as 'the Press regard[ed] the issue as stale and the public 
never seem to have caught on at all.'90 The Parliamentary response had also been 
low key.91 Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham (Chief of the Air Staff) thought 
this lack of interest was good news, as implementation could therefore proceed.92  
 
The policy was not contentious in the RAF, though fewer women volunteered for 
training than anticipated. Officers and Senior NCOs were urged to lead by example. 
Compulsory weapons’ training for all female recruits started from 1 April 1984.93 
The RAF News sought to open debate on the policy through its letters’ column but it 
did not publish any correspondence, for or against.94 Letters' pages at the time were 
filled with the latest irritation about allowances and conditions of service, 
particularly perceived beneficial arrangements for married compared with single 
personnel.  
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With women now to be trained to use weapons and potentially exposed to danger, 
there was a case for increasing the X-factor. A civil servant in the finance staff 
disagreed, doubting that arms training would have 'any radical effect on the day-to-
day duties of those WRAF who [were] trained.'95 Bearing weapons would be a 
'minor rather than a major change in role'.96 Nevertheless, this was the basis on 
which airmen were regarded as combatants and a case for increasing women's X-
factor was put to the Armed Force Pay Review Body (AFPRB).  
 
Arming was just one of the factors which swayed the AFPRB.  Since its previous 
consideration of the X-factor in 1975, the WRNS had been brought within the scope 
of the Naval Discipline Act; thus all women now shared ‘restrictions on personal 
liberty’ (see Chapter 5).97 Compulsory discharge on pregnancy without the right to 
return to work was also noted as a disadvantage compared with civil employment. 
On arming, though, the AFPRB was careful to say that women were ‘not trained to 
undertake a combat role’ and they did not serve as pilots in the RAF or go to sea in 
the Navy.98 There was an obvious, but unstated, implication of that definition of 
combat for the RAF, namely the majority of men also did not fly. However, they 
were regarded as having combat roles. Women's X-factor was increased from 5% to 
7.5% of basic pay. Men's rate remained 10%.99 
 
Flying 
Pilot and Navigator Roles 
In the late 1970s, the RAF was experiencing one of its periodic crises of aircrew 
recruitment and retention. In 1976, on the assumption that requirements would 
decline as defence cuts continued, the Air Force Board decided to base recruiting 
targets on the number of new pilots that squadrons could absorb rather than on total 
aircrew establishment.100 However, requirements did not decline. Moreover, 
                                                 
95 TNA: DEFE 71/226, Arming of WRAF Personnel - X-Factor, Taylor (F2 Air) to S10(Air), 5 Jun 
1979. 
96 Ibid. 
97 AFPRB Eleventh Report, Cmnd. 8549, (London: HMSO, 1982), p.8. 
98 Ibid, p.8. 
99 Ibid, p.8. 
100 FOI AHB: ID3/92/32 Part 5, Brief for Chief of Air Staff, 24 Aug 1977. Total establishment 
included aircrew in ground-based posts. The number of new pilots on a squadron was limited to avoid 
too great a dilution of experience levels. 
Chapter 4: The WRAF to the Early 1980s 
141 
'recruiting [was] well down; quality of those accepted ... [had] reduced; wastage in 
training [was] higher than predicted; there [was] a bottleneck [in training]; retention 
[was] below expectations and premature voluntary release applications [were] well 
up on previous years.'101 Failure to recruit was attributed to uncertainty about the 
security of RAF careers; there had been a redundancy programme in the mid-1970s. 
Retention problems were blamed on poor pay and conditions of service with a 
'serious and widening comparability gap'.102 The backlog of men wanting early 
release (known as premature voluntary release) from the Service was such that 
junior officers who applied were expected to wait until the mid-1980s for an exit 
date, causing 'a serious morale problem'.103 
 
One of the potential solutions was to recruit women as pilots and navigators for roles 
described as non-combatant, as in America. While Air Marshal Sir John Nicholls 
(Air Member for Supply and Organisation) wanted to debate the issue, Air Marshal 
Sir John Gingell (Air Member for Personnel) was against.104 All RAF pilots were 
recruited on their potential to become fast jet pilots. Those that failed to make the 
grade could train for multi-engine or rotary wing aircraft. Gingell argued that non-
combatant women would reduce the pool of potential fast jet pilots and would take 
training places needed for men. Furthermore, women tended not to serve as long as 
men. Finally, he doubted that the idea would receive support.105 The suggestion was 
dropped. 
 
A combination of a substantial pay rise awarded by the incoming Conservative 
government in 1979 and less onerous terms of service eased the problem for a time. 
Instead of permanent commissions which kept them in the RAF until age 38 or the 
completion of 16 years service (whichever was the later), pilots and navigators were 
offered a 12-year term with an option to leave after 8 years. This was thought to be a 
more attractive period of service.106 It was an important development. As female 
officers' average length of service began to increase in the 1980s, the argument that 
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women did not serve long enough to make flying training economic weakened (see 
Chapter 6). 
 
University Air Squadrons 
At the same time as pilot and navigator roles for women were considered but 
dismissed, female undergraduate flying membership of University Air Squadrons 
(UASs) was also discussed. Formed in the 1920s, UASs were retained after the 
Second World War as a means of encouraging interest in aviation and the RAF and 
as preparation for potential officers.107 The RAF College Cranwell Flight Cadet 
Scheme having been phased out in 1971,108 universities were expected to be ‘the 
primary source of the future leadership of … the RAF.’ 109 Male undergraduates 
awarded RAF sponsorship received flying training; they were obliged to join the 
Service on graduation. Others were selected by UAS commanding officers as 
volunteer reserves and given fewer flying hours. Those of acceptable standard were 
encouraged to join the regular Service but they were not obliged to do so. Some 
undergraduates joined as ground branch members with no flying training. A few 
women were admitted as social members.   
 
With the RAF critically dependent on male graduates entering as aircrew, UASs 
experienced a crisis of recruiting. In 1977, only 91 of 183 available cadetships were 
awarded.110 The aptitude for flying training of men accepted as volunteer reserves 
was declining.111 Air Vice Marshal Harcourt-Smith (Commandant of RAF College 
Cranwell and responsible for UASs) put local recruiting difficulties down to 'the sex 
discrimination problem.'112 In addition to anti-military views on campuses, he 
observed a worsening situation due to the growth in women's rights' movements. 
The RAF was seen in a bad light compared with the Army and the Royal Navy, 
which both admitted women to university units. Consequently, some Students' 
Unions hindered recruitment to UASs by preventing them from attending Freshers' 
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Fairs. Harcourt-Smith proposed volunteer reserve membership for women, with 
some flying training, on the grounds that it would 'remove a major source of 
complaint and [UASs] would therefore have direct access to a larger pool of 
potential male recruits.'113 Additionally, he saw such membership as a useful means 
of attracting female graduates to join the WRAF. 
 
In 1979, a draft Air Force Board paper recommended up to 10% of Volunteer 
Reserve places be open to women in competition with men. This was seen as a way 
of placating complaints without diminishing the pool of potential RAF pilots. 
Women would replace men at the lower end of the quality spectrum who were 
unlikely to be offered commissions.114 The paper was criticised by the finance 
department. UAS budgets had only recently survived on the grounds that the 
squadrons were a key source of pilots. As women could not join as pilots, it was 
contradictory to propose to train women to fly at public expense.115 Another 
respondent was concerned about trying to explain in public why women could fly 
with UASs but not in the RAF.116 Air Vice Marshal Bailey (Director General of 
Personnel Services) doubted that a 10% quota would 'mollify the women's rights 
firebrands at the universities'.117 He hinted that the Air Member for Personnel was 
against women pilots. A revised version was circulated, setting out options without 
making recommendations. As predicted, and consistent with his refusal to support 
WRAF pilots a year earlier, Air Marshal Gingell decreed 'it should be put on ice'.118   
 
Undeterred, female undergraduates applied for membership of University Air 
Squadrons.119 Julie Gibson, studying aeronautical engineering at London's City 
University, put her case for flying membership to the commanding officer of 
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London UAS in 1981. She was rebuffed on the standard grounds of '[women's] 
exclusion from the combat roles and because of the improbability of amortizing 
training costs before marriage or motherhood.'120 An appeal through her MP was 
likewise rebuffed.121 A similar issue arose earlier when a young woman named Miss 
Walker applied for a naval flying scholarship.122 The Treasury Solicitor's department 
advised MOD that it would probably be unsuccessful in defending a complaint to 
the Equal Opportunities Commission as there was no exemption from clauses of the 
legislation concerning facilities for education.123 The reply to Miss Walker 
acknowledged she was correct in saying that the exemption under the SDA did not 
apply. However, as she would legitimately be excluded from joining the RN as a 
pilot, she was urged not to deprive a young man of a place but to ‘reflect very 
seriously on the implications for the Navy, the Ministry and the taxpayer’.124 
 
A case for admitting women to UASs on the same terms as men was put to the Air 
Force Board in 1985. The introduction to the paper noted that university authorities, 
student bodies and Ministers believed membership rules were too restrictive, with a 
key criticism being exclusion of women. However, as the RAF did not recruit 
women to be pilots, the paper cautioned that giving women volunteer reserve status 
could raise false expectations about employment prospects. Accordingly, they would 
have to be admitted as ground branch members, but with an entitlement to some 
flying training to satisfy equality concerns. Flying for ground branch women in turn 
implied that male ground branch undergraduates would have to have flying hours. 
The paper concluded that the rules should be changed to allow ground branch 
membership with some flying training for men and women alike.125 The paper was 
approved and a quota of up to 10% of the membership was opened to women from 
1985.126 
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Rear Crew 
In the late 1970s, women's foothold as rear crew was insecure. Although employed 
on passenger aircraft, this was only a limited aspect of their air loadmaster (ALM, 
formerly air quartermaster) trade's duties. In January 1978, Air Chief Marshal Sir 
John Aiken (predecessor to Gingell as Air Member for Personnel) considered 
disestablishing this role for women as there was now very little pure passenger 
work. The VC10 aircraft, used in place of Britannias and Comets, routinely carried 
freight at the same time as passengers. Women were deemed physically unable to 
deal with freight, so a male ALM must always be on board. In war, the VC10 would 
be used for troop carrying and ammunition supply, tasks from which women were 
excluded. Only 7% of ALM jobs were open to women.127 Although Aiken presented 
this as a significant reduction, it was close to the 8% approved for women in 1961.  
 
While financial and operational considerations pointed to disestablishment, Aiken 
sought political guidance on whether this change would be acceptable given the 
climate of widening women's work.128 Air Marshal Sir John Nicholls (Air Member 
for Supply and Organisation) was against disestablishment. He thought the principle 
of female aircrew was 'important and we should not walk back from it'.129 James 
Wellbeloved (Under Secretary of State, Air in the Labour government) agreed, 
deciding that 'the opportunity for women to become aircrew [was] highly important, 
both psychologically and presentationally.'130 The ALM trade remained open to 
women. Their work was extended to some Hercules transport aircraft roles in the 
early 1980s.131 
 
A new role emerged on airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. This task had been 
performed with Shackleton aircraft, crewed by pilots, navigators, air electronics 
officers and air electronics operators.132 It was planned to replace it with a more 
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capable Nimrod aircraft, fitted with a new radar, surveillance systems and data 
processing equipment. The AEW task was 'detection, tracking, recognition and 
reporting of all airborne traffic'.133 The necessary expertise in air battle management 
was akin to work in ground-based air defence control centres in the UK. This work 
was undertaken by fighter control officers and the associated non-commissioned 
trade of aerospace systems operators. Although these specialisations were short of 
personnel, it was decided to earmark up to a third of the posts on the AEW Nimrod 
for them. The remainder would come initially from existing Shackleton crews.134   
  
As women formed a significant proportion of fighter control personnel, the question 
arose as to whether they would be eligible for AEW Nimrod jobs. Knowing that 
women were not employed in combat, Wing Commander Borrett (a staff officer for 
air defence matters) sought advice as to the definition of a combat aircraft. He 
thought the Nimrod could be described as non-combatant as it did not entail 
'bring[ing] weapons to bear directly on the enemy'.135 He also thought that the risk to 
which women would be exposed was certainly no more than, and possibly less than, 
when they did similar work in UK control centres. He suggested that in war they 
might be safer when airborne than working at ground radar stations.136 Once again, 
it was pointed out that there was no international or domestic legal prohibition on 
employing women in combat. It was a matter of MOD policy, and political and 
public acceptance.137 The idea of using women in AEW Nimrod found no favour 
with Air Force Board members. Air Chief Marshal Sir Rex Roe (Air Member 
Supply and Organisation) offered 'to field [it], presumably into touch?'138 Air 
Marshals Sir Charles Ness (Air Member for Personnel) and Sir David Craig (Vice 
Chief of the Air Staff) were also against, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael 
Beetham (Chief of the Air Staff) ruled that women would not fly in Nimrod 
aircraft.139 
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Although initially rebuffed, the question of employing women was not closed. The 
fighter control specialisation had a poor recruiting record and high failure rate in 
training.140 Consequently, an ability to master the skills was more important than 
capping the number of women employed. Complete statistics for any one year are 
elusive. However, the 1978 complement for fighter control officers was 357 posts.141 
In 1984 there were 57 female fighter control officers, perhaps as much as 16% of the 
complement, and 140 non-commissioned aerospace operators.142 In addition, of 378 
recruits into the aerospace operator trade between April 1976 and March 1978, 128 
were female.143 Air Marshal Sir Peter Harding, Craig's successor as Vice Chief of 
Air Staff, proposed employing women in Nimrod AEW.144 The operational case 
followed the same line as Wing Commander Borratt's in 1981. Harding added that 
exclusion would be bad for women's morale and could have an adverse impact on 
recruitment.145 Air Force Board members endorsed it unanimously, expressing 
surprise that their predecessors had been opposed.146 Ministerial approval was given 
on the understanding that, as Nimrod was essentially 'an airborne radar unit directly 
comparable to a ground radar unit', it 'did not conflict with the ruling that women 
should not be employed in direct combat roles' and women '[would] be placed at 
very little more risk through being airborne'.147 However, delay ensued because 
conversion of Nimrod to the AEW role was a procurement fiasco. The programme 
was cancelled in 1986 and the MOD decided to buy the Sentry aircraft from the 
USA.148 When its crew complement was considered, the decision to employ women 
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was carried over from the 1984 ruling.149 The first woman entered training for 
Sentry in 1989.150 
 
In the context of potential employment of women on AEW Nimrod, Air Vice 
Marshal Hayr (Assistant Chief of Air Staff - Operations) championed a new role for 
some female radio operators. He wanted qualified linguists working at 26 Signals 
Unit in Berlin to be considered for Nimrod Reconnaissance aircraft in an air signals 
specialisation. This career pattern was open to airmen. Hayr set out three particular 
considerations: whether this constituted combatant work; terms of service; and the 
potential for publicity for this normally secret work. He argued that the 
reconnaissance role was 'not [regarded as] a combat aircraft in the strictest sense' as 
it operated at a distance behind the front line.151 The work would not place women 
in 'any greater danger than girls currently serving in Operations Centres in RAF 
Germany.'152 However, he cautioned that 'unwanted publicity' for the Squadron 
would need to be carefully handled.153 This seemed to give his superiors a reason for 
rejecting the initiative. Consistent with his stance on AEW Nimrod, Air Chief 
Marshal Beetham asked Air Marshal Sir David Craig to 'pour cold water on this - 
and drown it'.154 
 
WRAF Careers 
Greater integration of women into the RAF continued while WRAF-specific roles 
diminished. The Director's job was no longer seen as full-time so the post-holder 
was given additional responsibility for RAF welfare.155 Merger of initial officer 
training was completed in 1979 when all officer recruits trained at Cranwell. 
Training was undertaken in mixed flights. Recruit training for female junior ranks 
was collocated with men's at RAF Swinderby in 1982. However, the training 
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remained segregated until 1990.156 There were other less eye-catching moves 
towards integration. From 1976, the Air Force List stopped recording WRAF 
officers' names in a separate section and included them according to branch and 
seniority of rank in the main RAF section.157 More importantly, 'manpower' statistics 
prepared annually for the Principal Personnel Officers' Committee included women 
from September 1979.158 The astonishing fact is that, previously, personnel analysis 
did not include the women's Services. 
  
It was intended in 1949 that women would compete with men for promotion. 
However, the lack of women gaining senior officer ranks led to the reintroduction in 
1962 of the wartime system of a separate promotion list for officers whose role was 
to administer the women's Service.159 This was designed to provide a field of 
candidates for the job of Director. Women could opt into this additional promotion 
competition. In theory this gave them ‘two bites of the promotion cherry’.160 In 
practice, once they had accepted this special promotion, they were no longer 
competitive in the common promotion field. For example, Alison Mackintosh served 
to the rank of 'squadron leader' as an engineer, but was promoted to 'wing 
commander' and subsequently to 'group captain' as a WRAF administration officer. 
She was one of two contenders for the Director’s job in 1980. Unsuccessful, she was 
considered unsuitable for an engineering appointment as she would not have 
achieved that rank in her specialisation and had spent too many years out of the 
engineering environment.161 
 
The vast majority of women's promotions to senior ranks were through this WRAF 
administration route rather than in competition with men. Analysis for the Under 
Secretary of State in 1978 recorded one air commodore (the Director), two group 
captains (both deputies to the Director) and five wing commanders. Two of the wing 
commanders were in WRAF jobs. Of the three in general appointments, two worked 
in administration and one was a fighter control officer.162 This was much as it had 
                                                 
156 Montague, ‘Women in the RAF’, p.226.  'Flight' here means a class of trainees. 
157 Air Force List, (London: HMSO, 1976). 
158 TNA: DEFE 10/1254, Strength, Recruitment and Outflow, PPO paper, 6 Sep 1979. 
159 TNA: AIR 2/19122, DDP Pol to DWRAF, WRAF G Competition, 11 Jul 1977.  
160 Ibid, A/DDP Pol to DDPG1, 17 May 1977. 
161 Ibid, DDPG1 to DDPol, 30 May 1977. 
162 FOI AHB: ID3/92/32 Part 5, Promotion Prospects for WRAF Officers, 24 May 1978. 
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been since the inception of regular service. From 1949 to 1986 only three women 
reached the rank of group captain (or group officer before 1968) in open 
competition.163 Of the thirteen women to reach the rank of air commodore or air 
commandant, eleven served as Director. Only two were promoted in open 
competition with men.164 Prospects for senior non-commissioned ranks were also 
poor except in WRAF roles. Of the 100 female warrant officers and SNCOs in 1976, 
half were in women’s trades. Only 1.25% of airwomen held SNCO rank in mixed-
gender trades compared with 31% of airmen.165  
 
Joan Hopkins' experience provides an interesting insight into an individual's career. 
Although other NATO countries were apparently more open to women making 
military careers, there was a gap between policy and practice. From 1970 all NATO 
job specifications were annotated as to whether they were open to women and, if 
they were not, a statement had to be provided as to why they were only for men. 
However, Wing Commander Hopkins' nomination for a NATO fighter control post 
in Norway was rejected. This caused the RAF's personnel department to wonder 
'how many more theoretical "female acceptable" posts would vanish when 
threatened with the actuality!'.166 Hopkins fared better under the RAF system. 
Promoted to group captain, she was the first woman appointed to command an 
operational station. Air Marshal Sir Charles Ness (Air Member for Personnel) 
remarked that she was 'selected as the best officer available ... no other criterion 
[was] acceptable.'167 On reaching air commodore rank, she declined to be considered 
for the Director post, preferring to stay in her fighter control specialisation.168 
 
Promotion to senior ranks required commitment to a full career and, on average, 
women did not stay in the Service long enough. This is borne out in statistics for 
1963 and 1976 on age and rank distribution of non-commissioned ranks (Table 4.1). 
However, perceptions of lack of value for money associated with short service had 
given way to perceived advantages. As previously expressed in 1962 (Chapter 3), in 
                                                 
163 Joan Peck (an engineer), Bridget Martin (secretarial officer) and Joan Hopkins (fighter control). 
164 Bridget Martin (Escott, Women in Air Force Blue, p.261) and Joan Hopkins.  
165 TNA: AIR 2/19169 Study of Factors Affecting WRAF Manning Policy, 27 Feb 1976. 
166 TNA: AIR 2/19195, WRAF Posts in NATO, Air Commodore Pierse, 9 Jun 1977. 
167 FOI AHB: ID3/92/32 Part 5, Future for the General Duties (Ground) Branch, Mar 1982. Hopkins 
commanded RAF Neatishead, an air defence station. 
168 Air Commodore Joan Hopkins interviewed by the author, 18 and 19 May 2009, transcript pp.36-8.  
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1976 women's short period of service was seen as providing flexibility in controlling 
overall numbers as recruiting fluctuated. Explicitly, women were now described as 
'a manning [sic] regulator to enable the Service to expand in the short term or 
contract by natural wastage thus lessening the need to resort to redundancy.'169 In 
addition, large numbers of junior-rank women in particular trades were described as 
enhancing men's promotion prospects.170   
 
Table 4.1 Airwomen: Age and Rank Distribution 1963 and 1976 
 
1963         
Age Junior  
Ranks 






17-20 3911         39 -   3950       64.0 
21-25 1398       228 6   1632       26.5 
26-35   151         63 51     265         4.3 
36-45     27         29 145     201         3.3 
46-50       6           5 52       63         1.0 
51-55       3           3 38       44         0.7 
>55 - - -       14         0.2 
      
Total  5496       367 292   6169 100 











Under 20 1817          4 - -    1821       45.9 
20 up to 
25 
1603      153           4 -    1760       44.3 
25 up to 
30 
  150        94         21 -      265         6.7 
30 and 
over 
    17        33         54         21      125         3.1 
       
Total 3587      284         79         21    3971 100 
TNA: AIR 2/19169, Study of Factors Affecting WRAF Manning Policy, 27 Feb 1976. 
90% of non-commissioned women were aged 25 or younger. The proportion of SNCOs and warrant 
officers was higher in 1963 because some wartime generation women were still in the Service.  
 
 
                                                 
169 TNA: AIR 2/19169 Study of Factors Affecting WRAF Manning Policy, 27 Feb 1976. At that 
time, the RAF was making 3,300 airmen and 260 officers redundant (TNA: DEFE 71/145, Air Force 
Board Paper (75)3, 27 Jan 1975).  
170 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
Although exempt from the Sex Discrimination Act which came into force at the end 
of 1975, the Ministry of Defence personnel policy-makers agreed that the armed 
forces should abide by the spirit of the law, even if there was a presumption that the 
status quo would prevail. While the impact was not immediate, it had the effect of 
bringing the question of women's roles onto agendas. In particular, the RAF was 
concerned about potential damage to its self-image as being more egalitarian than 
the other Services. With signs that women's exclusion from flying at University Air 
Squadrons was having an adverse influence on recruiting young men to be the 
RAF's future elite, concessions were discussed, initially resisted and eventually 
granted to undergraduate women. This foray for young women into pilot training, 
albeit without the right to join the Service as aircrew, was an important milestone. It 
generated evidence of women's potential as pilots in direct comparison with young 
men destined to join the Service. Within the RAF, women's proven skills as fighter 
control officers and aerospace operators also widened their proposed employment in 
the expanded airborne early warning role. Again resisted when first put forward, by 
1984 it seemed an obvious decision. 
 
For most of the WRAF, the key development was the introduction of training in 
small arms which made them as combatant as male counterparts. It came about 
because declining establishments on RAF stations made the guarding task 
problematic unless all uniformed personnel could be utilised. By making women as 
employable as men, this one measure removed an important barrier to posts on RAF 
stations. Again, it would take some years to prove its value in terms of promotion 
prospects as women started to fill more important posts. However, it had an 
immediate impact on pay, with a reduction in the differential. The remaining 
justification for unequal pay was women's lesser commitment embodied in the right 
to leave of those who married while in the Services.   
 
Policy-makers went to extraordinary lengths to continue to describe what women 
did as non-combatant. The principle that women should not be employed in combat 
appeared to be sacrosanct. It was backed up by occasional quotes from Ministers at 
the MOD who asserted, but did not provide evidence for, knowledge of public 
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opinion. Thus women as armed guards were to be trained for defensive rather than 
offensive tasks. Weapons in their hands were likewise described as defensive. As 
airborne fighter controllers, women took an indirect role in bringing weapons to bear 
on an enemy, not directly firing missiles. The aircraft they were to crew also were 
categorized as non-combat. Risk to which these women would be exposed was seen 
as not much more than when they performed similar roles at ground-based radar 
stations because the aircraft would not fly close to the front line. So by geography, 
and description of weapons, aircraft and roles, women were deemed still to be 
employed only in non-combatant work. Yet this description would not be applied to 
men undertaking the same duties. All these descriptions were a means of allowing 
the Secretary of State to continue to claim that women were employed in non-
combatant roles, thus preserving the principle. Also, as all pilots were recruited for 
their potential to fly fast jets (i.e. indisputably combat aircraft), RAF policy-makers 
excluded women from elite roles. Nevertheless, senior men introduced new policies 
that enabled the RAF to exploit the skills of the women it recruited.  
 
With the WRAF Directorate fulfilling an advisory rather than policy-making role, it 
was inevitable that the influence of women's leadership was not central to 
developments. Nevertheless, the small arms issue showed the Director's role at its 
best. When Air Commodore Tamblin identified problems associated with women's 
non-combatant status, she encouraged station executives to raise questions through 
the chain of command and supported proposed policy changes at the Ministry. 
However, the opportunity of setting the agenda on women's terms of service by 
attacking regulations on marriage and pregnancy was declined. Believing that 
motherhood was incompatible with a military career and that the right to leave on 
marriage was fundamental to attracting young women into the Service, WRAF 
leadership supported extant regulations. This was despite having evidence from the 
USA that changes to such regulations had no detrimental impact on recruitment and 
led to a lengthening of time served by women. Without a strong push from senior 
women officers, successive Air Members for Personnel were unlikely to tackle these 
obstacles. Women could remain a useful part of the personnel mix while leaving full 
career paths mainly as the preserve of men. 
Chapter 5: The WRNS in the 1970s and Early 1980s 
154 
Chapter 5: The Women’s Royal Naval Service in the 1970s and 
Early 1980s: Femininity Triumphs over Feminism 
  
Following the introduction of equal basic pay in April 1975, the Navy News received 
letters from sailors which were 'rather scathing of the girls in uniform'.1 Calling this 
'sad for the working relationship between the boys and girls in blue', its editorial 
argued that Wrens: 
 
'... offer[ed] to the Royal Navy as much contribution, generally speaking, as 
they [were] allowed to make. They often [got] the dullest jobs. If the pay 
system [had] its faults, or the Management [were] defeated on sea/shore ratios, 
it seem[ed] a pity to take it out on the girls. The place would never be the same 
without them.'2   
 
Men complained that women had lesser obligations to the Service and this should be 
more fairly reflected in pay differentials. Specifically, Wrens were not under the 
Naval Discipline Act, thus they could (and some did) walk away from the job 
without fear of arrest and prosecution. Also, they were spared the disruption to 
personal life associated with seagoing.  
 
The purpose of the WRNS remained in question, though as the Navy News's item 
suggested, there was a feeling that it had its part to play. However, defence reviews 
resulted in closures of UK and overseas bases, reducing the Navy's shore-based 
complement. With more cuts to come, Commandant Mary Talbot (Director WRNS 
July 1973 - July 1976) asked for a study into the future role of her Service.3 The 
study, and subsequent ones on seagoing and flying that it spawned, form the basis 
for this chapter. These studies took place at a time when legislation put equality of 
opportunity onto the agenda at MOD.  This chapter examines the struggle to define 
the future place and character of the WRNS as a military Service.  
 
                                                 
1 Navy News, 'Is Jack niggled by Jenny: questions on jobs and pay', Jul 1975, p.22.  
2 Ibid. Sea/shore ratio is the term used to express men's time at sea compared with time in shore jobs. 
Acceptable ratios were set by trade and rank but they were frequently exceeded. Ratings commonly 
blamed lack of shore jobs on the employment of Wrens.  
3 TNA: ADM 167/178, Admiralty Board Minutes, 3 Mar 1975. 
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In introducing a book of essays evaluating the impact of the World Wars on 
women's social and economic roles, Margaret and Patrice Higonnet offered the 
image of a double helix to represent the relative standing of men and women. They 
described the female strand as subordinate to men’s. They argued that a change in 
status for women was often marked by a corresponding change for men, thus 
keeping the relative position the same. However, they cautioned against interpreting 
women’s part in the relationship as that of 'passive victim without responsibility for 
constructing the relationship'.4 This chapter will show that extending the Naval 
Discipline Act to women led to a partial erosion of subordinate status. However, 
senior female officers and junior ratings alike revelled in perceptions of the Wrens 
as the most feminine of the women's Services. Women were likely to be vociferous 
opponents of change, just as many men were. This chapter suggests that, with 
gender as the central issue in the Navy's job segregation, femininity remained the 
dominant image of the WRNS. Feminism, seen as the impetus for greater 
militarisation of American servicewomen, was generally rejected.  
 
In an article examining the entry of women into the British Foreign Service after the 
Second World War, Helen McCarthy argued that the Foreign Office defended its 
exclusion of women on practical grounds rather than as a matter of principle. Once 
practical objections were overcome by women successfully filling diplomatic roles 
during the war, it gave way.5 McCarthy's consideration of arguments as being based 
on principles or practicalities is a helpful way of examining policy developments in 
the Navy Department. This chapter will show that the Admiralty Board continued to 
exclude women from regular service at sea because it adhered to the principle that 
women should be excluded from combat roles. The supposed impracticalities of 
mixed crews in ships were reduced to supporting arguments. While the RAF made 
concessions in order to be seen to abide by the spirit of the Sex Discrimination Act, 
the Navy upheld women's non-combatant status as the essential factor in the armed 
forces exemption from the Act. This insistence on combat being the demarcation 
line also exposes understandings of the terms ‘combat’ and ‘combatant’ as applied 
to ships and women.  
                                                 
4 Margaret R. Higonnet and Patrice L.-R. Higonnet, ‘The Double Helix’, p.39. 
5 Helen McCarthy, ‘Petticoat Diplomacy: the Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, c. 
1919-1946’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol.20, No.3, 2009, p.319. 
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Pritchard's Study into the Future of the WRNS 
Women’s employment at the beginning of the 1970s had not changed markedly 
since the WRNS's formation as a peacetime component in 1949. The WRNS still ran 
its own recruitment, initial training, postings of officers to jobs and their promotions. 
Junior ranks were obliged to live in Service provided accommodation, and naval 
establishments had a cohort of female staff (Unit Officers, regulators and quarters 
assistants) who oversaw welfare and discipline.6 These duplicated male equivalents 
and were a significant route for promotion to senior ranks for women. Wrens 
worked in shore-based jobs, such as drivers, and roles which had a significant 
proportion of shore-based compared with seagoing appointments, for example in the 
Fleet Air Arm. Women were also beginning to make a mark in new jobs in 
computing. Outside women’s administration, the largest categories of employment 
for ratings were clerks (28.9% of the trained strength), radio operators (12.6%), 
stewards (7.9%), radar plotters (7.7%) and stores accountants (7.2%).7 The Service 
mostly sustained a strength above 3,000 women (Table 5.1). A dip below this figure 
was attributed to retention problems, blamed on poor pay before the major revision 
of military salaries in 1970.8   
 
Table 5.1 Strength of the Naval Services 1970-84 
          Thousands  
Year 1970 1972 1974   1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 
 
Men 82.7 78.9 74.7 72.2 71.3 68.1 69.0 67.4 
Women     2.8     2.9   3.0   3.3   3.4   3.2   3.4   3.4 
Total 85.5 81.8 77.7 75.5 74.7 71.3 72.4 70.8 
Women - 
% of total 
    3.3     3.5   3.9   4.3   4.6   4.5   4.7   4.8 
Annual Abstract of Statistics (London: HMSO) Volume 117 (1981) Tables 7.4 and 7.8; Volume 122 
(1986), Tables 7.3 and 7.10.9 
 
Responding to Mary Talbot's request for a study, Alan Pritchard (Assistant Under 
Secretary Naval Personnel) was appointed to chair proceedings. He was assisted by 
a naval captain and two WRNS officers, with civil servants as secretariat. Although 
                                                 
6 Regulator is the naval term for disciplinary staff.  
7 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974, Annex D. 
8 NMRN: 1988.350.28.15, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 19 Oct 1970. 
9 Figures in the Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1970, combined the RN and Royal Marines. Later years 
listed them separately. For consistency, this table uses the total of RN and RM. 'Women' excludes 
nurses who were not WRNS but Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service.   
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the terms of reference invited Pritchard to set his work 'in the context of the national 
tendency towards the wider employment of women', his scope was limited by an 
unpublicised briefing that service at sea was not to be considered.10 Pritchard noted 
this constraint in his report, without attribution. Given his seniority – Assistant 
Under Secretary was the third tier of civil servants in the MOD – the likely sources 
were the First or Second Sea Lords.  
 
Pritchard's report in November 1974 recognised that, in the absence of combat roles 
and with the use of civilians in shore-based support for the Navy, a case was needed 
for the existence of the WRNS. He listed four main factors in its favour. First, well-
qualified female recruits were available and filled roles for which male recruiting 
was difficult or, if there was no seagoing equivalent work, not required. Second, 
they were cheaper to employ than sailors and likely to remain so after the 
introduction of 'equal pay'. This came about not only because of the X-factor 
discussed in Chapter 4 but because men with seagoing liability were in a higher pay 
band than women in the same trade. Third, in isolated locations civilians were not 
available. Fourth, Wrens were a loyal workforce whereas 'growing militancy of 
Trades Unions and even Staff Associations [had] cast doubt on the unquestioned 
dependability of both industrial and non-industrial civilian support.'11 Wrens were 
also described as making a contribution to 'the social cohesiveness of otherwise male 
Establishments, especially in isolated areas.'12 This was an interesting observation. 
In reference to seagoing, the presence of women was usually presumed to be 
disruptive.13 Mindful of budget issues, Pritchard recommended greater integration to 
cut overheads. 
 
Pritchard identified problems in attitudes towards the WRNS, training and 
employment. Men and women referred to a 'special relationship' between the WRNS 
and the RN. Pritchard acknowledged that the relationship offered 'the advantage of 
mutual affection and a closer camaraderie', but observed that it also 'had the hidden 
disadvantage of disregarding and obscuring the potential and abilities of members of 
                                                 
10 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974.   
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 For example, Captain Read to Pritchard, 3 Feb 1976 (TNA: DEFE 69/689, Seagoing Service for 
WRNS).  
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the WRNS.'14 He noted that men and women alike regarded the WRNS as the most 
feminine of the women's Services. While Pritchard encountered 'some frustration 
among the more assertive but no less feminine [Wrens]', he was surprised by the 
'general lack of desire for change'.15  
 
Pritchard described Wrens' employment as being fitted around the needs of the RN; 
men's careers had primacy. He observed that women's training was not as thorough 
as men's. Coupled with lack of sea experience, this resulted in women being given 
lesser tasks even if they were better qualified than male colleagues. Pritchard picked 
out examples of stewards and cooks whose training was comparable to men's. 
However, the former were rarely employed in the most prestigious role of bar 
manager. Female cooks were given routine work while men prepared more creative 
dishes. Women promoted to supervisory jobs had few opportunities for variety of 
work. Because they stayed in post for a long time, they blocked promotions for 
younger women. This tendency was exacerbated by attempts to retain married 
women by keeping them in their preferred location to avoid them leaving. Pritchard 
regarded these employment practices as a waste of women's talents. His 
recommendations addressed the need to improve the status of the WRNS by 
reducing the differences between it and the Royal Navy.16 
 
Apart from his recommendation that women come under the Naval Discipline Act 
(see below), Pritchard made notable proposals on improving training. Female 
ratings' recruit training took place at HMS Dauntless, near Reading. Established 
during the war, it was in poor condition and needed substantial investment to 
modernize accommodation. Pritchard re-iterated the proposal to move it, mooted 
since 1969. As it was not intended to combine women and men's training, a number 
of locations were considered following his report. The strongest case in terms of 
financial considerations and effectiveness of training favoured HMS Raleigh at 
Plymouth. This was Navy's recruit school. Land was available for women’s 
accommodation blocks and it had all the necessary training facilities. Despite its 
advantages Admiral Sir David Williams (Second Sea Lord) told the Admiralty 
                                                 
14 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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Board that Commandant Talbot objected on grounds of ‘disparity in educational 
level and social class between the WRNS and the [male] ratings under training’.17 
However, he thought that such reservations ‘could be over-emphasized’.18 Vonla 
McBride, who succeeded Mary Talbot as Director as the options were being 
considered, agreed to collocation at Raleigh. She drew the line at integration of 
initial training.19   
 
Pritchard's report also brought about the move of officer training from its prestigious 
home at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, to Dartmouth where new entrant male 
officers trained. Again, this was to be collocation rather than the introduction of 
joint training. Once more ethos was the main concern of the WRNS Director. At 
Greenwich, female cadet officers and staff mixed socially with men’s courses in 
residence, including senior officers on staff training.20 A London location, in historic 
surroundings, with mature company was an idyllic setting. The WRNS course 
included visits to galleries, museums, Parliament and the Courts of Justice.21 
Reluctance to lose these advantages was tempered by the opportunity to modernise 
the course. It remained a twelve week programme, but time devoted to WRNS 
matters was reduced to allow for more content on the Royal Navy’s organisation and 
functions, Britain’s role in the world and leadership training.22 These changes were 
seen as more readily implemented in a setting which already provided such training 
for men. Two places per annum for staff training were also to be reserved for female 
officers. In a separate development, the MOD's National Defence College was 
opened to women of all three Services. These advanced training opportunities were 




                                                 
17 TNA: ADM 167/179, Admiralty Board Minutes, 1 Jul 1976. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. It took until 1981 to implement the decision.  
20 Staff training prepared officers for work at MOD or Headquarters. Selection was an indicator of 
potential for further promotions. 
21 Commandant Anthea Larken, interviewed by the author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p7. Larken ran the 
final course at Greenwich and the first at Dartmouth. The move was implemented in 1976. 
22 TNA: DEFE 13/1342, News Release, 18 Mar 1976.   
23 Ibid, Second Sea Lord to Under Secretary of State (Navy) 11 Aug 1976 and MOD News Release, 
No.36 of 1976. Chief Officer Swallow and Major Meechie WRAC were the first military women to 
attend the National Defence College. 
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Military Status  
The main change instigated by Pritchard’s study was his contentious 
recommendation to replace the voluntary code of discipline with the Naval 
Discipline Act.24 A case for the NDA was made during the war and when regular 
service was introduced (Chapter 1). In rejecting it, the accepted explanation was that 
the WRNS had excellent discipline without need of a legal code. Wrens were 
considered the elite of women's Services and its recruits superior to women in the air 
force and the army. Post-war Wren officers grew up in this culture of assumed 
superiority. For example, in giving evidence to a House of Commons Select 
Committee, Commandant Margaret Drummond (Director WRNS 1964 - 1967) 
claimed that introducing the NDA would be a slight on the new generation. It would 
be a judgement that they had been found wanting in comparison with their 
predecessors who had maintained their discipline without recourse to military law.25 
Pritchard recognised this view, reporting that male and female senior officers 
described the voluntary code as the 'basis of [the] special relationship' between the 
WRNS and the RN. It was linked with 'the widely held view that the WRNS [had] 
remained a "feminine" organisation.'26 
 
Pritchard made a strong case for the NDA on grounds he described as practical and 
psychological. He dismissed objections made in the 1940s that the NDA was too 
harsh, as its terms were now in line with those of Army and Air Force Acts. Legal 
experts advised that using the voluntary disciplinary code for civil offences had no 
foundation in law and that, if challenged, punishments could not be enforced. Such 
challenge, Pritchard thought, would come about because of 'the willingness of young 
people to question the basis of authority exercised over them'.27 He went on to 
identify benefits of the NDA for women's status. In particular, women would 
command men by virtue of their own authority rather than by delegation from a 
male superior. However, Pritchard assigned most weight to the psychological factor 
                                                 
24 It was described as such by Second Sea Lord, TNA: ADM 167/178, Minutes of Admiralty Board, 
13 Feb 1975.   
25 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers On-line: Report from the Select Committee on the 
Armed Forces Bill, evidence from Commandant Margaret Drummond, 28 Jul 1966 
(http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk  accessed 1 Mar 2010). 
26 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974. 
27 Ibid. 
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of matching 'equality of opportunity with equality of obligation'.28 He thought it 
would 'stretch the goodwill of the RN' to extend women's employment if the degree 
of separateness indicated by different disciplinary codes remained.29 
 
Discussion at the Admiralty Board focussed on the legal position. This was urgent as 
Service Discipline Acts were imminently due for Parliamentary review.  Frank Judd, 
Under Secretary of State for the Navy, summarized three options: a civilian code of 
conduct could be introduced; women could come under the Army Act as Royal 
Marines did when ashore; or they could apply the NDA.30 The Board reconvened 
three weeks later to consider additional advice. Commandant Mary Talbot was 
invited to the meeting to give her opinion directly. She said she had been against the 
NDA on the grounds that there was no legal necessity and it would 'appear to strike 
at the heart of the WRNS system of voluntary discipline'.31 However, she accepted 
new advice that the disciplinary code needed to be regularised. She rejected a 
civilian code on the grounds that 'with no more disciplinary sanctions than could be 
applied to the civil service, [it] would wholly undermine the position of the WRNS 
as a uniformed Service.'32 She suggested Wrens would 'feel their status had been 
significantly eroded' under a civilian code.33 Her preferred solution now was the 
NDA. The Board agreed. However, they wanted to avoid linking it to a promise of 
wider opportunities as these might not materialise.34 Rather than a ringing 
endorsement, Talbot told her annual conference of senior officers that the Board 
decision must be ‘accepted and supported’.35 In doing so, she echoed Commandant 
Jocelyn Woollcombe's words of 1947 decrying the failure to introduce the NDA.   
 
Antony Buck, formerly Under Secretary of State (Navy) in the Heath government 
and serving on the House of Commons Select Committee for the quinquennial 
review of military law, wondered how the 'steam' had gone from the NDA issue.36 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 TNA: ADM 167/178, Admiralty Board Minutes, 13 Feb 1975. 




35 NMRN: 1988.350.28.20, Minutes of Conference, 27 Oct 75. 
36 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers On-line: Report from the Select Committee on the 
Armed Forces Bill, Mr Buck, 10 Mar 1976 (http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk accessed 1 Mar 2010).  
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The Ministry of Defence witness, Rear Admiral Homan, made light of it, saying that 
the ‘proposals [were] very small’.37 Despite the Board's caution, and taking his line 
from Pritchard’s report, Homan repeated the claim that women would now have 
greater opportunities and should have the same obligations as men.38 Parliament 
agreed to the extension of the Naval Discipline Act and the law came into force on 1 
July 1977. 
 
The change in status of the WRNS needed sensitive handling. Fears of mass 
resignations by offended women proved groundless.39 Protest apparently amounted 
to female cadets under training at Dartmouth wearing black armbands for the day.40 
As female officers and senior ratings would have the same authority as men, the 
next obvious step was to bring in the same rank titles and insignia. However, 
Pritchard advised against such a move. He argued that it would stir considerable 
resentment in the WRNS and erode its powerful sense of identity.41 This was 
perceptive. Julia Simpson, a meteorological officer, was given short shrift for 
suggesting to a senior colleague a change to gold rank braid.42  
 
Bringing the WRNS under the NDA was a genuine increase in women’s status, 
giving them parity of military rank with men. Unlike the Higonnets’ double helix 
analogy, there was no corresponding increase in status for men. Indeed, with the 
Queen’s commission replacing that of the Admiralty Board, men were now obliged 
to recognise women holding higher rank, as they would a male superior. The visible 
manifestation of this new authority was mandatory offering and returning of 
salutes.43  
 
                                                 
37 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers On-line: Report from the Select Committee on the Naval 
Discipline Act, in answer to Mr Buck, 10 Mar 1976 (http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk  accessed 1 
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38 Ibid. 
39 Analysis of WRNS entries in Navy Lists of the period show no indication of unusual patterns of 
leaving. 
40 NMRN: Naval Review, ‘View from the Nest’, by ‘Snapdragon’, 75th Anniversary issue, 1988, p.38. 
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articles. This article was written by a female officer and covered the role and history of the WRNS.  
41 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974. 
42 Captain Julia Simpson interviewed by the author, 13 Aug 2007, transcript p.11. 
43 NMRN: 1988.350.28.22, Senior Women Officers’ Conference, Oct 1977. Report on the 
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Women became subject to the same regulations as men and part of the normal, 
predominantly male, chain of command for summary justice. Serious offences 
would go to court martial and a woman who absented herself could now be detained 
by the police, returned to her unit and charged with desertion or absence without 
leave. As predicted by Pritchard, the incidence of desertion declined. Statistics from 
Naval Home Command reported 100 deserters in 1974 (before the NDA came into 
force), 31 in year ending 31 Mar 1978 (the year in which it came in) and 9 cases 
from 1 Apr – 20 Nov 78.44  
 
Post-Pritchard Report Studies 
Seagoing  
When Pritchard’s report went to the Admiralty Board, Frank Judd questioned the 
constraint that sea service should not be considered.45 Further studies were 
commissioned into whether women should go to sea or fly in the Navy’s aircraft as 
pilots or observers.46 Despite the Board minutes saying that the work was to be 
‘thorough and open-minded’ and that Judd ‘wanted to ensure that jobs were filled by 
the best people available, regardless of sex’, the task had the caveat that only non-
combatant roles would be considered.47 This limitation scarcely needed justification. 
An assertion that neither public opinion nor the Royal Navy was ready for women in 
combat roles, together with points concerning physical strength, operational 
requirements and the denial of seagoing jobs necessary for men’s careers, were 
sufficient grounds for limiting the scope.48 With warships ruled out, two questions 
needed to be answered: what jobs could women do at sea and what vessels were 
non-combatant? 
 
Roles identified as suitable included radio operators, writers (i.e. clerks), cooks and 
stewards. While women's capability to undertake the work seemed to be accepted, 
their personal qualities came under attack. Wrens in these 'categories' were described 
as ‘unfortunately … drawn from the lower intelligence level and [in need of] more 
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guidance and supervision than others, [having] a greater tendency to get into trouble 
over disciplinary matters.’49 Junior Wrens at sea should therefore be accompanied 
by a senior woman – officer or petty officer – for welfare duties. The senior woman 
would also need to fill a job and the proposed solution was to earmark a role in the 
ship's galley. The ability of petty officer cooks or stewards to meet the challenge 
was doubted. Various other difficulties were foreseen with the concept of seagoing: 
divisiveness in the WRNS between women in categories that could go to sea versus 
those who could not; perhaps a lack of interest in going to sea; the possibility of 
attracting a different sort of woman in future; and wives’ suspicion of Wrens with 
whom their husbands worked.50  
 
The list of possible ships comprised survey ships controlled by the Hydrographer,51 
trials ships52 and the Royal Yacht. Rear Admiral Haslam (the Hydrographer) had 
four ships but their future was uncertain as their mapping function was being 
considered for transfer to the civilian sector.53 He expressed 'grave misgivings about 
the adverse effects on morale, operational ability and discipline' if women served in 
his ships.54 Haslam cited particular concerns: the loss of efficiency in ship duties 
where strength was required; his ships were combatant in war; the expense of 
modifications 'at a time of national monetary crisis'; opposition from 'younger 
officers and men'; opposition from wives 'to having ladies cooped up at sea for long 
periods with traditional sailors'; and disciplinary problems arising from having a 
mixed crew.55 Haslam was 'opposed to being the front-runner in any experiments of 
such a controversial nature'.56 By now he was not just the front-runner, he was the 
only runner. The Royal Yacht had no difficulty in being excused from consideration. 
Rear Admiral Janion (Flag Officer Royal Yacht) had only to mention that the Duke 
of Edinburgh was against the idea on grounds of the cost of modifications to create 
separate accommodation for Wrens. The Yacht was deleted from the list.57 Trials 
                                                 
49 TNA: DEFE 69/689, Seagoing Opportunities for the WRNS, 10 Jun 1975. 
50 Ibid. Or perhaps an unexpressed suspicion of their husbands’ behaviour? 
51 The Hydrographer was responsible for provision of maritime charts and navigational information. 
52 Three such ships were listed. They were used for test firing of weapons. (TNA: DEFE 69/689, 
Seagoing Opportunities for WRNS, minutes of meeting held on 7 Jul 1975). 
53 TNA: DEFE 69/689, Seagoing Opportunities for WRNS, 20 Dec 1977, noting a proposal in the 
1974 Defence Review. 
54 Ibid, Seagoing Service for WRNS, Captain Read to Pritchard, 3 Feb 1976. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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ships also dropped out of contention because they were due out of service and, as 
with the Yacht, costs could not be justified.58 
 
Rear Admiral Haslam's case against women at sea was supported by senior 
colleagues. While Admiral Sir David Williams (Second Sea Lord) wrote to Patrick 
Duffy (Frank Judd's successor) suggesting only the Hydrographer's ships could be 
considered, he went on to say that, as they undertook long periods at sea, they were 
'peculiarly unsuitable [original emphasis] for women'.59 In addition, although used 
on 'non-combatant duties the majority of the time they [were] still military vessels 
and available in a combatant role'.60 Williams concluded that now (1976) was not a 
good time to ‘burden the [ships] with women.’61 The word ‘burden’ gives an insight 
into the thinking on women at sea at this time. Duffy agreed to defer the matter for a 
year.62 
 
Work duly started again in 1977. A draft paper for the Admiralty Board set out the 
case for seagoing: the public relations benefits of 'acting in the spirit of the Sex 
Discrimination Act'; benefits for morale and recruiting in the WRNS by showing 
'that they [were] capable of making a worthwhile contribution in what [was] 
traditionally a man's world'; sea experience for women that would provide 'valuable 
background for a wider range of shore jobs'; providing personnel in categories short 
of men; and giving the Navy experience of women at sea before predicted shortages 
of men for the 1980s and 1990s materialised.63 Potential arguments against were the 
impact on morale and discipline aboard ships and concerns of sailors' families.64 
 
From this starting point a reader might suppose that a robust proposal was to follow. 
However, the recommendation was patently absurd. Once more the Hydrographer's 
ships were considered. An additional argument was made against employing Wrens 
at this time. The ships were due to deploy to the Persian Gulf, a region the Navy 
Department considered unfit for its women because of ‘lack of shore leave and 
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entertainment and poor working conditions’.65 Introducing women into the ships 
was described as risking ‘a further deterioration in the morale of officers and men 
and their families’.66 Again, Haslam's ships were rejected. So the author proposed 
employing eight women aboard the Seabed Operations Vessel. Commentary from a 
colleague in the Naval Personnel Division pointed out that of the eight, only two 
would be in categories that were short of men. He added that Wrens might not enjoy 
'swinging around a buoy in a [Seabed Operations Vessel] watching divers dive day 
and night' and wished the Board paper author 'the best of luck'.67 One further point 
of note – the ship was not yet built. It was due into service in 1982. However, this 
was presented as an advantage as there was still time to amend the design to include 
accommodation needs of women.68  
 
The proposal was not supported by Admiralty Board members. It was seen as doing 
little to help the Navy and there was apparently no strong feeling in favour in the 
WRNS. Patrick Duffy was told by a senior civil servant that 'Politically the move 
might merely be seen as a gimmick' and he was persuaded to put the idea off for a 
while.69 A further study into the WRNS future would be arranged in 1980.70  
 
Flying 
As Pritchard's report was being considered by the Admiralty Board, manpower 
planning staff in the Navy Department were already thinking of training a female 
helicopter pilot for shore-based duties.71 Admiral Williams was not in favour of 
what he claimed could be described as 'an expensive, one-off gimmick'.72 As women 
were excluded from warships, female aircrew could only serve in a limited number 
of posts. This would reduce opportunities ashore for men and so increase their 
seagoing time. In addition to resulting inflexibility, women could not be expected to 
serve for the minimum period (five years) on completion of training. Nevertheless, 
the Board agreed that the question of female aircrew should be studied. 
                                                 
65 Ibid. Interestingly, women in the RAF were stationed in the Middle East. 
66 Ibid.   
67 Ibid, Seagoing Opportunities for WRNS Draft Board Submission, Naval Personnel Division 2, 4 
Jan 1978. 
68 Ibid, Seagoing Opportunities for WRNS Draft Board Submission, 20 Dec 1977.  
69 Ibid, DUS(Navy) to Under Secretary of State (RN), 8 May 1978. 
70 Ibid. 
71 TNA: ADM 167/176, Admiralty Board Paper, 24 Feb 1975. 
72 Ibid. 
Chapter 5: The WRNS in the 1970s and Early 1980s 
167 
 
At her autumn 1975 conference of senior women officers, Mary Talbot reported 
optimistically on progress. Eleven non-combatant helicopter jobs had been identified 
as potentially suitable. However, allowing for men's share of shore-based jobs, only 
two of these posts could be filled by female officers at any one time. Five women 
would be asked to attend aircrew selection with the intention of choosing three to 
start training.73 Talbot thought this plan would be put to the Admiralty Board for 
approval. A year later, her successor reported that the idea had been shelved. The 
Assistant Under Secretary for Naval Personnel had objected on the grounds that the 
Navy was not short of male pilots and so the cost of training  women for limited 
flying roles could not be justified.74 
 
However, by early 1978, the Navy was short of helicopter pilots due to growing 
demand from the North Sea oil industry. The Assistant Under Secretary wanted to 
reconsider training female aircrew. He recollected that the main obstacle had been 
'the veto on combatant status' for women. He asked now whether 'under pressure of 
a serious shortage we might manage to persuade ourselves to take a different view of 
that problem?'75 Two years elapsed before a paper was put to the Admiralty Board 
Sub-Committee. By this time, the Navy was short of about 130 pilots out of a 
requirement for about 600. As a consequence, it was unable to meet NATO 
standards of aircrew availability. Male recruiting was meeting targets but, with 
competition from North Sea industries, the Service was struggling to retain men 
beyond their minimum period of service.76  
 
The 1980 paper on women aircrew highlighted interesting factors in addition to 
customary arguments concerning cost of training and length of service. Admiral 
Cassidi (Second Sea Lord) pointed out that exclusion from combat 'was the main 
reason for exempting the Armed Services from ... the Sex Discrimination Act'.77 
Accordingly, the Board 'would need to consider very carefully indeed any move that 
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left the Service vulnerable to all the demands of the sex equality movement.'78 
However, he acknowledged that the Secretary of State was about to approve arming 
servicewomen in the RAF and army and that there appeared to be no Parliamentary 
or public objections. Cassidi suggested that 'if the UK is now ready to envisage 
Servicewomen in eyeball to eyeball confrontation with an armed enemy in 
emergency or war there is unlikely to be strong objection to WRNS officers being 
trained ... for anti-submarine helicopter operations'.79 If this role was included, 
Cassidi  suggested that the Navy could employ a cadre of at least sixteen female 
helicopter pilots. He believed a cadre of this size was sufficient to overcome 
previous argument that numbers were insignificant. He dismissed the fears that 
women would not serve for long enough, proposing that women who accepted pilot 
training should not be able to leave on marriage. He also suggested that female 
pilots would not be poached by North Sea oil companies or other competitors.80  
 
Initial stages of naval pilot training were carried out by the RAF. If the Navy 
intended recruiting female helicopter pilots they would have to pass elementary 
flying training at an RAF station. Admiral Cassidi reported that the Air Member for 
Personnel 'had been consulted and could see no difficulty in introducing women ... at 
RAF Leeming.'81 Such a development would probably have led to questions about 
WRAF officers' opportunities which the Air Force Board had already rejected 
(Chapter 4). Perhaps if the Air Member for Personnel was unconcerned about the 
Navy's deliberations, it may have been due to the different practices of the two 
Services. The RAF selected all trainee pilots on the basis of potential to fly fast jets. 
The Fleet Air Arm selected candidates on aptitude for the less demanding standard 
of helicopter training and chose its fast jet cadre from the best performers in 
training. This difference in policy could have provided an argument for the RAF to 
defend its position even if the RN proceeded with accepting women for aircrew 
duties.     
 




81 FOI Fleet: Admiralty Board Sub-Committee Minutes, ABSC/M(80)4, 25 Sep 1980. This could 
have been either Air Marshal Ness or Air Marshal Gingell. Ness took over in May 1980.    
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Admiral Cassidi's Board colleagues did not accept his arguments. They saw arming 
of servicewomen by the army and RAF as 'self defence rather than a truly combatant 
role'.82 They rejected the idea that anti-submarine helicopter operations were not a 
combat situation. Thus, female pilots could 'compromise the Services' position with 
regard to the Sex Discrimination Act'.83 They doubted the ability to hold women to 
long contracts and thought commercial employers were just as likely to poach 
female as male pilots. In summarising opinion, Admiral Sir Henry Leach (First Sea 
Lord) observed that an experiment 'would attract a lot of attention and would be 
difficult to abandon.'84 Cassidi was invited to keep the idea to hand in case it was 
needed in the future.    
 
Combat Discourse 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions negotiated in the mid-1970s defined all 
members of armed forces, with the exceptions of personnel employed only on 
medical duties or as chaplains, as combatants. They defined the term as meaning 
‘the right to participate directly in hostilities’.85 Thus, in international law, the 
personal use of weapons was not the essential element of being described as a 
combatant – membership of armed forces was sufficient. These Protocols were 
recommended for approval by the MOD's Chiefs of Staff Committee. The UK’s 
representative signed them in December 1977.86 With the WRNS coming under the 
Naval Discipline Act in July 1977, Wrens were combatants in international law. 
Restricting their employment was thus a matter of national choice. 
 
The Navy regarded all sailors as undertaking combatant roles irrespective of their 
duties aboard ship. It used the phrase 'all of one company' to indicate that men 
shared the risks of seagoing and warfare. If women went to sea, but were still to be 
non-combatants, then that label must be applied to the ship in which they served. An 
attempt was made to distinguish between ships whose primary purpose was to fight 
enemy forces and those that supported the fleet. While that might mean that women 
were not in ships taking offensive action, it did not alleviate risk. Apart from 




85 Ibid, Article 43 to Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, dated 8 Jun 1977. 
86 TNA: DEFE 4/284, Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes, 7 Nov 1977.  
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hospital ships, in war all shipping was vulnerable to attack. Sea warfare was not 
constrained by a geographic 'front line' which could be expressed in army and RAF 
debates on limits to women's roles. Until the Navy was willing to describe women's 
roles as combatant, there was no means of employing them as part of ships' 
companies.    
 
This exclusion was clearly a matter of gender as not all personnel aboard warships 
were combatants or even necessarily in the Navy. For example, it was common 
practice to employ civilian laundry workers, usually of Chinese origin. In addition, 
civilian staff of the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) ran shops aboard 
ships. During the Falklands War, civilian staff were supposed to be given the 
opportunity to leave ships. This did not always happen in practice. NAAFI staff who 
stayed aboard were given uniforms so that they would be treated appropriately if 
captured.87 One woman accompanied the Task Force ashore during the campaign. 
She was Linda Kitson, the official war artist, commissioned by the Imperial War 
Museum. She was not permitted to embark in a warship, so she sailed to the 
Falkland Islands aboard the troop ship QE II. She transferred to the Canberra and 
landed on East Falkland on 3 June 1982.88 She 'followed the troops from San Carlos 
to Darwin and Goose Green, Fitzroy and Bluff Cove to Stanley itself.'89 
 
Opinions on Sea Service   
The Admiralty Board asserted that the Navy was not ready for women's sea service 
and the public would not want women in combat roles. The latter was hard to prove. 
Periodic surveys of public attitudes showed that most people had little knowledge of 
the Services. Their information derived mostly from newspaper reports rather than 
direct experience. There was a tendency to equate the armed forces with the army 
and survey questions centred upon men’s careers. There were no questions 
concerning appropriate roles for women.90 However, there was evidence of naval 
opinion following the opening of limited seagoing for women in the United States 
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Navy in 1978.91 This prompted a few letters in the Navy News. A leading seaman 
suggested that, if women were to go to sea, they should be in all-female ships rather 
than mixed crews.92 A submariner, opposed to female sailors, put the idea down to 
‘women’s liberation’ which he condemned as something started by ‘neurotic North 
American ladies setting fire to their brassieres’.93 A woman who served in merchant 
ships in America responded in favour of mixed crews.94 No letters from Wrens were 
published on the subject.  
 
When the Deputy Under Secretary (Navy) told his Minister that there was 'no strong 
feeling' amongst Wrens in favour of seagoing, he accurately represented the views 
of successive Directors.95 Mary Talbot had expressed this stance personally to the 
Admiralty Board in 1975.96 Vonla McBride, her successor, formally responded to 
sea studies' recommendations in terms of generally welcoming new opportunities for 
women, but needing to be convinced that there was a 'real and continued 
requirement'.97 This was consistent with her comments to her conference of senior 
women officers in 1976 that delay on seagoing was preferable, as 'we should not 
push against the stream.'98 There was some merit in this view as limited seagoing 
was not meaningful in terms of women's careers. However, McBride was personally 
strongly opposed to women in combatant roles. She regarded fighting as men’s 
responsibility.99 She castigated American servicewomen at a NATO Headquarters 
for their ‘jungle green fatigues’ and boots, saying she was relieved to see her women 
‘all looking like Wrens in their uniforms’.100 She feared that the feminine image of 
the WRNS would be lost if it attracted women who sought the tough conditions of 
life aboard a warship, with its limited privacy, lack of individual space, noise, dirt, 
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and the need for physical endurance. She ‘[didn’t] want to know the butch girls' who 
could pass such physical tests.101  
 
Acceptable Seagoing     
Although excluded from membership of ship's companies, women went to sea 
periodically. Until the mid nineteenth century it had been common to find women in 
Royal Navy ships, as Suzanne Stark's well documented account showed. However, 
names were not entered in muster books of ships’ complements and women who 
participated in battles were not awarded general service medals.102 Twentieth 
century history also holds examples of women serving at sea. As Chapter 1 
illustrated, some were employed in trooping ships during World War II and as crew 
of harbour boats. Post-war, women at sea for naval as opposed to merchant marine 
purposes could be divided into four categories: Wrens going to sea for a day at a 
time (known as day sailing); Wrens in support ships for periods of a few days or 
weeks; civilian women, scientific civil servants or members of the Naval 
Constructors Branch103 going to sea for a few weeks; and members of the Queen 
Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service (QARNNS)104 aboard hospital ships. 
 
Day sailing for Wrens was a fairly common practice, predominantly involving 
female weapon analysts whose role was to report on trial firings. The inefficiencies 
of returning women ashore and collecting them again the next morning were 
accepted as preferable to accommodating them aboard ship. Besides the obvious 
waste of time involved, women considered that it led to poorer outcomes for the 
work. Male colleagues remained aboard, using off-duty time to develop a 
relationship with the ship’s company and discussing the day’s events.105 However, 
with permission from the Commander-in-Chief, women could stay aboard ship. This 
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had a certain novelty value as judged by a report in the Navy News when a female 
petty officer spent twelve days aboard HMS Invincible. She was the shorthand 
recorder for a Board of Inquiry.106  
 
Longer periods at sea were possible in ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). For 
example, in 1970 Second Officer Julia Simpson undertook several trips, each of 
about a week's duration, in RFA Engadine. 107 She was a meteorological officer 
based in Portland. Her section supported deck landing training for helicopter 
operations. With a male colleague suddenly unable to go on deployment, the captain 
of her establishment and the captain of Engadine decided that she should 
substitute.108 Four Wrens were also embarked for two weeks in 1975 as part of an 
operational evaluation of helicopter support.109 More systematic employment of 
female air mechanics at sea started in the early 1980s. Again, these women were 
employed in support of helicopter operations aboard Engadine. A trial deployment 
with four women was conducted in 1981. A report praised Wrens for their 
performance of professional duties. However, they were criticized for not 
participating in mess deck culture. Chief Officer Anthea Saville, working at the time 
in personnel planning, considered the report unbalanced and unfair. No attempt was 
made to compare women in their first experience of being at sea with young male 
ratings’ attempts at finding their sea legs. She also suggested that it was 
unreasonable to suppose that a handful of women should attend the male-dominated, 
smoky environment of the mess deck.110 Despite reservations in the report, the 
practice of sending female air mechanics to sea for short periods continued.  
 
Two examples of women at sea were reported in the Navy News in 1980. 
Constructor Midshipman Kirsty Robertson, who was studying naval architecture at 
University College, London joined the Constructor Branch. As part of her training, 
she spent six weeks at sea in HMS Hecate, one of the Hydrographer's ships. The 
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same report also mentioned Barbara Dawe, a computer programmer with Marconi. 
She was aboard HMS Londonderry working on sea trials of equipment.111  
 
In addition to the principle of not having women at sea because they were regarded 
as non-combatant, the Navy Department also had a list of practical objections. These 
included insufficient physical strength to cope with their share of general duties 
about the ship or to deal with an emergency such as flooding or fire, degradation of 
operational effectiveness and lack of suitable accommodation. An unexpected 
opportunity to test some of these elements arose in the Falklands War.  
Without access to shore-based facilities in the South Atlantic, the Naval Task Force 
included a hospital ship. The cruise ship SS Uganda was taken into service and 
hastily refitted for the role. Most of the civilian crew remained aboard to run the 
ship. The hospital was operated by RN medical staff, nurses of the QARNNS and 
bandsmen of the Royal Marines in their war role of ancillaries for first aid duties.112 
The QARNNS previous experience in hospital ships had been evacuation of 
casualties to shore-based facilities elsewhere. The role of Uganda’s medical staff 
was different in scale. They set up and operated emergency operating theatres, with 
intensive care facilities, a high dependency ward and a recovery ward. The ship was 
at sea continuously for 113 days.113 Marked as a hospital ship in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention, during the fighting it mainly sailed in a designated sea area, 
notified to the Argentine authorities. Occasionally, it sailed close to the Islands to 
improve casualty evacuation. It was twice ‘buzzed’ by Argentine war planes and, 
according to the official history, sailed through a minefield.114  
 
Nurses knew their war role could entail work aboard hospital ships. However, they 
were not trained for seagoing nor did they have appropriate uniforms.115 The work 
of setting up the wards was physically demanding as the areas designated to be 
                                                 
111 Navy News, Jun 1980, p.3. Londonderry was a frigate that had been converted into a sea trials 
ship. 
112 Captain Julia Massey (QARNNS), interviewed by the author, 25 Sep 2009, transcript p.6. 
113 Marion Browning, Allan Cameron, Alan Cullen, Barrie Sanderson and Bill Wragge, Uganda: the 
Story of a Very Special Ship, (Exeter: SS Uganda Trust, 1998), p.257. 
114 Marion Browning, Allan Cameron, Alan Cullen, Barrie Sanderson and Bill Wragge, Uganda, 
p.266; Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume II War and 
Diplomacy, (London & New York: Routledge, 2007 edition), p.734. 
115 Uniform had to be made of natural fibres to decrease severity of injury should they become burns’ 
victims. Massey, transcript p.9. 
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wards had to be scrubbed clean, boxes of equipment moved about the ship and 
unloaded, and beds fitted together and secured to the decks. Nurses undertook a 
great proportion of these tasks, assisted in the heavy work by the bandsmen.116 On 
the way to the Falklands, water was rationed until a desalination plant could be sent 
to the ship and fitted.117 Once casualties arrived, nurses worked a demanding shift 
pattern, in physically trying conditions, with heavy seas making even routine 
movement about the ship difficult. In addition, arrival and departure of helicopters 
made the environment noisy so that off-duty rest periods were often interrupted.118  
 
This was the acceptable face of women at sea. While they did physically demanding 
work, they were not required to undertake tasks associated with running the ship. 
Like the male medical staff, they occupied passenger accommodation which gave 
them generous space and private ablutions, unlike warship conditions. Their 
presence was welcomed by patients who did not find it odd to have women in 
uniform so close to the fighting. Rather than degrading operational effectiveness, 
they were an integral part of the success of the hospital ship. This should have 
afforded the Naval authorities with a successful example of women at sea. However, 
lessons were quickly forgotten.  
 
Of lasting disappointment to some members of the QARNNS was the failure of 
Surgeon Vice Admiral Sir John Harrison (Director General of Medical Services) to 
acknowledge their role during his speech to the annual dinner of the medical 
services club, held on 10 September 1982.119 This was the first such dinner they had 
attended, having just been admitted to membership. Sir John welcomed them as new 
members, but omitted them from the list of tributes paid to participants in the 
Falklands War. Roles of the Royal Navy and army doctors, Royal Naval Reserve 
doctors, bandsmen of the Royal Marines, the Hydrographer for use of support ships 
                                                 
116 Massey, transcript pp.5-6. 
117 Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service Archive [henceforward QARNNS Archive]: File 
45 – Operation Corporate Book III, weekly newsletter, 10 May 1982.  
118 Tannoy broadcasts and movement of helicopters were frequent. Captain Julia Massey, ‘A day in 
SS Uganda at the Falkland Islands’, in Claire Taylor (ed), Nursing in the Senior Service 1902 - 
2002,(Gosport: QARNNS Association, 2002), p.59 and QARNNS: File 46 – Operation Corporate 
1982, diary of a senior naval nurse, entry for 13 May 1982.   
119 Massey, transcript p.10. Date of dinner from Journal of the Royal Naval Service, Vol.68, Winter 
1982. 
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in casualty evacuation, helicopter pilots and flight deck crews, and the Red Cross 
and St John’s hospital welfare officers were all acknowledged.120    
 
Women at sea were something of a novelty. With few exceptions, they made brief 
appearances in life aboard ship. They were not part of the ship’s company; WRNS 
ratings did not wear the name of the ship on their caps. Men’s routines, such as 
wandering to ablutions in next to no clothing and use of strong language, were not 
adapted permanently to the presence of women who were seen simply as a diversion 
from the monotonous routine at sea.     
 
WRNS Careers 
Approval by the Admiralty Board of Pritchard’s work on the future of the WRNS 
gave momentum to greater administrative integration that was being explored in 
order to reduce costs. Postings and promotions for ratings were already integrated 
with the men’s system. This step was now taken for officers, with the exception of 
promotion and appointments to superintendent (the second tier in the WRNS). In the 
mid 1970s, superintendents could only fill jobs designated for female officers and it 
remained the prerogative of the Director to appoint these officers. Like the RN, the 
WRNS operated a system of ‘up or out’. That is, an officer had to be promoted to 
the next rank within a given timeframe based on age and length of service in current 
rank.121 Failure to achieve promotion in that period resulted in compulsory 
discharge. The benefit of this system was the constant drawing up through the ranks 
of talented women. The disadvantage was that, in an organisation with only thirty 
first officers, eleven chief officers, three superintendents and one commandant, there 
were insufficient promotions available for those worthy of more senior rank. 
Pritchard intended his report to be the basis for a widening of employment for 
women. Five years after his report an extra 400 administrative jobs had been 
earmarked as being open to women 'on an opportunity basis'.122 This phrase seemed 
to mean that, in the absence of a male candidate, women could be considered. Of the 
                                                 
120 The speech was re-printed in Journal of the Royal Naval Service, Vol.68, Winter 1982. (QARNNS 
Archive: File 18-1981-4). 
121 TNA: ADM 1/21221 Admiralty Fleet Order 451/49 WRNS Permanent Service – Reports, 11 Feb 
1949. 
122 TNA: DEFE 10/1250, Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, Principal Personnel Officers' Committee 
Paper, Sep 1978. 
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400 posts, 43 were actually held by WRNS officers.123 Ten years after his report 
there was a decrease in the number of senior WRNS officers.124 Nevertheless, by 
remaining a separate entity, the WRNS successfully safeguarded more senior jobs 
for officers than the integrated WRAF.  
 
Non-commissioned ranks also enjoyed better promotion prospects than airwomen. 
Statistics for 1974 showed that 14% held Senior NCO ranks and a further 24% held 
leading rate (Junior NCO equivalent). This compared with WRAF figures for 1976 
of 2.5% Senior NCO and 7% Junior NCO. As the basis for the percentages may not 
have been the same, absolute figures give a clearer picture: 915 Wrens held junior or 
senior NCO rank compared with 384 airwomen who held equivalent ranks.125 
Longer average length of service may have contributed to better promotion 
prospects. However, Wrens also benefitted from being employed in more trades 
from which men were excluded. For example 68 women held these ranks as dental 
hygienists or assistants, 43 were education assistants, 17 were drivers, 30 employed 
as quarters assistants to oversee female accommodation, 45 as female disciplinary 
staff and 36 as welfare workers.126 
 
As in the WRAF, marriage and pregnancy remained key reasons for women cutting 
short their careers. Exasperation among senior WRNS officers about married 
women demanding preferential treatment was expressed in similar terms to those of 
their predecessors in the early 1960s. For example, a 1973 report to the conference 
of senior women officers noted that 'we move [married women] when we can be 
sure of filling the gap if they go out ... but it is a bit of a gamble.'127 The 1974 report 
described married women as 'a mixed blessing'.128 In 1975, the Navy News carried 
an article about the difficulties of trying to keep pace with an engaged Wren's 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974. There were a total of 277 WRNS 
officers. Of the 45 First Officers and higher ranks, two-thirds were employed in WRNS 
administration. In 1985 the number of senior officers was: one Commandant, two Superintendents, 
nine Chief Officers and twenty-six First Officers. This was seven fewer than in 1974 (Navy List 
(London: HMSO 1985)). 
125 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974 and AIR 2/19169, Study of Factors 
Affecting WRAF Manning Policy, 27 Feb 1976. Wrens' percentage was related to women who had 
completed training. Basis for airwomen's statistics was not quoted.    
126 TNA: ADM 105/99, WRNS Study Group Report, Nov 1974. 
127 NMRN: 1988.350.28.18, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 10 Oct 1973. 
128 NMRN: 1988.350.28.19, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 23 Oct 1974. 
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aspirations for posting near her fiancé.129 In 1979, the Director of Naval Officer 
Appointing complained that 'those who contemplate[d] a dual career as a WRNS 
officer and a housewife tended to present extremely difficult problems for the 
appointer' because they were not as 'mobile' as single women.130 He preferred that 
they left the Service as soon as possible.131 Nevertheless, the WRNS was better at 
retaining its women than the other services in the 1970s. In 1978, average length of 
service for Wrens was quoted as having increased from about three years to over 
five years.132 No contemporary analysis of this increase appeared in reports on 
WRNS personnel statistics.  
 
Despite closer integration with the RN and the new military standing of the WRNS, 
it remained a separate entity. Although her executive powers were reduced as 
recruiting, selection, training and posting systems were merged with RN systems, 
the Director was still Head of Service. However, her role was now seen as less than 
full time. Like Director WRAF who was given an RAF welfare role, Director 
WRNS took on an additional task. She became the chairman of the Navy's uniform 
clothing committee.133    
 
Attitudes towards women in the Service among WRNS hierarchy remained 
consistent with previous generations. Directors emphasised subordination to the RN 
and the need to preserve femininity in predominantly male working environments. 
Commandant Elizabeth Craig-McFeely, who took over from Vonla McBride in July 
1979, encapsulated these views in addressing her senior officers in saying: 
 
'.. if the RN has a requirement for the WRNS to undertake particular tasks then 
we must do it. ... It is important that [women's] careers are safeguarded, that 
we retain our femininity, the rights of the individual and the reputation of the 
WRNS. ... it is vital ... that the WRNS remain a separate corps. Our infiltration 
into the male world must be gradual. If we are to go to sea, fly or be armed 
                                                 
129 Navy News, 'Wrens' fads and fancies', Feb 1975, p.2. 
130 NMRN: 1988.350.28.23, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 20 Nov 1978. 
131 Ibid. 
132 NMRN: 1988.350.28.17, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 13 Oct 1972; 1988.350.28.23, 
Senior Women Officers' Conference, 20 Nov 1978. 
133 NMRN: 2009.103.14, Judith Sherratt collection, recording of Commandant Vonla McBride 
speech, Oct 1978. The word 'chairman' was always used in the MOD.   
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then it must be in selected jobs where needed, and NOT [original emphasis] 
undertaken as a publicity stunt.'134 
 
She went on to assert the need to 'maintain the high standards we have always had of 
dress in uniform, plain clothes, make up, grooming and manners.'135  
 
The Admiralty Board successfully resisted seagoing, flying and arming. With 
another manpower crisis in the late 1970s, Fred Mulley (Secretary of State) asked 
whether, amongst other possible measures, the Services could employ more women. 
The Navy responded that '[women's] use in the Royal Navy [was] extremely 
limited'.136 However, their employment was being extended where possible, 'with 
the proviso that it should not deprive men of an acceptable minimum time ashore'.137 
It seems that male and female leaders agreed about limits to Wrens' careers. 
 
Conclusion 
In a period when legislation was attempting to address inequalities, changes in the 
employment of Wrens were discussed in terms of their impact on their femininity. 
Unlike wartime predecessors, who had civilian employment experience, senior 
women officers of the 1970s and 1980s made their careers entirely in the WRNS. 
They were enculturated into its feminine ethos and a special but subordinate 
relationship with the Royal Navy. Successive Directors lauded the WRNS as more 
feminine than army and RAF counterparts and the more militarised women of the 
USA's armed forces were derided by Commandant Vonla McBride. A feminist 
agenda held no interest for Directors of the WRNS at this time. Rather, it was feared 
because it was perceived as a threat to the character of their Service. Yet the ability 
to sustain careers as some half-way house between the RN and its civilian workforce 
was coming under pressure due to cuts in the defence budget.     
 
The Admiralty Board treated women's non-combatant status as a fundamental 
principle which governed limits to their employment. As it underpinned exemption 
from the Sex Discrimination Act, concessions which challenged that status were 
                                                 
134 NMRN: 1988.350.28.24, Senior Women Officers' Conference, 5 Oct 1979. 
135 Ibid. 'Plain clothes' meant civilian clothing. 
136 TNA: DEFE 13/1287, Service Manpower, Dr Warner, 5 Jan 1979. 
137 Ibid. 
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avoided in case they led to even greater equality of employment than the limited 
measures under discussion. Studies of seagoing or flying were so constrained as to 
be meaningless. Proposing to employ eight women in a ship yet to be built, or to 
create a cadre of sixteen helicopter pilots, would neither enhance WRNS careers nor 
alleviate manpower shortages. While Frank Judd may have detected interest from 
some Wrens, there was no pressure from women to bring about changes such as 
seagoing or flying which were characterised as publicity stunts or gimmicks. 
 
While the Board sought to preserve the Royal Navy's exemption from the Sex 
Discrimination Act, it could not avoid all aspects of the legal climate. Unlike its 
counterpart of the late 1940s, which had declined advice to bring the WRNS under 
the Naval Discipline Act, the Board in 1975 agreed that the Service could no longer 
rely on a voluntary code of discipline. Wrens came under military law from July 
1977 and with it came authority associated with rank and obligation to fulfil terms of 
service. 
 
Conundrums of women's employment were not resolved as arguments veered 
between two standpoints. As in the 1940s, women were represented as either useful 
in filling gaps left by lack of sailors or civilians, or as blocking jobs ashore needed 
by men as respite from seagoing. Pritchard attempted to introduce as much 
opportunity for women as possible under the constraints of shore-based work and 
gave impetus to cutting overheads to keep the WRNS viable as a separate entity. 
Integration of bureaucratic processes with those of the RN had the effect of making 
the WRNS more like the Women’s Royal Air Force. Officer posts established only 
for running the Service were for the most part abolished. Only a small cadre in the 
hierarchy remained. In future, women were expected to make their careers in their 
specialist work with only a few migrating into 'women’s roles' to achieve senior 
rank. However, not having seagoing experience, women could not compete with 
men for the vast majority of senior posts. Thus, while the Pritchard report was 
successful in opening more shore appointments to women, it did not create a 
coherent long-term career structure.  
 
This period in the history of the WRNS was dominated by studies of what its role 
should be, but they failed to resolve the problem of what purpose it served. Women 
Chapter 5: The WRNS in the 1970s and Early 1980s 
181 
were given military status, access to better training and more posts, but these 
changes were insufficient to safeguard their future. As the Navy News editorial 
suggested, women made 'as much contribution, generally speaking, as they [were] 
allowed'.138 As the next chapter shows, the same question was still being posed a 
decade later. 
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Chapter 6: Opening Main Combat Roles to Women: How Naval 
Revolution Hastened Air Force Evolution 
 
'I think people forget the passions that there were.' 
Admiral Lord West on reaction to his proposal that women should serve at sea.1 
 
In July 1989, the Air Force Board decided women could fly 'non-combat' aircraft. At 
the same time the Army Board approved more support roles for women. However, 
women continued to be excluded from infantry, armoured corps, Royal Artillery and 
Army Air Corps because policy banned them from direct combat roles. Four months 
later, faced with the Navy's proposal to employ Wrens in five 'non-combat' support 
ships, Archie Hamilton (Minister for the Armed Forces in the Conservative 
government and a former Guards officer) asked for a brief on 'a recorded 
Government decision not to employ women in combat - not just the Services' 
quoting the policy'.2 The reply from Miss Willetts, based on information provided by 
the Army Historical Branch, stated that 'departmental and Parliamentary discussion 
on the employment of women in the Services [had] been based on the premise that 
the British public would not accept that women should be placed in a position where 
they could be required to kill or be killed.'3 Archie Hamilton concluded that 
'employment of women in combat' was therefore a matter of 'social, military and 
political judgements'.4 
 
This chapter determines how judgements on acceptable roles for women in the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force changed. It examines how the Navy moved 
from seeing five minor ships with mixed crews as a proposal which went 'too far, 
too fast' in October 1989, to being the first Service to open its main combat roles to 
women in early 1990.5 It exposes interactions between Navy Board decisions and 
Air Force Board policies, and the frustration of advocates of combat flying for 
women who condemned the Air Member for Personnel's cautious approach as 'too 
                                                 
1 Admiral Lord West interviewed by the author, 5 Jun 2007, transcript p.11. 
2 FOI Fleet: Employment of Women in Combat, minute to Army Historical Branch, 20 Nov 1989. 
3 FOI Fleet: Employment of Women in Combat, brief for Minister for the Armed Forces, 1 Dec 1989. 
4 FOI Fleet: Employment of Women in Combat, Military Assistant to Minister for the Armed Forces 
to PL(SPP)a, 5 Dec 1989. 
5 FOI Fleet: Correspondence: 'Study into the Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN', Naval 
Home Command to Head of NMT, 11 Oct 1989. 
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little, too late'.6 It asks why the Navy found itself at 'the leading edge of gender 
integration policy' rather than the RAF and to what extent equality of opportunity 
was seen as a new principle to replace combat exclusion.7 Finally, it examines 
continuing exclusions, revealing the new demarcation line between men and 
women's employment. 
 
The issue for the RN and the RAF in the late 1980s was how to recruit and retain 
enough people of the required quality. This chapter argues that the RAF adopted an 
evolutionary approach to female aircrew because it had an existing hierarchy of 
flying roles into which a small number of women could be integrated gradually. It 
could delay challenging combat exclusion, preserving elite roles for men. The Navy 
wanted to adopt an equivalent policy by designating some ships as 'non-combat'. 
However, a piecemeal approach could not solve problems in men and women's 
careers. What emerges is the importance of Archie Hamilton in pressing Admiral Sir 
Julian Oswald (First Sea Lord) for a case 'based on rational analysis, not prejudice'.8 
But this was a pragmatic approach rather than a conscious drive for equality.    
    
Captain Alan West's Study into the Employment of the WRNS 
In the late 1980s, Commandant Anthea Larken (Director WRNS March 1988 - 
March 1991) observed dissatisfaction with their careers among WRNS officers. 
They were leaving because, without sea service, they could see no future. Larken 
described this as 'a brick wall' which blocked promotion.9 According to three 
headmistresses of leading schools, the Service no longer offered prospects attractive 
to their best girls. Embarrassingly, this included the head of the Royal School for the 
Daughters of Officers of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines.10 While there was 
still a waiting list of women wanting to join, it was shrinking.11  
 
                                                 
6 FOI AHB: Correspondence: 'Employment of Female Aircrew', Deputy Controller Aircraft to Air 
Member for Personnel, 5 Jul 1991. 
7 Dandeker and Segal, 'Gender Integration in the Armed Forces', p36. 
8 Margaret Aldred, interviewed by the author 13 Jul 2007, transcript p.5. 
9 Larken, interviewed by author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.15. 
10 Captain Coates' papers: Report of a Study into the Employment of Women's Royal Naval Service 
Personnel in the Royal Navy, Mar 1989 [Henceforward: West Report], p.11. 
11 West Report, p.11.  
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A report being drafted by the National Audit Office (NAO) on the Services' use of 
personnel was critical of the WRNS. It suggested that 1,385 of 2,950 posts had 
insufficient military content and could be performed more cheaply by civilians. 
These included secretaries, administrative personnel, telephonists and dental 
assistants. This compared with 1,700 of 4,732 for the WRAC and only 238 of 5,804 
WRAF posts identified as insufficiently military.12 While Admiral Sir Brian Brown 
(Second Sea Lord September 1988 - April 1991) was unconcerned, Anthea Larken 
feared that the NAO report could lead to the demise of the WRNS if seagoing was 
not introduced.13  
 
The need for a study into the employment of the WRNS emerged from the Navy 
Board's consideration of personnel problems in late 1987.14 Rear Admiral Michael 
Livesay (Assistant Chief of Naval Staff) advised the Board that retention of 
experienced men was a critical problem. Too many were leaving, thus increasing 
time at sea for the rest. In turn, this resulted in more men choosing to leave. As to 
supply of recruits, he thought the demographic trough developing in youth cohorts 
(Table 6.1) would be a problem for recruiting junior rates. While the pool of 
potential officers would benefit from increased participation in higher education, 
junior ratings were mostly recruited from the declining 16-19 age group. Over the 
long term, requirements would fall due to the introduction of ships operated and 
maintained by fewer, multi-skilled men. Complements could be cut further by 
turning more shore-based work over to civilians. However, he concluded 'it [was] by 
no means certain that manpower problems [were] containable.'15 Turning to the 
WRNS, continuing to use it as 'a manpower make-weight' would not suffice in 
future.16 He wanted it to have a wider role 'to pre-empt imposed tasks' or 'a worse 
fate - a withering on the vine'.17 To make women more employable, he suggested a 
study which 'should embrace a review of the definition of combat roles.'18  
                                                 
12 National Audit Office, 'Ministry of Defence: Control and Use of Manpower', (London: HMSO, 
1989), pp.24-25. Field work was conducted in 1986 and 1987. 
13 Admiral Sir Brian Brown interviewed by author, 1 Apr 2010, transcript p.5; Larken, interviewed by 
author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.20. 
14 FOI Fleet: ACNS 13/23, 'Headmark 2000', 11 Nov 1987 (extract).  
15 Ibid. MOD documents referring to 'manpower' often intended readers to understand 'men and 
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The Navy Board commissioned research but dampened expectation by 'noting that 
there [was] little enthusiasm in the Navy (shared by the WRNS) to employ WRNS at 
sea.' 19 Captain Alan West, decorated following the Falklands War and earmarked 
for high rank, was appointed to lead the study. With a full time staff of three, he was 
given six months to investigate: 
 
'i. current and predicted social and demographic trends in society; 
ii. the need to get the most cost effective return from our investment in 
personnel; 
iii. what Ministerial approval would be needed recognising successive 
Governments' policy that women should not be employed in combat areas. 
... address[ing]: 
a. Terms of Service. 
b. Sea Service. 
c. Flying. 
d. Total Integration [of the WRNS with the RN]. 
taking into account the rationale, rules and experience of other Armed 
Forces.'20 
 
Better resourced than Tony Pritchard in the 1970s, Alan West had a wider remit. 
Pritchard considered women's careers in isolation. West's study was commissioned 
because of concerns about trends in both men and women's naval employment, and 
wider social developments.  
 
Alan West had spent most of his career at sea and so had little experience of 
working with Wrens.21 He recalled that, had he not been selected to undertake the 
study, and not having previously considered the idea, his instinctive reaction would 
have been against women serving at sea. He thought this was the opinion of 'most 
people in the Navy'.22 Looking back, he thought that 'some people who picked me 
                                                 
19 FOI Fleet: NAVB/P(88)1 Management and Effectiveness, 3 Jun 1988 (extract). 
20 West Report, Annex A.  
21 At this point in his career he had spent seventeen years in ships and had done one tour at MOD. 
West, transcript p.1. 
22 Ibid, p.2. 
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thought "get West to do that because he will [say] it is totally impossible and we can 
forget it".'23 He remembered that 'a lot of senior officers just thought it would be a 
complete disaster', including a Navy Board member whom he would not name.24 
Anthea Larken welcomed his appointment. Knowing he was a highly regarded 
officer, she believed it indicated intent to take a serious look at the future of her 
Service.25 
 
Recruitment and Retention in the Royal Navy 
Part of the motivation for commissioning the West study was Navy Board concern 
about the country's impending demographic trough in youth cohorts and its impact 
on male recruiting.26 The Air Force Board responded to demographic pressures by 
increasing the percentage of women in the RAF from about 7% to 10%  to take 
advantage of the availability of high quality female recruits.27 With Wrens confined 
to shore jobs, this solution was not open to the Navy Board.  
 
Naval personnel numbers were not only about the appropriate age cohorts and the 
potential supply of young male recruits. Levels of male recruitment were lower than 


















                                                 
23 Ibid, p.9. 
24 Ibid, pp.8-9. 
25 Larken, interviewed by author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.12. 
26 FOI Fleet: ACNS 13/23, 'Headmark 2000', 11 Nov 1987 (extract). 
27 FOI AHB: ID6/1006, Force Mix - Ground Airwomen Element, 30 Aug 1988.  
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Table 6.1 Intake into the Royal Navy and Royal Marines in Relation to Male 
Age Cohorts (UK) 1966-89.        
                    Thousands 
 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981  1986  1989  
 
RN and RM Intake 7.5 8.1 9.667 8.167 4.052 6.024 5.759 
        
Age Cohort - Male         
15-19  1917 2178 1976 2167 2424 2296 2091 
15-24  3626 4113 4137 4146 4596 4727 4459 
Intake/cohort (%)        
15-19 0.39% 0.37% 0.49% 0.38% 0.17% 0.26% 0.28% 
15-24 0.21% 0.20% 0.23% 0.20% 0.09% 0.13% 0.13% 
Annual Abstract of Statistics: Age cohort figures for 1961 and 1966: Vol. 108 (1971) Table 13. Age 
cohorts figures for 1971 to 1989: Vol.127 (1991) Table 2.5 (these had a different basis from those of 
1961 and 1966). Intakes to RN and RM for 1961 and 1966: Vol.106 (1969) Table 137. Intakes to RN 
and RM for financial years starting April 1971 and Apr 1976: Vol.117 (1981) Table 7.5; April 1981, 
1986, 1989: Vol.127 (1991) Table 7.4. 
 
The Navy would not have been short of male recruits in the 1980s if the usual 
assumption that high unemployment aided recruitment into the armed forces held 
good.28 Youth unemployment, while falling in the late 1980s, remained high 
compared with the 1960s when the Navy succeeded in recruiting a larger percentage 
of the youth cohort. For example, in October 1989 there were 309,900 unemployed 
men aged 18-24 of whom 81,000 were aged 18-19.29 This compared with male 
unemployment for all age groups of 286,000 in 1961, 281,000 in 1965 and nearly 
513,000 in 1969.30  
 
Unemployment was most prevalent among school leavers with poor qualifications. 
In 1988, 40% of the unemployed aged 16-24 had no qualifications. A further 17% 
had a top attainment at Certificate of Secondary Education level below grade 1.31 Sir 
Neville Purvis (Director General Naval Manning and Training in the late 1980s) 
explained that, although when he joined the Navy in the 1950s he had 'people who 
                                                 
28 For example, this link was made by Cynthia Enloe who suggested that, as 'unemployment rates 
remain[ed] stubbornly high among young men', the British army had no need to extend women's 
employment in the 1980s because there was a ready supply of male recruits (Cynthia Enloe, Does 
Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives (London: Pandora, 1988 edition), 
Introduction p.xx). 
29 Employment Gazette, Vol.98, No.12, (London: HMSO, 1990), Tables 2.5 and 2.7. Data based on 
UK claimant count in Oct 1989. 
30 Annual Abstract of Statistics, Vol.108, (London: HMSO, 1971), Tables 151 (GB) and 152 
(Northern Ireland). Northern Ireland figures were for men and women, but have been included in full. 
Male unemployment would therefore have been slightly lower than stated here. Figures by age group 
were not collected at that time. 
31 Employment Gazette, Vol.98, No.5, (London: HMSO, 1990), p.276. 
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could barely read and write' working for him, the Service was now 'looking for 
people with technical qualifications, with good GCSEs and A levels because those 
were the things which we needed to be able to train them'.32 The WRNS had the 
advantage over the RN in qualifications. According to a 1987 sample, 55% of 
female ratings had three or more GCE subjects at grade C or above compared with 
29% of male ratings.33 
 
Although Alan West did not analyse the merchant navy's situation, he noted that the 
Director of Naval Recruiting was considering recruiting directly from this source.34 
Interestingly, the number of British men in the merchant navy had collapsed over the 
preceding decade (Table 6.2). Training places had also been cut. There were forty-
three new deck officer cadets and fifty new engineering cadets in 1987 compared 
with 1,220 and 846 respectively in 1970.35 The number of boy rating entrants 
dropped from 1,745 in 1979/80 to 274 in 1983/4.36 This fall suggests either a pool of 
potential seafarers who no longer had access to careers in the merchant fleet or loss 
of interest in seagoing. The former could give the RN an opportunity to recruit. 
However, merchant navy employment was significantly different from that in the 
Royal Navy. Junior ranks were largely employed on a casual basis, signing on for a 
voyage and spending time ashore before seeking another berth. They worked set 
hours and could earn overtime pay. They had more free time and less onerous 
disciplinary regulations. Decline in merchant navy employment does not seem to 











                                                 
32 Vice Admiral Sir Neville Purvis interviewed by author 15 Jun 2010, transcript, p.4. 
33 West Report, p.13. 
34 Ibid, Annex C. 
35 Michael Davies, Belief in the Sea: State Encouragement of British Merchant Shipping & 
Shipbuilding, (London: Lloyd's of London Press, 1992), p.331. 
36 Tony Lane, Grey Dawn Breaking: British Merchant Seafarers in the Late Twentieth Century, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p.23. 
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Table 6.2 Manpower on the General Council of British Shipping Register  
          Number 
Year 1976 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
UK 
Officers 
33314 17758 15225 14628 10871 9588 8885 7892 
UK 
Ratings 
25019 19268 17536 18328 12706 12785 12114 9946 
E J Gubbins, Implications in the Decline of the British Merchant Navy, (Loughborough: 
Loughborough University of Technology, 1991), Table 10. 
 
Despite the apparently sufficient supply of young men in the population and decline 
in alternative seafaring careers, the RN struggled to recruit enough men.37 Alan 
West suggested that armed forces careers were 'less fashionable, particularly with 
young people's apparent desire for greater affluence, personal satisfaction and job 
mobility'.38 He thought this was in conflict with 'notions of service and long 
commitment'.39 However, there was a fundamental dilemma in policy which the 
Navy failed to resolve. It wanted young men in order to accustom them to seafaring 
before they settled into a more sedentary lifestyle.40 It needed them well-qualified in 
order to meet the demands of the work. However, those with necessary aptitudes 
delayed entry to the job market to improve their qualifications. The Navy, still 
preferring to take 16-19 year olds, was accepting youths of lower quality than it 
wanted in order to meet recruiting targets.41  
 
Alan West tested various solutions to male recruitment problems. Noting that ethnic 
minorities were a growing component of the younger age cohort, he considered 
whether more could be done to attract volunteers from such groups. However, given 
the Navy's poor record on ethnic minority recruitment, he thought this would not 
achieve the necessary quick result.42 He observed that France still used conscription 
but rightly dismissed its re-introduction in Britain as politically impossible.43 
Finally, he pondered expanding the Navy's participation in the Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS). This was a government initiative for school leavers, offering a two 
year programme of work experience combined with training. It was open to those 
                                                 
37 West Report, p.9.  
38 Ibid, Annex C. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson interviewed by author 11 May 2011, transcript p.8. 
41 FOI MOD: Navy Board, Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, Second Sea Lord, Jan 1990. 
42 West Report, p.9. 
43 Ibid, p.10. 
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not in full time jobs or education. According to Brian Harrison, 'By 1986 nearly a 
third of all school-leavers were joining a YTS scheme.'44 However, Alan West found 
that the scheme had not been successful in the Navy.45 Indeed, in the period 
September 1983 - May 1986, of 6,000 YTS places available in the armed forces, 
only 2,700 had been filled.46    
 
Alan West also confirmed problems with retention of experienced men. He ascribed 
it to social pressures associated with family life. These included home ownership, 
wives' careers and children's education. Wanting domestic stability, men resisted 
increased separation from families.47 Retention problems had also happened in the 
late 1970s, but a substantial pay rise in 1979 stemmed the outflow. However, West 




While Britain led the way on employment of women in the armed forces in the 
1940s, it now lagged behind its allies. Limited seagoing was open to women in the 
USA, Australia and New Zealand. Canada had moved on to a trial of women in 
warships. Denmark and the Netherlands had women serving in warships and 
Norway also allowed women to serve in submarines.49 Alan West judged that sex 
discrimination or human rights legislation was important in these policy 
developments.50 He suggested that changing attitudes in Britain might result in 
'political pressure' in response to 'feminist pressure groups... seek[ing] to impose 
integration' of women into the RN.51 According to West, the imposition of policy 
had been detrimental to implementation of women's seagoing in the US and 
Netherlands' navies.52     
 
                                                 
44 Brian Harrison, Finding a Role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990, The New Oxford History of 
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.248. 
45 West Report, p10.  
46 Employment Gazette, Vol.94, No.5, (London: HMSO, 1986), p.160. 
47 West Report, Annex C. 
48 Ibid, p.9. 
49 Ibid, Annex E. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, pp.15-16. 
52 Ibid, p.16. 
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Women as the Solution to Manpower Problems 
West reported two distinct perspectives on the WRNS. He characterised the 
traditional view as seeing Wrens as 'an office ornament'. He believed this led to 
public perceptions, fostered by press articles, that they were a 'decorative uniformed 
corps of secretaries'.53 Many male officers were 'unconsciously patronising' in their 
support for the WRNS, older senior ratings were 'least likely to be aware of the 
quality of professionalism' of Wrens, and junior ratings thought they blocked shore 
jobs.54 The feminine image used to encourage recruiting, he argued 'inhibit[ed] 
understanding of the fact that the WRNS [was] closely involved in highly technical 
and operational work'.55 This was a fundamental dilemma in discussing wider 
employment of Wrens. Seagoing was thought likely to attract a different sort of 
woman that would be detrimental to this customary view of a 'feminine' Service. 
West took pains to say that women in other navies were no less feminine even 
though they served at sea.56 
 
Worries about 'femininity' could be seen as code for 'sexuality'. The potential for 
sexual relationships was an important concern of those opposing women serving in 
ships. Alan West was briefed to consider the potential for sexual liaisons and 
women's assumed poor work performance during menstruation.57 The latter he 
dismissed after consulting the Navy's medical authorities.58 Having examined 
experience in the US and Dutch navies, he acknowledged, but played down, 
problems arising from heterosexual relationships. Lesbianism was a more sensitive 
subject. Homosexual practices were illegal under military law. This ban continued 
until 2000.59 West sought to allay fears, noting 'evidence [did] not suggest that the 
incidence of lesbianism [rose] with the introduction of sea service.'60 Nevertheless, 
there was recognition that seagoing would appeal to a cohort of women prepared for 
                                                 
53 Ibid, p.5 and p.7. 
54 Ibid, p.6. 
55 Ibid, p.7. 
56 Ibid, p.23. 
57 West, transcript p.3. 
58 West Report, pp.25-6. 
59 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.377. 
60 West Report, p.23 and p.25. These comments drew on visits to American, Dutch and New Zealand 
navies. 
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the rigours of life at sea and thus there would be a divergence from the former style 
of the WRNS. 
 
Alan West recommended that women should go to sea from April 1990 and the 
WRNS should merge with the RN on 1 April 1991.61 This was intended to give 
women full career opportunities, solve both quality and quantity issues in 
recruitment and, by reducing the strains caused by shortages of personnel, it was 
hoped to improve retention.  
 
But what ships would be opened to women? West seems to have chosen, or been 
encouraged to take, a narrow interpretation of his terms of reference. He ignored the 
invitation to consider Ministerial approval in connection with combat roles, stating 
that 'Fortunately it [did] not lie within the remit of this study to attempt to overcome 
[political objections].'62 Setting aside warships, West worked out the number of jobs 
which could be done by women in minor vessels. He proposed a limit of 10-15% of 
the posts in any one ship as a starting point.63 This was to take account of 
suggestions that women were not strong enough to carry out some of the communal 
duties, such as loading ship's stores and damage control tasks. The potential female 
complement was also affected by the constraint of dividing accommodation between 
men and women. Junior ratings lived in communal mess decks. West recommended 
that in mixed ships, mess decks should be single sex. He identified five ships which 
would be suitable: HMS Hecla and HMS Roebuck (survey ships); HMS Shetland 
(an offshore patrol vessel); HMS Challenger (the seabed operations vessel); and 
HMS Juno (a former frigate then used as a navigation training ship).64 Applying a 
15% limit to the complement figures provided in his report, opening these initial five 
ships would have created approximately 78 posts for women.65  
 
Alan West saw this as a critical moment for the WRNS, stating that many Wrens felt 
that they were 'poised for a big breakthrough and many [saw] this Study as the 
catalyst ... Failure to grasp the opportunity would be a major disappointment, 
                                                 
61 Ibid, p.35. 
62 Ibid, p.20. 
63 Ibid, p.26. 
64 Ibid, p.31. 
65 Calculation by the author by applying a 15% cap to complement figures for these ships at West 
Report, Annex F. 
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leading to frustration and demotivation.'66 He believed that his recommendations 
safeguarded women's roles from the 'predatory gaze of the NAO'.67 When 
interviewed in 2007, he described his report as 'pusillanimous'.68 He knew the issue 
was sensitive and, in many quarters of both the RN and the WRNS, deeply 
unpopular. Although he had some supporters, he received abusive telephone calls 
from contemporaries who were not convinced.69 However, detractors had no viable 
alternative to offer to personnel shortages. Alan West thought he had 'kick[ed] open 
the door' with a seagoing recommendation which he described as 'what the market 
would bear'.70  
 
Decision on the Future of the WRNS 
The key men determining the future of the WRNS were Admiral Sir Brian Brown 
(Second Sea Lord), Admiral Sir Julian Oswald (First Sea Lord) and Archie 
Hamilton. Brian Brown was a supply and secretariat officer rather than a seaman 
officer. He had also served as a pilot. He described himself as the Navy Board 
member with most reservations about seagoing, on the grounds that it would be his 
responsibility to make the policy work.71 However, he also appears to have doubted 
the morality of employing women in combat roles while naval men might be in safe 
jobs ashore. Remembering media coverage of the Falklands War, he recoiled from 
the thought of female burns' victims appearing on television.72 Admiral Oswald, 
who took over as First Sea Lord in May 1989, was also thought to be reluctant to 
have Wrens at sea.73 Looking back in 2004, he admitted he was not initially 
convinced, but said he wanted to listen to the arguments.74  
 
Brian Brown was not persuaded that women's career prospects were inadequate. 
Rather, he thought there was no evidence that women were leaving, there was a 
plentiful supply of replacements, and it would not necessarily be a disadvantage if 
                                                 
66 Ibid, p.7. 
67 Ibid, p.28. 
68 West, transcript p.7. 
69 Ibid, p.11. 
70 Ibid, p.13.  
71 Brown, interviewed by author, 1 Apr 2010, transcript p.15. 
72 Ibid, pp.7-8. 
73 Aldred, transcript p.4; Larken, interviewed by author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.21; Rear Admiral 
Wilkinson, e-mail to author, 12 Nov 2012. 
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they were of lesser quality than hitherto. He dismissed National Audit Office 
criticisms. He was 'not firmly [author's emphasis] opposed to women at sea' but he 
thought Wrens did not want seagoing.75 He also thought the case for integrating 
women into the Royal Navy was unproven.  
 
It took Admiral Brown three months to send Alan West's report to departments and 
headquarters for consideration. Recipients were given a further three months to 
comment. Alongside the operational case for change and financial factors, the 
'overriding consideration' was the 'future manning needs of the Royal Navy'.76 This 
protracted timescale is indicative of how controversial the recommendations were. 
Admiral Brown subsequently said he intended to 'give people a chance first to chew 
it over thoroughly and to evolve their thoughts ... basically get used to the fact that 
[seagoing for women was] perhaps a prospect.'77  
 
Women's ability to undertake professional duties aboard ships was not in doubt. 
Captain Wilkinson, Secretary to Admiral Oswald, sounded out officers in the Naval 
staff and told the Admiral that views on this were favourable, as: 
 
'There were very severe shortages in certain branches - radio operators in 
particular - also stewards - where the women were very strong ... and radar 
operators, too - we all knew that women were very good at sitting in front of a 
radar screen or listening for long periods - much better than young men.'78  
 
The radio operator category was critically under-staffed, with about 70 able seaman 
posts vacant in ships.79 But there was concern about the physical strength needed for 
emergencies (fire fighting and damage control) and handling supplies when ships' 
stores were replenished. Archie Hamilton thought such worries were exaggerated. 
                                                 
75 FOI Fleet: The WRNS Study, Second Sea Lord to DGNMT, 11 Apr 1989. 
76 FOI Fleet: Correspondence: 'Study into the Employment of WRNS Personnel in the Royal Navy', 
Head of NMT, 30 Jun 1989.  
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He believed that a case could equally be made for the limitations of over-weight 
men which was apparently a problem.80   
 
Written comments mostly avoided the social impact of women aboard ship though 
Rear Admiral Hugo White (Assistant Chief of Naval Staff) thought this was likely to 
be a greater source of difficulty than working at sea.81 Raising the subject of wives' 
attitudes, Naval Home Command also expressed concerns.82 A staff officer working 
in naval discipline wanted clarity on fraternisation rules. He feared changes could 
'endanger our line on homosexuality'.83   
 
It was apparent from comments on West's recommendations that limited seagoing 
for women would not solve the Navy's 'manpower' problem. The Navy was short of 
over 200 men at sea, a further 600 were filling posts in ships for which they had 
insufficient experience, and there were 2,000 vacancies ashore.84 Estimates of the 
number of women at sea, if West's recommendations had been implemented, varied 
from 150 - 250. These would predominantly be junior ranks and would not match 
the skill deficiencies at sea.85 Assuming a limit of 15% of ships' complements was 
still being applied, these estimates would appear to be based on policy being 
extended to all ships in the classes of West's proposed list of five initial ships, plus 
some additional minor vessel classes.  
 
Two strands emerged in replies: improving men's retention or finding more ships 
that qualified as 'non-combatant'. Naval Home Command feared that women at sea 
could worsen the situation if unhappy wives of sailors persuaded their husbands to 
                                                 
80 NMRN Oral History Collection: Lord Hamilton of Epsom interviewed by Katy Elliott, 4 July 2006, 
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leave.86 Fleet Headquarters suggested that, if a reduction in men's early leaving from 
the prevailing 8% to 7.4% could be achieved, it would cover the shortfall.87 Rear 
Admiral White thought better pay to improve retention of men would be more likely 
to improve the position than women's limited seagoing. The latter should only be 
pursued if 'it [was] assessed that no other measure or mix of measures of comparable 
cost could successfully overcome RN manpower shortages'.88 However, no financial 
analysis was offered and aspirations to improve retention had been unfulfilled for 
decades. Better pay, even if it could be negotiated, was only likely to be a short term 
palliative before patterns of behaviour based on family and career factors were 
reasserted.  
 
Some attempt was made to identify additional opportunities for seagoing. Ideas 
included Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, warships during periods when they were only 
doing sea trials, providing skeleton crews needed when ships were undergoing refit, 
warships until war was in the offing then replacing women with men.89 The latter 
was a persistent idea. However, Brian Brown saw it as the worst of possible 
solutions.90 It would undermine the 'work up' concept, during which ships' 
complements trained together in a variety of scenarios and simulated emergencies. 
Further, if an unexpected operation had to be mounted in haste, there could be 
insufficient time to replace women. Indeed, there might not be men available. In 
addition, it would undermine the credibility of women who would be seen as 'fair 
weather sailors'.91 Fundamentally, it would weaken operational effectiveness, a key 
fear of policy-makers. In these efforts to expand opportunities at sea nobody 
recommended full service in warships.  
 
Alan West's other key recommendation, that women should be integrated into the 
Royal Navy by April 1991, attracted little support. There would be too few women 
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gaining experience at sea to make integration meaningful. However, there was 
willingness to offer outward signs of convergence with the men's Service by 
adopting RN rank titles, and gold lace to replace the blue lace of the WRNS for rank 
and badges on uniforms.92 Even so, Home Command thought this would take two 
years to achieve.93 Mr Brack (Assistant under Secretary for Naval Personnel), 
observing that the other Services were making changes in women's employment, 
thought the Navy must do something, but there was 'no need to be revolutionary: 
evolutionary ... [was] quite sufficient.'94 He favoured some seagoing, but thought 
integration of women into the Royal Navy unnecessary. He suggested a quick move 
to adopt RN rank titles and insignia. As these measures were completed in the army 
in 1950 and the RAF in 1968, this hardly seemed to meet his own test of making 




Assessments of the wider employment of women in allied navies referred to feminist 
pressure driving change. This was seen in a negative light and something to be 
avoided because an imposed policy would be more difficult to implement and it 
would be hard for the Navy Board to set limits to new opportunities.96 However, it is 
not apparent that women's military employment featured in British feminist groups' 
agendas. For example, articles in the feminist publication Spare Rib suggest a stance 
on women taking part in combat which was divided into distinct categories. Armed 
female freedom fighters acting against repressive regimes were lauded. Articles on 
armed forces in Britain took issue with the basing of cruise missiles and condemned 
aggressive actions of the army in Northern Ireland. Rather than pressing for British 
servicewomen's equality, it disparaged their participation.97 In 1981, Lesley 
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Merryfinch, in a four page article under the headline 'Equality in the Army - No 
Way!', wrote that her reaction to British servicewomen was one of: 
 
'anger, sorrow and pity ... ang[er] at the terrible force of false promises which 
lured them into wanting to join up ... [sadness] to see them caught up in that 
most patriarchal of structures and blinded to what that [was] doing to them as 
women ... and pity for them because ... you [could not] automatically leave by 
giving notice'.98  
 
The following year, an article by Jan Parker highlighted the treatment of three 
lesbians dismissed from the army, describing the army as 'oppress[ing] women 
within its own ranks'.99 This lesbian cause was another reason for criticising the 
armed forces. Such pressure in respect of equal opportunities as Navy Board 
members perceived probably came from establishment sources: the NAO Report on 
MOD personnel and the subsequent Public Accounts Committee report, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission and Parliamentary questions or letters to Ministers.100 
 
In the WRNS Directorate, Commandant Anthea Larken was disappointed with Alan 
West's recommendations. She and her deputy, Chief Officer Rosie Wilson, thought 
the WRNS could not survive as a shore-based service. They took NAO criticism 
seriously.101 However, with just five support ships recommended for women, there 
would be 'too few opportunities to permit a balanced development of female 
seagoing expertise and experience' and this would 'inhibit progress on integration' of 
the WRNS into the Royal Navy.102  
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Anthea Larken knew that Wrens themselves were divided on seagoing.103 A survey 
conducted by Alan West's study team in 1988/89 confirmed her judgement. Of 298 
ratings who responded, 147 replied that they would go to sea, 113 would not and 38 
were undecided. Officers were more evenly split: 26 replied 'yes', 24 opted for 'no' 
and 5 were 'undecided'.104 Wrens were women who had joined a shore-based 
organisation. It was not surprising that many would not volunteer for seagoing. 
Some would already be too senior in rank to make a successful transition. More 
important was the attitude of potential recruits. Evidence presented to Alan West 
suggested interest in seagoing opportunities.105 
 
Overturning Exclusion from Warships  
Archie Hamilton read Alan West's report and was unimpressed by the Navy's 'toe in 
the water' approach compared with bolder moves by the RAF and army.106 At the 
suggestion of Commander Roy Clare (his military assistant), he visited a Dutch 
frigate. 107 The Dutch Navy had had women at sea in warships for about ten years. It 
had ocean-going capability and its mixed-crew ships performed well in operational 
training which was run by the Royal Navy from Portland. The gap between Dutch 
experience and Alan West's recommendations was apparent to Hamilton. 108 He 
could not understand why the Royal Navy accepted 'substandard men' while turning 
away 'good women'.109 The Navy was perceived as being left behind.110 
  
With Brian Brown resistant to wider seagoing, Admiral Oswald was in a difficult 
position. Maintenance of good relations with Ministers was important to Service 
chiefs. Rightly or wrongly, it was perceived as influential in the share of resources 
allocated to the Services in annual budget negotiations.111 Admiral Oswald's 
relationship with Tom King, the Secretary of State, was already strained over a press 
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article.112 He was unlikely to want to lose ground also with Archie Hamilton, 
compared with RAF and army counterparts.   
 
Meanwhile, Admiral Oswald was encouraged to open warships to women by the 
two captains who worked on his personal staff. Captain Lippiett, who accompanied 
him on visits to naval establishments, took him to visit female reservists who already 
went to sea for training weekends.113 Captain Wilkinson sounded out officers in the 
Naval staff and told Admiral Oswald that 'basically, people thought that if we were 
going to do it, do it properly and get on with it.'114  
 
The unresolved problem was government policy which precluded women from 
serving in combat roles. In 1988, Roger Freeman (Under Secretary of State for the 
Armed Forces) stated twice in the House of Commons that women should not be in 
'direct combat'.115 This had become akin to a reflex response when discussing 
servicewomen's employment. Whatever was changing, the threshold of combat was 
said not to have been crossed. Some respondents to the West report thought the time 
had come to seek political guidance on what was acceptable. Was the defining 
characteristic the use of weapons, the risk of becoming a casualty or some 
geographic reference to a 'combat zone'? 116 In November 1989, Archie Hamilton 
challenged the existence of a formal policy that excluded women from combat 
roles.117 The oft quoted position was subsequently described in the Navy Board 
paper on employment of the WRNS as a 'precept' rather than a 'policy'.118 Exclusion 
of women from warships as a matter of principle that they should not undertake 
combat roles appeared to have weak foundations.  
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Roy Clare suggested that Admiral Oswald could 'see which way the political wind 
was blowing', but he had to manage the Navy Board to bring about agreement.119 On 
this controversial issue it was important for the Board to be united. It fell to Rear 
Admiral Neville Purvis to brief Board members individually. He presented a 
threefold case. First, the Navy was short of skilled men while the WRNS had no 
difficulty in attracting high quality recruits. Second, 'it seem[ed] highly probable that 
there [would] be pressure in the future to relinquish a WRNS with no seagoing 
function'.120 Finally, he thought it would be better for the Navy to make this decision 
on its own terms rather than having it imposed through 'political correctness'.121  
 
Persuaded to accept the idea of women serving in warships, Admiral Brown wrote a 
Navy Board paper which presented a cogent case for seagoing, with integration of 
women into the Royal Navy to follow in the medium term. He based sea service 
predominantly on the Navy's needs, with brief reference to equality of opportunity 
for women. He described demographic trends as 'adverse' but 'not of themselves 
disabling'.122 He referred to 'economic and social conditions inhibit[ing] recruiting 
and encouraging restiveness among serving personnel.'123 He observed that 'Greater 
risks in male recruiting quality [were] being contemplated at a time when there 
[was] no shortage of women of high quality who wish[ed] to join.'124 Thus, he 
argued, women would improve both quantity and quality, representing 'a real 
improvement for manning'.125 In approving the paper, the Navy Board decided that 
there were two co-equal aims: 'to meet manning needs, and to improve the prospects 
for equal opportunities for the WRNS.'126 The Navy Board was persuaded to support 
the policy unanimously. 
 
The precept that women should not serve in combat was set aside in a letter from 
Archie Hamilton to Margaret Thatcher and a short reply from her secretary saying 
                                                 
119 Clare, transcript p.5. 
120 Purvis, transcript pp.14-15. 
121 Ibid. 




126 FOI MOD: WRNS Study - NAVB(I) 11 Jan 90, minute to Navy Board members, Secretary to 
First Sea Lord, 15 Jan 1990. 
Chapter 6: Opening Main Combat Roles to Women 
203 
that she was content.127 The Queen's approval was also sought. Hamilton regarded 
his approach as pragmatic. He did not claim to champion equality of opportunity. 
Indeed, he thought he was perfectly capable of resisting any such pressure. He 
feared reactionary Conservative MPs would cause trouble, but anticipated less 
difficulty with the Labour opposition who would be obliged to accept the equal 
opportunities case.128 He announced the decision in the House of Commons on 5 
February 1990, saying that he was 'sure that the service [would] rise to meet the 
challenge' – a phrase he regretted, as it prompted ribald remarks.129 It was hardly 
surprising that a largely male House of Commons perceived a sexual connotation to 
Hamilton's words. The sexual aspect of men and women serving together in the 
confines of ships was a theme readily taken up by the media and played immediately 
on the fears of sailors' wives. 
 
Flying Policies 
In common with NATO allies, in the late 1980s the RAF faced a shortage of 
aircrew. Although pilot recruiting targets were met, quality was declining and failure 
rates in training increasing. Retention of experienced men was even more 
problematic. The percentage opting to leave at break points in contracts rose from 
28% to 38% between 1987 and 1989. In addition, applications to leave the RAF 
early reached a five-year high in 1989. The situation with navigators was worse. 
This specialisation was largely populated by men who had failed selection for pilot 
or did not make the grade in pilot training. Only 10% of navigators made the 
specialisation their first choice. The RAF missed its target for newly qualified 
navigators in all but one year in the 1980s.130  
 
Meanwhile, squadron establishments were due to rise from 1991 when NATO 
policy of increasing crew to aircraft ratio from 1.2:1 to 1.5:1 was due to come into 
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effect.131 Possible solutions discussed at a NATO conference in 1988 included 
improving terms and conditions of service to aid retention, reducing overall 
requirement by cutting office jobs and increasing recruiting targets.132 However, the 
RAF could not compete on pay and conditions with civilian airlines and North Sea 
oil operators. Increasing the targets was not going to solve the problem of quality of 
entrants. 
 
Work on the idea of female aircrew started in the Air Secretary's department in the 
mid-1980s. It was seen as a way of increasing the recruiting base. Initially there was 
a lack of progress. Government policy that women were not employed in combat 
was assumed to prevent any such initiative because the RAF recruited on the basis 
of aptitude to 'discharge all roles - combat and non-combat'. 133 If women were to be 
employed, either the restriction on women's employment or the RAF's approach to 
recruitment of pilots would have to be abandoned. It was the recruiting policy which 
was set aside to accommodate female aircrew in a 1989 decision to allow women to 
fly aircraft designated as non-combat. 
 
The author of the paper for the Air Force Board was given a strong public hint of the 
new Chief of Air Staff's view. In an interview for RAF News in January 1989, Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding praised women flying with University Air 
Squadrons, lamented that they could not join the RAF as pilots, and promised it 
would be considered.134 A few weeks later, a draft paper was circulated for 
comment. It recorded accumulated evidence in favour. The USA, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and the Netherlands all had female pilots. The RAF already employed 
women in some rear crew roles. Female undergraduates were now proving their 
aptitude at University Air Squadrons. There was growing pressure for change from 
these women and from external bodies such as the National Audit Office and the 
Equal Opportunities Commission.135 Air Vice Marshal Bob Honey (Air Secretary, 
responsible for career management) suggested that aircrew roles for women would 
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enhance 'the Service's reputation as an equal opportunities employer'.136 He 
recommended women be employed as pilots and navigators in unarmed aircraft and 
as flying instructors. This limited approach was also seen as a means of gaining 
experience of recruiting, training and employing women as aircrew.137 
 
Dissenting views were expressed by Air Commodore Profit (Inspector of Flight 
Safety) and Air Vice Marshal Roger Austin (Director General Aircraft). Profit 
argued for improving men's terms and conditions or employment of male senior 
NCOs.138 Austin expressed his opposition in emotive terms, saying that he had tried 
but probably failed to set aside male chauvinism. He rejected claims which might be 
made for equal opportunities, arguing that '[our] requirements are special (hence ... 
we are still allowed to reject homosexuals even though most other occupations 
cannot).'139 If the case was associated with a shortage of men, he preferred to 
improve men's terms of service. He ended by supposing that women aircrew would 
be a reality sooner or later. But he thought he would be retired by then and could rest 
content that 'my air force [was] awake and alert - and powdering its nose as it 
admire[d] Robert Redford and Tom Jones on the Flight Safety calendar.'140 
 
Some of those in favour thought the recommendation did not go far enough. Having 
just visited Cambridge University Air Squadron, where a female member had won 
the top prize for flying, Air Commodore Tim Garden foresaw problems if a woman 
came top in Basic Flying Training but was assigned a lesser role than men. He 
wanted to seek Ministerial approval for women to fly fast jets.141 Air Vice Marshal 
Eric Macey (Director General Training) suggested adding air defence combat jets 
and reconnaissance aircraft to the list – thus drawing a line short of offensive 
action.142 Air Commodore Farrer, Director of Air Defence, could not understand 
why women should be '[confined] to roles in which they [could] be shot at but 
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[could] not themselves shoot back.'143 Air Vice Marshal Mills, Director General 
Medical Services, argued a practical point which interchanged 'excluded' and 
'included' aircraft types. He thought that, as 'size for size and weight for weight 
women have less strength than men', they might be more suited to fast jets than to 
'larger and heavier aircraft with a potential for asymmetric and other problems of 
control'.144 
 
Air Vice Marshal Honey's paper glossed over women's potential short period of 
service compared with men which even those in favour of its recommendation 
observed. The key concern was that women would leave early due to pregnancy as 
the intention was to retain compulsory discharge. However, it was proposed that 
female aircrew could be 'allowed to complete at least their obligatory service 
sometime after childbirth'.145 This was questioned both by those who favoured 
female aircrew and those opposed. Air Vice Marshal Mills, a proponent, queried the 
coupling of 'allowed' and 'obligatory' in the same statement. He counselled against 
being dogmatic because 'Women's reactions to the fact of motherhood [could] be 
unpredictable', with 'postnatal attitudes' potentially different from 'antenatal 
intentions'. But he thought pregnancy was 'unlikely to be a notable factor with the 
highly motivated young women' who would initially volunteer to train as aircrew. 146 
Air Vice Marshal Roger Austin doubted that the RAF would be able to insist on 
return after childbirth unless a childcare allowance was paid or crèche facilities 
established.147 His line was supported by another opponent, Air Commodore 
Profit.148 Other officers who favoured female aircrew, but queried the idea of 
encouraging mothers to return to complete their service, included Air Commodore 
Peter Beer (Director of Air Plans), Air Commodore David Cousins (Director for Air 
Offensive issues) and Air Vice Marshal Hann (Director General Personnel 
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Services).149 Rather than making a clear statement on how she thought terms of 
service should be changed, Air Commodore Shirley Jones (Director WRAF) 
responded that she would be 'interested to know how best these [could] be 
resolved'.150 Air Vice Marshal John Thomson (Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 
March 1989) added further criticism that, rather than being safe from poaching from 
other employers, women were more likely to leave than men. He based his argument 
on data from the United States Air Force. 151  
 
John Thomson had a more fundamental problem with the basic argument of Honey's 
paper that female aircrew would help to alleviate concerns about the quality of 
applicants for aircrew roles. His particular concern was the fast jet force. The paper 
suggested that women would replace male candidates who achieved the lowest 
scores in aptitude tests. Although aptitude scores were not an exact predictor of 
subsequent success in training, these men were more likely than the high scoring 
candidates to fail training, as 1 in 3 men did at this time, or be assigned to multi-
engine or rotary wing aircraft.152 Men who performed best in training were selected 
for fast jet roles or 'creamed off' to become instructors for a tour of duty, before later 
transferring to an operational squadron. High quality female candidates would not be 
eligible for fast jet squadrons, though the intention was that the best could be 
selected as instructors. Thomson observed that these rules implied that the quality of 
pilots and navigators for the fast jet force would not be improved, as only the 
occasional selection of a woman for flying instructor duties would replace a man of 
fast jet standard. However, he was not in favour of a bolder policy. He felt 'an 
underlying unease at the anthropological and psychological factors concerning 
women and combat and the further effects on male colleagues and the civilian 
population of placing them at risk.'153 He urged the need to 'differentiate between 
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women's ability to fly high performance aircraft in peace ... and the appropriateness 
of commanding them to kill and be killed in action.'154  
 
A revised paper, sponsored by Air Marshal Sir Laurence Jones (Air Member for 
Personnel) went to the Air Force Board Standing Committee in June.155 Despite 
John Thomson's complaints about inconsistencies in the paper, this final version was 
substantially the same as the earlier draft.156 The minutes of the meeting focussed on 
the acceptable list of aircraft, the status of support helicopters being the contentious 
issue. As Chinook and Puma helicopters were used in close support of land forces 
they were deemed to operate too close to potential action for women to be involved. 
They were deleted from the list. The meeting approved women to serve as aircrew in 
non-weapon carrying or dropping aircraft. They were to form up to 10% of annual 
intakes for pilots and navigators, starting from 1 April 1990. New terms of service 
were to be agreed with the Treasury.157 As one of his last actions before handing 
over to Tom King, George Younger gave approval on 19 July.158 From circulation of 
the draft policy paper to approval by Ministers took under five months. 
 
RN and Army Air Corps Developments 
Having overturned the combat exclusion with its seagoing policy, the Navy Board 
returned to flying, where the Fleet Air Arm was operating with a shortfall of 16% of 
its pilot complement. Vice Admiral Sir Brian Brown was keen to have 'consistent 
criteria throughout the Naval Service on the extent to which women should be 
involved in combat'.159 However, he did not want to 'prejudice the achievement of 
tri-Service agreement on combat in non-seagoing contexts.'160 Mindful of the RAF's 
reluctance to have female combat pilots, he suggested that Sea Harrier squadrons 
remain for men only. These were the Navy's fighter aircraft which operated from 
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carriers. He thought women's roles could be extended to helicopters operating over 
battle areas on land. However, as the army was reviewing the employment of 
women in the Army Air Corps, it was sensible to wait.161 Female naval aviators 
would be employed in anti-submarine warfare, so the Board's approval of the 
proposal in December 1990 again pushed the combat boundary.162 Thus the Navy 
took account of the limits of RAF and army policies while pressing on with its own 
new policy on women's roles. 
 
Women were to join the Army Air Corps as ground crew from 1991.163 As the 
army's non-commissioned aircrew were selected from ground crew, this move 
opened the way for women. It was also agreed in principle that women were to be 
eligible to join directly as officer aircrew. However, an implementation date was not 
set, as the Director of the Army Air Corps was reported to be reluctant to take this 
step.164 Nevertheless, due to a shortage of male aircrew, the army was expected to 
have women flying Gazelle and subsequently Lynx support helicopters. This would 
imply operational duty in Northern Ireland. The plan had been endorsed by 
Ministers.165 
 
Updating his Air Force Board colleagues on these developments, Air Marshal Sir 
David Parry-Evans (Air Member for Personnel in place of Laurence Jones) 
concluded that the RAF should look at widening women's employment. He 
confessed to 'a slight unease'.166 Unease also seemed to be behind the remarks of Air 
Commodore Squire (Director of Air Offensive), who thought that the RAF would be 
unable to 'hold the line' in respect of policy on aircrew for helicopters.167 He clearly 
had doubts about the wisdom of female pilots in offensive roles, remarking that as 
there were two pilots, it would be 'always possible to have a male pilot in every 
cockpit.'168 
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Ending Flying Restrictions in the RAF 
The RAF had to review policy on women aircrew before non-combat flying policy 
had time to take effect.169 Air Marshal Sir Roger Palin, the next Air Member for 
Personnel, put a further paper on women aircrew to Air Force Board Standing 
Committee colleagues in July 1991. He stated there were only two legal grounds for 
continuing to exclude women from a role. The first was that they would have an 
adverse impact on military operations. The second was statutory health and safety 
reasons.170 However, the Navy had Ministerial approval to employ women in all its 
aircraft, including Sea Harrier combat jets. Army Air Corps policy would also put 
women into combat zones. Consequently, he recommended immediate opening of 
support helicopter roles and maritime patrol aircraft. He stopped short of combat 
jets, suggesting instead that the experience of other countries should be investigated. 
He described this move as 'put[ting] our own house in order before find[ing] 
ourselves forced down possibly less welcome routes'.171 This latter remark seemed 
to imply a desire to maintain exclusion from combat jets. It was the only additional 
route not yet proposed. 
 
Roger Palin's line was recognised as indefensible in the light of developments in the 
other Services by all but one reply to his paper.172 Remarking that it would be seen 
as 'too little, too late', Deputy Controller Aircraft speculated that the policy would 
fall to the first Parliamentary Question on the subject.173 Tim Garden, now Assistant 
Chief of Air Staff, continued his previous support for unrestricted flying. He 
opposed the step-by-step approach claiming that it 'promote[d] the idea that we are 
entrenched male chauvinists – hardly ideal for the Service that should be most 
forward thinking.'174 He thought that 'Ministers have moved rather more quickly 
than the military in their acceptance of women on combat duties'.175 Moray Stewart 
(Second Parliamentary Under Secretary) urged the opening of all roles to 'widen the 
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recruiting base' and to remove 'this contentious subject from the sex discrimination 
arena'.176 
 
The decision to open all flying roles to women was taken in principle at a meeting of 
the Air Force Board Standing Committee in September 1991. As an immediate step, 
support helicopter roles and maritime patrol aircraft roles were approved and Air 
Marshal Palin was asked to produce a paper on fast jet roles 'taking into account the 
legal position'.177  
 
This final paper in the sequence was sent to Board members on 27 November 1991 
and it was circulated within the Air Force Department at MOD. Roger Palin 
included an annex which attempted to assess women's effectiveness as combatants. 
It named historical examples starting from Boadicea. It mentioned female Soviet 
fighter pilots in World War II but dismissed them as 'few and far between'.178 It went 
on to say that Israel excluded women from combat because previously their presence 
had prevented men from 'operat[ing] with the necessary ruthlessness'.179 It observed 
that Britain now had armed policewomen but thought there was a difference 
between 'confronting a criminal and an enemy'.180 The annex tried to draw a 
distinction between the types of combat at a distance, that had already been 
approved, from the combat experience of fast jet crews. It claimed that the latter 
'involv[ed] a more intimate contact with the enemy than is the case ... [in] dropping 
torpedoes or depth bombs against an unseen submarine'.181 It concluded with two 
risks. The first was uncertainty over how women would react in combat. The second 
was whether women would have a 'deleterious effect on their male counterparts.'182 
In the text of the paper, Air Marshal Palin argued that it would be difficult to make a 
legal case for excluding women from combat jets in the absence of firm evidence 
that they could not do the job. Also, such a stance had been undermined by 'our own 
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and our sister Services' decisions to open other combat roles to women.'183 He 
concluded that fast jet roles should be opened to women.  
 
Again, Air Marshal Palin's paper attracted criticism. Air Commodore Barnes, 
Director of Public Relations, commented that he would have 'preferred a more 
positive approach, "why we should do it" rather than "are there sufficient reasons not 
to" '.184 Air Commodore Bagnall, (on the staff of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff) 
thought the paper 'underplay[ed] the strengths of "today's woman".'185 He went on 
'women are at least as strong and resilient in character as their male counterparts and 
I have no doubt that they would ... be equally capable in air combat situations'.186 He 
called the paper's annex 'patronising'.  
 
Roger Palin defended his paper on the grounds that he had to 'cover the concerns 
that we know some senior officers feel and indeed, have voiced.'187 He had a 
supporter in the former Assistant Chief of Air Staff and now Commander-in-Chief 
of Support Command, Air Marshal Sir John Thomson. Thomson would have 
preferred time for the first female aircrew to reach operational service before taking 
this step. He thought the subject 'merited further reflection and discussion' and that 
the paper's annex 'represented a relevant starting point'.188 Far from seeing the annex 
as a starting point, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding asked for it to be 
withdrawn.189 Palin agreed, mentioning that he had just attended a British Military 
Studies Group Seminar on women 's roles in the armed forces and he was now 
'persuaded that some of the more negative views expressed have their foundation in 
myth rather than in reality.'190 Further, he did not wish 'future historians to look back 
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Continuing Exclusions 
Ground Combat - Royal Marines and RAF Regiment 
As the army did not open land warfare roles to women, there was no pressure on the 
Navy or the RAF to end exclusion of women from the Royal Marines or RAF 
Regiment. However, following the decision to open seagoing, the Navy Board asked 
Lieutenant General Sir Martin Garrod (Commandant General Royal Marines) to 
examine the extent to which he could employ women.192 This resulted only in 
women's admission to the Royal Marine Band. 'Bandsmen' had medical orderly roles 
in war and it was agreed that women could perform such duties.193  
 
The RAF Regiment's case was less clear cut. Its function was airfield defence rather 
than the more mobile, offensive role of the Marines. The Regiment had two main 
components at the time: Rapier squadrons for anti-aircraft defence and field 
squadrons which provided ground troops for defence of airfields. Army policy was 
applied to the latter as the role of field squadrons was deemed akin to infantry. 
However, women could potentially perform air defence tasks. Nevertheless, this was 
retained as a male preserve on the grounds that the RAF Regiment was too small to 
allow for a cohort of personnel which could only carry out a limited set of roles.194 
The extent to which men actually switched between roles was not mentioned.    
 
Submarines 
Having interpreted his terms of reference as excluding women in combat roles, Alan 
West did not include analysis of submarine service in his report. However, he noted 
that women were eligible to serve in submarines in Norway, though few did so in 
1988. Denmark had also approved submarine service in principle but 
implementation was in abeyance until the next generation of submarines was 
built.195  
 
Papers examining the suitability of submarine service for women were produced for 
the Navy Board in 1993 and 1998. Initial thinking was that the Navy should gain 
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further experience of employing women in surface ships before considering the 
more demanding submarine environment.196 Evidence was then collected from the 
Institute of Naval Medicine on foetal health, a female officer who spent a week at 
sea in a submarine, and from focus groups of women of all ranks who had served in 
ships.197 The 1998 paper, which included a summary of the 1993 findings, remained 
against women's employment in submarines. There was no doubting the position of 
the author who introduced his report with a quote from Horace which translates as: 
'So that what is a beautiful woman on top ends in a black and ugly fish.'198 
Arguments were based on living conditions, health, psychological and social issues, 
and personnel planning problems. 
 
Submarines had many more constraints on living conditions compared with surface 
ships. They always went to sea with a full complement and sometimes with 
additional personnel for training purposes. In consequence, there were insufficient 
bunks. It was standard practice in Trafalgar and Vanguard classes of submarines for 
some crew members to 'hot bunk'199, or sleep in camp beds in weapons' storage 
areas. If women were to have a self-contained sleeping area and ablutions, as in 
surface ships, there would be a net reduction in space for bunks. The alternative of 
shared accommodation, accepted in Norway's navy, was deemed unacceptable in 
British culture.200    
 
A key uncertainty concerned women's health and the possibility of a woman being 
in the early stages of pregnancy. Acceptable radiation and atmospheric pollutant 
levels were derived from national health and safety regulations. However, unlike 
industrial workers, submariners lived in the environment as well as working in it. If 
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a woman was pregnant, the potential harmful effects on a developing foetus of 
continuous exposure for up to ninety days was unknown. There was also concern 
that a medical emergency, such as ectopic pregnancy or miscarriage, would be 
beyond the experience of on-board medical staff.201 It was not evident from the 
paper whether these risks were worse than emergencies which might occur for any 
crew member.   
 
Psychological and social aspects of submarine service were also considered. Serving 
in nuclear-powered, ocean-going submarines was regarded as more demanding than 
coastal patrolling as in Norwegian service. Nuclear-powered submarines spent more 
time submerged because they did not have to surface regularly like conventionally-
powered submarines which had to refresh their atmosphere. Nuclear-armed 
submarines routinely spent twelve weeks submerged.202 Their crews could only 
receive family messages weekly and they could not reply. Incoming messages were 
limited to forty words, were vetted ashore before transmission and again by the 
submarine's captain to ensure that they contained no distressing news.203 There was 
a fear that women would not adapt to this isolation. In addition, there was 
recognition that relationships could form between crew members or there could be 
unwelcome sexual advances. Putting a crew member ashore to defuse an 
inappropriate, deteriorating or unwelcome relationship, the solution used in the 
surface fleet, would not be available during a long submarine patrol.204    
 
Personnel planning was more complex for submarines than for surface ships. A full 
complement was achieved through use of an emergency relief pool of men who 
could be assigned at short notice if a crew member had to be withdrawn before a 
patrol started. To generate this surplus of trained manpower, men were directed into 
submarine service. The Navy would have preferred to avoid compulsion, but was 
unable to attract enough volunteers. Findings from a very limited set of focus group 
meetings of Navy women suggested that there would also be insufficient female 
volunteers to sustain jobs assigned to women. This judgement was shared by 
                                                 
201FOI Fleet: Mixed Gender Manning of Submarines: a feasibility study, Flag Officer Submarines, 31 
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Lieutenant Hutchings, a female officer who went to sea for a week in a Trafalgar 
class submarine as part of the research for the 1998 paper. It was thought that the 
possibility of compulsory service in submarines could deter women from staying in 
the Navy or, indeed, from joining.205 
 
Presenting findings to the Navy Board, Admiral Sir John Brigstocke (Second Sea 
Lord) said he thought accommodation (other than cost of modifications) was not an 
issue. Nor did he think that normal radiation levels posed a threat. He was not 
convinced by arguments about the potential for sexual harassment. However, he 
shared reservations about potential health risks for pregnant women from 
atmospheric pollutants. Board members agreed that the most compelling argument 
against opening submarines to women was the difficulties of managing crew 
complements and the likelihood of compulsory rather than voluntary submarine 
service. The recommendation to maintain exclusion was accepted.206  
 
Conclusion 
There were important differences in how the RAF and RN understood participation 
in combat and what was acceptable for women's roles. In the RAF, all aircrew were 
deemed at risk of being shot down. The key question was whether women would 
press home an attack and kill enemies. This emphasis on belligerent action allowed a 
simple classification of aircraft. Combat aircraft carried weapons, those which did 
not were described as non-combat. The existing hierarchy of male aircrew's status, 
implied by selection of the best in training for fast jet training and the remainder for 
multi-engine or helicopter roles, made it simple to extend women's roles from 
previously agreed rear crew duties to pilot and navigator duties in a limited list of 
aircraft. Thus RAF policy-makers took a step-by-step approach although it did not 
address the pressing problem of the quality of crews in fast jet squadrons. Until the 
decision to send women to sea, the RAF was able to stay ahead of the Navy and 
Army in terms of its wider employment of women without having to overturn the 
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. The MOD announced on 8 Dec 2011 that women would be permitted to serve in submarines. 
Training of officers would start in 2012 for assignments to Vanguard class submarines from 2013. 
Female ratings would start training in 2014. www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews, accessed 9 
Dec 2011. It is interesting to note the intention to have female officers in submarines in advance of 
more junior personnel. This may be in order to circumvent problems experienced initially in warships 
where the absence of senior female staff was perceived as problematic.   
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combat exclusion. For the Navy, with all ships equipped with some weapons and 
difficulty in delineating risk on a geographic basis, it proved impossible to justify 
categorising ships as non-combat. In addition, as firing of weapons was limited to 
subsections of crews, the difficult point was acceptance that women would be at risk 
of death or injury.  
 
The key decision was that taken by the Navy Board to open warships to women, 
thus overturning exclusion from combat. Rational analysis of the demands of jobs at 
sea, skills of women, quality of male recruits, poor retention of experienced men, 
examples from allied navies, and fears for the future of a shore-based WRNS, all 
pointed to widening women's employment. Even had there been a convincing 
definition of non-combat ships, sending up to 250 women to sea was not a solution 
to the scale of naval personnel problems. Unlike Patrick Duffy in 1978, Archie 
Hamilton pressed the issue with his reluctant admirals, challenging the existence of 
a formal government policy excluding women from combat. The Royal Navy found 
itself at the forefront of policy on women in combat roles  because it could not 
match the steps taken by the other Services in extending women's employment 
piecemeal.  
 
The RAF's evolutionary approach fell victim to the Navy's revolution as naval 
aviation opened to women. Although successive incumbents as Air Member for 
Personnel were reluctant to take the step of opening combat flying to women, they 
found themselves isolated from Air Force Board colleagues and the rising 
generation of air commodores and air vice marshals. With proof emerging from 
University Air Squadrons and early female aircrew candidates that some women met 
the criteria for fast jet flying, the Board conceded the need to match the Navy's 
bolder policy. 
 
The new combat demarcation line was set by the army to which the other Services 
deferred in respect of land warfare. Language now changed again. As women could 
participate in direct combat in the Navy and the RAF, the Army made a distinction 
between this and 'close combat', in which contact might be made with the enemy 
face-to-face rather than confrontation being at distance.     
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Women's influence on these policy developments varied between the Services. The 
WRAF Directorate was only on the margins of the work. It was informed 
periodically, but it was not important in deciding the outcome. In contrast,  
Commandant Anthea Larken had regular access to crucial Navy Board members 
and, occasionally, the Minister. While she knew Wrens were divided on seagoing, 
she took account of  threats of budget pressure on the future of her Service and made 
her contribution to the case for change. She could act because she still had standing 
as the Head of Service in a way that the Director WRAF did not. 
 
Although the Navy Board claimed equality of opportunity for women as a co-equal 
aim of its policy of seagoing in warships, this did not seem to be a defining new 
principle during the months of considering the outcome of Alan West's study. As 
shown in this chapter, many senior officers raised objections to his recommendation 
that women serve in even a limited number of ships. Archie Hamilton, who pressed 
Admiral Oswald on the need to adopt the bolder policy of women serving in 
warships, claimed quality of recruits as the imperative rather than equality which he 
felt he could resist.207 However, alongside the aim of countering shortfalls of men, 
'equality' became a means of rationalising and explaining the decision to the naval 
community. 
 
Comments on flying policy developments suggest more sympathy for an equality 
agenda in the Air Force Department, though it seems unlikely that the RAF would 
have progressed swiftly to the full range of flying duties for women if left to its own 
devices. However, the Navy's overturning of the exclusion of women from main 
combat roles undermined the reason habitually quoted for not allowing women to fly 
fast jets. The Navy's move put pressure on the Air Force Board to respond by 
removing its restrictions on aircraft types that women could fly. The rising 
generation of RAF leaders seemed more attuned to a principle of equality than some 
of their seniors. As they progressed to the most senior positions, they might have 
taken the combat jet decision independently of policies in the other Services once 
evidence of women's competence as aircrew accumulated.  
                                                 
207 Lord Hamilton, telephone interview, 17 May 2007. 
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Chapter 7: Implementation of Seagoing and Flying Policies: 
Adopting a Principle of Equality 
 
'Why would I want to join the Navy if I didn’t want to go to sea?'
1
 
Un-named female applicant. 
  
'I had a dream that I wanted to fly'
2
 
Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson - the first woman to qualify as a pilot in regular 
service. 
 
In the early 1990s, the MOD planned and implemented defence cuts as a 
consequence of the ending of the Cold War. Concerns of the late 1980s about both 
the impact of the 1990s' demographic trough on recruitment and social pressures on 
the retention of experienced personnel were overtaken by the changed strategic 
environment. In 1991, the armed forces expected to reduce personnel by 18% over 
the following five years.3 Recruiting targets were cut and thousands of servicemen 
and women were made redundant. Expansion of women's participation proceeded in 
this wider context of defence cuts. 
 
This chapter explores how new employment opportunities for women were 
implemented between 1989 and 1994 and examines what these policies reveal about 
the newly espoused principle of equality. It also sets out the consequences of this 
further integration for women's Services and their Directors. Through analysis of 
implementation compared with initial policy targets, it argues that the Royal Navy 
was more successful in meeting its objectives than the RAF. The greater change in 
women's employment in the Navy also had wider implications for women's terms of 
service than the RAF's decisions on flying roles. However, it suggests that 'equality' 
was intended within the limits of the Services' perception that they retained a 'right 
to be different' from civilian norms.4 It shows that external pressure was necessary 
before women were given terms of service that aligned with employment law.     
                                                 
1 Un-named female applicant, as told by Commander Rosie Wilson, interviewed by the author, 11 Jan 
2011, transcript p.9. WRNS officers adopted RN ranks from 1 December 1990. To avoid confusion, 
only RN rank titles are used for WRNS officers in this chapter with the exception of the Director who 
retained her title of Commandant. 
2 Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson, interviewed by the author, 20 Jul 2010, transcript p.28. She flew 
Andover and Hercules aircraft. 
3 Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twentieth Report, Cm. 1414, (London: HMSO, Jan 1991). 
4 This perception was attributed to policy-makers, defence officials and some male officers in 
connection with combat policy in Dandeker and Segal, 'Gender Integration in the Armed Forces', 
pp.40-1. It was articulated in 1989 by Air Vice Marshal Austin who linked his opposition to female 
aircrew with that of exclusion of homosexuals from the armed forces (FOI AHB: Correspondence: 
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Implementation of Seagoing in Warships 
In January 1990, the Navy Board agreed two aims for its policy on the future 
employment of the WRNS, describing them as co-equal. The first was to cut the 
manpower (meant literally) deficit which then stood at 2,000 posts ashore and 300 at 
sea.5  The second was to 'improve the prospects for equal opportunities for the 
WRNS'.6 These aims were to be achieved by employing women in warships and 
opening up roles from which they had been previously excluded.7 
 
Captain Tim England, an engineer, was assigned to lead an implementation team. 
He had a long list of tasks to be tackled: terms and conditions of service; calling for 
and training volunteers; planning new career patterns; merger of men and women's 
branches; promotion regulations; uniforms, protective clothing and equipment; 
selection of ships for modification of accommodation and ablutions; revision of 
ships' complements to match accommodation available for women; and rules of 
behaviour for ships' companies.8 In addition, internal communications and public 
relations campaigns were mounted. Tasks were divided between the team and staff 
at the MOD or Naval Headquarters. 
 
The Navy's public relations missed its goal of explaining the new roles for women. 
Commandant Larken described the Navy as being 'hoist in [sic] our own petard' with 
press coverage.9 In order to present a positive image of the Service, photogenic 
young Wrens were chosen for the media day staged aboard a frigate. Papers printed 
'a lot of sexy images' rather than concentrating on the Navy's preferred line of the 
new career opportunities it was offering to women.10  
 
The predicted adverse reaction by sailors' wives was immediate.11 Married men were 
incensed that they had not had the chance to broach the subject at home before the 
                                                                                                                                         
'Female Aircrew in the RAF', Air Vice Marshal Austin to Director Air Staff Briefing and Co-
ordination, 13 Mar 1989). 
5 FOI MOD: Navy Board, Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, Second Sea Lord, Jan 1990. 
6 FOI MOD: WRNS Study - NAVB(I) 11 Jan 90, Minute to Navy Board members, Secretary to First 
Sea Lord, 15 Jan 1990. 
7 Ibid.  
8 FOI Fleet: WRNS Personnel Sea Service - Ship Accommodation, 29 Mar 1990 and Wilson, 11 Jan 
2011, transcript pp.1-5.  
9 Larken interviewed by author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Experience of wives' reactions from other countries was included in the West Report, p.24.  
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announcement.12 Wives in Portsmouth and Plymouth organised demonstrations, 
protesting that marriages would be put at risk by Wrens serving alongside their 
husbands in ships.13 One woman wrote to Archie Hamilton saying that it would be 
'like dangling carrots before donkeys'.14 While the national press soon lost interest, 
local papers in areas with major naval bases persisted with articles about wives' 
objections.15  
 
The Navy News gave the issues extensive coverage. In successive months, the paper 
published pages of letters for and against women at sea from serving men and 
women, retired personnel and wives of sailors.16 Its postbag was described as being 
dominated by the subject. Letters were variously described as 'critical, welcoming, 
acidic, witty - and unprintable.'17 No indication was given of the weight of opinion, 
though a majority of printed letters emphasised problems concerning men and 
women living together in ships rather than whether women should take on combat 
roles.18   
 
A number of ideas took hold within the Navy. Early feedback to the Implementation 
Team showed that more credence was given to the need to overcome manpower 
deficits than to providing equal career opportunities to women.19 Captain England 
sent a briefing to commanding officers for dissemination to subordinates in which he 
encouraged the belief that opening warships to women was a political decision. He 
wrote that, rather than distinguishing between combat and non-combat ships, 
'Ministers recommended that the Navy Board should consider WRNS personnel 
serving in all suitable surface ships'.20 He explained that it was not a trial, though 
many thought it should be. He also countered the rumour that women would be 
                                                 
12 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service Feedback, 19 Apr 1990. 
13 Navy News, Mar 1990, reported  20-30 women participating in protests in both Plymouth and 
Portsmouth.  The Portsmouth local paper reported fewer than 40 marchers (The News, 16 Feb 1990). 
14 Aldred, transcript p.5. 
15 The News (Portsmouth), 6 Feb 1990, 7 Feb 1990, 12 Feb 1990 and 16 Feb 1990; Western Morning 
News (Plymouth), 6 Feb 1990, 7 Feb 1990, 10 Feb 1990, 17 Feb 1990.  
16 Navy News, Mar 1990, Apr 1990 and May 1990. 
17 Ibid, Apr 1990. 
18 Ibid, Mar 1990, Apr 1990 and May 1990. 
19 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service Feedback, 19 Apr 1990. This report drew on issues raised with the 
implementation team. 
20 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service Feedback, 19 Apr 1990. 
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withdrawn from ships in the event of hostilities.21 One idea mooted as a means of  
avoiding mixed-crew ships was to give women their own ships. Alan West had 
dismissed this idea in his report in 1989. This was not the way other countries had 
handled seagoing for women, nor would it have been practical. A ship's complement 
needed experienced personnel and where were such women to be found unless they 
had been to sea already?22 Nevertheless, women-only ships retained some currency 
even after the decision to have mixed crews was announced.23  
 
Female Sailors  
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald set targets of between 300 and 400 women at sea by the 
end of 1990, with the first contingent aboard ship by 1 October 1990.24 This was an 
ambitious timescale, giving staff just eight months to implement a policy which 
Board members had spent nearly ten months considering. As new recruits would not 
be ready for sea jobs until 1991, volunteers were needed from among serving Wrens 
if initial targets were to be met. The first call went out two days after the 
announcement.25 Initially, the objective was to choose women whose training for 
their trade most closely matched men's. They only needed additional training to 
enable them to work in ships. These courses included safety at sea, fire fighting and 
nuclear, chemical and biological warfare defence. Priority was given to radio 
operators, radar operators, photographers, stores accountants, cooks, physical 
training specialists, writers (i.e. clerks), regulators (disciplinary staff), aircraft 
mechanics, meteorological observers and stewards.26  
 
Although there were concerns about the rate of volunteering by serving Wrens, 
Admiral Oswald's target for the number of initial volunteers was achieved by June 
1990.27 His aspiration that these all be at sea by the end of 1990 proved unrealistic. 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 West Report, p.26. 
23 Two letters (one from a naval wife, the other from a retired petty officer) to Navy News, Mar 1990; 
Lieutenant Commander Elaine Smith, interviewed by author,10 Aug 2010, transcript p.12. Smith 
recalled this idea was the subject of wardroom discussion at Fleet Headquarters, Northwood. 
24 FOI MOD: WRNS Study - NAVB(I) 11 Jan 90, Minute to Navy Board Members, Secretary to First 
Sea Lord, 15 Jan 1990. 
25 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Volunteers for Sea Service, signal 7 Feb 1990. 
26 Ibid and WRNS Sea Service Feedback, 19 Apr 1990. 
27 FOI Treasury: DM - DSPA/AT/0046/002 Part A , Pay for the Women's Royal Naval Service, Head 
of Naval Manpower and Training to Mr Bush, 11 Jun 1990.  
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It proved impossible to schedule training and ship modifications so quickly. 
Nevertheless, sixteen ratings and three officers joined the frigate HMS Brilliant by  
8 October 1990. By the end of the year, a further 71 had joined the aircraft carrier 
HMS Invincible and 11 were serving in the training ship HMS Juno.28 The Board 
paper of January 1990 identified a critical shortage of 70 radio operators, amounting 
to 24% of the vacant posts at sea.29 By 11 January 1991, when women joined HMS 
Battleaxe, 32 female radio operators had been drafted to sea, nearly halving this 
problem within a year of the policy announcement.30 By the end of 1991 planned 
ship modifications allowed for 567 berths, rising to over 1,300 in 1994.31   
 
In a signal on 28 March 1990, Commandant Larken reported that the response to the 
call for volunteers had fallen well short of expectations 'based upon the earlier 
soundings'.32 She did not quote an anticipated figure, though subsequently an 
evaluation report stated that 1,500 Wrens had been expected to volunteer.33 Larken 
blamed the slow response on adverse reporting and 'some lack of welcome from 
men'.34 She urged commanding officers to 'personally do [their] utmost to counter 
gloomy and unhelpful counsel, and put the positive and forward looking view'.35 In 
May 1990 Mr Bush, a Treasury official, also claimed that the rate of volunteering 
was poor. He had previously been critical of the policy, suggesting that it would 
affect female retention and recruitment adversely.36  
 
Commandant Larken and authors of the evaluation report may have been referring to 
a survey conducted during the West Study in 1988-1989. Of the returned 
questionnaires, about 50% of female officers and ratings had answered the question 
                                                 
28 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, 13 Dec 1990. One Wren and thirty members of 
the QARNNS were serving in Royal Fleet Auxiliary Argus, a casualty receiving ship for the Gulf 
War of early 1991. Two nurses served in HMS Invincible. See Appendix 6 for ratings' branches in the 
first mixed-crew ships.    
29 FOI MOD: Navy Board, Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, Second Sea Lord, Jan 1990. 
30 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, 13 Dec 1990. Figures for female officers or total 
ships' complements were not included. 
31 Ibid. See Appendix 7 for a list of ships to be modified. 
32 FOI Fleet: WRNS Personnel - Service at Sea, signal 28 Mar 1990.  
33 FOI MOD: Integration of Sea Service: a Report to the Royal Navy on the Integration of the WRNS 
into the RN, Lyn Bryant, Joan Chandler and Tracey Bunyard, University of Plymouth, Oct 1995. 
34 FOI Fleet: WRNS Personnel - Service at Sea, signal 28 Mar 1990. 
35 Ibid. 
36 FOI Treasury: DM - DSPA/AT/0046/002 Part A, Women's Royal Naval Service, Mr Bush to Mr 
Bonner MOD, 4 May 1990. A note on the letter recorded that none of the twenty-four Wrens serving 
in Hong Kong had volunteered. 
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'would you wish to serve at sea?' in the affirmative.37 This figure may have seemed 
reasonable as the response of women who had joined the WRNS in support of the 
RN. However, 63% replied 'yes' to the question 'would you wish to fly?'.38 It seems 
extremely improbable that a majority of Wrens aspired to be aircrew. Indeed, when 
the RAF announced that women would be accepted as pilots and navigators in July 
1989, only two members of the WRNS applied to transfer.39 The response to the 
'flying' question should have raised doubt about the simplicity of the questionnaire. 
It seems more probable that respondents were indicating support for principles 
rather than personal intentions to volunteer. Reaction to a theoretical possibility may 
have differed from response to actual opportunity. In addition, opposition following 
the announcement of seagoing may also explain lower than anticipated volunteering.   
 
Although there was some gloom about the response of serving Wrens, the impact on 
female recruitment was positive. Intakes increased both in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of the total intake. More roles were opened to women, with the WRNS 
recruiting its first engine room mechanics, sonar operators and seamen (sic).40 
However, in parallel with the work to widen the employment of Wrens, plans were 
made to cut the size of the Navy in response to the end of the Cold War. By 1993, 
530 officers and over 1,000 non-commissioned personnel were to leave on 
redundancy terms.41 To minimise redundancy, recruitment to all the armed forces 
was severely curtailed from 1992. Although the Navy cut targets, women continued 
to form a greater percentage of annual intakes than before the sea service 
announcement (Table 7.1). Women as a percentage of strength of naval services also 
rose from previous norms (Table 7.2).  
                                                 
37 West Report, Annex M. 'Yes' to seagoing: 26/55 officers and 147/298 ratings.  
38 West Report, Annex M.  'Yes' to flying: 36/55 officers and 188/298 ratings. 
39 AHB: WAAF/WRAF Miscellaneous Papers, News Release, 10 Aug 1989. 
40 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, 13 Dec 1990. 
41 Navy News, Jul 1992, p.1. 
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Table 7.1 Intake into Naval Services from Civilian Life 1985/86 - 1994/95 
 
                     Number  
 1985/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 
 
Men 5080 6024 5592 5535 5759 5712 5570 1888 1272 961 
Women 289 545 580 700 860 1199 1013 384 250 340 
Total 5369 6569 6172 6235 6619 6911 6583 2272 1522 1301 
Women as 
% of total 
5.4 8.3 9.4 11.2 13.0 17.3 15.4 16.9 16.4 26.1 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, (London: HMSO) Vol.132 (1996), Table 7.4.  'Men' includes Royal 
Navy and Royal Marines. 'Women' includes nurses in the QARNNS as separate statistics were not 
published. 
 
Table 7.2 Strength of the Naval Services 1986-95 
                                                   Thousands 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
 
Men 64.4 63.2 62.2 61.2 59.6 57.9 57.5 54.9 51.5 47.0 
Women 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.9 
Total 67.8 66.6 65.5 64.7 63.2 62.1 62.1 59.4 55.8 50.9 
Women 
as % of 
Total 
Intake 
5.0 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.7 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.7 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, (London: HMSO) Vol.132 (1996), Table 7.3. 
'Men' includes Royal Navy and Royal Marines. Figures for 'women' include nurses in the QARNNS 
and so overstate the percentage of WRNS compared with tables in earlier chapters.  
 
The most intractable issue was the shortage of seagoing officers and senior ratings, 
with only approximately 8.5%  of the latter volunteering.42 Senior women aboard 
ship were regarded as important for two reasons: young female ratings would have 
someone to turn to if they needed advice and senior women would be available to 
assist male supervisors or managers who might encounter difficulties in integrating 
Wrens into their departments.43 However, based on Dutch experience, Alan West 
predicted in his report that women who lacked sea experience early in their careers 
would be unable to step into supervisory posts at sea.44 
  
Lieutenant Commander Elaine Smith made the attempt to switch to seagoing duties. 
Having worked in radar and intelligence, and not being qualified for other branches, 
                                                 
42 FOI MOD: Integration of Sea Service: a Report to the Royal Navy on the Integration of the WRNS 
into the RN, Lyn Bryant, Joan Chandler and Tracey Bunyard, University of Plymouth, Oct 1995. 
43 FOI Fleet:  Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study: Ship-board Survey, Lyn Bryant, 
Tracey Bunyard, Joan Chandler and Commander J L Wakeling, University of Plymouth, Oct 1995, 
p.7 and Commodore John Hart, interviewed by author, 7 Jun 2011, transcript p.10. 
44 West Report, p.26. 
Chapter 7: Implementation of Seagoing and Flying Policies 
226 
she became a seaman officer.45 This is the executive branch of the Royal Navy, 
providing the route to the command of ships. She was assigned to HMS Fearless for 
three months as an officer under training, a status normally associated with the 
junior officer ranks of midshipman or sub-lieutenant.46 She worked in the various 
departments in the ship for about a week each to learn about their organisation and 
roles. However, her experience proved to her that she was not employable at sea as a 
lieutenant commander. She drew on the example of her period shadowing the work 
of officers on the bridge. She held the same rank as the senior navigation officer, but 
although accustomed to working with charts, she had no experience of taking fixes 
to establish the position of a ship or of the calculations necessary to navigate a ship 
safely. The junior navigation officer assigned to instruct her had difficulty in coping 
with an officer senior to himself in rank, but deficient in skills and knowledge 
associated with her 'seaman' officer status. Although the senior officers aboard 
Fearless encouraged her, Smith decided that there was too much to absorb and too 
many training courses that she would need to do. She believed that, without sea 
experience accumulated as a more junior officer, she lacked the necessary expertise 
to take charge of a department in a ship. She curtailed her career, opting for 
redundancy.47 
 
First Gulf War - 1991  
The concept of women in combat was almost immediately tested when HMS 
Brilliant deployed to the Gulf War in January 1991. Its commanding officer in 1990, 
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Richard Cobbold, volunteered to take the first Wrens 
to sea. He thought it would be an interesting challenge for his final months in 
command.48 The ship was programmed for duty in UK waters but the crisis in the 
Gulf led to a change of orders. Cobbold reflected that 'as it turned out, it was a very 
good thing  - it stopped people messing about, and they had to get on with it.'49 
Admiral Bathurst, Commander-in-Chief Fleet, said that he was asked by Julian 
Oswald whether he would send instead a male-only ship. The question was said to 
have originated from Ministers. Bathurst thought that to take Brilliant out of the plan 
                                                 
45 Smith, transcript p.10.  
46 Ibid, pp.14-15. 
47Ibid, pp.15-21. 
48 Richard Cobbold was replaced by Captain Toby Elliott in December 1990. 
49 Cobbold, transcript p.3. 
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because women were on board would undermine the policy. He argued that 'it [was] 
a very good opportunity for [Ministers] to find out the consequence of their 
decision'.50 It is interesting to note that he ascribed the policy to politicians rather 
than to the Navy Board. 
 
The media took no interest in women at sea during a war in which air and land 
operations dominated. However, Brilliant's crew made news when sex was the story. 
After hostilities had ended and while the ship was still in the Gulf, a married male 
officer and a single female officer were found naked together in his cabin. This was 
in contravention of strict rules about socialising aboard ship.51 The officers were 
sent for court martial and, as The Times recorded it, were found guilty of being 
naked together 'without reasonable excuse'.52 Each was fined £750.53 The Sun 
provided the headline 'Nude romp', describing the woman as a 'randy Wren' while 
the man was more flatteringly called a 'dashing lieutenant'.54 The second story 
concerned a female rating who became pregnant. Unlike the officers found in a 
cabin aboard ship, the ratings had not contravened rules because they conducted 
their relationship while on shore leave. The female rating co-operated with the Daily 
Mirror, which reported her story sympathetically. Apparently she concealed her 
pregnancy while aboard ship because she did not want to be sent home. The doctor 
thought she was putting on weight due to overeating and the stress of war.55  
 
Policy Evaluation 
The Navy Board commissioned an evaluation of implementation of seagoing from 
the social science department of Plymouth University. Research, based on 
questionnaire surveys and interviews in mixed ships and men-only ships between 
1993 and 1995, revealed problems created by haste in sending women to sea.56 The 
reports exposed harsh realities of life aboard ship for women trying to break into 
                                                 
50 IWM Sound Archive: Admiral Sir Ben Bathurst, accession number 27084, reel 11. 
51 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, Annex E, Fleet Temporary Memorandum (Aug 
1990), 13 Dec 1990. 
52 The Times, 14 Jun 1991. 
53 Ibid. 
54 The Sun, 14 Jun 1991, p.1 and p.5. 
55 Daily Mirror, 30 Sep 91, pp.16-17.  
56 FOI Fleet: Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study: Ship-board Survey, Lyn Bryant, Tracey 
Bunyard, Joan Chandler and Commander J L Wakeling, University of Plymouth, Oct 1995; FOI 
MOD: Integration of Sea Service: a Report to the Royal Navy on the Integration of the WRNS into 
the RN, Lyn Bryant, Joan Chandler and Tracey Bunyard, University of Plymouth, October 1995. 
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previously male domains. Volunteers had had limited training and were not 
confident in fulfilling general duties aboard ship, particularly emergency roles. 
Uniforms appropriate to seagoing were not finalised until 1994. Protective clothing 
and equipment was not initially available in female sizes. Ratings complained of 
unfairness in how supervisors allocated tasks. Men thought they were given the 
heavy or dangerous work; women felt they were used too much for cleaning jobs. In 
some ships, the best accommodation for ratings had been given up to women. This 
led to rumours that women received preferential treatment. Men thought themselves 
vulnerable to unjustified complaints while women worried about making an 
accusation in case they were subsequently bullied. Male managers had no training in 
dealing with harassment complaints.57 Despite the catalogue of problems, the reports 
from Plymouth University noted that the Navy was doing more to aid 
implementation of equality policies than most employers.58 The findings were 
discussed by the Navy Board and the Second Sea Lord sent the executive summary 
to commanders to take action.59 
 
Fleet Headquarters staff, who visited ships as a matter of routine, also observed 
progress with implementation. In addition, Commandant Anne Spencer (Anthea 
Larken's successor) visited ships and passed information on to Headquarters staff. It 
was a commonly held view that the spirit aboard ship could be assessed within 
minutes of the start of a visit.60 Where a ship's company was not integrating, 
responsibility was placed on the ship's senior officers. It was seen as a failure of 
leadership and commanding officers were to be held to account.61 Training on 
equality issues was introduced for officers and NCOs in an effort to improve 
management and leadership.62  
 
                                                 
57 FOI Fleet: Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study: Ship-board Survey, Lyn Bryant, Tracey 
Bunyard, Joan Chandler and Commander J L Wakeling, University of Plymouth, Oct 1995. 
58 Ibid, p.3. 
59 FOI Fleet: Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study of Seagoing Personnel, 4 Dec 1995. 
60 Commandant Anne Spencer, interviewed by author, 12 Jan 2011, transcript pp.12-13; Hart, 
transcript p.7; Clare, transcript p.15 and p.21.  
61 FOI Fleet: Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study of Seagoing Personnel, 4 Dec 1995; 
Spencer, transcript p.24. 
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Belief that women at sea were an experiment, that it was not working and could be 
reversed, was fuelled by the Navy's response to post-Cold War defence cuts.63 With 
reductions in recruitment, there were insufficient new women to replace those 
coming to the end of their first assignment at sea. In 1994 women were consolidated 
in fewer ships. Between six and eight ships reverted to male manning.64  
 
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the Navy wished it had not made its 
decision just as post-Cold War planning was starting. A lone officer, writing for the 
Naval Review, suggested the policy should be abandoned.65 He thought it was being 
judged successful because opinion was being suppressed. He called for a 'frank and 
honest debate'.66 Admiral Bathurst, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet in 1990, 
subsequently said 'we would rather at the time – we would rather we hadn't had to 
go down this route. But we couldn't man the Navy with men only.'67  
 
Implementation of Flying Policies 
While Director WRNS was significantly involved in planning the introduction of 
seagoing and subsequent merger of her Service with the RN (see below), Air 
Commodore Ruth Montague's contribution to the implementation of RAF flying 
policy was limited.68 She appealed for volunteers through the RAF News69 and a 
member of her staff attended meetings which reviewed selection of potential 
aircrew.70 However, she thought it best that work was carried out by specialists 
within existing committees and policy areas.71 Air Vice Marshal Bob Honey, 
responsible for career management for RAF personnel, confirmed that the Director 
WRAF did not take part in big policy decisions in the personnel department.72  
 
 
                                                 
63 'Ricochet',  'Amazons at Sea', in Naval Review, Vol.82, No.3, 1994, p.221. 
64 FOI Fleet: Women at Sea, Minute to Minister Armed Forces' Office, 14 Feb 1994. 
65 'Ricochet', 'Amazons at Sea', pp.221-3.  
66 Ibid, p.223.  
67 IWM Sound Archive: Admiral Sir Ben Bathurst, reel 11. 
68 Ruth Montague was promoted first to group captain and then to air commodore to fill the Deputy 
Director and, subsequently, Director posts. She was the last officer to be promoted on this 'WRAF' 
basis.  
69 RAF News, 10 Jan 1992, pp 1 and 3. 
70 Air Commodore Ruth Montague, interviewed by author, 29 August 2007, transcript pp.4-5. 
71 Ibid, p.11. 
72 Air Vice Marshal Bob Honey, interviewed by author, 25 May 2011, transcript p.14. 
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Difficulties in Meeting Targets 
The 1989 policy paper set a recruiting target of 25 female pilots and 10 female 
navigators each year, representing 10% of the planned intake. Allowing for failures 
in training, it was anticipated that there would be 100 female pilots and 45 
navigators within five years.73 Reality fell well short of the projection. In April 1994 
there were about 10 female pilots and 10 navigators (see Table 7.5). Two main 
reasons are apparent. First, the 1989 policy paper set unrealistic targets through 
inadequate  assessment of the impact of anthropometric data and failure to learn 
from experience in other countries. Second, implementation was affected by post-
Cold War defence cuts.   
 
Table 7.3 Male and Female Officer Aircrew in the RAF 1989-2007 
 
       Number at April 
 Pilot Navigator 
 M F M F 
   
1989 3290 - 1820 - 
1990 3170 - 1820 - 
1991 3080 <5 1820 <5 
1992 3060 <5 1810 <5 
1993 2980 <5 1770 10 
1994 2880 10 1700 10 
1995 2730 10 1600 20 
1996 2580 20 1500 20 
1997 2380 20 1390 20 
1998 2310 20 1350 30 
1999 2220 30 1300 30 
2000 2180 30 1240 30 
2001 2140 30 1180 30 
2002 2090 40 1140 40 
2003 2130 40 1100 50 
2004 2130 50 1050 50 
2005 2110 50 1010 50 
2006 2070 50 960 50 
2007 2010 50 900 60 
FOI DASA: RAF and RN Aircrew Statistics 1989-2007, 27 Nov 2007. Statistics were rounded. 
Numbers below 5 were not recorded. These figures include trained aircrew whether employed on 
flying duties or not. 
 
 
The 1989 policy paper for the Air Force Board made only brief reference to 
anthropometric limitations, saying that '[women] could be weeded out in the 
                                                 
73 FOI MOD: AFBSC(89)11 Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force, Jun 1989. 
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selection process' if they did not meet the criteria.74 Without quoting statistics, it 
noted in an annex that the Canadian forces rejected a higher proportion of women 
than men on anthropometric grounds.75 No estimate was given of the proportion of 
women who would be rejected for failing to meet the limits for RAF aircraft, even 
though Air Vice Marshal Mills, Director General of Medical Services, had 
commented for a draft version that perhaps 50% of women would fail 
anthropometric criteria.76  
  
Air Vice Marshal Mill's advice was supported in a paper in 1990 from the Institute 
of Aviation Medicine. It compared data on sitting height, buttock to knee length and 
reach for women in the United States Air Force with the RAF's minimum entry 
limits for aircrew. It found that 60% of women would be excluded on sitting height, 
30% on buttock to knee length and 50% on reach.77 Assessed against particular 
aircraft types, the author estimated that 55% of women would not meet the 
requirements for the Jet Provost training aircraft and 60% would not meet those for 
the Hawk aircraft used to train fast jet pilots.78 
 
Ejection seat parameters were another critical factor. Some women were too light, so 
there was increased risk of serious injury if they had to eject. It was thought that 
some countries added weights to women's personal survival packs to enable them to 
fly aircraft fitted with ejection seats.79 The RAF apparently accepted some women 
who met the anthropometric criteria but were too light, even for the parameters of 
the Tucano training aircraft's ejection seat.80 Flight Lieutenant Dawn Hadlow, the 
first woman to qualify as a flying instructor, thought that none of the women would 
have dared to withdraw on the basis of increased risk of injury through being too 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 FOI AHB: Correspondence: 'Female Aircrew in the RAF', Air Vice Marshal Mills to Air Secretary, 
30 Mar 1989. 
77 G. M. Turner, RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, 'The Application of USAF Female 
Anthropometric Data to Identify Problems with the Introduction of Female Aircrew into the RAF', 
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development [henceforward AGARD] Conference 
Proceedings No. 491, April 1990, p.17.1. 
78 Ibid, p.17.2. 
79 Ibid, p.17.2. 
80 FOI AHB: Correspondence: 'Employment of Female Aircrew', Deputy Controller Aircraft to Air 
Member for Personnel, 2 Dec 1991. 
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light. She recalled flying with flight reference books in her pockets to increase her 
weight.81  
 
Annexes to the 1989 policy paper recorded numbers of female aircrew in Canada 
and the USA. Canada opened some aircrew roles from 1978, with unrestricted 
employment from 1986. By 1989 there were eighteen female pilots from a total of 
2,053 and eight navigators out of 783. In the previous two years, nine women had 
been recruited to these roles compared with 410 men, just over 2%. The paper 
quoted the Canadian Forces as saying that 'very few women [had] shown an 
interest'.82 The United States Air Force set targets for women as a proportion of the 
available squadron jobs. Forty places per annum were available to female pilots on 
squadrons, compared with 1,700 for men. Thus its target for female recruits was 
between 2% and 3% of its male intake.83  
 
Such analysis as there was of potential recruits for the RAF concentrated on women 
in University Air Squadrons.84 In 1989 there were 74 female members. A survey of 
these women showed that 30 had applied to civil airlines. Some expressed interest in 
joining the RAF to fly instead.85 However, the paper failed to note that these women 
would not necessarily pass the RAF's anthropometric requirements. Not being 
eligible for RAF flying careers when they joined UASs, they had been admitted on 
the less demanding criteria of the Bulldog aircraft rather than more stringent 
standards of the RAF's operational and training aircraft.86 No assessment was made 
of the other major source of recruits, the Air Training Corps.87 The Air Force Board 
paper failed to include a plan for achieving a target of 10% for female recruits. It did 
not explain how the RAF was to do so much better than Canada and the USA in 
attracting women who met the criteria. 
                                                 
81 Flight Lieutenant Dawn Hadlow, interviewed by author, 14 Mar 2012, transcript p.9. 
82 FOI MOD: AFBSC(89)11 Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force, Jun 1989. 
83 Ibid. 
84 In the late 1970s about one-third of the pilot intake came from this source (TNA: DEFE 10/1206, 
PPO 38/77 University Service Units, 8 Jun 1977).  
85 FOI MOD: AFBSC(89)11 Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force, Jun 1989. 
86 G. M. Turner, 'The Application of USAF Female Anthropometric Data to Identify Problems with 
the Introduction of Female Aircrew into the RAF', AGARD Conference Proceedings No.491, Apr 
1990, pp.17.1-2. The author estimated that only 20% of women would not meet the anthropometric 
guidelines for the Bulldog. 
87 This youth organisation supplied about 45% of the officer aircrew intake in the late 1970s (TNA: 
AIR 29/4666 RAF Inspectorate of Recruiting Annual Reports 1976-79).  
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Achievement of targets was also affected by defence cuts which followed the ending 
of the Cold War. The RAF's 50 operational squadrons of 1989 were reduced to 42 
by 1995.88 Over this period, there was a cut of over 16% in pilot numbers and nearly 
11% in navigators (Table 7.3). With experienced pilots to be redeployed from 
disbanding squadrons, considerably fewer places were available for junior pilots 
emerging from training. New intakes were substantially reduced and trainees' 
progress through the sequence of courses was interrupted. Waiting times for courses 
could exceed a year and some trainees were diverted temporarily into ground-based 
jobs.89 Dawn Hadlow, who was selected for ground attack Tornado aircraft training, 
recollected being told she would have to wait 18 months for her course because 
training had been affected by the diversion of resources to the Gulf War in 1991.90 
Helen Gardiner waited eighteen months for her operational conversion unit course 
for the fighter variant of Tornado aircraft (see Figure 7.1 for the pattern of flying 
training).91 With defence cuts slowing flying training for men and women alike, it 
took until financial year 2002/03 before the initial target figure of 45 navigators was 
surpassed (Table 7.5). By 2007 about 2½% of pilots were female. This was 
comparable to the level found in the UK's commercial airlines.92 It also mirrored the 
experience of American and Canadian armed forces. 
 
Practical Problems 
Implementation was hampered by practical problems and further failures to take 
note of experience from elsewhere. In April 1990, NATO's Advisory Group for 
Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) held a conference on female 
aircrew. Papers given at the conference revealed problems with selection testing, 
anthropometric data, equipment and clothing sizes, the hazards of publicity and 
dealing with stresses in training.93 RAF experience showed similar problems to 
those reported by American and Canadian officials. 
                                                 
88 Annual Abstract of Statistics, Vol.132 (London: HMSO, 1996), Table 7.1.  
89 Personal knowledge of the author who worked at the RAF's Training Group Headquarters 1991-93. 
90 Hadlow, transcript p.14. Rather than wait for fast jet training, she became an instructor. 
91 Squadron Leader Helen Gardiner interviewed by author, 21 Oct 2011, transcript pp.8-9. 
92 Clare Walker, 'Aviation is Still a Man's World', in Keith Hayward (ed.),  British Aviation 1908-
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Apr 2008), pp.64-65.  
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The RAF had already encountered problems with flying equipment and clothing 
with the introduction of female air loadmasters into the Hercules transport aircraft 
fleet in the 1980s. Coveralls were designed for men of minimum height 5' 6"; flying 
boots were a minimum size 6. Even with women of the requisite height, other 
dimensions did not match up to men's. Feet, hand and neck sizes all tended to be 
smaller in women than in men of the same height. In consequence, boots, gloves, 
helmets and aircrew respirators were too large for some women. Some could not 
achieve a neck seal with the respirator, which was necessary for safeguarding 
against the threat of chemical or biological agents.94 There was already a system in 
place for ordering items for men who exceeded stocked sizes. The same method was 
to be used for women who were smaller. The Institute of Aviation Medicine 
cautioned that necessary sizes might not be available for years, as moulds and lasts 
did not exist.95  
 
If possible, women made do with the nearest men's size, with adjustments made by 
stations' safety equipment sections. Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson recollected: 
 
'My hands were a lot smaller. And I’m not necessarily a small woman. In 
flying training they tried to sew some gloves for me but it was never really 
satisfactory and the flying suit was always too big.'96 
 
Flight Lieutenant Keren Watkins remembered having her hands and feet drawn 
around so that gloves and boots could be made for her.97 Flight Lieutenant Wendy 
Nichols, one of the first batch of trainee navigators in 1990, also remembered that 
nothing fitted. Only 5' 3'', her flying suit was too big. With long sleeves getting in 
the way of plotting positions on maps, she 'took matters into [her] own hands and 
got the stuff better tailored'.98  
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Fast jets provided a challenging twist to the usual dilemma of toilet facilities for 
women working in male environments. Men could urinate into a tube containing 
absorbent sponges. A different solution was needed for women. The USA's National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration introduced incontinence pads for crew use 
during the launch and entry to orbit phase of space shuttle missions in the early 
1980s.99 The Institute of Aviation Medicine worked on the same idea but was still 
trying out solutions in 1997. The incontinence pads being provided to women were 
not popular with Helen Gardiner and Keren Watkins, two of the early fast jet 
women. They said they wore them but tried to avoid using them.100 
 
Some Early Female Aircrew Experiences 
 
As all RAF pilots and navigators were officers, there was substantial delay before 
recruits completed selection processes and officer training (an eighteen week course 
- see Figure 7.1). In order to make an early impact with the new policy, like the 
Navy, the RAF sought volunteers from within its ranks. There were forty-seven 
applicants within ten days of the announcement: five were civilians and the 
remainder were already in the Services.101 Eleven attended the Officer and Aircrew 
Selection Centre at Biggin Hill on 14 August 1989.102 Some women were accepted 
although they were too short to meet the anthropometric criteria.103 This practice had 
been applied previously to male candidates who were judged to have excellent 
potential.104 
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Figure 7.1 Pattern of Flying Training 
 FOI MOD: AFBSC(89)11 Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force, Jun 1989. 
 
 
Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson, who had been seeking a flying career for years, was 
among the first accepted.105 An engineering officer, in 1989 she was taking her 
private pilot's licence with a view to going into civil aviation when she left the 
Service. Attempting to fast track her because of her 30 hours of civil flying, she was 
exempted from Elementary Flying Training and sent directly to Basic Flying 
Training. Her male colleagues had at least the 63 hours of elementary training or 
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possibly more than 90 hours at a UAS.106 Not surprisingly, she found her limited 
experience, spread as it was over a number of years, left her ill-prepared for the 
intensity of RAF training. She needed, and was given, extra hours of flying to come 
up to standard.107 This was no small matter. Flying training syllabuses defined the 
number of hours (a proxy for cost) available to each student. There was a small 
margin of additional hours which were used at the discretion of training staff.108 The 
allocation of extra hours was contentious. Men who were struggling could complain 
that women were treated more favourably. Overcoming initial difficulties, Julie 
Gibson was awarded 'wings' in June 1991. She flew Andover communications 
aircraft with 32 Squadron before moving to the Hercules transport fleet. Starting as a 
co-pilot in 1994, she was the first woman to become a captain on Hercules aircraft in 
1998.109  
 
The RAF was eager to capitalise on the public relations value of admitting women to 
flying roles.110 In April 1990, Major Deanna Brasseur of the Royal Canadian Air 
Force warned a NATO conference on women as military pilots that publicity during 
training was harmful. She observed that Canadian trainee pilots were not counselled 
on how to handle the media and cautioned that women who dropped out of training 
could be reported as national failures.111  
 
As predicted by Brasseur, publicity proved to be a source of friction within the RAF 
as female pilots attempted to concentrate on qualifying while satisfying Public 
Relations demands for good media coverage. Julie Gibson described dealing with 
publicity as 'horrible'.112 She explained the problem as more widespread than the 
training squadron. She said '[the publicity] created jealousy because people were 
jealous of the attention, jealous of the opportunity that was coming. It created 
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stress.'113 According to Flight Lieutenant Keren Watkins, who qualified as a fast jet 
pilot in 1993, women could be seen as seeking the limelight and not serious about 
making a career in military flying. It damaged their professional standing with male 
colleagues.114 Flight Lieutenant Jo Salter, the first woman to qualify to fly fast jets, 
said she benefitted from the attention being focussed on Flight Lieutenant Sally Cox 
who had reached the tactical weapons phase of training before her.115 Salter avoided 
the glare of press interest until she became a combat pilot with 617 Squadron. She 
dealt with subsequent fan mail by enlisting the help of male colleagues to reply.116 
 
Sally Cox failed the tactical weapons course and, as commonly happened to officers 
who dropped out of fast jet training, she reverted to flying multi-engine aircraft.117 
Unlike Major Brasseur's description of Canadian experience, Cox's unsuccessful 
attempt to become a fast jet pilot was mostly handled sympathetically by the press. 
Reference was made to the difficulty of the training, the earlier failure of a male 
colleague on the same course and the fact that 20% of candidates usually did not 
make the grade.118 Exceptionally, the London Evening Standard used her failure as 
an opportunity to run an editorial piece questioning the morality of allowing women 
to serve in combat roles. The paper asked whether the country wanted 'our Sally 
Coxes dropping bombs?'119 It followed this up with a sexist cartoon that suggested 
women were temperamentally ill-suited to combat flying.120 It subsequently 
published two letters on the subject, one from a man and one from a woman. Neither 
agreed with the editorial line. Rather, both correspondents argued that excluding 
women was discriminatory, that the expectation of willingness to fight should not be 
a burden borne only by men and that if women were willing and able, then combat 
roles should be open to them.121  
 
Press coverage had a different tone from that which plagued the Navy. Reports were 
usually content to cover the facts of women's progress. The sexual scandal angle that 
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accompanied women in ships was absent. However, Helen Gardiner recalled the 
chaos that ensued when news broke that, while on 'Quick Reaction Alert' duty, she 
had been sent to intercept two Russian aircraft approaching UK airspace. A 
television channel wanted to make it a news story. It attempted to telephone her for 
an interview while she was still on duty. Such was the interest from the media that 
calls to her Squadron had to be vetted before being connected.122    
 
Senior RAF figures became concerned about the adverse impact of publicity.  Air 
Marshal Sir John Thomson, Commander-in-Chief Support Command, thought it 
would be important to stop focussing publicity on female aircrew and 'allow these 
people to integrate and compete with their fellows without this additional 
pressure.'123 His view was shared by Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon, who 
became Chief of the Air Staff in 1992. He told the RAF News that previous publicity 
was understandable, but it put women under too much strain.124  
 
Initial volunteers for pilot training suffered higher failure rates than the planned 
figure. This prompted Air Marshal Thomson to complain about the quality of 
candidates. Training being part of his Command, he commented that women were 
withdrawing because 'of impending marriage ... [or] not enjoying flying'. 125 
However, he thought that better candidates were coming through the system.126  
 
Thomson's better candidates included women who had benefitted from membership 
of UASs or the Air Training Corps. Helen Gardiner had 100 hours in her logbook 
and Keren Watkins 140 hours before embarking on Basic Flying Training.127 This 
was a substantially better platform than Julie Gibson's level of experience at the start 
of training. Both were successful. Gardiner was the first air defence pilot, flying 
Tornado F3 fighter aircraft. Watkins, initially selected to be an instructor, went on to 
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be the first woman to fly the single seat Jaguar aircraft.128 Kath Bennett, the third 
woman on their basic course and a former member of the Air Training Corps, 
succeeded in qualifying as a helicopter pilot.129  
 
The 1989 policy proposal had observed that women could usefully add to the 
numbers and quality of the pool of navigators and so it proved.130 With navigator 
training being shorter than that for pilots, these were the first to graduate from basic 
flying training (March 1991) and subsequently to reach operational squadrons.131As 
with pilots, initially they were to be employed only on non-combat aircraft. 
However, early successful candidates showed up a limitation of this policy. Air 
Marshal Sir Roger Palin, Air Member for Personnel, observed that some women 
were outperforming men at the Air Navigation School, but they could only be 
assigned to air transport or air-to-air refuelling aircraft. This meant that 'an undue 
proportion of their less capable male colleagues [were being] posted to Nimrod, 
where they [would] either fail training or the present standard [would] have to be 
reduced.'132  Decisions to extend women's employment to all types of aircraft 
prevented this problem from persisting.  
 
Terms of Service 
Pay 
By the late 1980s there were two key inequalities between men and women's terms 
of service. First, women were paid less than men, in part because women received a 
lower rate of military pay supplement, known as X-factor (see Chapter 4). In March 
1989, equal X-factor was proposed by Brigadier Crawford in his report on the future 
of the Women's Royal Army Corps. Recommending the employment of women in 
units in close support to infantry and armoured troops, he argued that women would 
be exposed to more danger than hitherto, would work longer hours and experience 
greater turbulence through operational deployments. He supported the full rate of X-
factor for all members of the WRAC, rather than attempting to distinguish between 
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the demands of actual roles undertaken by women. He argued his case on the basis 
that there was 'no differentiation in the 'X' factor paid to males who [were] exposed 
to danger and hard physical work and those who [were] not'.133  
 
Paying X-factor on the basis of role and posting, rather than according to gender, 
had been considered and dismissed by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body a year 
earlier. It accepted the MOD's case that such judgements between jobs would be too 
subjective and administratively difficult.134 However, it concluded that the gap 
between men and women's obligations had narrowed. In recognition of women's 
liability for armed guard duty, increased participation in deployments and greater 
turbulence through shorter tour lengths and more overseas postings, the difference 
was reduced from 2.5 to 1 percentage point in 1988. This differential was justified 
on the basis that women were 'not generally liable to combat duties'.135  
 
As the X-factor differential was linked to combat duties, it was not affected by the 
RAF's 1989 decision to open pilot and navigator jobs to women. Women were to fly 
those aircraft described as non-combat. However, seagoing brought women the same 
liability for naval combat duties as men. Mrs Samuel, a Treasury official, had 
already noted the potential administrative difficulties of seagoing Wrens receiving 
the full X-factor while other servicewomen remained on the lower rate.136 In 1990, 
the Navy Department wanted to recommend equal X-factor for Wrens. As this had 
implications for the army and the RAF and it would take time to negotiate, it was 
held over for the next pay review. Full X-factor for all servicewomen was agreed in 
1991.137  
 
There was a further aspect to pay for Wrens. From 1975 when the Equal Pay Act 
(1970) came into force, airwomen received the same basic pay as men on the basis 
of the skill level required for their trade. In the Navy, male ratings received extra 
pay for seagoing. This was not based on their trade but was paid in recognition that 
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they undertook extensive communal duties aboard ship as well as their own 
specialised work. These 'all of one company' rates, as they were known, were paid as 
long as the man remained available for sea duty.138 The extension of seagoing pay to 
women was agreed as a matter of 'natural justice' and following legal advice that 
under both domestic and European law a pay differential could not be justified.139 
Debate centred on the date from which the increment should be paid. Proposals 
considered were the date of joining a ship or the date of volunteering. As there could 
be a substantial delay between volunteering and actually joining a ship, a 
compromise was agreed: the date of completion of the sea safety course.140 Treasury 
agreement was sought in February 1990, an approach made to the Chairman of the 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body in March and the Prime Minister approved his 
recommendation in April.141 The pay rise for junior rates going to sea was estimated 
at not more than £1,000 per annum (1990 value).142 It was exceptional for action on 
pay to be taken outside the normal Pay Review Body timetable. However, in this 
instance, it was deemed essential to agree new terms of service to encourage women 
to volunteer for seagoing.143  
 
Entitlement to Resign 
The second key inequality favoured women who married while in the armed forces. 
These women had the right to leave on or after marriage at shorter notice than men 
or single women. In the 1980s, male ratings, airmen and single women could apply 
to leave at eighteen months notice.144 On marriage, Wrens could give nine months 
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notice145 while airwomen could leave at six months notice.146 Needing to protect the 
investment in training, in 1989 the RAF made volunteers for pilot and navigator 
roles surrender the right to leave on marriage until they had amortized costs. This 
was set at six years after completion of the final stage of training - an Operational 
Conversion Unit course (Figure 7.1).147 This conformed to the period set for male 
aircrew who wanted to apply for premature release. Treasury officials asked why the 
policy change should not apply throughout the women's Services.148 However, 
flying policy was intended to affect only a few women. For the vast majority who 
worked in ground based roles, the Air Force Board reaffirmed that the right to leave 
on marriage was 'seen as fundamental to women's terms of service'.149 The Air Force 
eventually changed its rules in 1994, shortly after reference to the 'WRAF' ceased 
(see below).150 The situation for the Navy was different. From September 1990, all 
WRNS recruits had to go to sea and so were given longer and more expensive 
training. To protect that investment, they lost the right to leave on marriage.151  
 
Pregnancy 
A further issue concerning women's terms of service was addressed at this time: 
policy on pregnancy. There were two components: dismissal and maternity benefits. 
Servicewomen were normally discharged in the sixteenth week of pregnancy, 
though practice varied. For example, Wrens could work in civilian maternity clothes 
beyond that point.152 The Services allowed women to apply to rejoin after childbirth, 
provided that they undertook to fulfil their military commitments and made adequate 
child care arrangements. However, there was no right of return. Applications could 
                                                 
145 Naval Historical Branch Admiralty Library: Defence Council Instructions (Navy) 417/84, Change 
in the Notice Period for Female Ratings on Marriage,16 Nov 1984.  
146 FOI AHB: ID3/A/18/1 Part 3, Nine Year Notice Engagement, 15 Jun 1989. 
147 FOI Treasury: DM - DSPA/AT/0046/001 Part A, Female Aircrew, AUS(P)Air to Mr Fox, 29 Jun 
1989. 
148 Ibid, Female Aircrew in the RAF, Mr Fox to AUS(P)(Air), 7 Jul 1989. 
149 FOI AHB: ID3/A/18/1 Part 3, Nine Year Notice Engagement, 15 Jun 1989. 
150 RAF News, 29 Jul 94, p.4.  
151 Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twentieth Report, Cm.1414 (London: HMSO, 1991). 
152 Larken, interviewed by author, 29 Mar 2010, transcript p.10. 
Chapter 7: Implementation of Seagoing and Flying Policies 
244 
be rejected.153 This provision to re-apply was not well known and seems to have 
been rarely invoked.154 
   
Maternity benefits were contentious in the late 1980s because the armed forces were 
exempt from the Social Security Act (1986) which introduced statutory maternity 
pay (SMP).155 SMP was paid for eighteen weeks, of which six weeks could be paid 
at 90% of weekly earnings. To qualify for this rate, women had to have worked for 
the employer for at least two years and remain in work until fifteen weeks before the 
baby was due. If they did not qualify for this high rate, they were entitled to a fixed 
basic rate (£32.85 in 1987/88).156 SMP was subject to tax and national insurance.157 
Servicewomen received tax free, maternity allowance. It was worth £30.05 per week 
in 1987/88 and was also payable for eighteen weeks.158  
 
A review of policy in the RAF's personnel department concluded in February 1988 
that there was no need to introduce SMP. Usually, servicewomen left before 
qualifying for the higher rate and the basic rate was deemed as good as the maternity 
allowance.159 However, for those servicewomen who were allowed to continue 
beyond the sixteenth week of pregnancy, the difference between maternity 
allowance and SMP was significant. A calculation for women leaving the armed 
forces on pregnancy in 1988 suggested average pay was £9,000 per annum.160 On 
that basis, the higher rate of SMP would have been £155 per week. This estimate 
was thought to be biased towards higher ranks than those women who actually left 
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on pregnancy.161 However, even the lowest ranking servicewoman would have been 
entitled to £97 per week if they qualified for higher rate SMP.162 
 
The case for SMP for servicewomen was taken up with Ministers by Anne 
Armstrong, the families' correspondent of Soldier magazine.163 Roger Freeman, 
Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, was already in discussion with the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) on the issue. It arose in 
negotiations on the rate of national insurance contributions to be paid by the armed 
forces.164 Two key principles emerged. MOD officials wanted assurance that the rate 
of SMP payable would come under 'fair dismissal' clauses in the legislation. Their 
second concern was that SMP would imply introduction of maternity leave and the 
right to return to work.165 This second issue was simple to resolve. SMP benefit and 
maternity leave came under two separate pieces of legislation. Granting SMP would 
not lead to maternity leave.166 Uncertainty over the question of fair dismissal of 
pregnant women continued into mid 1989, at which point legal advice concurred 
that this regulation would apply. Pregnant women were deemed unable to fulfil their 
duties.167 Once MOD's fears were allayed, an amendment was included in the review 
of the Social Security Act. SMP was introduced for women whose expected week of 
confinement was on or after 21 October 1990.168  
 
Rather than seagoing and flying policies driving change, the MOD continued to 
reject maternity leave. Junior women had questioned the lack of maternity leave for 
some years.169 However, senior women tended to oppose its introduction. Group 
Captain Cynthia Fowler (Deputy Director WRAF 1989-91) feared that periods of 
absence could call into question the employment of women as costs would be 
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increased.170 Commandant Larken was against mothers being employed in the 
Service, believing that the responsibilities of motherhood were incompatible with 
the demands of a military career.171 In addition, if maternity leave was available, it 
would also have to be granted to single women. This official sanction of behaviour, 
which went against the social code of conduct, was anathema.172 Mothers were not 
given the right to rejoin; they were only to be encouraged to apply to return.173  
 
The MOD's attempt to draw a line on revised terms of service for women at  
maternity leave failed following the intervention of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission. In 1990 it took up cases for two women dismissed on pregnancy.174 
Following judicial review, the MOD conceded the introduction of unpaid maternity 
leave. From October 1990 women were entitled to a maximum of 29 weeks leave.175 
In December 1991, following further legal processes, MOD announced that women 
could apply for 14 weeks paid maternity leave and 48 weeks total leave.176  
 
With the MOD acknowledging that it had been in contravention of EU and domestic 
law since August 1978, women who had been dismissed on pregnancy sought 
compensation for unfair treatment. Cases were brought by 5,038 women.177 Initially 
many settled for the maximum payout available under industrial tribunal rules. The 
compensation limit of £11,000 was successfully challenged at the European Court of 
Justice and a few payouts, reaching hundreds of thousands of pounds, hit the 
headlines in the national and specialist press. There were few defenders of the sums, 
with both men and women arguing that 'they knew the rules, so they should not be 
claiming this money'.178 Payouts were in marked contrast to the limited sums 
awarded to personnel (mostly men) injured in the First Gulf War. The Sun expressed 
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the situation succinctly with the headline 'Barmy Army' concerning a £300,000 
award to a former major. It went on (original emphasis): 
 
'she knew the rules. SHE decided to marry; SHE got herself pregnant. YOU 
are paying the bill. But injured personnel get just a few grand.'179 
 
By 1999 all maternity claims were settled at a cost of £60.3 million.180 These cases 
divided opinion in the Services and generated some ill feeling towards women at a 
time when morale was strained by post-Cold War reductions in defence spending. 
This was not simply a divide on the basis of gender. Childless women could be as 
vehemently opposed to these payouts as men.181  
 
The Women's Services 
Merging the WRNS into the Royal Navy 
Rather than the haste which had accompanied seagoing policy, time was allowed to 
complete the necessary planning to integrate women into the Royal Navy. Most 
work was due for completion by April 1994.182 The earlier date of 1 November 1993 
was selected for disbanding the WRNS to coincide with the last day in office of 
Anne Spencer, the retiring Commandant.183  
 
As an early symbol of women's new standing, officers' rank titles were changed to 
those of the Royal Navy on 1 December 1990.184 As female officers' titles, such as 
first officer, chief officer and superintendent, had been something of a mystery to 
those not closely involved, the change was welcomed. Equivalent ranks of lieutenant 
commander, commander and captain needed no explanation of the person's authority 
in military circles. The term 'wren' was retained in rank titles for junior ratings. 
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Commandant Spencer described this as the most emotive subject and she announced 
the outcome of deliberations with some satisfaction in The Wren.185  
 
Anne Spencer might equally have applied 'emotive' to the subject of braid used for 
rank insignia and badges. Blue braid had been symbolic of the WRNS since its first 
formation in 1917. For many, changing from blue to gold represented a real loss of 
identity and a signal that their Service was being gradually absorbed into the Royal 
Navy. Yet gold braid was also seen as a further necessary step 'to reinforce the esprit 
engendered by full integration' if women at sea were to be recognised as having the 
same authority of rank as men.186 Due to a shortage of gold braid, this change was 
not implemented until 1 April 1992.187 
 
The sea service implementation team had a major task in planning career structures 
for seagoers, women who chose not to volunteer and those in roles with no jobs at 
sea. Possible career paths were mapped out for each individual officer. For ratings, 
the work was tackled at the level of the branch in which they were employed. 
Separate rosters for promotion were retained for non-seagoing women while those 
who did go to sea were merged over a period of time into the RN's system.188 Early 
volunteers had the option to revert to shore-based service if they found it too hard to 
adjust to ship-board work. This privilege was not extended to later volunteers or new 
recruits. Thus the WRNS fragmented into recent recruits obliged to go to sea, 
volunteers for sea, volunteers who reverted to shore work only, non-volunteers in 
branches that could go to sea and women who worked in roles with no equivalent 
aboard ship. The latter, about 20% of non-commissioned Wrens, were identified by 
Anne Spencer as casualties of the policy change (see Table 7.6).189 Over a period of 
years, many of these roles were disestablished.  
 
Anne Spencer identified a second group of casualties: those women too senior to go 
to sea.190 This was true to an extent. Some took the opportunity offered by the post-
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Cold War redundancy programmes to leave. However, there are striking examples 
of success among those who stayed despite not going to sea. Annette Picton and 
Carolyn Stait, who were lieutenant commanders in 1990, subsequently achieved 
promotions to commander, captain and finally to commodore.191 They were the first 
women in regular naval service to reach this rank. After their retirement, there was a 
demographic hiatus while those who served in ships gained sufficient experience to 
compete for high rank. Excluding medical services, by 2011 the most senior women 
officers held the rank of commander (13 out of a total of 890 commanders) and, in 
branches open to women, 32 of 525 warrant officers were female.192   
Table 7.4 Women in Non-Seagoing Branches 












Dental Hygienist 19 7 1 Retained 
Dental Surgery 
Assistant 
84 11 3 Retained 
Education and 
Training Support 
106 29 8 *Phased out by April 
2000 - announced 
1993. 
Family Services  - 12 17 (Not traced) 




13 15 10 (Not traced) 
Telephonist 56 4 3 ***Declared obsolete 
August 1992. 
Remaining jobs to be 
filled by civilians.  
Weapon Analyst 106 23 5 ****Phased out by 
April 2000 - 
announced 1993. 
Writer (P)   1 (Not traced) 
Total 395 103 49  
FOI Treasury: DM - DSPA/AT/0046/002 Part A, Pay for Seagoers in the Women's Royal Naval 
Service, Annex A, 1 Feb 1990.  
* Navy News, Jun 1993, p.12; ** FOI Treasury: DM - DSPA/AT/0046/002 Part A, Pay for the 
Women's Royal Naval Service, Head of Naval Manpower and Training to Mr Bush, 11 Jun 1990;  
***Navy News, Aug 1992, p.15; ****Navy News, Apr 1993, p.4.  
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The WRAF 
Following the 1989 study into the employment of women in the army, the Women's 
Royal Army Corps disbanded in 1992 and women integrated into various support 
Corps.193 With the WRNS disbanding in November 1993, that left only the WRAF 
with a distinctive designation. This was an anomaly as women had joined the RAF 
rather than a women's Corps or Service from 1949. The Air Force Board decided it 
needed to address the image of separateness.194  
 
Air Commodore Ruth Montague made a plea for the role of Director to continue, 
mainly based on representational duties. She suggested it could be reduced by a 
rank, to group captain.195 Her case was not convincing. Rather, it was suggested that 
senior women officers would not wish to be promoted artificially into the role and 
preferred to make their careers within their specialisation. The case of Air 
Commodore Joan Hopkins, a fighter control officer, was cited as an example (see 
Chapter 4).196 The date of a planned re-organisation of the RAF Command structure, 
1 April 1994, was chosen as the moment when reference to 'WRAF' would cease. 197 
This was convenient also for Ruth Montague's retirement date. For women in the Air 
Force the change made little difference.  
 
Women's career prospects improved as it became possible to combine careers and 
family. In 1990, not including the Director post which was confined to women, one 
female group captain and eighteen wing commanders were serving in ground 
branches.198 By 2011, there were five air commodores, twenty group captains and 
ninety wing commanders, the latter including some aircrew.199  
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Promotion depended not only on performance in a post but the status of that post. In 
the early 1990s the process of selection for appointments was opaque. Officers 
stated a preference for their next posting on annual report forms. Forthcoming 
vacancies were not advertised. The Air Secretary's staff decided on suitable 
candidates. For senior appointments, such as station commanders, candidates were 
discussed with the Commander-in-Chief of the appropriate Headquarters. Air Vice 
Marshal Honey, Air Secretary from 1989 to 1994, recounted: 
 
'It must have been Support Command – for [an officer to command] Uxbridge. 
I looked at the group captains and I thought Cynthia Fowler was the person to 
do it on merit. I had met her earlier when she was a squadron leader. I was 
very impressed with how sharp she was ... When I went to the Commander-in-
Chief ... he was not taken by the idea. ... And I also had to put that in front of 
Chief of the Air Staff ... They didn't want to do it. ... I said, well fine. Give her 
the chance. Put her in there. If she does a good job - great. If she doesn't, we'll 
get rid of her. ... On that basis, they eventually accepted it. But it was this 
block – you can't have a woman station commander. ... That took a lot of 
persuading, but it just showed you, even in those days - and that must have 
been 1990 or 1991, a resistance to putting women into positions of real 
responsibility.'200 
 
At that time, station commanders were normally married men who served 
accompanied. Wives were expected to undertake social and welfare tasks. 
Appointing a single woman undermined this practice. In Cynthia Fowler's case, the 
key senior officer was prepared to put her name forward. She was successful as the 
first female commanding officer of a large RAF station and was subsequently 
promoted to air commodore. She was only the third woman since the creation of 
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Conclusion 
Crucially for women's careers, the decision to open the surface fleet was approved 
by the Queen and the Prime Minister and announced by Archie Hamilton on the 
basis of equality not just as a solution to manpower shortages. Likewise, members of 
the Air Force Board supported, or at least recognised, the idea of equality of 
opportunity for women. It would have been difficult to reverse the new policies 
given that they had been linked to a newly adopted principle of equality. 
 
Admiral Oswald forced the pace on implementation of seagoing by setting 
ambitious targets. However, his policy added to practical problems in training, 
equipment and clothing, and the development of working practices and social rules 
aboard ship. As Plymouth University's evaluation reports showed, men and women 
were still struggling to adapt to the policy five years after its introduction. 
Nevertheless, Admiral Oswald's initial objective of between 300 and 400 women at 
sea was met in 1991. Subsequent plans for expansion and ability to sustain the 
number of women at sea were affected by defence cuts. 
 
The failure of RAF policy to meet targets for numbers of female pilots and 
navigators was in part due to defence cuts but also occurred because they were ill-
founded in the light of experience in other countries and expert advice on the impact 
of anthropometric data was ignored. Initial staff work did not include a recruiting 
plan. Implementation also suffered from haste. In seeking to gain kudos in opening 
new roles to women, it waived entry standards for some early volunteers. More of 
these women withdrew from training than the planned wastage figure. Like the 
Navy, the RAF did not allow time to solve equipment and clothing issues. The slow-
down in training as a consequence of defence cuts, on top of the unsubstantiated 
aspiration to recruit twenty-five female pilots and ten navigators per annum, resulted 
in only about twenty women reaching squadrons by April 1994. However, as 
suggested when the policy was adopted, women were proving to be competent 
navigators. Numbers qualifying as pilots were consistent with experience in other 
countries.   
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While women's job opportunities were expanded, the MOD's interpretation of 
'equality' stopped short of meaning that women were to be treated in accordance 
with civilian employment norms. Policy-makers resisted the introduction of 
maternity leave, not least because of opposition from senior women officers who 
perceived the obligations of motherhood as incompatible with military duties. It took 
a combination of action by aggrieved former servicewomen, dismissed because of 
pregnancy, and the Equal Opportunities Commission, which took up their cause, to 
bring about change. Still, the Directorate of the WRAF clung to a distinction in 
terms of service through the right of women to resign on marriage. This disparity 
between men's and women's commitment to the RAF was only relinquished when 
reference to 'WRAF' was discontinued in 1994. 
 
In November 1993 and April 1994, Anne Spencer and Ruth Montague (the last 
Directors of the WRNS and WRAF respectively) retired. Their departures also 
marked the end of the WRNS and reference to the WRAF. Air Commodore Ruth 
Montague was marginal to developments in women's employment opportunities, 
opposed changes in maternity and marriage regulations and sought to retain the post 
of Director. In contrast, senior WRNS officers contributed to the decision to disband 
their Service in the knowledge that they were helping to create a fundamentally new 
career for women in the Royal Navy. Although they realised that changes would end 
careers for those who could not or would not adapt, they believed they were 





This thesis has established why and how the integration of women into the Royal 
Navy and the Royal Air Force was achieved over the period from the end of the 
Second World War to the mid-1990s. It has done so by exploring the purpose of 
employing women in these Services, understandings of combatant status and combat 
roles, the impact of terms and conditions of service on women's careers and the 
importance of organisational factors on the influence of senior women officers. By 
taking the history of these two Services together, it has exposed critical policy 
interactions. It has accounted for why the Royal Navy opened main combat roles to 
women before the RAF and why new boundary lines were drawn at land warfare 
and submarine service. It has identified the key steps in the erosion of the principle 
that women were not employed in combat, how the armed forces' divergence from 
societal norms and employment laws came to a crisis point in the late 1980s, and the 
apparent adoption of a new principle of equality in 1990. 
 
Accounts of women in the armed forces have been dominated by analysis of 
wartime service and, latterly, by developments in widening their roles in the 1990s. 
Army issues have attracted more scholarship than histories of women in the other 
two Services. In particular, land warfare, with its potential for close contact with the 
enemy, demands for physical strength and aggression, and the assumed adverse 
impact of women's presence in small combat teams, has received more attention 
than the opening of main combat roles to women in the Royal Navy and the Royal 
Air Force.  
 
Lucy Noakes' account of the establishment of the WRAC identified two key ideas. 
First, women were seen as lessening the need for men at a time when the 
continuation of national service indicated an unusually high requirement for 
personnel in the armed forces in peacetime. Second, she argued that women released 
men for higher value work. This thesis supports her analysis that regular service 
following the Second World War was not a foregone conclusion. However, as 
Chapter 1 showed, lessening the need for men was not central to the arguments in 
the Air Ministry or the Admiralty. Indeed, some senior male officers thought that the 
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employment of servicewomen implied the loss of the equivalent number of more 
useful men.  
 
In 1945, guided by the views of Air Marshals Sutton and Evill, the Air Ministry was 
in favour of a reserve cadre for women rather than regular service. Opinion was 
swayed by Air Marshal Slessor's (Sutton's successor as Air Member for Personnel) 
belief that servicewomen would be needed in a future total war, that the RAF should 
be organised in peacetime with all the components it would need in war, and that 
regular service would avoid the difficulties encountered in re-establishing the 
WAAF in the early years of the Second World War. While Sir William Brown's 
objection that employing women would not give value for money was 
acknowledged, his argument was overturned by Slessor's case for the military 
imperative at the Air Force Board. 
 
The existence of the WRNS owed more to army and RAF intentions to employ 
women, than to enthusiasm in the Admiralty to retain its women's Service. 
Constraining women to shore-based work meant there were two camps: those who 
thought women released men to serve in the fleet (higher value work) and those who 
believed that the Navy could manage without women who would block jobs needed 
to give men respite from seagoing. Like the Air Force Board, the Admiralty was 
unconvinced about obtaining value for money from the WRNS. Without pressure 
from the other Ministries, it is more likely that the Admiralty would have opted for a 
reserve of women rather than regular service in 1946. 
 
Two important points emerge from arguments on regular service that continued to 
play a part throughout this history. First the Air Ministry was more committed to 
integrating women into the RAF than the Admiralty was in its employment of 
women. Second, in both Ministries, there was an unresolved debate about whether 
employing women represented value for money. The RAF was predominantly 
concerned by high turnover of women and the potential waste of training resources. 
Assessments of the WRNS tended to conclude that women were cheaper to employ 
than men. However, being a separate organisation, its overheads were more costly 




The precarious foothold of the WRNS is evident throughout the period covered by 
this thesis. Its existence was persistently questioned, though sometimes this may 
have been simply routine consideration of measures that might save money, rather 
than a genuine intention to disband it. For example, its demise was suggested in the 
very month its regular status came into being and in the years leading up to the end 
of national service (Chapter 3). The role of the WRNS was studied in the 1970s, this 
time at the request of Commandant Mary Talbot, who sought to pre-empt any move 
in a defence review to question again the purpose of her Service (Chapter 5). All of 
this was familiar territory, then, to Commandant Anthea Larken when the National 
Audit Office attacked the lack of military duties in half of all Wrens' jobs in 1988 
(Chapter 6). The WRAF was not subject to such pressures on its existence because 
airwomen were part of the RAF and worked on operational stations. 
 
Despite questions as to its purpose and value, the WRNS survived. The Admiralty 
Board would have needed compelling reasons to make a political and public case to 
disband it. In 1949 the Admiralty Board thought it would be too embarrassing to 
dismantle an organisation that had only just been established. Perhaps the critical 
period was in 1957 when the announcement of the end of national service, signalling 
a significant cut in size of the armed forces, could potentially have been used as a 
moment for also dispensing with a uniformed corps of women. However, the other 
two Services announced their intention of retaining and, indeed, increasing their 
reliance on women as a hedge against insufficient male volunteers of the necessary 
quality. Although there seemed to be some reluctance in the Admiralty, the WRNS 
was retained. Like the others, it then sought to increase the strength of its women's 
Service. In November 1974, Tony Pritchard made a strong case for retaining the 
Wrens: women were well-qualified recruits available for jobs not requiring men; 
cheaper to employ than sailors; a workforce for isolated locations where civilian 
staff might not be available; and loyal at a time when doubt was cast on the 
reliability of unionised civilian staff. In 1988, when the National Audit Office 
perspective implied a need to make better use of the WRNS, there seemed to be an 
Admiralty Board presumption in favour of keeping the Wrens. Again, women were 
proving to be high quality recruits compared with the average sailor. At a time when 
the Royal Navy was struggling to retain men, dispensing with the WRNS would 




This thesis has not attempted to trace all the developments in women's employment. 
At the start of regular service in 1949, roles for the WRNS and the WRAF were a 
subset of those in which women had been employed in the war. In part, airwomen's 
employment was dictated by expected length of service. Unsurprisingly, they were 
excluded from long training such as apprenticeships. In addition, they were also not 
employed initially in some clerical trades with short training as this was needed for 
national servicemen, who served on even shorter terms of engagement. In the 
WRNS, roles included those that had no equivalent at sea (for example, drivers), 
those with a large percentage of shore-based rather than seagoing posts (for 
example, in the Fleet Air Arm) and those required for administration and training of 
women. 
 
The central issue was women's relationship to combat. There were two aspects: 
combatant status and combat roles. The first was determined by gender. All 
servicemen, with the exception of chaplains and medical staff, were regarded as 
combatants. Women were not. Yet it was acknowledged within the defence 
Ministries that, in international law, women in the armed forces had combatant 
status. This status gave them safeguards under the Geneva Conventions. 
Nevertheless, it was the practice of the British armed forces to regard servicewomen 
as non-combatants.  
 
Critically for regular servicewomen's career prospects, their employment was 
governed by this non-combatant designation and the exclusions from key roles and 
postings that derived from that principle. As Chapter 1 showed, in the late 1940 
discussions, neither the Air Ministry nor the Admiralty appeared to give serious 
consideration to the War Office's idea of arming servicewomen, a proposal it also 
dropped. Seagoing was dismissed out of hand in the May 1946 Cabinet paper. This 
stance was not seen to require any justification. However, acknowledging women's 
role as pilots in the wartime Air Transport Auxiliary, the Air Ministry announced its 
intention to employ some female aircrew. This plan foundered on what became 
familiar grounds: cost, taking up of training places needed for men, and the limited 





The definition of combat roles was problematic in the RAF with its divide between 
airborne and ground-based work. The extent of ground-based airmen's combat 
liability was questioned during women's pay negotiations in the late 1940s and in the 
1950s (Chapters 2 and 3). Airmen were said to have a very limited liability to take 
up weapons. However, the existence of that liability, with its associated training, 
was sufficient to distinguish men as combatants and women as non-combatants, 
even when their main employment was otherwise identical. 
 
As small arms training was the marker for combatant status for the great majority of 
men in the RAF, the decision to extend that liability to airwomen in the early 1980s 
was accorded insufficient attention in Christopher Dandeker and Mady Wechslar 
Segal's analysis of women's wider employment. As Chapter 4 showed, this decision 
removed the need to cap the number of women who could be employed and it 
opened important postings from which women had been excluded because they were 
previously not permitted to undertake tasks assigned to post-holders in war. In turn, 
access to these higher profile posts improved promotion prospects. This 
development was brought about by male officers on stations who needed more 
flexibility in assigning work to women and the encouragement of Air Commodore 
Joy Tamblin, acting in her advisory capacity. Small arms training was a key 
milestone that affected all airwomen, whereas opening of aircrew roles provided 
opportunities for comparatively few.  
 
Introduction of weapons training, also implemented in the WRAC at the time 
(though not in the WRNS until 1989), was not described as making women's roles 
combatant. As was made apparent in Chapter 5, the MOD had good reason to avoid 
suggesting that that boundary had been crossed. Women's employment being 
restricted to what were described as non-combatant roles was the basis for 
exemption from the Sex Discrimination Act (1975). If that exemption was 
challenged, then women's exclusion from seagoing, flying and combat arms of the 
army could also have been questioned in the early 1980s.  
 
Having abandoned plans to introduce female aircrew roles at the start of regular 
service, the RAF subsequently opened roles in response to various problems. The 
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first female aircrew were employed in duties akin to stewards aboard passenger 
aircraft on the basis of women being better suited than men to the role. They gained 
recognition as aircrew in 1962 when this status was given to the air quartermaster 
trade. Women's abilities as fighter control officers and aerospace operators, and the 
consequent high percentage of women employed in those fields, led to approval in 
1984 of female rear crew for the airborne early warning aircraft. Fears about 
maintaining adequate elite male recruiting through the University Air Squadrons, 
under pressure from equality lobbies in universities, resulted in undergraduate 
women being trained as pilots from 1985. These women's proven aptitude for flying 
contributed to the decision to open pilot and navigator roles in the RAF in 1989 as 
the quality of male applicants declined. However, the RAF could and did stop short 
of fast jet roles, even though limiting women to 'non-combat' aircraft failed to solve 
the problem of insufficient men of the necessary standard for fast jet squadrons. 
 
A variety of arguments were used to justify the categorisation of these new roles for 
women as non-combatant. Distinction was made between the purpose of weapons, 
types of aircraft or geographic factors. Thus, in the hands of women, small arms 
were used for defence, whereas men could undertake offensive action. Likewise, 
aircraft were divided into combat or non-combat categories, according to whether 
they were armed. Women could fly helicopters from 1989, but not in support of land 
warfare. They were approved to fly as rear crew in airborne early warning aircraft in 
1984, but their role was to aid the air battle, not engage in the fight. Yet such 
distinctions drew criticism from some senior RAF officers who thought it lacked 
logic to describe as non-combatant women trained to use weapons in defence of 
their base or exposed to risk through operational flying. 
 
Scholarship on women's roles in the armed forces in the 1980s and early 1990s has 
primarily focussed on the army. Joanna Bourke, Rachel Woodward and Trish 
Winter emphasised the importance of the diminishing supply of youths entering the 
labour market to decisions to expand women's employment. Christopher Dandeker 
and Mady Wechslar Segal's study into changes in each of the armed forces 




The importance of the demographic trough can be overstated. Chapter 6 showed 
that, although concerns about the supply of youngsters entering the labour market in 
the 1990s spurred studies in each of the Services into how to sustain their personnel 
requirements, this should not be taken as the reason for subsequent policy decisions 
to open more roles to women. The relative size of recruiting targets compared with 
numbers in relevant age cohorts, and the state of youth unemployment, suggests an 
adequate supply of young men in the population. The quality of potential recruits 
was a more critical issue.  
 
For non-commissioned ranks in the RAF, the earlier decision to enable women to be 
armed allowed Air Marshal Jones (Air Member for Personnel) to pre-empt potential 
demographic trough problems by simply increasing the number of women who 
could be recruited. This required only a note to Air Force Board colleagues 
informing them of his decision rather than the protracted development of policy for 
the RN and in the army. Quality rather than numbers was the key concern for flying 
roles which continued to attract sufficient young men. However, in the late 1980s, 
the increasing failure rates in flying training caused alarm. Shortfalls in the numbers 
of pilots and navigators qualifying to join squadrons compounded the usual struggle 
to retain pilots in the face of competition from the civilian sector. A quota of women 
was seen as a means of replacing men with lower aptitude scores at the selection 
centre with better performing female candidates. 
 
However, the Royal Navy was short of recruits, while the WRNS had a waiting list 
of women wanting to join. The Navy failed to adjust its recruitment policies to take 
account of the propensity of youngsters to remain in education for longer. Indeed, 
there was an inherent contradiction in that the Navy needed its recruits to be well 
qualified in order to absorb training to operate and maintain complex equipment, but 
it wanted men to join at a young age in order that they could undertake years of sea 
service before developing ties to life ashore. Those of the necessary technical 
aptitude preferred to remain in education, joining the labour market later. 
 
Although there were recruitment problems centred on quality, personnel planning 
staff were more concerned with the persistent inability to retain sufficient highly 
trained and experienced men. Excessive outflow added to recruitment targets. 
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Dandeker and Segal made only limited mention of changing patterns of men and 
women's period of service. As Chapter 6 showed, retention of servicemen in the 
1980s was affected by their aspirations for a settled family life. This came into 
conflict with demands of a military career that prized commitment to the Service, 
including the need to go where sent, at short notice, and accepting the risks entailed 
in operational service. As men's willingness to serve for long periods declined, so 
that of servicewomen increased. This, too, was a response to social developments: 
later marriage; an ability to control fertility; and deferring the age at which first 
pregnancy occurred. The narrowing gap between men and women's length of service 
altered the analysis of women's value for money in roles that required expensive 
training.  
 
The Royal Navy's inability to follow the RAF's example and differentiate between 
combat and non-combat ships, and their deployment during operations, played a 
major part in its decision to open seagoing in warships. Even if such a definition 
could have been made convincing, it would still have failed to alleviate personnel 
problems as insufficient posts would have been created to solve shortages at sea or 
to provide enough opportunities for Wrens. It is clear that Admirals Oswald and 
Brown were reluctant to take the step of employing women in warships.  
 
As in 1945-6, developments in 1989 and the early 1990s showed the crucial 
interactions between policies in the three Services. Admiral Oswald was under 
pressure from Archie Hamilton because the Minister saw the other Services' Chiefs 
proceeding with plans for wider employment of women. The principle of women's 
exclusion from combat had been used by the RAF and the army to set their proposed 
demarcation lines on women's roles in 1989. New opportunities were still described 
as non-combat roles. This exclusion was quoted as authoritative policy in papers on 
women's roles. It had been previously publicly endorsed by MOD ministers 
speaking in the House of Commons. However, during discussions on seagoing, 
Hamilton challenged the existence of a formal policy on the matter. The brief 
produced for him exposed the 'policy' as a 'precept' and so removed a key objection 




Archie Hamilton expected rational analysis of the personnel situation rather than 
prejudiced argument. He could not understand the idea of accepting men of lower 
standard, who would be more likely to fail training, when the WRNS was turning 
away more highly qualified volunteers. He also had the example of his visit to the 
Dutch Navy and examples from other allied nations of women serving at sea. 
Having questioned the origins of the non-combat principle, Hamilton removed the 
main obstacle that had been consistently used to set limits to servicewomen's roles. 
Unable to find an alternative solution to the Navy's personnel problems, Admiral 
Oswald conceded that women could serve in warships.  
 
Eighteen months after the seagoing decision, the Navy Board approved flying roles 
for women in the Fleet Air Arm. Once the unmistakeably combat roles of seagoing 
and naval flying were opened, the RAF's dividing line of 'combat' versus 'non-
combat' aircraft was no longer sustainable. Most members of the Air Force Board 
recognised this reality, leaving only Air Chief Marshal Palin to articulate the case 
for exclusion from fast jets. 
 
The new boundary line was drawn at submarine service and land warfare. There 
were many understandable reasons for exclusion from ocean-going submarines in 
the early 1990s. These presented a more physically and mentally testing 
environment than surface ships. The men and women of the Navy had much to learn 
about working together at sea before facing that challenge. However, there remained 
a deep-seated prejudice against women serving in this elite part of the Royal Navy. 
This thesis has also shown how the RAF and the Navy were content to allow army 
policy to dictate limits to women's employment in land warfare. In addition to 
doubts about women's physical strength and stamina, and their presumed adverse 
impact on cohesion and effectiveness of combat teams, the language used to 
describe combat focussed on more active words in describing men's roles in order to 
express the need for difference. Men were said to take part in 'direct combat' in 
which an enemy could be seen. In the infantry or armoured corps, men needed to be 
aggressive, belligerent and actively seek out the enemy. Coming in to 'close contact' 
with the enemy was perceived as unacceptable for women. Women's combat roles 




As Chapter 7 showed, implementation of seagoing and flying policies was affected 
by the post-Cold War defence budget cuts, redundancy programmes and reduction in 
recruiting targets. This serves to highlight the importance of the timing of the 
seagoing decision, made just a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Had 
Archie Hamilton accepted the limited seagoing in a few selected ships proposed by 
Admiral Oswald on the basis of Alan West's report, then it could be argued that 
warship service could have been deferred, at least for the period of reductions and 
reorganisation. If that had been the case, then the Air Force Board would not have 
come under pressure to open fast jet flying as early as 1991.  
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests regret among some personnel that wider roles for 
women had been introduced. However, even if policy-makers had wanted to reverse 
the decisions, it would have been very difficult. In the Navy, women were already at 
sea. New recruits had joined as seafarers and with the expectation of careers on that 
basis. The Navy Board had puts its weight behind the policy, explicitly promising 
that it was not an experiment, but that, in part, it was intended to promote equality of 
opportunity. In addition, it had been endorsed by the Queen and the Prime Minister. 
Whether or not there were regrets, policy of wider employment could not be easily 
abandoned. 
 
Analysis in this thesis has shown that employment policies cannot be considered in 
isolation from developments in society. Initially, regulations on terms and conditions 
of service largely mirrored those found in civilian employment. Women were paid 
less than men, there was no formal marriage bar and they were obliged to leave on 
pregnancy. As conditions in the civilian labour market changed in the 1970s and 
1980s with the passing of the Equal Pay Act (1970), Employment Protection Act 
(1975), the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) and the Social Security Act (1986), so the 
Services' policies increasingly diverged from civilian practice.   
 
Examination of pay policy illuminated important aspects of women's position in the 
armed forces relative to men. Chapter 2 showed how pay and pension negotiations 
delayed the introduction of regular terms of service. A crucial victory was achieved, 
in part by the efforts of Air Commandant Felicity Hanbury. It was Hanbury who 
enlisted the help of Caroline Haslett to overturn Sir Stafford Cripps' proposed 
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civilian pay scale for servicewomen. Equally of significance was the insistence of 
the defence Ministries that servicewomen should be paid in accordance with armed 
forces patterns because it was important for women to identify with the Services 
rather than as civilians.  
 
It was common for employers at the time to pay women less than men on the 
assumption that they did not bear the burden of family costs. Unusually, Service pay 
scales already made this differentiation between married and single men through the 
mechanism of the marriage allowance. Thus it was a simple matter to define all 
servicewomen as single and relate their pay to the lower scale. In addition, because 
they did not share men's liability to use weapons, women were paid less than single 
men. When equal pay for non-industrial civil servants was introduced in the 1950s, 
the RAF wanted women to be paid the same as single men on the grounds that 
airwomen did the same work as airmen. As pay was negotiated on a tri-Service 
basis, and the case was not supported by the army or the Navy as they did not agree 
that their women undertook equal work, the Air Ministry set aside its proposal. By 
this time, evidence from the early 1950s showed that women did not stay to fulfil 
even their initial engagement because they could (and did) leave on marriage and 
had to leave on becoming pregnant. This lesser obligation to fulfil their military 
service was added to their non-combatant status to justify a pay differential, even 
when pay on the basis of marital status stopped in 1970. It was the seagoing decision 
that brought about equal pay for servicewomen, though the introduction of small 
arms training narrowed the differential significantly. 
 
Women's tendency to serve for only a short time was a perennial problem that 
policy-makers failed to solve or, indeed, tackle. As Chapter 3 showed, this pattern of 
short service undermined targets to build up the number of women on introduction 
of regular service and following the end of national service. In neither Service did 
the number of women justify placing weight on lessening the need for men as a 
factor for retention of female components. Once the wartime generation had left, the 
percentage of women in the WRNS and the WRAF was mostly in the range of 3 - 
4.5%, rising in the WRAF to over 5% in the 1980s. These figures fell well short of 
wartime peaks of 15.7% for the WAAF and 8.5%  for the WRNS. However, short 
service was not always perceived as a disadvantage. RAF trades with a high 
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proportion of women, who were likely to leave after a few years, were seen as 
giving longer serving men enhanced promotion prospects. In addition, in the 1960s, 
short service began to be seen by Air Force Department finance staff as an 
advantageous way of managing reduction in the size of the RAF without incurring 
redundancy or immediate pension costs. However, more commonly, short service 
was at the heart of questioning investment in training, equipping and 
accommodating women.  
 
While obstacles to married service were eased through attempts to collocate couples 
(or at least achieve some degree of proximity) and, from 1979 in response to the Sex 
Discrimination Act, allocation of married quarters to women, policy on pregnancy 
failed to keep pace with changes in legislation and attitudes in society towards 
mothers taking paid employment. The Directors of the women's Services 
consistently opposed retention of pregnant women. A mother's duty to her family 
was seen as superseding that to her career. Military obligations of unlimited hours of 
duty and geographic mobility were regarded as incompatible with family 
responsibilities. In addition, as with the birth control pill, introduction of maternity 
leave would also require concessions to single motherhood. Unmarried mothers 
were viewed as transgressing the moral code and liable to bring the women's 
Services into disrepute. This fear for reputation was not unfounded. As Chapter 7 
illustrated, sexual behaviour of servicewomen was more likely to attract press 
attention than the work they undertook. Although from the late 1970s and 1980s, 
senior female officers knew of American experience of improved length of service if 
maternity leave was granted, the idea was not pursued. With the female leadership 
opposed to change, male policy-makers were no more inclined to take up the issue.  
 
By the late 1980s, as in society, servicewomen were more likely to remain single or 
marry at a later age than in earlier post-war cohorts. Likewise, child-bearing could 
be planned and thereby deferred in favour of career aspirations. As a consequence, 
servicewomen in the 1980s served for longer than their predecessors. In addition, 
they were increasingly aware of their disadvantage in employment rights compared 
with civilians. However, the only concession to women, who raised questions on 
maternity policy in the 1980s, was the award of statutory maternity pay in place of 
maternity allowance. Extension of women's employment into flying roles and 
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seagoing, with consequent increased cost of women's training, did not bring about a 
change in maternity policy. This was where the line was drawn for the apparently 
new principle of equality of opportunity. It did not stand for long. The MOD 
introduced paid maternity leave when legal action was taken on the basis of 
European Union law by dismissed women, supported by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission.  
 
Studying developments in the WRAF and the WRNS together has allowed the 
importance of organisation and status to emerge. These gendered titles covered very 
different situations. Having decided to retain women, and learning from employing 
women alongside men during the war, the Air Force Board chose to make women 
members of the RAF. Women came under the Air Force Act and were given powers 
associated with rank in the same way as men. This philosophy of integration of 
women into the RAF marginalised the Director of the WRAF from the outset of 
regular service. The high point of the post-holder's influence was embodied in its 
transitional leader, Air Commandant Felicity Hanbury. Air Commodore Joy 
Tamblin made an important contribution in the introduction of small arms training. 
However, on the development of flying roles for women, little was heard from 
successive Directors of the WRAF. Indeed, when the early women aircrew would 
have benefitted from a senior female officer speaking up on equipment and clothing 
issues, or in affording them some protection from unwelcome publicity, Air 
Commodore Ruth Montague was sidelined.  
 
As women were not interchangeable with sailors, the WRNS was retained as a 
separate entity. The Admiralty Board's ambivalence about the idea of military 
women was shown by its rejection of legal advice to bring Wrens under the Naval 
Discipline Act. Thus, women were not accorded powers of rank enjoyed by women 
in the other Services. Importantly, their civilian status was seen also as a 
manifestation of lesser commitment and status within the naval Services and in 
comparison with the WRAF and WRAC. 
 
However, Directors of the WRNS were in a stronger position than those of the 
WRAF even though the scope of the job declined over the decades. As Chapter 5 
illustrated, sometimes this authority was used to argue for the Wrens' distinctive 
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identity, particularly exemption from the Naval Discipline Act, blue braid on 
uniforms rather than gold, and unique rank titles. Nevertheless, being Head of 
Service placed these officers on a footing with RN officers of higher rank. They had 
routine meetings with the First and Second Sea Lords, and at the time of the 
seagoing decision, access also to Archie Hamilton. Commandant Anthea Larken and 
her staff were an integral part of the deliberations on the West Study. In supporting 
the move to seagoing and consequent transfer of women into the Royal Navy, they 
were aware that the policy signalled the end of the Service that they had known. 
Whatever personal misgivings may have been held, the need to create a new naval 
career for women was accepted. Anne Spencer, who succeeded Anthea Larken, then 
also played her part in implementation of policy. These senior female officers were 
actively engaged in this far reaching policy in contrast to Air Commodore 
Montague's lack of engagement with female aircrew issues.    
 
This thesis has explored personnel policies and established how the employment of 
women in the armed forces exposed and then narrowed the gap between military 
policies and social norms. However, it points to the need for a wider piece of 
research into the armed forces' right to be different from society, encompassing 
issues of ethnicity and sexuality as well as gender. Such research would shed light 
on the Ministry of Defence's position in respect of UK and European Union 
legislation. In addition, there is scope for a further study of the Women's Royal 
Army Corps in this period in order to understand how careers within a separate 
corps developed while women were employed in support of different elements of the 
army. The army's opening of the Royal Artillery and Army Air Corps to women, 
while maintaining exclusion from the infantry and armoured corps, provides 
interesting research questions that merit historical study.    
 
This thesis has brought the history of women in the Navy and the Air Force in the 
second half of the twentieth century out of the shadow cast by army issues. Seagoing 
policy brought an end to the WRNS as women were integrated into the Royal Navy 
in November 1993. This was viewed with great sadness by many Wrens, but was 
seen as necessary to preserve women's roles as part of Britain's naval services. A 
few months later, airwomen scarcely noticed when the acronym 'WRAF' was 
dropped in favour of 'RAF'. However, for Flight Lieutenant Jo Salter, 'W' appearing 
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after her name on the honours board as winner of the British Aerospace trophy for 
the best overall student on advanced flying training at RAF Valley, remained a 
source of pride.1 
                                                 
1 Flight Lieutenant Jo Salter, transcript, p.17. 
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Appendix 1: Rank Titles 
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* In 1968 WRAF officers were given the same rank titles as RAF officers. 
** The highest rank achieved to date in the Women's Royal Army Corps is 
brigadier. 
                                                 
1 Women joined the RAF from 1 February 1949 but for administrative purposes were designated as 
'WRAF'. Reference to 'WRAF' ceased in 1994.  
2 Unlike the RAF's rank of 'air commodore', 'commodore' was not a substantive rank in the Royal 














































































































                                                 
3 Non-commissioned aircrew ranks have been omitted. Technician ranks were introduced later. 
Aircraftman 1st and 2nd class were later renamed as leading aircraftman and aircraftman. The former 
leading aircraftman rank became senior aircraftman. Ditto for women's rank titles.   
4 TNA: AIR 2/10271, Air Ministry Order A75, 20 Jan 1949. Lance corporals ranked with privates but 
were senior to that rank. 
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Appendix 2: Notes on Interviewees 
 
Recorded Interviews Conducted by the Author 
 
Margaret Aldred joined the Ministry of Defence in 1975. Between Spring 
1988 and early 1990, she was private secretary to Archie 
Hamilton, Minister of State for the Armed Forces.   
  
Admiral Sir Brian 
Brown 
was a supply and secretarial officer who also served as a 
pilot with the Fleet Air Arm. He became the Second Sea 
Lord (Head of Naval Personnel) in 1989.  
  
Rear Admiral Roy 
Clare 
was a seaman officer who joined the RN as a junior rating. 
He was military assistant to the Minister for the Armed 
Forces  (1988-1990) and went on to command HMS York as 
commander of the 3rd Destroyer Squadron. In 1996, he was 




was a member of the study team investigating the 




in the rank of captain, was in command of HMS Brilliant, 





in the rank of group captain, was Deputy Director WRAF 
for 18 months between 1989 and 1991. She went on to 
command RAF Uxbridge and was the third female officer to 





as an undergraduate, attended East Midlands University Air 
Squadron. After completing her degree, she joined the RAF 
as a pilot. She gained her wings in 1993. She went on to 
become the first female fighter pilot, flying Tornado F3 




commissioned into the RAF as an engineering officer. She 
transferred to pilot training in 1990. She was the first 
woman in the regular Service to be awarded her wings 
(1991). She went on to fly Andover communication aircraft 
with 32 Squadron before being selected to fly Hercules 
transport aircraft. She was the first woman to become a 





as an undergraduate, attended London University Air 
Squadron. After completing her degree, she joined the RAF 
as a pilot. She gained her wings in 1992. She was the first 




Lord Hamilton of 
Epsom 
was Minister for the Armed Forces from July 1988 - May 
1993.  
  
Marshal of the 
Royal Air Force Sir 
Peter Harding  
was appointed as Chief of the Air Staff in January 1989. He 




was Secretary to Commander in Chief Fleet (1991-1993) 
and subsequently Chief Staff Officer (Personnel and 
Logistics) on the staff of Flag Officer Surface Flotilla 
(1993-1996).  
  
Air Vice Marshal 
Robert Honey 
was the Air Secretary 1989 - 1994. He was responsible for 




was a fighter control specialist. As a group captain she was 
the first woman to command an operational station. She was 
the second woman to reach air commodore in open 
competition with men.  
  
Baroness Howe of 
Idlicote 
served as Deputy Chairman of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission from 1975-79.  In 1990 she chaired the 
Hansard Society’s Commission, resulting in the publication 





joined the WRNS as a Wren rating in the role of weapon 
analyst. On commissioning, she specialised in photographic 
interpretation. She was the first WRNS officer to attend the 
Royal College of Defence Studies. She was the penultimate 
Director of the WRNS serving in that role from 1988 – 
1991. 
  
Rear Admiral John 
Lippiett 
was a seaman officer who was military assistant to the First 
Sea Lord (December 1988 - December 1990). He later 
commanded HMS Norfolk as captain of 9th Frigate 




was a member of the Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval 
Nursing Service. She served as a nursing sister on the high 





was the Deputy Director of the WRAF from 1986. She 
became Director in the rank of air commodore in 1989 and 












( née Smith) 
was the second woman to qualify as a navigator. Already 
serving in the photographic interpretation specialisation, she 
transferred to aircrew in 1990. In 1992 she joined 30 
Squadron, flying Hercules transport aircraft.    
  
Vice Admiral Sir 
Ned Purvis 
served as Director General of Naval Manning and Training 
and oversaw the 1988/89 study into employment of the 








was the final Deputy Director WRNS (Apr - Oct 1993). She 
continued in the RN in a variety of staff and administrative 
appointments, including Assistant Director (Equal 
Opportunities) (May 1998 - December 2000). Her final tour 
of duty was as the base commandeer of HMS Excellent. She 
retired in 2006. 
  
Flight Lieutenant Jo 
Salter 
joined the RAF in 1989 to become an engineering officer 
but took the opportunity to become a pilot when RAF policy 
changed. She gained her wings in April 1992 and went on to 
become the first woman to qualify to fly fast jets. She joined 
617 Squadron to fly Tornado ground attack aircraft. 
  
Freydis Sharland was a pilot in the Air Transport Auxiliary from 1942. She 
flew about forty aircraft types during the war, including 




was deputy secretary of the military committee of NATO in 
Brussels from 1989-91. In 1990, while in that appointment, 






was a communications specialist who volunteered for 





joined the WRNS in 1962 and served as the last Director 
WRNS (1991 - 1993). 
  
Air Commodore Joy 
Tamblin 
was the Director of the WRAF from October 1976 to 





as an undergraduate, attended the University Air Squadron 
of Wales. After completing her degree, she joined the RAF 
as a pilot. She gained her wings in 1993. She was selected 
to become a flying instructor and subsequently went on to 
become the first woman to fly single-seat fast jets. She flew 





Interview - Not Recorded 
 
  
Admiral Lord West  in the rank of captain, in the autumn of 1988 was appointed 
to do a study into the future employment of the WRNS. He 
went on to become First Sea Lord.   
  
Rear Admiral Nick 
Wilkinson 
as a captain, was Secretary to First Sea Lord. Later, as a rear 





became Deputy Director WRNS in October 1989, then 
deputy head of Sea Service Implementation Team.  
Russell Potts was a civil servant who served in a variety of Ministry of 
Defence jobs. He was seconded to the Prices and Incomes 
Board (1969-70) to revise the pay structure of the armed 
forces. He acted as secretary to the 1974 study into the 
future role of the WRNS. 
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Appendix 3: Women's Roles for Regular Service 
 
Women's Royal Naval Service - Ratings' Categories of Work at December 
1947
5




Category December 1947 1951 Remarks 
General Service    




Clothing √ √  
Cook (O) √ √  
Cook (S) √ √  
Dental Surgery 
Attendant 




√ √  
Hairdresser √ √  
Mess Caterer √   
Motor Transport 
Driver 
√ √  
Quarters Assistant √ √  
Radar Plot  √ Probable re-
establishment of 
wartime role 
Regulating7 √ √  
Sick Berth Attendant  √ New trade 
(Wren) Signals √ √  
Steward (General) √ √  
Steward (Officers) √ √  




Tailoress √ √  
Telegraphist √ √ Previously 
declared obsolete 
but re-instated. 
Victualling √ √  
Welfare Worker √ √  
Writer8 (General) √ √  
Writer (Pay) √ √  
                                                 
5 NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR 1077(47) Regulations and Instructions WRNS, Appendices 3 & 4, 31 
Dec 1947, promulgated 1948. 
6 Ibid, BR 1077(51) Regulations and Instructions WRNS, Appendix 2, 6 Nov 1951. 
7 'Regulators' were disciplinary staff. 
8 Clerical staff were referred to as 'writers'. 
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Category December 1947 1951 Remarks 
Writer (Shorthand) √ √  
    
Naval Aviation 
Categories 
   
Aircraft Direction √  Not listed in 
1951. 
Air Mechanic9  √ Previously 
declared obsolete 
but re-instated. 
Air Stores √ √  





(see footnote 5) 
√  Previously 
declared obsolete 
but re-instated. 
Range Assessor √ √  
Radio (Air)  √ Renaming of 
category 
Wren (Radio) (AR) 
and (AW) 
√  Renamed above. 
 
                                                 
9 Air Mechanics were re-named Naval Airwomen in November 1946 (NMRN: 1988.350.57, 
Admiralty Working Party on the Permanent WRNS Rating Force, notes of a meeting held on 6 Nov 
1946). The term air mechanic was re-introduced in 1950 (NMRN: 1988.350.1-5, BR 1077(51) 
Regulations and Instructions WRNS, 6 Nov 1951). 
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Women's Royal Naval Service - Proposed Substitution Roles for Officers at 
August 1946 
 
The total strength of the WRNS officer corps was expected to be 500. All officers 
would train in administrative duties for the management of the WRNS as well as 
training as specialists if substituting for men. This list shows the expected 
distribution of female officers in specialist work in the early stages of planning for 
regular service.  
 














Meteorological 25 To release instructor officers for 
other duties. Requires long 
training. 
25 
Safety Equipment 8 Questionable whether specialist 
role can be afforded in post war 
Air Arm. Duties could perhaps 
be absorbed into other roles. 
8 
Armament Stores 12 To replace [male] warrant 
officers. Women would be 
promoted from Wrens Air 
Mechanic (Ordnance) category, 
hence dependent on future of 
that category. Long technical 
course. 
- 
Air Radio Officers  20 To replace male officers and 
warrant officers. No difficulty 
with the provision of training. 
Dependent on the future of Wren 
Air Radio mechanics. 
16 
Communications 6 To be employed mostly in 
instructing Wrens. Probably 
replacing senior (male) ratings 
rather than officers. A useful 
outlet for a few Wren 
communication ratings.  
6 
Secretariat 70 Include Confidential Book 
duties. Quite straightforward and 
clearly replace men. 
70 
Pay and Cash 15 Quite straightforward. Numbers 
limited by the difficulty of 
[male] senior Writer ratings 
working under them. 
15 
                                                 
10 NMRN: 1988.350.58-9, Permanent WRNS Officer Force, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel, 
circulated 20 Aug 1946.  
11 Ibid. Rear Admiral Denny’s remarks have been abbreviated and edited. 

















Air Stores 8 Same remarks as for Pay and 
Cash. 
8 
Catering 15 Replacing warrant officer 
Stewards etc. Pre-war, these 
would have been civilian posts. 
Policy changed to allow an 
outlet for Stewards ashore as 




12 Replacing warrant officers. 
Providing an outlet for the large 
number of victualling and 
clothing Wrens in the permanent 
force. 
12 
Cipher 10 A total of 30 cipher officers of 
which 10 of the UK based shore 
billets could be filled by WRNS 
officers. A useful officer outlet 
for rating categories having no 
officer equivalent as the 





-  3 
Total 201  178* 
 
*Posts on the complement also attracted a 'margin' - an allowance of personnel over 
and above the established figure to allow for personnel between postings, on long 
training courses or other diversions. The allowance was 15% in 1947. Thus an 
additional 27 women would be allowed to replace the notional 27 male manning 








Trades were grouped by skill level and pay. Thus they appeared in more than one 





Group A  
  
Electrician grade I  
Fitter grade II airframe  
Fitter grade II engine  
Fitter motor transport  
Instrument repairer grade I  
Radar fitter - air  
Radar fitter - ground  
Wireless fitter  
  
Group B  
  
Aircraft finisher  
Cook  
Dental hygienist  
Dispenser Wartime trade disestablished. Re-
instated by August 1949. 
Electrician grade II  
Flight mechanic - airframe  
Flight mechanic - engine  
Instrument repair grade II  
Laboratory assistant  
Masseuse  
Mental nursing orderly  
Motor transport mechanic  
Operating room assistant  
Photographer  
Radar mechanic - air  
Radar mechanic - ground  
Radar operator  
Radiographer  
Safety equipment worker  
Wireless /teleprinter operator  
Wireless mechanic - air  
Wireless mechanic - ground  
                                                 




Group C  
  
Administrative  
Airframe assistant  
Clerk accounting  
Clerk equipment accounting  
Clerk general duties  
Clerk general duties personnel selection  
Clerk general duties postal Trade re-opened to women in 1949 
having previously been reserved 
post-war for national servicemen. 
Clerk pay accounting  
Clerk provisioning.  Trade re-opened to women in 1949 
having previously been reserved 
post-war for national servicemen. 
Cook  
Dental clerk orderly  
Driver MT  
Electrical assistant  
Engine assistant  
Equipment assistant  
Fabric worker  
Fighter plotter Trade added in 1949. 
Hairdresser  
Instrument assistant  
Interpreter  
Model maker’s assistant Wartime trade disestablished. Re-
instated in 1949 at 'assistant' grade.  
Musician  
Nursing orderly  
Operations clerk Trade added in 1949.  
Radar assistant - air  
Radar assistant - ground  
Radar operator  
Radio telephony operator  
Safety equipment assistant  
Tailor Previous wartime trade re-
established in 1949. 
Telephonist  
Teleprinter operator  
Tracer  
Wireless assistant - air  
Wireless assistant - ground  
WRAF physical training instructor  




Group D  
  
Administrative orderly  
Flight orderly  
Messing orderly  
Messing orderly, batwoman (sic)  
Messing orderly - mess steward  
Messing orderly - waitress Previous wartime trade re-
established in 1949. 
Technical orderly  
 




Number of officers 
Branch Title Apr 1949 





and Special Duties 
11 
Equipment Branch 67 
Secretarial Branch 232 
Education Branch 5 
Provost Branch 7 
Catering Branch 21 
Total 515 
 
* 'G' was the designation for women officers employed solely on administration of 
the WRAF. It may have stood for 'general'. The branch was subsumed into the 
Secretarial Branch in 1950.  
 
** Technical Branch comprised three formerly separate designations: engineering, 
armaments and signals. 
 
This list excludes the professional branches of medical, dental, legal, chaplains and 
musicians. Medical women were entered into the RAF branch and not listed 
separately as WRAF. 
 
RAF Officer Roles not open to WRAF  
 
General Duties (pilots, navigators, air signallers, air gunners, air engineers) 
RAF Regiment 
Aircraft Control  
Marine Branch  
Physical Fitness 
Airfield Construction Branch 
                                                 








Vera Laughton Mathews Apr 39 – Nov 46 
Jocelyn Woollcombe Nov 46 – Nov 50 
Mary Lloyd Nov 50 – Dec 54 
Nancy Robertson Dec 54 – Apr 58 
Elizabeth Hoyer-Millar Apr 58 – May 61 
Jean Davies May 61 – Jun 64 
Margaret Drummond Jun 64 – Jun 67 
Marion Kettlewell Jun 67 – Jul 70 
Daphne Blundell Jul 70 – Jul 73 
Mary Talbot Jul 73 – Jul 76 
Vonla McBride Jul 76 – Jul 79 
Elizabeth Craig McFeely Jul 79 – Jul 82 
Patricia Swallow Jul 82 – Feb 86 
Marjorie Fletcher Feb 86 – Mar 88 
Anthea Larken Mar 88 – Mar 91 




Katherine Jane Trefusis-Forbes Jan 39 - Oct 43 
Ruth Mary Eldridge Welsh Oct 43 - Nov 46 
Felicity Hanbury Dec 46 - Jun 50 
Nancy Salmon Jul 50 - Aug 56 
Henrietta Barnet Aug 56 - Mar 60 
Anne Stephens Mar 60 - Mar 63 
Jean Conan-Doyle Apr 63 - Apr 66 
Felicity Hill Apr 66 - Jul 69 
Philippa Marshall Jul 69 - Jul 73 
Molly Allott Jul 73 - Oct 76 
Joy Tamblin Oct 76 - Feb 80 
Helen Renton Feb 80 - Jan 86 
Shirley Jones Jan 86 - Nov 89 




Appendix 5: Aircraft and Roles Approved for Female Pilots and 




Operational Aircraft  
 







• BAe 146 











• VC10 and VC10k 
• Victor 
 
Helicopters - Search and Rescue: 
 
• Sea King  













                                                 
15 FOI AHB: Correspondence: 'Female Aircrew in the RAF', Chief of Air Staff to Under Secretary of 
State (Armed Forces), 4 Jul 1989. 
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Appendix 6: First Batch of Mixed Ships - Complement of Female 
Ratings16 
 
  Brilliant1 Invincible2 Juno3 Battleaxe4 
Petty Officer  1   
Leading Hand 1 1  1 
Radio 
Operator 
Able 4 17 3 4 
Petty Officer  1   
Leading Hand     
Radar 
Able 5 14 3 5 
Weapons 
Analyst 
Able  1   
Chief Petty 
Officer 
 1   
Petty Officer  1   
Leading Hand 1 1 1 1 
Writer 
Able 1 4 1 1 
Leading Hand 1   1 Stores 
Accountant Able 1 5 1 1 
Cook Leading Hand  1   





 1   
Chief Petty 
Officer 
 1   Regulator 




Able  1   
Photo-
grapher 
Leading Hand  1   
Leading Rate  1   Aircraft 
Engineer-
ing  
Able  5   
QARNNS   2   
























1. HMS Brilliant (Type 22 frigate) was the first ship with women in its complement. 
                                                 
16 FOI Fleet: WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, 13 Dec 1990. The report did not give figures for 





2. Two women of the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service (QARNNS) 
were also serving in HMS Invincible (aircraft carrier). 
3. HMS Juno (Leander class frigate in use as a training ship) was mixed 
complement  from 10 December 1990. 
4. HMS Battleaxe (Type 22 frigate) was mixed complement from 11 January 1991. 
 
In addition, there were 31 women in Royal Fleet Auxiliary Argus of whom 30 
belonged to the QARNNS and 1 was a Wren (Dental Surgery Assistant). This ship 
was a casualty receiving ship for the Gulf War of 1991.  
 
Leading Hand is a junior non-commissioned officer rank. 




Appendix 7: Complement Plan (Frigates and Above): 1991-9417 
 
 Ship Officers*   Senior Rates*  Junior Rates* 
1991 Sirius 4 2 21 
 Fearless 6 9 50 
 Brazen 5 6 32 
 Cornwall 5 6 24 
 Ark Royal 8 6 72 
 Broadsword 5 6 18 
 Sheffield 5 6 32 
 Cardiff 5 6 30 
 Liverpool 5 6 30 
 Southampton 5 6 30 
     
1992 Glasgow 5 6 30 
 Cumberland 5 6 24 
 Ambuscade 4 6 24 
 Coventry 5 6 32 
 Scylla 5 3 19 
 Arrow 4 6 24 
 Campbeltown 5 6 24 
 Exeter 5 6 30 
 Norfolk 3 4 24 
 Brave 5 6 32 
 Manchester 5 6 30 
 Chatham 5 6 24 
     
1993 Gloucester 5 6 30 
 Active 4 6 24 
 York 5 6 30 
 Boxer 5 6 32 
 London 5 6 32 
 Alacrity 4 6 24 
 Edinburgh 5 6 30 
 Illustrious 10 8 100 
     
1994 Birmingham 5 6 30 
 Newcastle 5 6 30 
 Nottingham 5 6 30 
 Avenger 4 6 24 
Totals  171 200 1072 
 
* Target capacities. One or more junior rates' mess decks were made over to women. 
For a ship with 24 to a mess, this capped the number of junior rate women who 
could be accommodated.   
In addition, HMS Bristol in its role as a training ship was expected to take 20 female 
officers under training from 1991.
                                                 






Material Obtained Using Requests under the Freedom of 




Archives  ...................................................................................... 294 
  
Privately Held Papers ................................................................... 298 
  
Interviews Conducted by Author ................................................. 299 
  
Correspondents ............................................................................. 300 
  
Command Papers ......................................................................... 300 
  
Other  ............................................................................................ 301 
  
Conference Proceedings ............................................................... 303 
  
Newspapers and Periodicals ......................................................... 304 
  
Professional Magazine ................................................................. 304 
  
Other Contemporary Published Sources ...................................... 304 
  
Secondary Sources ..................................................................... 305 
  
Books ........................................................................................... 305 
  
Articles  ........................................................................................ 310 
  
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography ...................................      312 
  
Unpublished Works ......................................................................      312 
  
Websites and Databases ...............................................................      312 
Bibliography 
288 
Material Obtained Using Requests under the Freedom of 
Information Act (2000): 
 
Air Historical Branch (AHB) Files 
 
ID3/A/18/1 Part 3 Terms and Conditions of Service. 
ID3/92/32 Part 5 RAF Officer Structure. 
ID3/110/21 Women's Services. 
ID3/900/36 Airborne Early Warning.  
ID6/1006 Manpower Personnel. 
ID 6/1024 Fixed Wing Aircraft - Sentry AEW Mark 1. 
IH1/373 Arming of WRAF Personnel - Regulations Applicable to WRAF Personnel. 




Air Force Board Standing Committee, Conclusions of Meeting 8(91) held on 24 
September 1991 (extract). 
Correspondence: 'Employment of Female Aircrew'. 
Correspondence: 'Female Aircrew in the RAF'. 
Correspondence: 'Nimrod AEW - Employment of WRAF Personnel'. 
Director Women's Royal Air Force, Air Commodore Montague to Air Member for 
Personnel, January 1992.Employment of WRAF Personnel on Nimrod AEW, Note 
to CAS, 17 May 1984. 
Employment of WRAF Personnel on Nimrod AEW MK3, DUS (Air) to USofS(AF), 
9 July, 1984. 
Employment of WRAF Personnel on Nimrod AEW MK3, VCAS to Commander in 
Chief Strike Command, 26 July 1984. 
Further Integration of Women in the RAF, Air Force Board Standing Committee 
Paper (93)13(X), Air Member for Personnel, 19 November 1993. 
Introduction of Reserve Liability for Servicewomen, AFBSC(85)6(X), Air Member 
for Personnel, 8 May 1985. 
Minutes, Air Force Board Standing Committee, Meeting 11(89), extract. 
RAF Manpower, Air Force Board Standing Committee Paper, AFBSC(85)11(X), 
Air Member for Personnel and Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 7 June 1985. 
University Air Squadrons, AFBSC(85)1(X), Air Member for Personnel, 26 February 
1985. 
 
Defence Analytical Services and Advice 
 
RAF and RN Aircrew Statistics 1989 to 2007, 27 November 2007. 
 
 
Department of Work and Pensions Documents 
 
1989/90 Bill: Extension of SMP to Servicewomen, June 1989. 
1989/90 Social Security Bill, 6 June 1989. 
1989/90 Social Security Bill, 6 July 1989. 
1989/90 Social Security Bill: Extension of Statutory Maternity Pay to 
Servicewomen, 17 July 1989. 
Bibliography 
289 
Background Note: Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, not dated. 
Benefit for Service Families - Draft, not dated, extract. 
Circular M/  Statutory Maternity Pay - HM Forces, not dated. 
Code SB 16702, dated 31 July 1990. 
Introduction of Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, not dated. 
Joint Parliamentary Under Secretary of State DHSS to Anne Armstrong, 18 January 
1989. 
Legislative Programme 1989/90, 5 January 1989. 
Note of Action, 9 July 1990. 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Armed Forces) to Parliamentary Under 
Secretary of State (DHSS), 1 June 1988. 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (DHSS) to MOD, 21 April 1988, extract. 
PES 1989, 27 February 1989. 
PS(C) Meeting with Anne Armstrong, 27 February 1990. 
PS(C) to Anne Armstrong, 25 January 1990. 
Social Security Bill: Commencement Provisions, dated 5 July 1990. 
Social Security Bill 1989-90: Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, 24 July 
1989. 
Social Security Bill 1989-90: Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, 25 July 
1989. 
Social Security Bill 1989-90: Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, 28 July 
1989. 
Social Security - Draft Clauses/Schedules, dated 24 July 1989. 
Soldier Magazine, Article by Anne Armstrong, p.35, 19 March 1990. 
Soldier Magazine, Article by Anne Armstrong, undated clipping. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Members of the Women's Services, 27 June 1989. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Members of the Women's Services in the Armed Forces, 
18 November 1988. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Members of the Women's Services in the Armed Forces, 
5 June 1989. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, DSS to MOD, 31 May 1990. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, Naval Pay, Pensions and Conditions of 
Service Division, 4 July 1990. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, August 1989. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, 5 September 1990. 
Statutory Maternity Pay for Women in the Armed Forces, 9 March 1989. 
Statutory Maternity Pay - HM Forces, not dated. 
Untitled Document, Funding of Statutory Maternity Pay, not dated, extract. 
Untitled Document, Reference 2292A/MC/2, Subject - Maternity Benefits for 
Servicewomen, header dated August 1988, extract. 
Untitled Document, Reference 2292A/MC/2, Subject - Maternity Benefits for 
Servicewomen, not dated, extract. 
Untitled Document, Reference 2292A/MC/3, Subject - Statutory Maternity Pay not 
Payable Outside the European Community,  not dated, extract. 
Untitled Document, Reference 2292A/MC/3, Subject - Discussions with MOD on 
Statutory Maternity Pay, not dated, extract. 
Untitled Document, Subject - Social Security Bill, not dated, extract. 
Untitled Document, Subject - Statutory Maternity Pay for Servicewomen, not dated, 
extract. 





Fleet Information Cell Documents 
 
ACNS 13/23, 'Headmark 2000', 11 November 1987 (extract). 
Admiralty Board Minutes A/M(79)4, 20 June 1979 (extract). 
Admiralty Board Sub-Committee Minutes, ABSC/M(79)5 dated 7 June 1979, 
(extract). 
Admiralty Board Sub-Committee Minutes, ABSC/M(80)4 dated 25 September 
1980. 
A/M(82)2 Minutes dated 22 October 1982, (extract). 
 
Correspondence: 'Study into the Employment of WRNS Personnel in the Royal 
Navy'. 
 
Defence Council Instruction Royal Navy 33, 8 February 1991. 
Employment of Female Aircrew in the RN, Second Sea Lord, October1990. 
Employment of Women in Combat Documents: 
Minute to Army Historical Branch, 20 November 1989. 
Head of Army Historical Branch to PL(SPP)a, 23 November 1989. 
Brief for Minister for the Armed Forces, 1 December 1989. 
Military Assistant to Minister for the Armed Forces to PL(SPP)a, 5 December 
1989. 
Employment of Women in Mine Clearance Diving Specialisation, date circa 
1997/98. 
Employment of Women as Pilots, Second Sea Lord,12 September 80. 
Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, FONAC to Head of NMT, 21 
September 1989. 
Employment of WRNS Personnel, Head of AG Sec 1 to Head of NMT, 26 January 
1990. 
Female Aircrew, Flag Officer Naval Aviation, 21 May 1990. 
Females in MM/PP, letter dated 15 December 1995. 
Females in MM/PP, letter dated 15 January 1996. 
FPMG(SP) 5/98 Review of Women's Employment Opportunities in the Armed 
Forces, 13 February 1998. 
Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study of Seagoing Personnel, 4 December 
1995. 
Integration of Sea Service - Continuation Study: Ship-board Survey, Lyn Bryant, 
Tracey Bunyard, Joan Chandler and Commander J L Wakeling, University of 
Plymouth, October 1995. 
Manpower Shortages: the Next Eighteen Months, Admiralty Board Paper AP(79)6, 
7 June 1979.  
Manpower Shortages: the Next Eighteen Months, Admiralty Board Sub-Committee 
Paper ABSC/P(79)7, 23 May 1979.  
Manpower Shortages at Sea and Ashore, paper by Second Sea Lord, not dated but 
circa May 1979. 
Manpower Shortages at Sea: Short Term Measures - Background - Current 
Situation, 17 May 1979. 
Mixed Gender Manning of Submarines: a feasibility study, Flag Officer Submarines, 
31 March 1998. 
Bibliography 
291 
Mixed Manning in Submarines: Foetal Health, Institute of Naval Medicine, 
December 1997. 
NAVB/M(88)6 Review of the Manpower Ceiling, Minutes dated 20 October 1988, 
(extract). 
NAVB/M(98)6(Rev), Employment of Women in Submarines and Employment of 
Women as Mine Clearance Divers, minutes dated 9 October 1998, (extract). 
NAVB/P(88)1 Management and Effectiveness, 3 June 1988 (extract). 
NAVB/P(88)5 1988 Audit of the Royal Navy - Manpower, 25 May 1988. 
NAVB/P(88)14 Review of the Manpower Ceiling, 14 August 1988. 
NAVB/P(89)12 Security Billets (extract). 
NAVB/P(90)1 - The Employment of WRNS Personnel in the Royal Navy, 
Controller of the Navy to Head of RP(N), 26 January 1990. 
NAVB/P(90)1 - The Employment of WRNS Personnel in the Royal Navy, Head of 
RP(N), 22 February 1990. 
NAVB/P(90)1 Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, Second Sea Lord, 24 
January 1990 (Annex B) (Main paper received from Ministry of Defence - see 
below). 
NAVB P(91)4 Post Options Restructuring of the RN (extract), 22 March 1991. 
Naval Housing Policy, Admiralty Board Paper, 10 June 1977. 
Officers' Study Group Report 1993 (extract). 
Open Engagement, Admiralty Board Paper, 11 August 1982. 
Open Engagement, Second Permanent Under Secretary to DUS(Navy), 23 August 
1982. 
Progress on Manpower Aspects of the 1982 Plan for Restructuring the Navy, 
A/P(84)15, 28 November 1984. 
Progress Statement on Follow-on Work from the Officers' Study Group Report, June 
1977. 
QARNNS and WRNS Methods of Discharge, 12 December 1977. 
Restructuring the Navy, Admiralty Board Paper, 19 November 984. 
The WRNS Study, Controller of the Navy to Second Sea Lord, 22 May 1989. 
The WRNS Study, Second Sea Lord to DGNMT, 11 April 1989. 
Women in the Navy, Second Sea Lord's office to Minister Armed Forces' office, 17 
December 1993. 
WRNS Personnel Sea Service, Fleet Headquarters to DGNMT, 28 February 1990. 
WRNS Personnel - Volunteers for Sea Service, DGNMT to Director WRNS, 31 
January 1990. 
WRNS Personnel - Volunteers for Sea Service, Director WRNS to DGNMT, 31 
January 1990. 
WRNS Study Implementation Steering Group Terms of Reference, not dated. 
Women at Sea, minute to Minister Armed Forces' office, 14 February 1994. 
Women at Sea, minute to Minister Armed Forces' office, 16 February 1994. 
WRNS Future Designations, 8 February 1993. 
WRNS Integration with the RN, 21 May 1991. 
WRNS Personnel - Commitment for Sea Service, 12 July 1991. 
WRNS Personnel Sea Service - Ship Accommodation, 29 March 1990. 
WRNS Personnel - Service at Sea, signal 28 March 1990. 
WRNS to Sea, draft letter for Treasury on pay for WRNS, 4 June 1990. 
WRNS at Sea Implementation - Initial Volunteers, signal dated 9 July 1990.  




WRNS Sea Service Feedback, 19 April 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Liability for Sea Service for New Recruits, 11 May 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Officers, signal 9 April 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Officers Conditions of Service, 15 March 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Situation Report, 13 December 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Sub Specialisations with no Current Sea Going Opportunities, 
minutes of a meeting held on 7 June 1990. 
WRNS Sea Service - Volunteers for Sea Service, signal 7 February 1990. 
 
Ministry of Defence Documents 
 
AFBSC(89)11 Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force, June 1989. 
S. D. Brennan, K. J. Weston-Lovelock and C. A. Morgan, Factors Affecting the 
Recruitment and Retention of Women in the Armed Forces, Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency, March 1998.   
Chief Claims Officer, Annual Report 1997/1998, extract, dated October 1998.  
Chief Claims Officer, Annual Report 1998/1999, extract, dated July 1999.  
Continuous Attitude Survey MoD (Navy), Senior Psychologist (Naval), dated 
February 1994. 
Executive Committee of the Army Board, Minutes of the 202nd Meeting, held on 20 
July 1989 (extract). 
Factors Affecting the Recruitment and Retention of Women in the Armed Forces, 
Defence Research Agency, March 1998. 
Integration of Sea Service: a Report to the Royal Navy on the Integration of the 
WRNS into the RN, Lyn Bryant, Joan Chandler and Tracey Bunyard, University of 
Plymouth, October 1995. 
Letter from Naval Service FOI Co-ordination Cell to Mr M Evans of The Times 
newspaper, 18 July 2005. 
Long Term Role and Employment of Women in the Army, Adjutant General's 
Department to Army Board Secretariat, 4 July 1989. 
Long Term Role and Employment of Women in the Army, ECAB/P(89)20, 6 July 
1989. 
The MARILYN Report: A Report on Manning and Recruiting in the Lean Years of 
the Nineties, 1988, ECAB/P(88)27. 
Navy Board, Employment of WRNS Personnel in the RN, Second Sea Lord, 
January 1990. 
Report on Study into Long Term Role and Employment of Women in the Army, 1 
March 1989. [Crawford report] 
 
Royal Air Force Continuous General Attitude Survey Documents: 
Annex to Top Management Summary, Defence Research Agency, February 
1995. 
Annex to December 1995 Top Management Summary, Defence Research 
Agency, January 1996. 
Annex to October 1995 Top Management Summary, Defence Research 
Agency, October 1995. 
Annual Report 1988/89, MoD, Science 3 (Air) dated April 1990. 
Annual Report 1989/90, MoD, Science 3 (Air) dated June 1991. 
Annual Report 1992/93, Annex A, MoD, Science 3 (Air). 
Annual Report 1992/93, Annex B, MoD, Science 3 (Air). 
Bibliography 
293 
Job Satisfaction Index, Defence Research Agency, March 1996. 
Job Satisfaction Index Update, Defence Research Agency, November 1995. 
Questionnaire, 1996. 
Top Management Summary, Defence Research Agency, December 1994. 
Top Management Summary, Defence Research Agency, October 1995. 
Top Management Summary, Defence Research Agency, December 1995. 
Trends in Morale, Top Management Summary, June 1993. 
Trends in Morale, Top Management Summary, December 1993. 
Trends in Morale, Top Management Summary, June 1994. 
 
Royal Air Force Recruiting Activities Reports: 
Manning Plan 85, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), August 1986. 
Manning Plan 86, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), 7 August 1987. 
Manning Plan 87, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), 27 July 1988. 
Manning Plan 88, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), 11 August 1989. 
Manning Plan 89, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), 11 September 1990. 
Manning Plan 90, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), 20 August 1991. 
Manning Plan 91, Inspector of Recruiting (RAF), July 1992. 
 
Women in Mine Clearance Diving: a Review and Further Suggestions, Institute of 
Naval Medicine, December 1999. 
Women in Submarines Feasibility Study: Focus Groups reports, Defence Analytical 
Services, January 1998. 
WRNS Study - NAVB(I) 11 Jan 90, Minute to Navy Board Members, Secretary to 
First Sea Lord, 15 January 1990. 
 
Royal Air Force Centre of Aviation Medicine Documents 
 
Donning/Doffing Assessment by Female Subjects of Aircrew Respirator NBC No 5 
and Mark 10 Helmet Fitted with NGL Mask Quick Release Assembly, Institute of 
Aviation Report, No. 008/90, March 1990. 
Menstrual Cycle and Performance, Institute of Aviation Report, No. 743, March 
1993. 
Subcutaneous Fat Distribution of Adult Males and Females Measured by Nuclear 





DM - DSPA/AT/0030/001 Part A Navy Recruitment; Careers Service - Entry of 
Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Corps and Women's Royal Naval Service 1988. 
 
DM - DSPA/AT/0046/001 Part A Pay and Conditions of Service; Training for 
Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force 1989. 
 
DM - DSPA/AT/0046/002 Part A Naval Recruitment, Employment of Women's 






Air Historical Branch (other than material released through Freedom of 
Information requests) 
 
Sebastian Cox, Note on the History of University Air Squadrons, Air Historical 
Branch, 28 July 2005. 
WAAF/WRAF Miscellaneous Papers (File). 
 
British Library Sound Archive 
 
C465/03/06 (F1894), Air Commandant Jean Conan Doyle, interviewed by Cathy 
Courtney, 24 July 1991. 
 
Christ Church Oxford 
 
Portal Papers Box A File 6. 
Portal Papers Box C Files 3, 4 and 6. 
Portal Papers Box D Files 1, 2, 3 and 5. 
 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online 
 
Report from the Select Committee – Naval Discipline Act, (London: HMSO, 29 
October 1956). 
Special Report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, (London: 
HMSO, 11 August 1966).  
Special Report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill Session 1975-
76, (London: HMSO, 12 May 1976).  
 
Imperial War Museum – Sound Archive 
 
Admiral Sir Ben Bathurst, interviewed 2004, accession number 27084.  
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Peter Harding, interviewed September 2005, 
accession number 28418. 
Commandant Marion Mildred Kettlewell interviewed May 1998, accession number 
18220. 
Admiral Sir Julian Oswald, interviewed December 2004, accession number 27454. 
Captain Dermot Rhodes, interviewed June 2006, accession number 28678.  
 
Institute of Engineering and Technology – Caroline Haslett Papers 
 
NAEST 33/14.1 File 3 – Correspondence with Lady Cripps and Sir Stafford. 
NAEST 33/14.3 ‘Cripps 5’ – Correspondence with Lady Cripps and Sir Stafford. 
NAEST 33/8.4-9.2 General Correspondence.  
  
King’s College London - Liddell Hart Archive 
 
Barnett BG and H. 




London School of Economics – Markham Collection 
 
File 13-4 Post-war Organization and Women’s Employment. 
File 13-6 British Council Paris – Lectures. 
File 24-21 Committee on Women’s Services – Minutes and Agendas. 
File 24-22 Minutes of Evidence at Committee on Women’s Services. 
File 24-25 Miscellaneous Correspondence and Papers re Committee on Women’s 
Services. 




MO FR 1620 ‘ “After the War” Feelings in the WAAF’, 1 March 1943. 
MO FR 2117 Geoffrey Thomas, ‘Women at Work’, June 1944. 
MO FR 2213 ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’, Feb-Mar 1945. 
MO FR 2236 J. G. Ferraby, ‘Observations on the Reluctant Stork’, Apr 1945.  




ADM 1  Admiralty and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Correspondence 
and Papers. 
ADM 105  Admiralty and Predecessors: Office of the Director General of the 
Medical Department of the Navy and Predecessors: Miscellaneous. 
ADM 116  Admiralty: Record Office: Cases. 
ADM 167  Board of Admiralty: Minutes and Memoranda. 
ADM 205  Admiralty: Office of the First Sea Lord, later First Sea Lord and Chief of 
the Naval Staff: Correspondence and Papers. 
ADM 234  Admiralty and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Reference Books 
(BR Series). 
ADM 239 Admiralty and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Confidential 
Reference Books. 
ADM 299 Admiralty and Ministry of Defence: Naval Manpower Department and 
Predecessors: Complements of Ships and Establishments. 
 
AIR 2  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Registered Files. 
AIR 6  Air Board and Air Ministry, Air Council: Minutes and Memoranda. 
AIR 8  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Department of the Chief of the Air 
Staff: Registered Files. 
AIR 10 Ministry of Defence and Predecessors: Air Publications and Reports. 
AIR 14  Air Ministry: Bomber Command: Registered Files. 
AIR 19  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence, Air Department: Private Office 
Papers. 
AIR 20  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Papers Accumulated by the Air 
Historical Branch. 
AIR 24  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Records Books, 
Commands. 
AIR 29  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Records Books, 
Miscellaneous Units. 
AIR 30  Air Ministry: Submission Papers to Sovereign. 
Bibliography 
296 
AIR 32  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Flying Training Command and 
Technical Training Command: Registered Files and Reports. 
AIR 57  Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Flying Personnel Research 
Committee: Reports and Papers. 
AIR 72  Air Ministry: 'Air Ministry Orders'. 
AIR 75 Marshal Sir John Slessor: Papers. 
AIR 77  Air Ministry, Department of the Scientific Adviser, and Ministry of 
Defence, Department of the Chief Scientist (Royal Air Force): Reports. 
 
CAB 65  War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes (WM and CM Series). 
CAB 66  War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda (WP and CP Series). 
CAB 128  Cabinet: Minutes (CM and CC Series). 
CAB 129  Cabinet: Memoranda (CP and C Series). 
CAB 131  Cabinet: Defence Committee: Minutes and Papers (DO, D and DC 
Series). 
CAB 195  Cabinet Secretary's Notebooks. 
 
DEFE 4  Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes. 
DEFE 5  Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda. 
DEFE 7  Ministry of Defence Prior to 1964: Registered Files (General Series). 
DEFE 10  Ministry of Defence: Major Committees and Working Parties: Minutes 
and Papers. 
DEFE 11  Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files. 
DEFE 13  Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers'). 
DEFE 24  Ministry of Defence: Defence Secretariat Branches and their 
Predecessors: Registered Files. 
DEFE 49  Ministry of Defence: Navy Department, Naval Personnel (Pay) Division: 
Registered Files (NPP Series). 
DEFE 69  Ministry of Defence (Navy): Registered Files and Branch Folders. 
DEFE 70  Ministry of Defence (Army): Registered Files and Branch Folders. 
DEFE 71  Ministry of Defence (Air): Registered Files and Branch Folders.  
 
INF 2  Ministry of Information and Central Office of Information: Guard Books and 
Related Unregistered Papers. 
INF 12  Central Office of Information: Registered Files. 
INF 13  Ministry of Information and Central Office of Information: Posters and 
Publications. 
 
LAB 8  Ministry of Labour and Successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files 
(EM Series and Other Series). 
 
PREM 8 Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers 1945 - 1951. 
 
RG 23  Government Social Survey Department: Social Survey: Reports and Papers. 
RG 40   Central Office of Information, Social Survey Division: Social Survey: 
Registered Files.  
 
T  162  Treasury: Establishments Department: Registered Files (E Series). 




T 213  Treasury: Defence Personnel Division and Defence Overseas Personnel: 
Registered Files (DP, 2-DP and 2-DOP Series).  
 
WO 32  War Office and Successors: Registered Files (General Series). 
WO 163 War Office and Ministry of Defence and Predecessors: War Office 
Council, later War Office Consultative Council, Army Council, Army Board and 
Their Various Committees: Minutes and Papers. 
 
National Army Museum - Helen Gwynne-Vaughan Papers 
 
Box 9401-253-1 to 806. 
Box 9401-253-807 to 1584. 
Box 9401-253-1585 to 2067. 
 
National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth 
 
Accession number 1988.350.1-5, BR1077 Regulations and Instructions for the 
WRNS. 
Accession number 1988.350.28.1-26, Senior Women Officers Conferences.  
Accession number 1988.350.53-56, DWRNS Memoranda. 
Accession number 1988.350.57, WRNS Permanent Service Working Party.  
Accession number 1988.350.58-9, WRNS Officers. 
Accession number 1991.24.1-136, Fletcher book – source material. 
Accession number 2009.103.14, Judith Sherratt papers – recording of Commandant 
Vonla McBride speech, October 1978. 
 
Accession numbers 1988.350.18.1-60, 1988.350.99.4, 2007.15.4-16 and 110/91,  
The Wren, published by the Association of Wrens. 
 
Naval Review, published privately and quarterly, all issues 1978, 1988, 1989, 1992. 
Ricochet (pseudonym), 'Amazons at Sea', in Naval Review, Vol.82, No.3,1994, 
pp.221-3.  
 
National Museum of the Royal Naval Oral History Collection, Portsmouth 
 
Admiral Sir Peter Abbott interviewed by Katy Elliott, 7 July 2006, accession 
number 2006.67. 
Admiral Sir Brian Brown interviewed by Dr Chris Howard Bailey, 6 December 
1993, accession number 1993/456. 
Lord Archie Hamilton of Epsom interviewed by Katy Elliott, 4 July 2006, accession 
number 2006.65. 
Commandant Anthea Larken interviewed by Katy Elliott, 24 July 2006, accession 
number 2006.74. 
Captain Julia Massey, accession number 1999.29/1*4. 
Claire Taylor, accession number 1999.16/1*8. 







Naval Historical Branch – Admiralty Library 
 












ROY/1/1 Lord Royle Papers. 
ROY/1/2 Lord Royle Papers. 
ROY/1/3 Lord Royle Papers. 
 
Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service Archive, Institute of Naval 
Medicine, Alverstoke 
 
File 18 QARNNS 1981-84 (Journal of the Royal Naval Service, Vol.68, Winter 
1982). 
File 19 QARNNS 1985-89. 
File 20 QARNNS 1990-92. 
File 43 Operation Corporate I. 
File 44 Operation Corporate II. 
File 45 Operation Corporate III. 
File 46 Operation Corporate Diary. 
 
Royal Air Force Museum Hendon 
 
Air Publication 3234, The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force 1939-1945, Air Historical 
Branch, 1953. 
Escott Papers: Questionnaires for women serving 1939 – 1950. 
Dame Katherine Watson-Watts1 Papers: AC 72/17, Boxes 1-11. 
Woodhead/Welsh Papers, X002.5638. 
 
Privately Held Papers: 
 
Papers of Captain Caroline Coates 
 
Report of a Study into the Employment of Women's Royal Naval Service Personnel 




                                                 
1 Also known as Jane Trefusis Forbes. On the award of the title ‘Dame’, she adopted her first name of 
Katherine; Watson-Watts was her married name.  
Bibliography 
299 
Papers of Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson 
 
Letter from Air Vice Marshal Filbey, 1 May 2001. 
Letter from University of London Air Squadron, 5 November 1981. 
Letter from Under Secretary of State for the Armed Forces to Peter Mills MP, 30 
November 1981. 
 
Papers of Dame Felicity Peake 
Boxes 1-3 and 5-7. 
Grigg Committee. 
 




Margaret Aldred interviewed by author, 13 July 2007. 
Admiral Sir Brian Brown interviewed by author, 1 April 2010. 
Rear Admiral Roy Clare interviewed by author, 9 March 2011. 
Captain Caroline Coates interviewed by author, 22 June 2010. 
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, interviewed by author, 18 June 2007. 
Air Commodore Cynthia Fowler interviewed by author, 25 May 2007. 
Squadron Leader Helen Gardiner interviewed by author, 21 October 2011. 
Flight Lieutenant Julie Gibson, interviewed by author, 20 July 2010. 
Flight Lieutenant Dawn Hadlow, interviewed by author, 14 March 2012. 
Lord Archie Hamilton of Epsom interviewed by author, 6 April 2011. 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Peter Harding interviewed by author, 7 June 
2007. 
Commodore John Hart, interviewed by author, 7 June 2011. 
Air Vice Marshal Robert Honey, interviewed by author, 25 May 2011. 
Air Commodore Joan Hopkins, interviewed by the author, 18 and 19 May 2009. 
Baroness Howe of Idlicote, interviewed by author, 28 June 2007. 
Commandant Anthea Larken interviewed by author, 29 March 2010. 
Rear Admiral John Lippiett interviewed by the author, 4 April 2011. 
Captain Julia Massey, interviewed by author, 25 September 2009. 
Air Commodore Ruth Montague, interviewed by author, 29 August 2007. 
Commander Jackie Mulholland, interviewed by author, 14 November 2011. 
Flight Lieutenant Wendy Nichols, interviewed by author, 11 February 2012. 
Vice Admiral Sir Ned Purvis interviewed by author 15 June 2010. 
Air Commodore Helen Renton, interviewed by author, 3 July 2009. 
Commander Maggie Robbins, interviewed by author, 27 July 2011. 
Flight Lieutenant Jo Salter, interviewed by author, 20 September 2007. 
Freydis Sharland, interviewed by author, 8 May 2008. 
Captain Julia Simpson, interviewed by author, 13 August 2007. 
Lieutenant Commander Elaine Smith, interviewed by author 10 August 2010. 
Commandant Anne Spencer, interviewed by author, 12 January 2011. 
Air Commodore Joy Tamblin, interviewed by author, 26 May 2009. 
Flight Lieutenant Keren Watkins, interviewed by author, 21 October 2011. 
Admiral Lord Alan West of Spithead, interviewed by author, 5 June 2007. 
Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson, interviewed by author, 11 May 2011. 






Lord Archie Hamilton of Epsom, telephone interview, 17 May 2007. 




Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason (Air Secretary 1986 - 1989). 
Flight Lieutenant Malcolm McBeath (Course Commander, Basic Navigation 
Course). 





Armed Forces Pay Review Body Third Report, Cmnd.5631, (London: HMSO, 
February 1974). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Fourth Report, Cmnd.6063, (London: HMSO, May 
1975). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Seventh Report, Cmnd.7177, (London: HMSO, 31 
March 1978). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Ninth Report, Cmnd.7899, (London: HMSO, May 
1980). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Eleventh Report, Cmnd.8549, (London: HMSO, 
May 1982).  
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Seventeenth Report, Cm.357, (London: HMSO, 
April 1988). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Eighteenth Report, Cm.579, (London: HMSO, 
February 1989). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Nineteenth Report, Cm.936, (London: HMSO, 
February 1990). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twentieth Report, Cm.1414, (London: HMSO, 
January 1991). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twenty First Report, Cm.1815, (London: HMSO, 
February 1992).  
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twenty Second Report, Cm.2150, (London: HMSO, 
February 1993). 
Armed Forces Pay Review Body Twenty Third Report, Cm.2461, (London: HMSO, 
February 1994). 
 
The Battle for Output: Economic Survey for 1947, Cmd.7046, (London: HMSO, 
1947). 
Defence: Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd.124, (London: HMSO, April 1957). 
Marriage Bar in the Civil Service, Cmd.6886, (London: HMSO, August 1946).  
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for 1939-46, Cmd.7225, London: 
HMSO, September 1947). 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for the Year 1947, Cmd.7559, 
(London: HMSO, November 1948). 
Bibliography 
301 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for the Year 1949, Cmd.8017, 
(London: HMSO, August 1950). 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for the Year 1950, Cmd.8338, 
(London: HMSO, August 1951). 
Ministry of Labour and National Service: Report for the Year 1948, Cmd.7822, 
(London: HMSO, November 1949). 
Recruiting: Government Comments on Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Recruiting (Cmnd.545), Cmnd.570, (London: HMSO, November 1958). 
Report of the Advisory Committee on Recruiting, Cmnd.545, (London: HMSO, 
October 1958). 
Report of the Committee on Amenities and Welfare Conditions in the Three 
Women’s Services, Cmd.6384, (London: HMSO, 1942). 
Royal Commission on Equal Pay 1944-46 Report, Cmd.6937, (London: HMSO, 28 
October 1946). 
Royal Commission on Population – Report, Cmd.7695, (London: HMSO, June 
1949). 
Standing Reference on the Pay of the Armed Forces Third Report, Cmnd.4291 
(London: HMSO, February 1970). 
Statement Relating to Defence, Cmd.6743, (London: HMSO, February 1946). 
Statement Relating to Defence, Cmd.7042, (London: HMSO, February 1947). 
Statement Relating to Defence, 1948, Cmd.7327, (London: HMSO, February 1948). 
Statement on Defence, 1949, Cmd.7631, (London: HMSO, February 1949). 
Statement on Defence, 1950, Cmd.7895, (London: HMSO, March 1950). 
Defence Programme, Cmd.8146, (London: HMSO, January 1951). 
Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy estimates 
1951-52, Cmd.8160, (London: HMSO, February 1951). 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air to Accompany Air estimates 1951-52, 
Cmd.8162, (London: HMSO, February 1951). 
Standing Reference on the Pay of the Armed Forces Third Report, Cmnd.4291, 
(London: HMSO, February 1970). 
Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom, Cmd.6564, (London: 




Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) 
Conference Proceedings 
 
Major Deanne Brasseur, 'A Canadian Female CF-18 Pilot's Experience', in 
Recruiting, Selection, Training and Military Operations of Female Aircrew, 
AGARD Conference Proceedings No. 491, April 1990, (AGARD, August 1990), 
pp.2.1-2.5. 
R J Hicks, 'Female Aircrew - The Canadian Forces Experience', in Recruiting, 
Selection, Training and Military Operations of Female Aircrew, AGARD 
Conference Proceedings No. 491, April 1990, (AGARD, August 1990), pp.11.1-
11.6. 
Commander Linda Vaught Hutton, 'The Integration of Women into US Navy 
Aircrew Training and Squadron Assignments', in Recruiting, Selection, Training and 
Military Operations of Female Aircrew, AGARD Conference Proceedings No.491, 
April 1990, (AGARD, August 1990), pp.1.1-1.5. 
Bibliography 
302 
Recruiting, Selection, Training and Military Operations of Female Aircrew, 
AGARD Conference Proceedings No.491, April 1990, (AGARD, August 1990). 
G. M. Turner, RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine, 'The Application of USAF 
Female Anthropometric Data to Identify Problems with the Introduction of Female 
Aircrew into the RAF'', in Recruiting, Selection, Training and Military Operations 
of Female Aircrew, AGARD Conference Proceedings No.491, April 1990, 
(AGARD, August 1990), p.17.1-17.3. 
G. M. Turner, 'Some Equipment Problems Associated with the Introduction of 
Female Aircrew into the Royal Air Force, Advisory Group for Aerospace Research 
and Development, in Recruiting, Selection, Training and Military Operations of 
Female Aircrew, AGARD Conference Proceedings No.491, April 1990, (AGARD, 




House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.387, Col.766-770, 10 March 1943. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.391, Col.1072-1073, 22 July 1943. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.423, Col.1338, 30 May 1946. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.430, Col.859-863, 20 November 1946. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.435, Col.92-107, 17 March 1947. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.438, Col.1069-1075, 11 June 1947. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.568, Col.2006-7, 17 April 1957. 
House of Commons Debates, 5th Ser., Vol.703, Col.28, 30 November 1964. 
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.132, Col.197, 26 April 1988. 
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.138, Col.1107, 20 October 1988. 
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.159, Col.477w, 6 November 1989. 
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.165, Col.586-587w, 23 January 1990. 
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.166, Col.679-82 and 733-4, 5 February 
1990.  
House of Commons Debates, 6th Series, Vol.168, Col.291-292 and 315, 28 February 
1990.  




Air Force List, (London: HMSO), 1948, 1949, 1950, 1954, 1955, 1976, 1989 and 
1990 editions. 
Annual Abstract of Statistics, Vols.88 (1938 – 1950), 90 (1953), 92 (1955), 93 
(1956), 98 (1961), 103 (1966), 106 (1969), 108 (1971), 113 (1976), 117 (1981), 122 
(1986), 127 (1991) and 132 (1996), (London: HMSO).  
Central Statistical Office, Fighting with Figures: a Statistical Digest of the Second 
World War, (London: Central Statistical Office, 1995). 
C. G. Burge (ed), ‘The Women’s Auxiliary Air Force’, The Royal Air Force 
Quarterly, Vol.16, 1944-45, pp. 214-216. 
C. G. Burge (ed), ‘White Paper on Post-War Pay, Allowances and Service pensions 
and Gratuities for Members of the Forces below Officer Rank’, The Royal Air Force 
Quarterly, Vol.17, 1945-46, pp.111-116. 
C. G. Burge (ed), ‘Post-War Code of Pay, Allowances, Retired Pay and Service 




Employment Gazette, Vol.94, No.5, (London: HMSO, 1986). 
Employment Gazette, Vol.98, No.5, (London: HMSO, 1990). 
Employment Gazette, Vol.98, No.12 (London: HMSO, 1990). 
Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1990, (London: HMSO, 1990).  
Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1991, (London: HMSO, 1991).  
Equal Opportunities Commission, Annual Report 1992, (London: HMSO, 1992).  
Hansard Society, Women at the Top, (London: Hansard Society, January 1990). 
Ministry of Defence, 'Air Publication 3003: A Brief History of the Royal Air Force',  
(London: HMSO, 2004). 
Ministry of Information, Roof over Britain: the Official Story of Britain’s Anti-
Aircraft Defences 1939-42 (London: HMSO, 1943). 
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Recruitment of Women for Industry, 
(London: HMSO, 1947).  
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Careers for Men and Women: His 
Majesty’s Forces, No.22, (London: HMSO, 1947).  
Ministry of Labour and National Service, A Short Guide to the Factories Act 1937 
and 1948, (London: HMSO, 1949).  
Ministry of Labour and National Service, Careers for Men and Women: His 
Majesty's Forces, (London: HMSO, 1950). 
National Audit Office, 'Ministry of Defence: Control and Use of Manpower', 
(London: HMSO, April 1989).  
Navy List, (London: HMSO), 1985, 1990, 2003, 2004 and 2005 editions. 
Squadron Leader M Redmore, 'Female Aircrew in the Royal Air Force', in Royal Air 
Force '90, (an RAF publication), pp.6-8. 
RN Broadsheet, 'Recruiting Facts and Figures', 1987. 
Standing Joint Committee of Women’s Organisations, Working Women Discuss – 
Population, Equal Pay and Domestic Work, (London: Victoria House Printing 




Air Commodore Barbara Cooper, 'Women and Air Power', Royal United Services 
Institute, 30 Nov 2011. 
Wing Commander Suraya Marshall, biography in Royal United Services Institute, 
'Women in Defence and Security Leadership Conference, programme p.14, 30 Nov 
2011. 
Kate Orr, and Paton Fiona, 'Women in the Armed Forces: Britain in Comparative 
Perspective', British Military Studies Group 1991. 
Commander Liz Walmsley, 'From Integration to Inclusion - Realizing the Full 





Newspapers and Periodicals: 
 




Evening Standard, (London), 4 and 5 March 1992. 
Navy News, Published Monthly, Issues 1975-1994. 
News of the World, 18 February 1951. 
RAF News, Published Fortnightly, Issues 1979-1982, August 1988 and 1989 - 1994. 
Spare Rib, Numbers 1 -238, July 1972 - October/November 1992. 
Star Daily. 




The Manchester Guardian. 
The News (Portsmouth), 6 Feb 1990, 7 Feb 1990, 12 Feb 1990 and 16 Feb 1990. 
The Sun. 
The Times. 
Western Morning News (Plymouth), 6 Feb 1990, 7 Feb 1990, 10 Feb 1990, and  




Peter Elliott, ‘The RAF’s First Women Pilots’, Air Clues, May 1990, pp. 170-174. 
 
Other Contemporary Published Sources: 
 
Lettice Curtis, Lettice Curtis: Her Autobiography (Walton on Thames: Red Kite, 
2004). 
Paddy Gregson, Ten Degrees Below Seaweed: A True Story of World War II Boats' 
Crew Wrens (Braunton Devon: Merlin Books, 1993). 
Helen Gwynne-Vaughan, Service with the Army, (London: Hutchinson, 1942). 
Gilbert Hackforth-Jones, Life in the Navy Today: A Young Man's Guide to All 
Branches of the Royal Navy (London: Cassell and Company Ltd, 1957). 
J. Hammerton, ABC of the RAF: Handbook for all Branches of the RAF (London: 
Amalgamated Press, 1943 edition). 
J. Hammerton (ed.), The Book of the WAAF: a Practical Guide to the Women’s 
Branch of the RAF (London: Amalgamated Press, 1942). 
Robert T. Herres, Women in Combat: The Presidential Commission on the 
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces (Washington, New York and London: 
Brassey's (US), 1993). 
Major General Jeanne Holm, Women in the Military: an Unfinished Revolution 
(Novato, Ca: Presidio, 1992 edition). 
Roger Jowell, and Witherspoon Sharon (eds.), British Social Attitudes: The 1985 
Report (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1985). 
Roger Jowell, Witherspoon Sharon, and Brook Lindsay (eds.), British Social 
Attitudes: The Fifth Report (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1988). 
Bibliography 
305 
Roger Jowell, Witherspoon Sharon, Brook Lindsay, and Taylor with Bridget (eds.), 
British Social Attitudes: The Seventh Report (Aldershot: Gower Publishing 
Company Limited, 1990). 
Linda Kitson, The Falklands War: A Visual Diary (London: Mitchell Beazley 
Publishers, 1982). 
John Lippiett, War and Peas: Intimate Letters from the Falklands War 1982 
(Bosham: Pistol Post Publications, 2007). 
Christian Lamb, I Only Joined for the Hat: Redoubtable Wrens at War - Their 
Trials, Tribulations and Triumphs, (London: Bene Factum Publishing, 2007). 
Julia Massey, ‘A Day in SS Uganda at the Falkland Islands’, in Claire Taylor (ed.), 
Nursing in the Senior Service 1902-2002, (Gosport: QARNNS Association, 2002). 
Vera Laughton Mathews, Blue Tapestry (London: Hollis and Carter, 1948). 
Vonla McBride, Never at Sea: Life in the WRNS (Reading: Educational Explorers, 
1966). 
Anne Mettam, 'The Flying Nightingales’, in A.E. Ross (ed.), Through Eyes of Blue: 
Personal Memories of the RAF from 1918 (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 2002), 
pp.164-167. 
Air Commodore R. M. B. Montague, ‘Women in the RAF’, in Tony Ross (ed.), 75 
Eventful Years: A Tribute to the Royal Air Force (London: Lockturn, 1993), pp.225-
229. 
National Union of Seamen, British Shipping: Heading for the Rocks (London: 
National Union of Seamen, 1982). 
Felicity Peake, Pure Chance, (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 1993). 
General Sir Frederick Pile, Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence against Air Attack (London: 
George G. Harrap, 1949). 
Vivienne Reynolds, Elizabeth Saxon, and Helen Renton, Service Women: A 
Personal Introduction to Careers in the WRNS, WRAC and WRAF (Reading: 
Educational Explorers, 1977). 
A. E. Ross (ed.), Through Eyes of Blue: Personal Memories of the RAF from 1918 
(Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing 2002). 
Tony Ross (ed.), 75 Eventful Years: A Tribute to the Royal Air Force (London: 
Lockturn, 1993). 






Louis le Bailly, From Fisher to the Falklands (London: Marine Management 
(Holdings) Ltd, 1991). 
Diana Barnato-Walker, Spreading My Wings (London: Grub Street, 2003). 
Roland Beamont, Fighter Test Pilot: From Hurricane to Tornado (Wellingborough: 
Patrick Stephens, 1986). 
K. B. Beauman, Partners in Blue: the Story of Women’s Service with the Royal Air 
Force (London: Hutchinson, 1971). 
Caitriona Beaumont, 'The Women's Movement, Politics and Citizenship, 1918-
1950s', in Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (ed.), Women in Twentieth-Century Britain 
(Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001), pp.262-77. 
Aaron Belkin, and Geoffrey Bateman (eds.), Don't Ask Don't Tell: Debating the Gay 
Ban in the Military (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
Bibliography 
306 
Martin Binkin and Shirley J. Bach, Women and the Military (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1977). 
Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-
Century Warfare (Great Britain: Basic Books, 1999). 
British Maritime League, British Owned Merchant Shipping: Flagging Out? Or 
Selling Out? (London: British Maritime League, 1984). 
British Maritime League, The Continuing Headlong Decline in the UK Registered 
Merchant Fleet (London: British Maritime League, 1988). 
D. K. Brown, A Century of Naval Construction: The History of the Royal Corps of 
Naval Constructors 1883 -1983 (London: Conway Maritime Press Ltd, 1983). 
D. K. Brown, and George Moore, Rebuilding the Royal Navy: Warship Design since 
1945 (London: Chatham Publishing, 2003). 
Marion Browning, Allan Cameron, Alan Cullen, Barrie Sanderson and Bill Wragge, 
Uganda: the Story of a Very Special Ship (Exeter: SS Uganda Trust, 1998). 
David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 1900 - 
2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, eighth edition, 2000). 
Guiseppe Caforio (ed.), Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor (sic) of 
Charles C. Moskos (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd, 2009). 
Angus Calder and Dorothy Sheldon, Speak for Yourself: a Mass Observation 
Anthology 1937-49 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984).  
Cynthia Cockburn, Brothers: Male Dominance and Technological Change (London: 
Pluto Press, 1983). 
Cynthia Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women's Activism and Feminist 
Analysis (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007). 
Stuart A. Cohen (ed.), Democratic Societies and Their Armed Forces: Israel in 
Comparative Context (London and Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2000). 
Stuart A Cohen (ed.), The New Citizen Armies: Israel's Armed Forces in 
Comparative Perspective (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
David Coleman, ‘Population and Family’, in A.H. Halsey and Josephine Webb 
(eds.), Twentieth-Century British Social Trends (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 
pp.27-93. 
David Coleman, and Salt John, The British Population: Patterns, Trends and 
Processes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
R. W. Connell, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). 
R. W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press, second edition, 2005). 
Christopher Dandeker, 'On "The Need to be Different": Recent Trends in Military 
Culture', in Hew Strachan (ed.), The British Army: Manpower and Society into the 
Twenty-First Century (London and Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.173-87. 
Michael Davies, Belief in the Sea: State Encouragement of British Merchant 
Shipping (London: Lloyd's of London Press, 1992). 
Gerard J. DeGroot, 'Introduction: Arms and the Woman', in Gerard J. DeGroot and 
Corinna Peniston-Bird (eds.), A Soldier and a Woman: Sexual Integration in the 
Military (Harlow: Longman, 2000), pp.3-17. 
Gerard J. DeGroot and Corinna Peniston-Bird (eds.), A Soldier and a Woman: 
Sexual Integration in the Military (Harlow: Longman, 2000). 
Cathy Downes, 'Great Britain', in Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (eds.), The 
Military: More than Just a Job? (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp.153-76.  
Cherry Drummond, The Remarkable Life of Victoria Drummond Marine Engineer 
(London: Institute of Marine Engineers, 1994). 
Bibliography 
307 
John D. Drummond, Blue for a Girl: The Story of the W.R.N.S.' (London: W. H. 
Allen, 1960). 
Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives 
(London: Pandora, 1988 edition). 
Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives 
(London: California University Press, 2000). 
Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War 
(London: University of California Press, 1993). 
Beryl E. Escott, The Heroines of SOE F Section: Britain's Secret Women in France 
(Stroud: The History Press, 2010). 
Beryl E. Escott, Our Wartime Days: The WAAF  in World War II (Stroud: Alan 
Sutton Publishing, 1995). 
Beryl E. Escott, The WAAF: A History of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force in the 
Second World War (Princes Risborough, Bucks: Shire Publications, 2003). 
Beryl E. Escott, Women in Air Force Blue: The Story of Women in the Royal Air 
Force from 1918 to the Present Day (Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: Patrick 
Stephens, 1989). 
Warren Farrell, Steven Svoboda and James Sterba, Does Feminism Discriminate 
against Men?: A Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
M. H. Fletcher, The WRNS: A History of the Women's Royal Naval Service 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989). 
Andrew Flinn and Harriet Jones (eds.), Freedom of Information. Open Access, 
Empty Archives? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
M. R. D. Foot, SOE in France: an Account of the Work of the British Special 
Operations Executive in France 1940 - 1944 (London: Frank Cass Publishers 
Whitehall History Publishing, 2004 edition). 
Nigel Fountain (consulting editor), Voices from the Twentieth Century: Women at 
War (London: Michael O'Mara Books Ltd, 2005 edition). 
Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume II 
War and Diplomacy (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 
David French, Army, Empire, and Cold War: the British Army and Military Policy, 
1945-1971 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the 
British People, C.1870-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Norman Friedman, The Post-war Naval Revolution (London: Conway Maritime 
Press, 1986). 
Nancy Loring Goldman (ed.), Female Soldiers - Combatants or Non-combatants? 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Greenwood Press, 1982). 
Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and 
Vice Versa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II 
(London: Bodley Head, 1987). 
E. J. Gubbins, Implications in the Decline of the British Merchant Navy 
(Loughborough: Loughborough University of Technology, 1991). 
Sally Hacker, Pleasure, Power and Technology: Some Tales of Gender, Engineering 
and the Cooperative Workplace (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
A.H. Halsey and Josephine Webb (eds.), Twentieth-Century British Social Trends 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
Bibliography 
308 
Kathleen Harland, A History of Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service 
(Published by The Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service, 1990). 
Brian Harrison, Finding a Role? The United Kingdom 1970-1990, The New Oxford 
History of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role. The United Kingdom 1951-1970, The New Oxford 
History of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
P. E. Hart, Youth Unemployment in Great Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
Keith Hayward (ed.), British Aviation 1908-2008: Towards the Second Century of 
British Powered Flight (London: Royal Aeronautical Society, 2008). 
Peter Hennessy, Having It So Good: Britain in the Fifties (London: Allen Lane, 
2006). 
Paul R. Higate (ed.), Military Masculinities: Identity and the State (London and 
Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 2003). 
Margaret R. Higonnet, and Patrice L.-R. Higonnet, 'The Double Helix', in Margaret 
R. Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel and Margaret Collins Weitz (eds.),  Behind 
the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1987), pp.31-47. 
Margaret R. Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel and Margaret Collins Weitz 
(eds.), Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1987). 
Molly Izzard, A Heroine in Her Time: a Life of Dame Helen Gwynne-Vaughan 
1879-1967, (London: Macmillan, 1969). 
Louise A. Jackson, Women Police: Gender, Welfare and Surveillance in the 
Twentieth Century (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006). 
C. G. Jefford, Observers and Navigators: and Other Non-pilot Aircrew in the RFC, 
RNAS and RAF (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing, 2001). 
Bettyann Holtzman Kevles, Almost Heaven: The Story of Women in Space 
(Cambridge Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 2006). 
Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth 
and Twenty-First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
Jonathan S. Kitchen, The Employment of Merchant Seamen (London: Croom Helm, 
1980). 
Elizabeth Knowles (ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009, 7th edition). 
Tony Lane, Grey Dawn Breaking: British Merchant Seafarers in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). 
Celia Lee and Paul Edward Strong (eds.), Women in War: from Home Front to 
Front Line (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2012). 
Nina E. Lerman, Ruth Oldenziel, and Arwen P. Mohun, Gender and Technology: A 
Reader (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
Donald MacKenzie, and Judy Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology 
(Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999, 2nd edition). 
Mona Macmillan, 'Camp Followers: A Note on Wives of the Armed Services', in 
Hilary Callen and Shirley Ardener (eds.), The Incorporated Wife (London: Croom 
Helm, 1984), pp.89-105. 
Ursula Stuart Mason, Britannia's Daughters: the Story of the WRNS (Barnsley: Pen 
and Sword Books, 2011). 
Ursula Stuart Mason, The Wrens 1917-77: A History of the Women's Royal Naval 
Service (Reading: Educational Explorers 1977). 
Bibliography 
309 
Susan McRae, Maternity Rights in Britain: the PSI Report on the Experience of 
Women and Employers (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1991). 
Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (eds.), The 
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (eds.), The Military: More than Just a Job? 
(London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). 
Kate Muir, Arms and the Woman (Sevenoaks: Coronet Books - Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1993). 
Georgina Natzio, 'Homeland Defence: British Gunners, Women and Ethics during 
the Second World War', in Celia Lee and Paul Edward Strong (eds.), Women in 
War: from Home Front to Front Line (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2012), 
pp.87-100. 
Ginny Neville, Alice Pennicott, Joanna Williams and Ann Worrall, Women in the 
Workforce: The Effect of the Demographic Changes in the 1990s (London: The 
Industrial Society, 1990). 
Lucy Noakes, War and the British: Gender, Memory and National Identity (London 
and New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1998). 
Lucy Noakes, Women in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex, 1907-1948 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 
Ruth Oldenziel, Making Technology Masculine: Men, Women and Modern 
Machines in America 1870 – 1945 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
1999). 
Michael J. Oliver, 'Researching Contemporary Monetary History', in Andrew Flinn 
and Harriet Jones (eds.), Freedom of Information. Open Access, Empty Archives? 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
Reina Pennington, Wings, Women and War: Soviet Airwomen in World War II 
Combat (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 
Brian Philpott, Eject! Eject! (London: Ian Allen, 1989). 
Martin Pugh, Women and the Women's Movement in Britain, 1914-1999 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000 2nd edition). 
D. Richards, Portal of Hungerford: the Life of Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
Viscount Portal of Hungerford (London: Heinemann, 1977). 
L. V. Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Government: The Politics and Policy of 
National Service 1945-51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
David R. Segal, Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower 
Policy (Lawrence Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989). 
James J. Sheehan, The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War 
(London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 2007). 
Suzanne J. Stark, Female Tars: Women Aboard Ship in the Age of Sail (London: 
Pimlico, 1998). 
Hew Strachan (ed.), The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First 
Century (London and Portland Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000). 
Penny Summerfield and Corinna Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence: Men, 
Women and the Home Guard in the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007). 
Penny Summerfield, Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives: Discourse and 
Subjectivity in Oral Histories of the Second World War, (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
Bibliography 
310 
Claire Taylor (ed.), Nursing in the Senior Service 1902-2002: Personal Histories of 
Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service (Gosport: QARNNS Association, 
2002). 
John Terraine, The Right of the Line: the Royal Air Force in the European War 
1939-1945, (Sevenoaks: Sceptre, 1988). 
Christopher Terrill, HMS Brilliant: In a Ship's Company (London: BBC Books, 
1995). 
Roy Terry, Women in Khaki: the Story of the British Woman Soldier, (London: 
Columbus Books, 1988). 
Pat Thane, 'Women Since 1945', in Paul Johnson (ed.), Twentieth Century Britain: 
Economic, Social and Cultural Change (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1994).  
Lesley Thomas, and Chris Howard Bailey, WRNS in Camera: The Women's Royal 
Naval Service in the Second World War (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2002). 
Martin van Crefeld, The Culture of War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008). 
Martin van Crefeld, Men, Women and War (London: Cassell, 2001). 
Martin van Crefeld, On Future War (London: Brassey's (UK), 1991).  
Martin van Crefeld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
Martin van Crefeld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (London & 
New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1989). 
Martin van Crefeld, 'Women in the Military: Gain or Regression', in Stuart A. Cohen 
(ed.), Democratic Societies and Their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context 
(London and Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2000), pp.135-149. 
Judy Wajcman, Feminism Confronts Technology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
Clare Walker, 'Aviation is Still a Man's World', in Keith Hayward (ed.), British 
Aviation 1908-2008: Towards the Second Century of British Powered Flight 
(London: Royal Aeronautical Society, 2008), pp.64-65. 
Diane Barnato Walker, Spreading My Wings (London: Grub Street, 2003). 
Rachel N. Weber, 'Manufacturing Gender in Military Cockpit Design', in Donald 
MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology  
(Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1999), pp.372-381. 
Laurie Weinstein, and Christie C. White (eds.), Wives and Warriors: Women and the 
Military in the United States and Canada (Westport, Connecticut and London: 
Bergin and Garvey, 1997). 
Rachel Woodward and Trish Winter, Sexing the Soldier: The Politics of Gender and 
the Contemporary British Army (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 
Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (ed.), Women in Twentieth-Century Britain (Harlow: 




Tarak Barkawi, Christopher Dandeker, Melissa Wells-Petry, and Elizabeth Kier, 
'Rights and Fights: Sexual Orientation and Military Effectiveness,' International 
Security, Vol.24, No.1, 1999, pp.181-201. 
Jeanne Boydston, 'Gender as a Question of Historical  Analysis,' Gender and 
History, Vol.20, No.3, November 2008, pp.558-83. 
D'Ann Campbell, 'Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United 
States, Great Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union', Journal of Military History, 
Vol.57, No.2, April 1993, pp.301-23. 
Joan Chandler, Lyn Bryant and Tracey Bunyard, 'Women in Military Occupations', 
Bibliography 
311 
Work, Employment and Society, Vol.9, No.1, March 1995, pp.123-35. 
Jeremy Crang, ' "Come into the Army, Maud": Women, Military Conscription, and 
the Markham Inquiry', Defence Studies, Vol.8, No.3, September 2008, pp.381-95. 
Jeremy Crang, 'The Revival of the British Women's Auxiliary Services in the Late 
Nineteen-Thirties,' Historical Research, Vol.83, No.220, May 2010, pp.343-57. 
Christopher Dandeker, 'New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on 
the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies,' 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol.45, No.4, 1994, pp.637-54. 
Christopher Dandeker and Mady Wechsler Segal, 'Gender Integration in the Armed 
Forces: Recent Policy Developments in the United Kingdom', Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol.23, No.1, Fall 1996, pp.29-47. 
Gerard J. DeGroot, 'Whose Finger on the Trigger? Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries', 
War in History, Vol.4, No.4, 1997, pp.434-53. 
T. L. Ditz, ‘The New Men's History and the Peculiar Absence of Gendered Power: 
Some Remedies from Early American Gender History', Gender and History, Vol.16, 
No.1, April 2004, pp.1-35. 
Helen McCarthy, ‘Petticoat Diplomacy: the Admission of Women to the British 
Foreign Service, c. 1919-1946’, Twentieth Century British History, Vol.20, No.3, 
2009, pp.285-321. 
S. J. Palmer, 'The Impact of the Gas Turbine on the Design of Major Surface 
Warships', Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, No.116, 1974, pp.1-
11. 
R. R. Pierson, ‘Beautiful Soul or Just Warrior: Gender and War’, Gender and 
History, Vol.1, No.1, Spring 1989, pp. 77-86. 
Jutta Schwarzkopf, 'Combatant or Non-Combatant? The Ambiguous Status of 
Women in British Anti-Aircraft Batteries During the Second World War', War and 
Society, Vol.28, No.2, October 2009, pp.105-31. 
A. Scott and W. Garthine, ‘Gender, Change and Periodisation’, Gender and History, 
Vol.20, No.3, November 2008, pp. 453-62. 
Joan W. Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', American 
Historical Review, Vol.91, No.5, December 1986, pp.1053-75. 
Mady Wechsler Segal, 'Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and 
Future', Gender and Society, Vol.9, No.6, December 1995, pp.757-75. 
A. J. Sims, 'The Habitability of Naval Ships under Wartime Conditions', 
Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, No.87, 1945, pp.50-70. 
Hugh Smith, 'Women in the Australian Defence Force: in Line for the Front Line?', 
The Australian Quarterly, Vol.62, No.2, Winter 1990, pp.125-44. 
Sandra Carson Stanley, and Mady Wechsler Segal, 'Military Women in NATO: An 
Update', Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1988, pp.559-85. 
Tessa Stone, 'Creating a (Gendered?) Military Identity: the Women's Auxiliary Air 
Force in Great Britain in World War II', Women's History Review, Vol.8, No.4, 
1999, pp.605-24. 
M. Vincent, ‘Introduction [to Gender and War Issue]’, Contemporary European 
History, Vol.10, No.3, 2001, pp. 345-51. 
Margaret Vining, and Barton C. Hacker, 'From Camp Follower to Lady in Uniform: 
Women, Social Class and Military Institutions before 1920', Contemporary 
European History, Vol.10, No.3, 2001, pp.353-73. 
Judy Wajcman, 'Addressing Technological Change: The Challenge to Social 
Theory', Current Sociology, No.50, 2002, pp.347-63. 
Bibliography 
312 
E. H. Watts, 'Crews' Accommodation in Tramp Ships', Transactions of the 
Institution of Naval Architects, No.87 (1945), pp.29-49. 
Rachel N. Weber, 'Manufacturing Gender in Commercial and Military Cockpit 
Design', Science, Technology and Human Values, Vol.22, No.2, Spring 1997, 
pp.235-53. 
 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (www.oxforddnb.com): 
 
Citrine, revised by Eleanor Putnam Symons, 'Haslett, Dame Caroline Harriet (1895-
1957)'. 
Tessa Stone, 'Forbes, Dame (Katherine) Jane Trefusis (1899-1971)'. 
Lesley Thomas, 'Mathews, Dame Elvira Sibyl Maria Laughton (1888-1959)'. 




Jennifer Margaret Gould, 'The Women's Corps: The Establishment of Women's 
Military Services in Britain', PhD Thesis, University of London, 1988. 
Air Commodore N H Mills, 'Women in the Service - Do We Tap Their Full 
Potential?', Royal College of Defence Studies Research Paper, 1987. 
Tessa Stone, 'The Integration of Women into a Military Service: The Women's 
Auxiliary Air Force in the Second World War', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 
1998. 
 










www.mod.gov.uk   
www.oxfordscholarship.com 
www.rafa.org.uk 
www.raf.mod.uk/history 
